Rethinking Existing Paradigms: Public Intellectuals In Action

Asia Leadership Fellow Program 2001 Report

International House of Japan
Japan Foundation Asia Center

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Korean and Japanese names are written in the native manner-surnames followed by given names.

Contents

Note from the editor

The Asia Leadership Fellow Program (ALFP) is one of many programs initiated and conducted by private and public-funded organisations in Japan in the name of intellectual exchange. Indeed, there seem to be so many, it can be confusing as to which one is which. Certainly though, in the case of the ALFP, it was initiated by the International House of Japan and the Japan Foundation Asia Center during the 1990s when both organisations widened their scope to contribute to the networking of intellectuals in Asia. Their decision has benefited many individuals including me whose privilege it has been to participate in ALFP 2001 and to edit this publication.

An important aspect of the Program is the time taken by Fellows to develop their thoughts on individually proposed topics at the program's outset. As such, the report begins with the Profiles and Papers of the Fellows. The papers may appear very different, even disparate – some are papers 'proper', others are action plans, some are in between - but they were tightened for the public symposium at the end of the Program and unified under the theme of 'Rethinking Existing Paradigms: Public Intellectuals in Action'. The Summary of Activities about the visits made and workshops attended perhaps best shows the character of the ALFP. Included as well is the outline proposal of our group project, initially titled 'Remapping Migration: A Case Study Linking Research and Media'. Concluding remarks are by Dr Huang Ping who is, we were unanimous, the most experienced and adept in intellectual exchange programmes. At any rate, he wears the right glasses! (Ping, you should know, has a very lively sense of humour too.) He has also kindly contributed, in the appendix, an enlightening and updated essay about the definitions of a public intellectual. Finally, there is a full list of the resource people and program people who are responsible - and deserve due credit - for the Program.

If I can just add, it must be very difficult to select and manage Fellows each year. Personalities and preferences; intelligences and egos; karaoke singers and non-karaoke singers! The mind boggles at how people are chosen. They speak in different languages too although English is a prerequisite. And yet somehow, we all managed to get along, and get along well.

My gratitude to all who run the ALFP - it allowed me the extraordinary luxury of reading, writing, talking and thinking for two months - and to my Fellow friends who very kindly allowed me to make all necessary editing decisions.

Ann Lee (ALFP 2001 Fellow)
Kuala Lumpur, July 2002

Foreword

Since inception in 1996, the Asia Leadership Fellow Program has been operating in a most crucial time, one when both the positive and negative effects of globalisation have begun to be apparent within the world community.

With the advancement of information technology and market integration, economic and social borders have been disappearing and communication has been eased. However, at the same time, the gap between the so-called 'winners' and the 'losers' has been widening, and problems springing from contradictions in development strategies, ethnic disputes or poverty have often led to hatred and violence.

Under such circumstances, exchange and dialogue among Asian 'public intellectuals' with a strong commitment to building an equitable civil society within the region are increasingly important. What can be done in order to maintain justice, fairness and egalitarianism in civil society? Now more than ever, it is essential for people in the region to recognise and respect each other's cultural backgrounds and value systems. A more robust discourse among Asian intellectuals from a variety of different disciplines and perspectives should further promote common understanding and deeper engagement at the regional level.

The Asia Leadership Fellow Program was designed to provide such opportunities for intellectual leaders from the region to meet for a period of two to three months, living and spending time together to discuss issues pertinent to them. Although the Fellows come to Japan with individual topics for research, the uniqueness of this Program lies in the collaborative interaction among the Fellows as they participate in field trips, workshops and seminars, thus sharing concerns and different viewpoints through common experience. It is hoped that, based on their efforts to understand what lies behind problems and to rethink existing paradigms, a wide network of Asian public intellectuals can go on to generate regional and transnational forums for coming up with new ideas to alleviate problems.

Once again, for the year 2001, the Program brought together seven Fellows who are outstanding leaders in their respective fields, tackling various social problems within Asia. Through workshops and seminars, as well as visits to various localities and organisations, each Fellow shared his or her interests and spent many hours with one another, discussing topics of common concern.

Although most of the activities took place at the International House of Japan in Tokyo, the Fellows made two four-day field trips in order to visit smaller cities and rural areas, and to meet the local people. Upon request of the Fellows, the Atomic Bomb Museum in Nagasaki was chosen as one of the places to visit. After spending a few hours at the museum and receiving briefings on the peace

movement in Nagasaki, the Fellows began discussing reasons why the Japanese "did not retaliate against violence with violence". This was one of the moments during the Program when the Fellows looked into issues much deeper than the organisers had anticipated.

The tragic incident at the World Trade Center on September 11, which occurred in the middle of the Fellowship period, also triggered heated discussions interpreting the causes of the tragedy – including the roles and responsibilities of the mass media in disseminating information.

Towards the end of the two-month Program, the Fellows took the initiative to set up a project about an issue that they believe will have a major impact on the region within the next five to ten years: migration. In this project, the Fellows will review the situation in their respective countries, taking a closer look at problems on a transnational level, and then produce media kits for better understanding and effective dissemination of information.

Their concern to link research with media is to explore opportunities whereby public intellectuals, their research and ideas do not remain in 'ivory towers' but rather reach the public and generate debate. The co-organisers of the Program, the International House of Japan and the Japan Foundation Asia Center, highly appreciate the efforts of the Fellows in initiating this project; their collaborative interaction is significant in making the sixth year of the Program a great success.

We would also like to acknowledge the generous cooperation of the many people who have assisted the Program by participating in the seminars and retreat conference, or by warmly receiving the group when being visited. It is hoped that this publication, which Ann Lee - one of the Fellows - kindly agreed to edit, will provide readers with some knowledge of what took place during the Asia Leadership Fellow Program 2001. It is also hoped that the Program will contribute to building the peace and happiness of the regional community through its extensive network of Asian intellectuals built up over the years, including this year in which the International House of Japan celebrates its 50th anniversary and the Japan Foundation its 30th.

International House of Japan
Japan Foundation Asia Center
Tokyo, July 2002

Profiles of the ALFP 2001 Fellows

Huang Ping (China)
Research Professor and Deputy Director, Institute of Sociology, Chinese Academy of Social Sciences

Having received his Ph.D. from LSE, University of London, Dr Huang is an internationally acclaimed sociologist. As an erudite scholar, he has written numerous books and papers in the field of the social sciences. In his empirical studies of contemporary Chinese society, he attempts to re-examine the validity of Western conceptional frameworks in the social sciences. Through various UN-related activities, he explores the application and implementation of theoretical studies and research into action.

David M. Celdran (Philippines)
Director for Current Affairs, ABS-CBN News Channel

Mr Celdran is a well-known broadcast journalist and producer. As programming head of the Current Affairs division of Philippines' biggest news organisation, he is in charge of the programming and production of the channel's talk and debate programmes. He plays a pivotal role in the nation's reform of the TV community as a member of the Philippine Center for Investigative Journalism. Through his prominence as a TV journalist, he perceives the powerful influences of TV media in the formation of human perceptions.

Ann Lee (Malaysia)
Managing & Artistic Director, The Kuali Group

Ms Lee is a writer, director, producer, performer, broadcaster, lecturer, and co-founder of Kuali Works, Malaysia's all-women arts company that specialises in theatre, television and publications. Following a career in advertising, she has worked closely with arts practitioners, organisations and sponsors in Malaysia–both private and public, national and international–to facilitate the practice and appreciation of the arts in Malaysia. She is also immediate past Chairperson of the PT Foundation, an HIV/AIDS organisation working with marginalised groups such as transsexuals, drug users and sex workers.

Mahendra P Lama (India)
Professor of South Asian Economies, Jawaharlal Nehru University

Dr Lama, a distinguished social scientist, specialises in economic development and cooperation in South Asia. While teaching economic cooperation and integration in South Asia and India's Foreign Economic Policy, he does extensive research with distinct policy slants. He was the member from India of the Independent Expert Group set up by the South Asian Association for Regional Co-operation (SAARC). He is also the Economic Adviser to the Government of Sikkim at Minister of State rank and the author of the much acclaimed *Sikkim Human Development Report 2001.*

Ryu Jeong Soon (Korea)
President, Korea Research & Consulting Institute on Poverty

Dr Ryu is a reputed scholar and an influential NGO activist in the field of social welfare. Her scholarly achievements have gained worldwide recognition. In particular, her research on "Poverty Problems in Korea after the Foreign Currency Crisis" triggered repercussions in Korean society, thereby leading to government welfare policy reform. In close partnership with NGOs, she monitors government policy and provides reference materials for social welfare policy improvement.

Anek Nakabutara (Thailand)
Executive Director, Social Fund Office

Mr Anek is an expert in rural planning and development. As a former UNDP officer, he was instrumental in establishing the Social Fund Office. Its chief objective is to administer social investment funds from the World Bank in order to mitigate various social problems in Thailand. His long-time dedicated efforts to improve Thai society are highly recognised. Due to his contribution, he was nominated as a representative to America from Southeast Asian countries in 1996.

Shimada Kazuyuki
Editorial Writer, Asahi Shimbun

As a journalist for the Asahi Shimbun, one of the major daily newspapers in Japan, Mr Shimada is chiefly concerned with regional security cooperation in Asia. While a correspondent to Washington and London, he wrote many articles, focusing especially upon disarmament and international security. He has also served as Bureau Chief of the Bangkok-based Asian General Bureau from 1996, and was appointed an editorial writer in the Tokyo headquarters in April 1998. His penetrating analysis of Japanese diplomacy is widely respected by general readers in Japan.

Beyond Boundaries: Imagining Impossibilities

Dr Huang Ping
Professor & Senior Research Fellow,
Chinese Academy of Social Sciences

I think, therefore I am --- A Cartesian motto

The moment when a small group of us, entitled 2001 Asia Leadership Program Fellows, arrived at International House of Japan ('I-House') about two months ago, I could not help asking myself: Where am I? Why am I here? Who are those fellows? How are we going to get along during the coming 'long' two to three months? And, finally, who are the 'us'? The first time that we had a seminar downstairs, one of the Fellows asked: Do we come here to present solutions or to raise questions? This is not only a problem for 2001 Fellows, but also, I would like to argue, a fundamental question for all of us who are involved in knowledge production and presentation.

Yes, indeed, are we to provide solutions or to ask questions? For me, the answer has always been the latter. However, even if we agree that raising questions is more crucial, what kinds of questions do we need to raise? How to raise them? If we do not seriously 'think', how can we possibly know what the questions are, how we can raise them properly? To whom we should raise them - for instance, only to those who ask for solutions and answers, or do we have to raise them for ourselves? Without seriously thinking, we cannot even identify and recognise who we are, and realise and figure out why we are here.

The two-month interchanging of ideas amongst the Fellows, the sharing of experiences during local visits with our host colleagues and Program organisers, was not merely uplifting and thought provoking, but also emotionally encouraging and challenging. There are thoughts, doubts, ideas and opinions we are familiar with but some are so paradoxical, problematic, and controversial that there cannot be a simple and single solution. This is especially true when issues come across with such events going on in today's world as September 11th.

Exactly because the world we are living in has been so multi-coloured, convoluted and sophisticated, we are eager for various kinds of debates and arguments from different schools and backgrounds, rather than a seemingly satisfactory solution. It does not matter who, from which part of the world, may claim to provide it.

What we are looking for in today's run-away world is not a final way-out solution given by academics or academic authorities, but an original perspective and alternative thinking which may empower our approaches to the problematics we have faced, and enrich our imaginations of tomorrow. The two-month interchange of ideas and argument reminds me of a well-cited quotation

amongst young philosophy colleagues 25 to 30 years ago: I think, therefore I am.

Only after years of seeking, wondering and doubting, however, can we gradually realize how convoluted it is to 'think'. Do we think first? Only then are we something? What/how have we been thinking of? And if we do not really think, how can we declare that we are among the people of ideas, or in other words, the so-called 'intellectual'? The short stay in I-House indeed provides us opportunities to think: think of current global change, think of the existing paradigms to understand the change, and think of the roles of public intellectuals in changing societies.

'Free-floating' seekers – Mannheim

Fifteen years ago, I applied for graduate study at the London School of Economics. At that time, I was so ambitious that I focused myself on a study of the problematic of the intellectual. Month after month, year after year, listening to lecturers and reading volumes of works, writing papers at night and preparing seminars during weekends plus chatting and arguing with colleagues, I was able to be "*relatively* free-floating" among men and women of ideas and letters. By the end of the day, however, I forgot almost all what I read and wrote! That is, except the keyword for the intellectual, namely "*relatively* free-floating" (1): free-floating with no map, no guideline, no dogma, but some original insights and constant seeking alternatives. Instead of physically walking around, free-floating is more about how intellectually to maintain necessary autonomy from the establishment, to question the *status quo*, to think of options, and to seek possible opportunities. (2)

Intellectually free-floating does help us to maintain a necessary autonomy of independent thinking, no doubt. However, when we argue free-floating the necessity for being intellectuals, we do not mean, in any case, that we should thus lose our concerns of the larger societies, separating us from what has been going on, while feeling what is going on is "fundamentally all right". (3) This is the danger of being arrogant and actually isolated from the societies; of being noisy with few listeners, loud with little audience!

It is especially embarrassing when public issues are indeed already public concerns but men and women of ideas keep enjoying our aloofness and alienation from other 'laypersons'. These issues may evolve from environmental or ecological crises, problems of identity or say, the rise of nationalism, protectionism, racism, fascism and in recent cases, terrorism. In the age of globalisation, all these issues have been debated by much of the general public all over the world yet often, little is really heard from scholars and professionals.

Being locked up by, or locking ourselves to a specific discipline (such as sociology), a specialised career (say, a professor), a limited sector (a department in university for instance), or an exclusive circle (usually a tiny group of

academics), we all tend to be, intentionally in some cases, 'professionalised' within a set of increasingly institutionalised systems. As a consequence, unintended in most cases, we are separated from one another and alienated from other groups of societies. We take it for granted that we speak for/listen to ourselves. We enjoy our indifference and low profile of society at large. This is partly why 'lay persons' close their eyes to 'scholars' like us. The problem is not, in actual fact, about our attachment to this discipline, nor our connection to *that* institution, but the very unconsciousness of the fenced enclosure of our thinking within existing paradigms, the "iron cage of rationality". (Max Weber) Within such 'iron cages', we do not see that issues and problems such as those of identity, modernity and globality never belong to any specific academic discipline, but rather to all of us in today's world.

Easy to act, difficult to know-Dr. Sun Yet-Sen

When we do not feel happy with these 'iron cages', the easiest path towards the way out is to get involved directly in actual social activities, to act, to help 'the other', usually 'the poor', to figure out and overcome their difficulties, and to provide solutions for them. We try to improve their situations and thus to change them. This is usually what we see nowadays, and what we do sometimes, in the name of NGOs or NPOs.

If a NGO/NPO does not have its alternative agenda, however, it may simply duplicate – in many cases it just poorly reiterates – what other international agencies and governmental organisations have been doing, including their mistakes and wrong-doings. Or, it may straightforwardly go to another extreme – for instance, from top-down to bottom-up approach, from statist to market fundamentalist ideology. For public intellectuals in action, we must remember in many cases, it is easy to act but difficult to know.

If we do not understand the roots of the problems, difficulties, troubles and dilemmas we are all confronting, we may be just scrambling in an endless maze, drained and exhausted somewhere on the way, with no idea how or where to get out. Even worse, in most circumstances, we are not good at trouble-shooting and problem-solving, usually much poorer than 'the poor'. How can we claim that we can help them in practical issues?

More concern about issues, less talk about '–isms'? Hu Shih

Of the existing paradigms, the problematic I would like to share with you today is the dualist approach. As offspring of the Enlightenment, we intellectuals often believe, without seriously *thinking of*, that there is a clear cut-off line between the Subject and the Object; Man and the Nature; Past and Future; the Traditional and the Modern; State and Society; We and the Other; West and East, etc. The grand narrative, the storyline underneath, is that we all, sooner or later, go through a series of stages, step by step, from one extreme to another to try to

control, to master, to take over the Object, the Nature, the Traditional, the Other, and then get to Paradise – in whatever name or –isms! These include developmentalism, Euro-centralism, Orientalism, Elitism, and so on and so forth.

We can easily list more –isms here, which have been questioned by thinkers for some time. Without a doubt, after all kinds of post-modern deconstruction, each -ism can be defended to a certain extent, and each should be historically seen as some kind of social construction rather than simply being accused of being biased or false ideology per se.

All the –isms, including conventional Socialism vs. Capitalism share certain perspectives, especially Developmentalism. Underlying this particular –ism has been the perspective that men, some privileged men in particular, are the rulers of nature, with little need for awareness of environment, gender and ethnic issues, or perspectives from 'the other'.

Beyond Boundaries

Various boundaries do not merely exist within these highly stereotyped –isms, but also in our daily lives, in our very racial, ethnic, cultural, social, and national identities. Whenever we see us as 'US', and therefore the other as 'the Other' we have, unconsciously perhaps, excluded 'the other Other' (for instance, women, the poor, and ethnic minorities). Even when these others are willing to communicate, to exchange, and to share their feelings with us, we suspect their unaffectedness and seriousness; we even sense them as potential enemies!

As a consequence, we in effect entrap ourselves into the dualist approach of 'either/or': either the modern or the traditional, either the rich or the poor, either Us or the Other, either insider or outsider, either expert or layperson, either elite or mass, either the West or the East, either development or underdevelopment, and so on.

Sometimes we have no problem with this kind of 'either/or' paradigm. Sometimes, we get puzzled or bewildered. Determined or confused, we unsophisticatedly ignore the enormous diversities in between. These are, like black-white photography, a key to understand the beauty of the world; the enigmas that may be contradictory for they can paradoxically harmonise with one another.

This is especially true when we are bound ourselves up by the nation-state perspective. Everything can be legitimised when it is tied to a particular nation-state. From national economy and national defence to national identity and national culture – all become nation-state belongings and properties. In the age of globalisation, however, this perspective becomes increasingly problematic. In the age of globalisation, our thinking becomes more trans-boundary and trans-national. This is an era with a constant flow of capital, technology, information,

products, and above all, PEOPLE!

Globalisation, or, perhaps more precisely, transnationalisation, is more than a simple process of Westernisation or Americanisation, which as a matter of fact challenges the nation-state as a system. It questions the nation-state framework and the nation-state paradigm, upon which all governments, states, countries are commonly structured and restructured. Today, we see lots of reactions or counteractions to such globalisation. Examples, if I may cite what I wrote last November in a speech at a UNDP Security conference, "can be seen from the rise of nationalism in many parts of the world, fascism in some parts, and further more from regional and transnational terrorism!" (4)

Today, because of September 11, everybody, everywhere is talking about terrorism and terrorists. What is the terrorism we are referring to here? Who are the terrorists? Where do they come from?

What is clear is that they were not attacking the World Trade Center in the name of any nation-state, particular country or government. It is not a war in a conventional sense – a war of one nation-state against another. It is more a global challenge to the nation-state system per se, a challenge from groups or individuals who do not have to organise themselves as a nation-state, who go beyond or break with any national, regional, geographical, and cultural boundaries.

Since the end of the Cold War, we have seen a non-stop increase of transnational flows of capital, technology, information, and those who are dealing with such capital, technology, information: executives, managers, directors, politicians, artists, scientists, experts, sport and entertainment stars, et al. But it is not until recent events and conflicts that we have noticed an enormous number of refugees, an increasing troop of 'over-stay tourists', millions of cheap-labour migrants (those who are commonly named but actually still not proven as terrorists).

All of them are moving around the world transnationally. Yet our existing paradigms are not powerful enough to explain, elucidate, and evaluate such mobile populations, The paradigms are still basically nation-state oriented and country-bound. We have yet to develop a set of analytical frameworks for transnationalisation.

Imagining Impossibilities

Lao Tze, Master of Taoism, tutor of Confucius, and the author of *Tao Te-Ching*, teaches his followers: "Nothing can be softer than water, anything hard can be overcome by water." Water has no boundaries. After all the questionings, what an intellectual longs for is the Golden Mean. Instead of "either globalisation or localisation", the riddle is to get out of the trap. For instance, can we imagine

'glocalisation' which is by no means a fifty-fifty combination? When we go beyond boundaries, impossibility becomes possible. Imagining possibilities enriches our imagination for future options and for alternative thinking.

Author's note: This paper is based on a shorter version which I presented at the Asia Leadership Fellow Public Symposium in the Lecture Hall, International House of Japan, 1:30-5:00pm, Friday, October 26, 2001, "Rethinking Existing Paradigms: Public Intellectuals in Action".

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Public Journalism and the Public Intellectual

David Celdran
Director for Current Affairs, ABS-CBN News Channel

Introduction: Extraordinary Times Create Extraordinary Ideas

Hardly has 2001 left us and it's already being called the year that has changed the world. Indeed, the attacks that took place on September 11 have not only affected Americans and their sense of security; they have altered the way the rest of the world has chosen to see itself. And for the majority of us, unable to witness and experience these events first hand, we have grown increasingly dependent on media – television in particular – to give us a sense of the moment and an understanding of the future.

I was in Tokyo for the ALFP 2001 when 9/11 happened. It was on CNN where I and all the other Fellows, first chanced upon the breaking story. For the next two months in Japan, broadcasts from BBC, CNN, and NHK, would be the basis for our discussions and debates on the fast-changing global developments and their implications on peace and security in the region. Every morning, over breakfast at the International House of Japan (I-House), we would swap bits and pieces of the latest news bulletins and recount conspiracy theories peddled by so-called think tanks and experts. Television was so central to the content of our lives as Fellows, that it was all but impossible to begin a discussion without reference to what was seen or heard on screen. Indeed, journalism in the age of electronic media was not only determining our conversations, it was transforming global dialogue around us as well.

As it became increasingly clear to us how much of the world today was being experienced through our television (and computer) screens, this intriguing thought served only to compel me – the television professional in the group – to scrutinise this inescapable *hyperreality* called televised news. After all, what else was a broadcast journalist like myself to do while sitting out the biggest story to happen in over a decade as a reporter?

Away from the action, it was difficult not to think how trivial the polite discussions and formal lectures of the Program sometimes felt amidst the crises and chaos unfolding across the globe. However, it didn't take too long to realise how wrong I was after all. Trite as the theme may have sounded in those first few weeks in Tokyo, evaluating the role of the public intellectual in Asia today has become imperative at a time when the voice of reason is being drowned out by the noise of vengeance and war. Now more than ever, the public intellectuals of Asia must rise above the chatter that so easily passes off as news and commentary, and provide a new way of establishing truth in an environment clouded by nationalist rhetoric and the propaganda of superpowers. And by all indications, public intellectuals the world over are losing the war of the airwaves

and the battle for the minds of viewers. Not only has television and other mainstream media succumbed to the over-simplification and generalisation that leaves nuanced analysis out, television and media today is at risk of losing its relevance altogether.

So what is it about the news that is creating the opposite effect of informing the public?

Why is it that despite the more images and information out there, the less truth we seem to get? As the superpowers of the world prepared for their 'war on terrorism' (with Japan playing an unprecedented role), these were the questions I found myself asking in those two months as a Fellow. The search for answers and the ensuing research have brought me to a timely discovery of new paradigms in the principles and practice of journalism. As the Fellows of 2001 each pursued paradigmatic shifts in their specific fields of interest: leadership and governance (Anek); identity (Ann); poverty alleviation (Mahendra); empowerment (Ping); human rights (June) and national security (Shimada-san), it was difficult not to catch the contagious spirit of creative thinking that engulfed the group. The rest of this paper is the fruition of that collaboration – a new lens with which to view reality from hereon – a world that refuses to be captured in black and white, in binary oppositions and convenient stereotypes. Public Journalism, as I have come to discover it while in Japan, is a testimony to this worldview.

Public Journalism: Journalism where People Matter

Asia, like the rest of the world, is undergoing an information revolution. At no other time in history has so much information been available and accessible to so many people. Privatisation and the deregulation of media environments in the region have torn down barriers of entry and increased the number of media outlets competing for public attention. The loosening grip of governments on media has likewise produced a free and lively press. Advances in technology, specifically digital and satellite technology, have multiplied the platforms for receiving information. Even the most remote communities in the region can now access the same information at the same time that those living in modern cities do. As the prophets of information technology like to say: information is power, and power is information. And in the hands of the majority, information democratises society.

But again, why is it that the more abundant and available information has become, the less involved the public seems to be? If indeed information is power, then why are communities feeling more powerless? Why, in the presence of so much news and information about their societies, are citizens growing more frustrated with their government, and more cynical about authority?

In short, there is a clear and growing disconnection between political life and

public life – and I suspect the media may be partly to blame for it.

In our age of information, news media - television in particular - has become the primary source of political knowledge. And as cultural theorists assert: if television mediates political experience, then any attempt to understand our political culture leads us invariably to a closer look at the forces that pressure and drive media organisations. In a privatised and deregulated environment where competition is intense, media corporations, especially those that are publicly traded, are motivated, inevitably, by profit. And since privately owned television networks survive on advertising revenue, the business of television is often little more than producing viewers for advertisers. Bigger audiences mean higher ratings, and higher ratings mean more income from advertisers. This is what we call 'the ratings game' and news departments have to learn to live by its rules to survive.

In the ratings game, what the audience wants, the audience often gets. And when research shows that a higher level of abstract and issue-oriented political content turns off viewers, especially less-educated viewers, programmers take this to mean that audiences dislike serious news. In response, news producers have created a trend known as infotainment – an often-indistinguishable blend of entertainment and news – where gossip, scandal, and at times – the bizarre – make the headlines.

In this market-oriented paradigm, the audience is viewed as a 'consuming public' and not as 'active citizens' – a programming framework that de-politicises news as much as it de-politicises citizens. To increase the ratings or readership, news is couched in conflict and drama, spectacle and controversy.

As the line between political news and entertainment blurs, people find it increasingly hard to view politics with a sense of urgency and seriousness. For the public, politics becomes a spectator sport – an arena of ambitious men and women of undesirable motives. This is partly the effect of years of reporting political scandal and gossip. Indeed, the news is producing citizens who are not only disengaging from political life but also rapidly losing interest in issues that matter to the country and the community; amounting to a cynical view of politicians and the entire political process.

The reaction of well-meaning journalists alarmed by this trend has been noble but sometimes naive. For them…for us, infotainment is killing serious political reporting and the proud tradition of objectivity, balance and sobriety associated with it. The accusation that news producers and editors today pander too much to consumer tastes betrays an elitism that is precisely what turns off the majority from traditional news. When you think of it, the popularity of tabloid news and infotainment is merely a response to the alienation of the public from the straight and hard news formats that have been traditionally determined by the educated elite and their standard of what is news and information.

The debate about what constitutes news continues to rage on, but we can no longer deny the reality that both infotainment and so-called serious news are grossly disconnected from the viewers. Because both sides of the debate underestimate the public, they are oblivious to research that shows that people are indeed receptive to information if it helps them gain personal power in dealing with public issues. People are interested and even enthusiastic about news that tells them what they can do about their problems.

This is where Public Journalism can fill the void. The purpose of which is to reconnect the public with the press, and in the process, the community with the political life of the nation.

Public Journalism – sometimes called Civic Journalism - offers a new model for journalists, a new paradigm for engaging viewers. It believes the 'power of the press' can be harnessed to empower the public by restoring the public's sense that they and their government can solve problems, and that issues that divide the public can be resolved through active participation. This is what overcomes cynicism and restores public trust in politics.

To do so, journalists need to put an end to business as usual. A new paradigm is needed that redefines the role of the press, and diversifies our sources and contacts for stories; a fresh approach that provides a different way to frame the news and a creative way to communicate it.

We can begin with how we view our role. 'Watchdogs', that's what we think of ourselves. And without doubt, this watchdog role has produced some of the finest investigative reporting on official corruption, abuse and inefficiency. At times, it has helped bring down corrupt regimes, as it has in my country. But as they say: too much of a good thing can be hazardous to your health. And indeed, research shows that this brand of reporting, or rather too much of it, can and does produce a culture of distrust and apathy. As the audience becomes de-sensitised to news of corruption, scandal and crime, they begin to hold back from involvement altogether. Another effect the watchdog role creates is complacency among citizens who increasingly depend on media to keep an eye on government for them. Power, in this case, is transferred and not internalised.

The new role of news media, as one leading advocate of Public Journalism puts it, is not so much to act as a 'watchdog' but rather as a 'guide dog'. Journalists can act as guides in their communities who convene and connect each other with government in dialogue and debate: a process that doesn't end with finger-pointing and blame and eventually to inaction, but one that challenges people to get involved and take ownership of problems with the purpose of developing alternatives, remedies and solutions.

Sourcing the news. This process must also be re-evaluated. Newsrooms today are structured around beats that almost exclusively seek information from

official sources like bureaucrats and politicians, scholars, spin-doctors, authorities, spokespersons and specialists. This is a journalism that communicates from top to bottom, from the powerful to powerless, from those who control information to those who lack it. On the other hand, public journalists diversify their sources and contacts to include the public – ordinary citizens who are the real stakeholders in society. By doing so, we help shift the creation of the public agenda from the political elites to the public, from top-bottom to bottom-up.

The way we frame the news must also begin to change. Journalists, like many politicians, are accustomed to a bi-polar approach in framing issues. The term for it is 'balance'. Stories are a battleground of opposing forces – good versus evil, business versus labour, developer versus environmentalist, right versus left, rich versus poor, government versus citizen. When conflict is used to frame the news, it often arrives packaged in hopeless insolubility where each side of the debate has a stake in continuing the argument and none in resolving it.

Public Journalism reports from within the extremes and allows diverse viewpoints to be heard and respected. The middle may not be as exciting, but it is where meaningful dialogue begins and creative solutions formulated. From an attitude of 'us vs. them' to 'we're all in this together', communities begin to move from conflict to consensus, from shouting matches to matching problems with solutions.

By viewing citizens as active participants rather than passive consumers of news, Public Journalism re-connects the public with political life. In many parts of Asia, journalists using these new tools of reporting are starting to see changes taking place in their communities.

In Kalibo, Aklan, in the Southern Philippines, Public Journalism has given hope to communities concerned with the rise in cases of paedophilia and sexual abuse of children – a problem, residents claimed, that could be traced to the flow of foreign tourists spilling out of popular beach resorts nearby.

Fearing the case would be sensationalised by the swarm of reporters eager to exploit the scandalous issue, citizens of Kalibo organised themselves and formed an alliance with local media organisations to make sure the problem would be covered in a responsible and sustained way. Together, they launched a weekly radio programme called 'Voice of Hope'. Local stations set aside their rivalry and agreed to air the programme simultaneously in order to reach as many residents as possible. Today, each week, radio journalists gather residents and government officials in the station and moderate discussions on community issues and common action. Not only have the people found solutions to their problems, they have also found for themselves a bigger voice in government. More and more experiments in 'democracy on the air' are taking place all over Asia. Anek from Thailand tells me that in Nan – a community in his country –

farmers, fishermen and ordinary folk are trying their hand as radio commentators. Every day, these 'deejays for the day' moderate community discussions where homegrown solutions to local conflicts and livelihood problems are deliberated. The other Fellows tell me that similar efforts are taking place in their countries where ordinary citizens are slowly discovering the technology of media and harnessing it for their benefit.

In our own field trips across Japan, first-hand I've seen variations of Public Journalism in the efforts of local journalists such as those in Ishinomaki – a fish port city in Northern Japan. Here, local journalists have linked arms with Non-political Organisations (NPOs) to bring an increasingly multi-ethnic community closer together by debunking the usual stereotypes and biases so often found sensationalised in the press. More than just encouraging racial tolerance, local journalists have likewise given migrant workers and foreign residents a voice in the community. News reports about local issues routinely include their points of view and opinions – an unlikely practice in a country that often looks the other way with regard to the rights and welfare of foreign workers.

In the coastal communities of Isahaya in the Nagasaki Prefecture, environmentalists count among themselves media professionals who aren't only looking for stories to report, but who are also personally concerned about the long-term side effects the construction of dikes would have on the local environment. True to the spirit of Public Journalism, these journalists have gone beyond exposing the government's plan and have sought, instead, a compromise solution that would protect the interests of farmers who support the construction of flood-control dikes and the interests of environmentalists that fear the drying up Isahaya's precious wetlands. In these places and others around the country, journalists are re-discovering their link to the community where they are, after all, stakeholders like the rest.

It may seem so far that Public Journalism is best suited to communities where journalists live and have ties to the local population. But it can also be applied at a national level where connections between citizens are less apparent and where issues are not always held in common. By harnessing technology, bridges on the air can be built linking communities across the nation, even across borders, via satellite, mobile phone and the Internet.

Using these new technologies, electronic town meetings like those I've produced in the Philippines can be staged. Here, residents across the country are linked with workers and families overseas in a national dialogue with the President. By satellite, ordinary people from the remotest towns of the country and migrant workers from cities abroad like Hong Kong, San Francisco and Dubai come together to discuss issues that matter to them most. One can argue that the problems raised in electronic venues like these may remain unresolved. However, what is just as important here is the experience of being given a voice, and of hearing other voices – a process that begins connecting not

only individuals to communities but fragmented communities to the nation.

Town meetings, candidates' forums, community debates, public symposia, radio call-in programmes, interactive talk shows – these are only a few examples, both big and small, local and national, of how journalists can act as agents of change.

But challenges do lie ahead. Foremost is convincing journalists themselves. Reporters, editors, and news executives must start to realise that empowering the community does not necessarily mean abandoning traditional journalistic principles of objectivity and balance. On the contrary, practising Public Journalism enhances and enriches reporting because it opens up new sources of information and new perspectives. As one reporter tells me: it re-invigorates and inspires jaded journalists like him.

But for Public Journalism to go mainstream, it must also enlist the sustained support of media corporations that own the resources to print and broadcast. Owners must first be convinced that Public Journalism can and does contribute to the corporate bottom-line. While profitability is not the objective of journalism, public or otherwise, it can be argued that reconnecting viewers with the news media may be a rewarding venture – both financially and socially.

Public Journalism generates meaningful news that builds a better relationship with audiences. It obtains their trust and gains their loyalty – a win-win situation that creates value in the long term, not only for stockholders, but for stakeholders as well.

Conclusion: Imagining the Impossible

Indeed, extraordinary times create extraordinary ideas, but so do extraordinary people. While the development of the topic for this paper was clearly influenced by the September 11 attacks and the media coverage of the events thereafter, much else must be attributed to the public intellectuals who joined me in this year's Program. I came to Japan with little hope for the future of television and journalism in my country and elsewhere in the world. I saw how market forces were holding the public trust of news hostage while dishing out entertainment in the name of information. I saw the end of journalism and the beginning of a mutated form of news called infotainment that was dumbing down culture, marginalising the serious, and transforming all reality into spectacle. I still see this, but now I also see some hope. And this hope I owe to those with me in the Program who have so creatively navigated beyond the existing paradigms that continue to enslave the intellectual community.

Through them, I've learned more than just an alternative vocabulary that defies the rigid boundaries of outdated knowledge. I've also learned that public intellectuals must also have heart. Anek calls it *Soft Power*, but we all have our own private word for it. And without meaning to sound a bit too mystical, I'd

venture into saying that it is precisely with a heart that we see beyond the obvious polarities of the world, and with soul that we are able to break down the fragile barriers that are merely constructs of a society unaware of its alternatives.

Call it *imagination* – or as Ping never fails to remind us – "imagining impossibility".

Be it in journalism, in development work or in everyday life, we must reinvent the old ways of thinking, the old ways of solving problems and the old ways of managing conflict. Above all, we must find new ways to see ourselves, to define new roles in our communities, and to discover a new understanding of our stake in the emerging global order. This is the role of the public intellectual in changing Asia – a process I believe was begun in the Japanese autumn of 2001.

Goodbye 'Asian Values', Hello 'Islamic Values'; What about 'Transnational Values'?

Ann Lee
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'Asian Values'

I picked 'Asian Values' as a focus for my individual research because this would allow me time to get to the heart, not of darkness perhaps, but of this business of a single Asia. 'Asia', it bears repeating, is a construct. It's the modern term for 'the Orient' or 'the East' (or better still, 'the Far East') that was/is all too easily made into the opposite of 'the West', between which lies Africa and a bit further up is the Middle East. In this map of things, talk of the world as a 'global village' is all too true - and all too trite.

As Amartya Sen, economist and Nobel prize winner has said: "The attempt to see Asia as a single unit reveals a distinctly Eurocentric perspective…attempts at generalisation about Asian values cannot but be extremely crude. Even the 2.8 million people in Singapore have vast variations of cultural and historical traditions". (1)

Or as Errol Mendes, Professor of Law, Director of the Human Rights Research & Education Centre, University of Ottawa writes: "There is no such thing as an homogeneous Asia…the reality is a kaleidoscope panorama of languages, religions, cultures, history, political systems and intra-Asian rivalries, prejudices, hatreds, affinities, etc". (2)

Goenawan Mohamad, Director, Institute for the Study of Free Flow of Information, Indonesia, has written: "The idea of 'Asian values' was misleading: it was state repression paraded as voluntary consensus." (3) Amongst the most pertinent words are those by another past ALFP Fellow, Ignas Kleden, Director, the Society for Political and Economy Study, Indonesia, who said: " The important thing about Asian values is not that they are Asian but that they are values." (4)

But at one time, Asian values were very fashionable and as such, may well be fashionable again. Why? Several reasons, but underlying them is because we are lazy. We are lazy natives. Sloppy romantics.

This is perfectly understandable. Let me explain. First, here is a list of Asian values.

A Top Ten of 'Asian Values'

1) respect for hierarchy
2) respect for authority (including deference to)
3) family first, individual second

4) social consensus to avoid overt conflict in social relations
5) emphasis on law and order
6) emphasis on stability to promote economic and social development
7) emphasis on education
8) emphasis on social discipline
9) reverence for traditional values and culture
10) discretion and privacy

Just to recap, the notion of 'Asian values' in the late 1980s and early 1990s came under much intellectual criticism – in 'Western' and 'Asian' countries - for three main reasons: 1) for being 'manipulated' by political players such as Lee Kuan Yew and Dr Mahathir Mohamad to suit their political administrations or 'regimes' 2) being grounded in no real economic theoretical sense despite being used to explain Asian economic efficiency, and 3) taking as 'Asian' what were essentially 'universal' values.

Particularly for the purposes of this symposium, why, when many intellectuals were saying, "Asian values are invalid", were Asian values still considered valid amongst larger communities, or other publics? Partly because many intellectuals are too far removed from their publics. And presently because it's not true that Asian values are dead and gone. They are alive and well, only they are the 'ghosts of Asian values'. Being ghosts, they require people to believe in them for them to be real, and they take different shapes and forms. Few of them are very solid but so what of it?

Amartya Sen may say that it is a Eurocentric perspective to think of Asia but it is also an Asiacentric perspective. For many of us who live in countries located on this side of the planet, 'we ourselves' believe and see things from an Asiacentric perspective - or try to. Yes, the region is frequently divided for more specificity - there is north, south, east, west, south east Asia - but it is Asia nevertheless. So long as there is 'an Asia', there will be an urge to look for Asian values. So the sheer diversity is mind-boggling? All the more we wish to make sense of it. And especially if there are pressing economic and political conditions of competition, and the super-convenience of making a common enemy out of a competitor like the US, or Europe - 'Asia' works for 'Asians' too.

The difference between intellectual weight and emotional attachment means the idea of 'Asian values' (and their ghosts) cannot be dismissed. If I feel 'Asian' and not 'Western', then no amount of intellectual argument will really dislodge or dull my emotional attachment.

Indeed, when it comes to rationalisation of this emotional attachment, it can be said that the only 'Asian values' argument that has been intellectually demolished is the one that Asian tiger economies 'were better than Western economies' because of 'Asian values'. But take away the economic and political references - since well, our economies are mostly in recession - and you see cultural Asian values (the search for them) alive and well in the arena of popular

culture and also performing arts – most obviously in the halls of national culture where the ghosts of Asian values reside as 'national values'. Chinese values, Filipino values, Indian values, Japanese values, Korean values, Malaysian values, Thai values – these are surely just different shapes and forms of Asian values. That is, reductive, over-simplified generalisations of what we have in common and what we have that is different (or indifferent) by relying on dominant, hegemonic, politically convenient versions of a national culture.

They take some resisting. It is, for example, over-simplified to think of Japanese culture as ikebana, kabuki, noh, politeness, deference and homogeneity. But these notions certainly suffice as a shorthand for powerful nationalist narratives.

The factor of emotion – indeed, extraordinary emotional attachment and not rational judgement that seems to have paltry power in comparison – can be relied upon to fully fertilise national values/nationalism and its many blooms (or "imagined communities" as best coined by Benedict Anderson in his influential text of the same name). (5)

For this reason, nationalism, (or neo-nationalism) – in the modern sense of group loyalty and loyalty to family and tribe transferred to nation-state – cannot be dismissed either. But not just because it satisfies an emotional attachment. Nationalism ain't all bad. As Ernest Gellner first pointed out: "As a doctrine, (non-egoistic nationalism) can be supported by some good arguments, such as the desirability of preserving cultural diversity, of a pluralistic international political system, and of the diminution of internal strains within states." (6)

Ghosts are out and about. As David McCrone points out, nationalism or national values are not necessarily static but "a discourse, a way of constructing meanings which influence and organise our actions and conceptions of ourselves". (7) As CJW-LWee, Fellow in Regional Social and Cultural Studies, Institute of S E Asian Studies, Singapore, writes: "Global, national and local identities intersect and inter-articulate…the Asian values experiments indicate that states are capable of actively and flexibly managing culture as an instrument to move national attention away from both cultural contestation from the margins, and the idea of the West and the Rest…" (8)

In particular, nationalism in Malaysia, a plural, post-colonial society "has undergone three phases, or transitions moving from an early phase when Malay ethno-nationalism arose, to a second phase when it was transformed into Malay economic nationalism. With the popularisation of 'Malaysia Inc' in the 1980s and 'Vision 2020' agenda of the 1990s, the project of nationalism has been transformed yet again into a discourse on corporate capitalism…Thus one local academic (Professor Wazir Jahan Karim, in an unpublished paper presented at St Catherine's College, Oxford, 1993) has remarked: 'Through the rubric of capitalism, everything seems to work well in Malaysia. The Malays hold special privileges, the Chinese buy them up, and the Indians have a good bash at

transport and energy, occasionally plunging the country into darkness when demand exceeds supply.'" (9)

The last remark, clearly irreverent, may well be offensive to some and certainly assumes a dominant Peninsular Malaysian perspective that sees Malaysia's ethnic mix in three: Malay, Chinese and Indian, excluding the states of Sabah and Sarawak and their variety of ethnic mixes which are rarely if ever included within the discourse of Malaysian national culture. To concentrate on the dominant is to make a useful generalisation but it might just be useless – at least, very limited.

If you look again at that "A Top Ten of Asian values", number 3 – the family one stands out as something everyone seems to agree is really Asian. However, just how true is this? It might be more of a lie, useful no doubt. Not a white lie (sic), or half lie, let's call it a sly little lie by omission. Family is not exclusive to those of us who live here. What about the (handy stereotypes) of Italian or Irish people who are famous for their family first scenarios too? 'Family is Asian' is a sweeping generalisation that is just lazy and sloppy. It may make you feel good but let's just stop it now.

We should remember the power of rhetoric.

Amartya Sen makes the surprisingly naive remark that he did not think it easy "to see how they (Asian values) could be made, by the mere force of rhetoric, into an Asian cause against the West." (10)

By the 'mere' force of rhetoric?

The force of rhetoric is usually anything but 'mere' and it can be said that the reason Asian values got as far as they did is because Asian values rhetoric tapped into a sort of thick seam or grand narrative of new found confidence arising from 'an Asian Inferiority complex' vis a vis former colonial masters. (Temporarily ignore the fact that there were and are also perceived intra- Asian Superiority complexes like Singapore v Malaysia or Japan v Korea.) It's only embarrassing now because as mentioned, economic realities – external, macro and micro – proved otherwise. But surely, the rhetoric did exactly that: made an Asian cause against the West – another powerful story of 'the ant against the elephant', of us against them again, the little brown and yellow men who matched up to the white men.

Why do we make these sweeping generalisations? I said 'lazy' earlier because we often don't care to think how we use language to make the particular and the multiple, simple and compelling to use.

In 1946, George Orwell wrote Politics and the English Language. Let's say what he wrote applies to any language, never mind English: "Modern English, especially

written English is full of bad habits which spread by imitation and which can be avoided if one is willing to take the necessary trouble. If one gets rid of these habits, one can think more clearly and to think clearly is a necessary first step toward political regeneration: so that the fight against bad English is not frivolous and is not the exclusive concern of professional writers."

Orwell castigated "staleness of imagery" and "lack of precision". He noted, "Other words used in variable meanings, in most cases more or less dishonestly are: class, totalitarian, science, progressive, reactionary, bourgeois, equality."

Let me add, 'Asia'.

It is in this essay that he wrote: "Political speech and writing are largely the defense of the indefensible. Things like the continuance of British rule in India, the Russian purges and deportations, the dropping of the atom bombs on Japan can indeed be defended, but only by arguments which are too brutal for most people to face…Thus political language has to consist largely on euphemism, question-begging and sheer cloudy vagueness. Defenceless villages are bombarded from the air, the inhabitants driven out into the countryside, the cattle machine-gunned, the huts set on fire with incendiary bullets: this is called pacification. Millions of peasants are robbed from their farms and sent trudging along the roads with no more than they carry: this is called transfer of population or rectification of frontiers". And when missiles intended for military camps fall on civilian sites, they are called unfortunate 'collateral damage'.

The last of course is not from Orwell but the Gulf War and now this so-called 'war on terrorism'.

Finally from Orwell: "Political language – and with variations this is true of all political parties, from Conservatives to Anarchists – is designed to make lies sound truthful and murder respectable, to give an appearance of solidity to pure wind. One cannot change this all in a moment, but one can at least change one's habits, and from time to time one can even, if one jeers loudly enough, send some worn and useful phrase – some jackboot, Achilles heel, hotbed, melting pot, acid test, veritable inferno, or other lump of verbal refuse – into the dustbin, where it belongs."

(I was pleasantly surprised to see past Fellow and playwright Kuo Pao Kun's suggestion that this program - 'the Asia Leadership Fellow Program' – aspire to be an 'Earthian Fellowship'. 'Earthian' not 'Asian' sounds more appropriate. It also sounds a bit corny and cumbersome perhaps, maybe hippies-speak with a 90s flavour, but it's a start. The title "Intellectuals in Action Fellowship" is another title that the Asia Leadership Fellow Program might more usefully have.)

We must ask ourselves when we talk of Asia and Asians, for what purpose are we dividing? Past Fellow, Goenawan Mohamad ventures: "The ASEAN raison

d'etre is still valid: no major conflict should take place between and among these neighbouring countries…" (11) It is difficult to disagree with this: to work towards Asian values in a search to keep the peace. He adds: "There is also another reason not to undo Asia's regionalist imperative – no matter how vague, fluid and flexible the concept is. It has something to do with the need to find ways to prevent further damage brought about by currency speculators."

Goenawan was writing in 1997 when the 'currency crisis' had, for some people, terrorised the region, sent lives crashing and otherwise dominated the world's headlines - or at least in this part of the world. Now of course, there is another crisis that is doing a better job of dominating the world's headlines.

'Islamic Values'

The destruction of the World Trade Center Towers and the awful loss of nearly 6,000 people (as currently reported) from many different parts of the world has apparently changed the world.

I say apparently because the Fall of the World Trade Towers has an almost mythical dimension of symbolism to it, a sign of the times for many things: a post-Cold War collapse of alternatives, the final reduction of the value of nation-states, a grandscale neo-capitalist narcissistic finale, the Fall of the American Empire. For some it is a symbol of low tech destroying high tech. I have to say I am reminded of the Sinking of the Titanic (by an iceberg apparently bringing down the might of industrial technology) or the Fall of Singapore (by soldiers on bicycles apparently bringing down the might of the British Empire).

Seven days after the event, on CNN, when 'terrorist' was first used and in rapid succession 'Osama bin Laden' so that 'Islamic terrorist' were neatly sewn together in no time at all again, Edward Said wrote: "…much as it has been quarrelled over by Muslims, there isn't a single Islam: there are Islams, just as there are Americas." (12)

I apologise for using this surely self-evident statement but I mention it just in case there is still somebody out there who is unaware of the 'ant and elephant' media-savvy rhetoric by Bush (and his advisors) and Osama (and his advisors), who both have vested interests in a 'clash of civilisations'.

While Bush appeals to saviours of democracy and freedom, Osama appeals to saviours of purity and integrity in Islam, creating dilemmas for Americans – liberal and conservative, and for Muslims and non-Muslims all over the world. But these are false dilemmas. "You are either with us or against us" is surely a most intellectually bankrupt and emotionally corrupt statement. Both leaders are using it. Like all 'leaders' in a time of conflict, they would rally others while disguising their own actual lack of moral leadership - moral in the more difficult and true sense not the easier, sanctimonious version that requires a proper

appearance of things: to look 'pious' in long beards, turbans and simple shoes, or to look professional and 'business as usual' in formal suits and high level boardroom settings.

The heading of my presentation may appear to support Samuel Huntington's simplistic and appealing 'clash of civilisations' thesis between 'the West' (American) and Islamic and Confucian civilisations but I use 'Islamic values' straight after 'Asian values' entirely ironically.

At the very least, the Asian region contains the main bulk of the 1.2 billion Muslims in the world – up to 50 million in China alone. Not that this has ever been recognised in the reference to 'Asian values'. Confucius was usually mentioned, or at least a sort of selective Confucianism. As Professor Wang Gungwu, Director of the East Asia Institute, National University of Singapore summarised: "The so-called Asian values are really those Confucian Chinese values that seem to oppose what have been called Western values." (13)

While I shift to 'Islamic values', let me say that I am mindful, as Anthony Giddens, Director of the London School of Economics & Political Science has said about the events in New York and Washington on September 11: "It is very important to avoid altogether the discourse of the 'clash of civilisations' – not because it's wholly untrue but because it becomes a self-fulfilling prophecy, a dangerous idea that becomes part of what it is supposed to describe." He adds: "The clash instead is between a range of different fundamentalisms and the more cosmopolitan world society most of us would like to build." (14)

A range of different fundamentalisms

I would like to suggest that those fundamentalisms at issue are indeed not between Islam and America as portrayed in the entirely convenient (especially for the status quo) way of pitting Osama against Bush.

Rather, the fundamentalisms are: the fundamentalism of six permanent members in the UN or G7 rulers deciding the fate of the rest of the world, the fundamentalism of the 'free' market; the fundamentalism of poor distribution of wealth, education and health; the fundamentalism of unequal access to the Internet and therefore to one of the supposedly worldwide benefits of globalisation; the fundamentalism of largely one form of liberal democracy; the fundamentalism of inequitable power between elites and the electorate; the fundamentalism of disequilibrium between the elected and the appointed; and the fundamentalism of men who would decide for women who have no power or choice but to let them.

It is not then 'the clash of civilisations' (although that sounds like a really good Hollywood movie) but 'a 'crush of fundamentalisms' about poverty, power and post cold-war capitalism, (a sort of independent movie that may go on to do

really well at the box office).

Like all peace-loving people, my heart goes out to all those who are still in grief and broken-hearted by the loss of relatives and friends as a result of the destruction of the World Trade Center towers – as a result of any attack on unsuspecting lives whether in Chile, East Timor, Ireland, Israel, Palestine, Somalia: so many parts of the world where covert action is taken by those who would be enfranchised with too much power, or disenfranchised with next to no power.

However appealing, we must take care not to succumb to the grand narrative of the ant and the elephant again as if the ant this time is Islam and the elephant is the West. Neither the ant nor the elephant stand alone (except perhaps when they are to die).

Here is a list of 'Islamic values' that conform largely to the ant of Islam and the elephant of the West; that conform only to one kind of Islam and one kind of America.

A Top Ten of ' Islamic values'

1. Eye for an eye
2. Very traditional/conservative
3. Gender-biased (male chauvinist)
4. Closed society, keep among themselves
5. Disciplinary, many rules & taboos
6. Life and religion too closely linked
7. Emphasis on collective not individual
8. Ego-centric, conversion compulsory upon marriage
9. Fixed, not as open to revisionism as Christianity
10. Over-sensitive and angry

In my opinion, the following list may be said to be a more accurate while selective list of 'Islamic values' such as I have experienced and observed, coming from a member country of the Organisation of Islamic Conference, Malaysia. Malaysia is not an Islamic state, though no two of these are alike, and the definition(s) of an Islamic state is subject to debate even as I speak. This then is a working list of Islamic values for the purposes of discussion.

A Working Guide to 'Islamic values'

1. Compassionate
2. Tolerant
3. Various
4. Holistic
5. Collective

6. Political
7. Gender and sexuality-conflicted
8. Disciplinary
9. Fatalistic
10. Scientific

You will see, I hope, that these values with the possible exception of 'scientific' can be found in related ways to most if not all the world's major religions. (I do not presume to use Arabic, the language of the Holy Quran.) It is a matter of fact that where I live (the middle-class suburb of Taman Tun Dr Ismail within the federal territory of Kuala Lumpur), many of the world's major religions and their denominations are represented. In the Malaysian Constitution, Islam is the official or national religion while, as per Article 3 (1) states: "Every person has the right to profess and practise his religion…" And indeed, all the world's major religions are practised – in various densities – throughout the country.

Let me state clearly that I am not a Muslim. I have been a student of Islam since 1987 when for personal and professional reasons I went to ABIM, an 'evangelist' organisation (founded by Anwar Ibrahim after his early student 'Malay/Muslim separatist' days) and got a free copy of the Holy Quran (published by Amana Corp, USA, 1983) – the classic English translation alongside Arabic by Yusuf Ali.

I am conscious that a little knowledge can be a dangerous thing and perhaps the only thing that qualifies me to speak at this point is, as Chandra Muzaffar, respected intellectual and founder of the International Just World Trust writes in his illuminating study *Islamic Resurgence in Malaysia*: "We have seen how right from 1957, the State recognised Islam as the official religion and interpreted that status along certain lines. But with the advent of Islamic resurgence, the State has gone beyond mere public projection of religious rituals and practices. It is now concerned, as we have observed with the role of Islamic values and institutions in the larger spheres of public life. Its Islamisation programme has therefore given a more national character to the religion in relation to Malaysian society as a whole. Islam is no longer a Muslim affair: *it is as much the concern of non-Muslims*". (my emphasis.) (15)

As far as Chandra is concerned, Islamic resurgence is largely part of a worldwide return to religion in the face of modernisation and an approach to development that has created urban-industrial societies which replace "the earlier organic character of the pre-industrial tribal or agrarian community" with "city life (that) is dichotomised and compartmentalised. Work and home, labour and recreation are separate components of a pattern of existence that is fragmented and isolated from the larger meaning of life and living." He notes it is the present young, educated, urban Muslims or Malay middle class (and not that of the 1950s and 1960s) who are "partly responsible for developing a more puristic, a more exclusive notion of identity." Malay Muslims like most South East Asian Muslims belong to the Shafii Mazhab (doctrinal school) of the Sunni

sect – one of four main doctrinal schools. But even within the 13 states in Malaysia, there are differences. In Perlis for example, the State constitution specifies that Perlis follows the Quran and Sunnah and not a particular mazhab. (16) Generally speaking, Malay Muslims are not of the Wahabi movement or the Shi'ite sect.

As is true of many if not all the world's major religions: the laws are divine, the interpretations are not – and local customs are yet another influence. Notwithstanding Chandra's observation of young, educated urban Muslims or Malay middle class developing a more 'puristic' notion of identity, many Malay Muslims have 'pluralistic' notions of identity and do not see themselves in terms of their religious or racial identity alone (even though Malaysian communal politics encourages such exclusivity).

Transnational values

Earlier, I mentioned Giddens' "range of fundamentalisms and the cosmopolitan world society that most of us would like to create". I did not deal with the cosmopolitan and I would like to now. Rabindranath Tagore wrote: "Neither the colourless vagueness of cosmopolitanism nor the fierce self-idolatry of nation worship is the goal of human history." (17)

'Cosmopolitan' certainly has the tinges of capitalist chic to it, a sort of 'New York London Paris Frankfurt Tokyo Kuala Lumpur' city-state chic (to my colleagues, please forgive the shameful bias of Kuala Lumpur, I don't know how it slipped in there…). In this sense, cosmopolitan may be "colourless" but I do not believe that is the only definition, and I dare say it is not how Giddens means it.

I choose to interpret 'cosmopolitan' to be the fundamental recognition for example that everyone in this room could be a Muslim. Everybody in this room could be Malaysian. Everybody in this room could be Japanese. That there are pluralistic definitions of these identities. (Of course, the 'Asian values' of our respective immigration laws make the realities of these pluralities very difficult – especially when you're the wife or if you are in a same sex relationship, when you're the significant other.) Everybody in this room could be American, Bhutanese, Dutch, English, French, German, Iranian, Iraqi, Jamaican, Korean, Lebanese – to use an alphabetical order.

Though needless to say, everybody in this room may refuse to identify themselves by nationality or sexuality or religion alone but as a thousand different things – including as sisters, brothers, daughters, mothers, husbands, sons and lovers, or simply, say human.

From cosmopolitan, I would like to end with the concept of 'transnational'. I'd never really heard of this word before coming to Tokyo. Often used in the

1970s interchangeably with 'international', the term 'transnational' today as I understand it means going beyond national boundaries – in a post-nation state sense - and more broadly, thinking 'beyond boundaries', akin to thinking by 'futurists' like Alvin Toffler in his *Third Wave*, but in more contemporary political and social science thinking by Anthony Giddens in his books such as *The Third Way,* also *Beyond Left & Right* as well as *The Transformation of Intimacy: Sexuality, love and eroticism in modern societies*.

But it was Professor Sakamoto Yoshikazu who seemed to sum things up most eloquently here in Tokyo with his concept of transnational civil societies – particularly as a possible way to deal with the 'crush of fundamentalisms' of power, poverty and post-cold war capitalism. Many others have discussed either the term 'civil society' or 'transnational'. I note Sakamoto-san has been talking about the same concept for some years now, and 'transnational' may well turn out to be a false route. (There was for me an ominous ring in Inoue Tatsuo's essay *Liberal Democracy and Asian Orientalism* where he writes: "They (the political leaders and spokespeople of several Asian governments) reject the assumption of a Liberal-Marxist dichotomy and advocate a third alternative: 'the Asian way'…a combination of capitalist economy and Asian values'." (18). Oh no, could transnational go the way of the old Asian values con?) Inoue adds, " To be sure, some serious thinkers expound more sophisticated and nuanced versions of the third way for Asian countries."

Here is where we might put Sakamoto-san. He argues persuasively for civil society and democratic world order in which he makes a differentiation between the term and concept of civil society, noting its various definitions from the time of Cicero ('societas civilis') to Hegel (burgerliche Gesellschaft) and which by the end of the 19th century seemed to have dried up, only to re-emerge again in the 1970s (in the democratic struggle against authoritarian state socialism such as by the Solidarity movement in Poland.). He considers that: "The unprecedented transformative dynamics of the modern world since the emergence of industrial capitalism in 18th century Europe seem to consist of the following contradictions which account for major conflicts and changes in modern times 1) capitalism vs socialism, 2) democracy vs authoritarianism and 3) nationalism vs internationalism." (19) He might have included religion but for some reason does not. Certainly by not doing so, he avoids the simplistic rut that Huntington makes between Islamic and 'Western' civilisations.

Sakamoto-san believes that the state, international organisation and the market in the contemporary world order must be grounded in civil society that is 1) "the engine of reflexive democratisation" and 2) "the source of democratic legitimation". Interestingly, he believes: "The family, school, hospital and non-governmental organisations will not constitute elements of the civil society I have in mind in so far as they are subordinated to and incorporated into the market as well as the state." This surely puts non-governmental organisations – sometime de facto moral guardians – in some challenging limbo.

Nevertheless, as Goenawan Mohamad writes: "A cross-national network of 'civil societies' free from any government control may bring back the relief that there are worthy values to be universally shared by different people with different identities." (20)

And there is "relief", not to mention hope for the liberal humanist project (which need not of course, be dominated by Francis Fukuyama's famous contention in *The End of History?*) that, as Sakamoto-san posits: "Capitalism, in the form of competitive free markets oriented to profit maximisation will have to undergo a significant modification, or even a radical re-examination because of the ecological constraints that are bound to grow, and because of the mounting democratic demands for equality and equity which run counter to the disparity and inequity resulting from the dynamics of competitive capitalism."

As I end this paper, it must be asked, particularly for the purposes of this symposium: how are 'transnational' or 'transnational values' being discussed – if at all - in bus queues, post offices and in between favourite tv programmes? I have to say that I am not enough of a 'public intellectual' to know. However, here is a top ten list, very tentatively offered, with a wry smile, for my own creative and artistic purposes once I get back home.

A Top Ten of 'Transnational values'

1. Cross-border/multi-disciplinary
   (multi-lingual, multi-layer)
2. Polymorphous
   (amorphous at least then)
3. Democratic
   (democracy - "an unfinished project": Wolin, 1989)
4. Spiritually-cognisant
   (not only secularism/religiosity)
5. Imaginative
   ('After irony')
6. 'Puniversal'
   (apparently elastic and contradictory)
7. Tolerant
   (learning to agree to disagree)
8. In multiples of 8…
   (that is, non-bipolar, non-dualist)

Author's note: I would like to thank the organisers of the ALFP Program for the initially disorienting experience and refreshing upset to a regular working routine in Malaysia rushing to meet with clients, deadlines, and generally juggling corporate, media, theatre, and NGO work. The sudden stop for two months to do nothing but read and talk and walk with any one or more of six new people became a great stimulus. I have had time to develop some of my own thoughts, to 'think regionally' and to understand in

greater depth (though hardly comprehensive) the ways that Japanese values are not homogenous or solely about high technology and a superb Tokyo subway system.

And despite hearing the sounds of various vans playing old patriotic wartime songs up and down the high street of Roppongi and other mainstream places in the city – I realise that not all Japanese – of course – would be so dismissive about the death of my maternal grandfather. (He was tortured and killed in WWII by Japanese soldiers commemorated at a war shine visited recently by a Prime Minister who apparently stands for reform.) It was a moving experience to visit the Nagasaki Atomic Bomb museum. (For me, the most potent exhibit is a melted rosary belonging to a woman who was worshipping at the time.) I listened to Professor Shinjii Takahashi, soft-spoken yet iron-calm, talking about his involvement in the difficult 'behind the scenes' debate about what to put on exhibit, and I was suddenly moved to tears. When later, privately, we talked and he said sorry, I was moved by the humility and futility of his apology (he older, me younger) for the death of a person who he never knew, I never knew, but who in my family would have been the patriarch of seven children, all with lives and families of their own. On Shinjii-san's recommendation, I also visited the Oka Masaharu Memorial Peace Museum. It's not, unfortunately, on the tourist map but it is about, as its leaflet says, "the non-Japanese people victimised by Japan's war of invasion who remain forgotten and unrecompensed even 50 years since the end of WWII." I also watched the videotape of the International Women's Tribunal held in Tokyo, in 2000, that sought to recognise rape as a war crime – and in which the verdict holds Emperor Hirohito accountable for the organisation of some 300,000 women from Japan and elsewhere in the region as so-called 'comfort women'. I did not even know there remains evidence and testimony of comfort women in Malaysia. (These are ''sensitive'' matters, as they say in Malaysia, not to be discussed openly or at least, to be discussed carefully.) It seemed though that for an older generation of Japanese who lived or fought during the war (and their sons and daughters), dealing with memories of the war is like dealing with a hair ball in the throat – patently there but if it is brought up: unsightly and distasteful, certainly difficult. A hair ball is not life-threatening.

It's been said before that cultural exchange programmes are a soft form of propaganda or íntelligence work for the countries, companies or individuals who sponsor them, and it is surely partly true; but let each programme be judged case by case on its own merits, and by what both parties hope to get out of it. My visit here and outside Tokyo has been enlightening; beyond a time and space that may be assumed within a period of 60 days. I-house was a cocoon. I have not had to worry about food, accommodation, finance, travelling, language, housework – all basics have been taken care to give me the luxury of time to do what I will. I am refreshed now with new energy and ideas. Thank you to all the individuals of I-House – notably Izumi-san, Naoko, Sonoda-san, and Tomoko – and at the Japan Foundation and its Asia Centre – Komatsu-san, Akiko, Chiharu-san, Ando-san, Thomas, and Ken Takiguchi in Kuala Lumpur. Thanks also to my generous colleagues of this year's Fellowship program.

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Reforms for Whom: Marginalised Communities of South Asia

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Unlike many other developing regions the urge for, advent and acceptance of market-led economic reforms are a somewhat recent phenomenon in South Asia. This phenomenon came to the limelight only after a majority of the South Asian countries including Bangladesh, India, Nepal, Pakistan and Sri Lanka made a major departure from *dirigiste* (state-directed economic development) and vigorously adopted the 'Washington Consensus' in the forms of liberalisation, privatisation, marketisation and modernisation. The immediate triggering factor was a major development paradigm dilemma for the entire South Asian region. This paradigm of centrally planned development had been the basis for macro-economic management for many decades, strongly conditioned by a traditional thrust on an inward-looking policy. (1)

The incompatibility of the traditional measures of intervention became more and more crystallized in the face of the complex and intensely competitive international environment. The remarkable success stories of Newly Industrial-ised Countries (NICs), the expansion of their production base and massive structural dynamism are in much contrast to slow moving South Asian countries which constitute over 20 percent of the total world population. The reforms had been imperative as their postponement would have further institutionalised a syndrome of severe price distortions, administrative overregulation, public sector inefficiency, falling savings and low yielding capital investment. All these had severely eaten into the resilience and sustainability of the South Asian economies.

Despite the known political difficulty of remedial action and the likelihood of perverse short term socio-economic effects, at least five of the seven South Asian countries including Bangladesh, India, Nepal, Pakistan and Sri Lanka, plunged into adjustment programs in the 1980s and 1990s. Bhutan and Maldives have not really defined their development strategies in the mould of market-led economic reforms, thereby remaining to a large extent within the framework of the traditional paradigm of governmental interventions. However, adoptions and implementation of these reform measures vary across the South Asian region in terms of i) time schedule, ii) sectoral coverage , iii) intensity and iv) sustainability. In other words, these countries are in different phases of economic reform programmes.

All these depended, at least in the last decade or so, on the nature of political regimes and outlook of the politicians holding key positions, as well as the degree of robustness of the economy in question. Besides the size and outlook

of bureaucracy and other organs of governance, articulation by pressure and interest groups including the private sector and the trade unions, and the perception and relative strength of international institutions like the World Bank and the IMF, played a rather critical role. The impact of economic reforms has also been varying in terms of visibility, nature and extent.

As these countries enhance and intensify the doses of liberalisation and privatisation, a changed regional profile is expected to emerge. This will inevitably inject two perceptibly relevant questions in the minds of South Asians. Will South Asia be as vibrant as the NICs, or as robust so that it is able to carve out a new paradigm of development for itself? Will the search for self-reliance, alleviation of poverty and social emancipation be over, or will it precariously hang between insolvency and subservience?

Against this backdrop of fast-changing economic profiles and social matrices, an attempt is made here to present three different shifts in the paradigms that are taking place in South Asian countries today. This paper also tries to simultaneously indicate the newly emerging paradigms. The paradigm shift is taken here as a distinct deviation from very well-established practices and widely followed development norms of the past; it is a conspicuous move away from systemic thinking, old institutional designs and governmental interventions to a regime characterised by free play of market forces, triggered essentially by non-state actors and non-governmental agencies.

Firstly, let us relate it to a development issue

'Development is government and government is development'. This has always been the case in South Asia. This thinking of government being the only development agency ruled South Asia for almost 50 years. In other words, entire development issues have been handled in such a way so as to give an instinctive impression that development is a prerogative and duty of only the government and state machineries. It made people too dependent on the government in every aspect of life. It confiscated their creativity and satiated the existence of traditionally voluntary societies. The community-based development ethos which had been the strongest pillar of the South Asian countries was thus gradually eroded by the actions of the governments. More acutely, the modern system of governance, backed by better technology and technical inputs, was never injected in an overwhelmingly rural South Asia.

However, in the last decade, this thinking has been undergoing a perceptible change. This is mainly because of the economic reforms under which governments have cut down welfare activities and started imposing fiscal discipline. Despite a persistent debate on the efficacy of market-led reforms in the region, the governments have started gradually withdrawing from the development activities.

The critical issue here is that of poverty and inequality. A driving force in the economic reforms process is the unabated hope of significant poverty reduction over the long term. This is expected to take place through contribution to economic growth, productivity and consumption benefits. The school of thought having an abiding faith in this positive facet believes that most developing countries will gain from the economic reforms process while some will benefit more than others.

However, there are a number of countries that have unfavourable initial conditions, making them less suited to take advantage of economic reforms and globalisation. They are likely to lose out and become more marginalised in relation to other countries.

Poverty in all forms is alarmingly massive in South Asia. Given the nature, extent and spatial distribution of poverty in the region, the issue of food security in South Asia has acquired an imperative dimension requiring full scale regional attention. Will the expected higher growth rate alone mitigate South Asia's deep-rooted problems of poverty and inequality, ill-health and illiteracy? And most important of all, will this growth rate be sustainable without costing much to human misery? These are the challenges as well as dangers.

There is a fierce quantum of scepticism about the ability of economic reforms alone to mitigate the human miseries in this sub-continent. This has been borne out by the experiences of similar other countries where economic reforms-led growth has not automatically been translated into noticeable poverty reduction and human development. More seriously, the globalisation-led new tentacles of poverty are yet to be known as they have yet to unfold fully. Will the existing institutions and delivery mechanisms, meant to mitigate poverty in the region, be able to tackle the emerging fangs of poverty, particularly when they are likely to be more complex and intractable?

Therefore, it is not just the pace of economic growth that matters for poverty alleviation, but also the kind and quality of growth.

The old system of delivering goods mainly through bureaucracy did not reduce poverty. In fact, bureaucracy became the main hurdle for delivery of goods and services to the poor. There has been much less accountability, lots of leakages and no capacity building. A negligible effort has been made to empower the downtrodden in the entire anti-poverty interventions.

Political leaders are now therefore looking for new alignments other than their traditional partners like bureaucrats. They are seeking more efficient, effective, sustainable and people-friendly alternatives to present delivery mechanisms. They want new development partners including NGOs, NPOs, the private sector and other civil society agencies.

At the same time, there have been a number of NGOs-led activities that have made significant difference in the alleviation of poverty. Their main thrust has been on local leadership, indigenous technology, local resources, empowerment and capacity building. We can cite a whole range of examples of these micro-level interventions, far away from the traditional macro-level interventions.

However, the biggest challenge is: how to transmit or trickle down the high economic growth injected by economic reforms into the alleviation of poverty?

What should be the transmission or trickle-down mechanism?

If it is the same old delivery mechanism, people will be further marginalised.

But no one knows the new mechanism. Hence the new partners in development have a critical role to play.

There are already very discouraging signs that after the economic reforms were initiated in many countries of South Asia, the number of people below the poverty line has sharply increased and the inequality of income has further widened.

The estimated number of people below the poverty line in Bangladesh was 47.5% in 1995-96. Though the rural poverty remained stable, there was a sharp increase in urban poverty from 13% to 18% of the total poor population during 1986-96. This also indicated the spilling over of rural poverty in urban areas. This was accompanied by a noticeable increase in inequality as indicated by the Gini coefficient which rose from 0.36 in 1983-84 to 0.432 in 1995-96.(2) In Pakistan, the latest *Economic Survey* emphatically mentions that poverty significantly and steadily increased from 17.3 % in 1987-88 to 32.6% in 1998-99. (3) In the income inequality trends also, the Gini coefficient rose from 0.355 in 1985-86 to 0.410 in 1992-93 showing a definite consolidation of inequality in Pakistan. (4)

This means the gains of better economic performance have been usurped by the haves. The have-nots continued to be marginalised and ignored.

So, are economic reforms today a question of now or never? Its high growth rate vs the process of marginalisation. The only hope is the changing paradigm of development intervention where governmental machineries will increasingly be replaced by the peoples' own delivery mechanisms. Will the real empowerment of people take place?

Secondly, let us highlight an environmental issue

A significant portion of South Asia is the Himalayan region including Bhutan and Nepal. The Himalayas conserve the South Asian plains land, provide water and

energy, and regulate the climate including rainfall. They are very critical for all the South Asian systems.

Economic reforms have posed significant challenges to the Himalayas and people living in the hills and the mountains. Traditionally, the hills and mountains remain largely far off from the mainstream business centres. But the reforms and globalisation process may change the entire existing paradigm in the mountain areas. For instance, in the mountain region, there has been very marginal integration of money, factor, product and labour markets. The pace of integration itself has been very slow and differential. The existing system cannot do much about it whereas the forces of globalisation would like this integration process to be both quicker and substantive.

In the newly emerging paradigm, multinational corporations (MNCs) and other private entrepreneurs are going to the hills to harness the natural resources, tourism and other hitherto restricted sectors. Their dictum of strategic alliances, and mergers and acquisitions will largely eliminate the traditional small and medium entrepreneurs in the hills and mountains. The likely impact on mountain areas will be in aspects of market, natural resources, land, poverty and the traditional niches.

Though agricultural produce will have better access to the market because of better communication and development of infrastructure, many of the resources will be very badly exposed and exploited.

The nature-based niche is already eroding. Globalisation may accelerate this process. For example, off-season vegetables which were grown in the hills and fetched a good price, are now grown in the green houses of many plain lands. Similarly, traditional niche products like apples of the hills are now increasingly replaced by apples brought from countries like Australia, Korea and China. This has been possible because fruits and vegetables have been put in the open general licence category (OGL) and are declared as freely importables. This has resulted in a steady slide-down in prices thereby leading to a sharp fall in areas under crop (food and fruit) cultivation.

Since most of the hills and mountain systems have strong endowments of natural resources like water and forests, the big development projects including roads, high dams and industries may induce a large scale displacement of people and also lead to environmental insecurity. This will also bring about conflicts over natural resources management both within the country and across the borders.

On top of this, there are indications to show how the phenomenon of climate change has started impacting the occupational patterns and agricultural practices in the mountain areas. A study carried out by the Kathmandu-based South Asian Association for Regional Cooperation (SAARC) Secretariat showed

that there is likely to be increased ice melting in the Himalayas because of the increasing impact of the Green House Effect. Further, the changes in rainfall patterns could inundate vast areas of the flood plains of the Ganga-Brahmaputra-Barak basins thereby multiplying the miseries and sufferings of millions of people. (5)

The entire eastern Himalayan zone had an unbelievably warm and pleasant winter in 1998-99. Many people in fact missed the usual winter conditions like fog, chill, frost and snow. Environmentalists largely attributed this unique climatic behaviour to global warming and the resultant changing global climate. Winter is usually the time when forest cover is under a cold spell and gets some regenerative space. However, this long spell of dryness led to forest fires and young seedlings died because of poor moisture. This literally dried up the sources of water thereby adversely affecting the bushes and scrubs in the forest, and provisions of drinking water. In this chain, traditional and grazing areas got high and dry. In other words, the entire natural cycle was disturbed.

This had visible adverse effects on the economy of Sikkim including drinking water, ravi crops and cash crops like cardamom, ginger and orange cultivation. According to the Agriculture Department, the total rainfall between October 1998 and March 31, 1999 was 93.34% less than the rainfall in the last 25 years in the State! Because of this prolonged drought, the farmers had to both postpone the sowing of seeds and in many cases had to resort to re-sowing of the same. Cardamom bushes that had survived all kinds of climatic depredations for the last six to eight decades also got dried to the hilt.

It had a telling effect on the farmers of the North Sikkim as cardamom and vegetables, particularly cabbages, form the backbone of the tribal economy of the region bordering Tibet. It is estimated that 60% of the State's large cardamom was lost in this unprecedented dry spell. The North district alone produces more than 2,500 tonnes of large cardamom annually, the bulk of which is exported and fetches nearly Rs20 crore. Bhutan, Nepal and many parts of the Himalayan region have started facing this unprecedented problem.

Receding of glaciers, hot winters, poor regenerative cycles have started showing their fangs. All these may lead to the failure of multiple industries, mostly traditional in structure and composition. This in turn could trigger off large-scale migration.

Farmers also have less maneuverability. They have limited knowledge, and a life support system based on natural inputs. If the natural resources chain is disturbed, the process of irreversibility sets in. The increasing role of the market may disrupt the mountains. Pressure on land for purely commercial purposes will be disastrous for the mountain areas. There are increasing trends that rich people from plain lands are buying land in the mountain areas for their use, mainly as tourist resorts etc. This has put tremendous pressure on land and topography.

Also, Himalayan flora and fauna including rare species of plants will be exploited by pharmaceutical industries in such a manner that they may become extinct. Patents and intellectual property rights will be monopolised. For example, in the case of medicinal plants which are considered to be prime properties of the mountain areas, the losses could be encountered on four counts i.e., i) these plants have been over exploited, ii) there has been severe loss of intellectual property rights, iii) there has been a big loss to the state exchequer as this trade is done informally and iv) traditional communities do not gain anything out of the commercial exploitation. For instance, a major question has been: what does a company like Dabur, a major player in this area, actually give to the communities who once owned these plants?

Finally, there is strong apprehension that people who are already on the periphery will be further marginalised by the process of globalisation. This is because the forces that have marginalised them so far cannot really be offset by the positive forces of globalisation. This will not only widen the gap between the people of the high land and low land but also within the people of the hills. This may trigger off a chain and variety of civil unrest as witnessed in Nepal today in the form of the Maoists movement and violence.

But it does not mean that reforms are bad for the mountain areas. The question is who will monitor and regulate these reforms and the agents of reforms? Globalisation does not prevent any states/ governments from playing their development role. Therefore, the public policy domain is always a critical area of intervention. Is government capable of doing this?

And finally, let us bring forward a technological issue

The reform measures undertaken by these economies have a distinct slant on the virtual free-for-all in the import of technology. Despite the known fact that new modern technologies could inject a fresh dynamism to the entire spectrum of economic activities in the region, there are some genuine concerns related to accessibility, affordability, adaptability and spatial and class impact of such technologies. Though the technological advances have tended to erode longstanding geographical, ideological and political obstacle for cross-border transactions, the South Asian indigenousness, innovativeness and low cost technology will be adversely affected, particularly in the context of labour-intensive forms of production which have been crucial to the generation of employment and to the sustenance of poor people.

The biggest impact of globalisation is derived from infrastructure and technology gains. This means a whole gamut and network of infrastructure will be forthcoming to supplement and complement the process of globalisation. Globalisation is a shelf of technologies and the process is essentially driven by value addition. Technology is a dynamic process, Its demonstration effects are tremendous. Choice of technology is therefore very vital. It is not choice per se.

The more critical factors are availability, accessibility, affordability and adaptability.

Since all this tends to unleash forces that undermine the norms implicit in domestic practices, conflicts within and between nations are engendered over domestic norms and the social institutions that embody them.

On the other hand, South Asia, particularly India, is emerging to be the hub of global information technology. This is where South Asian countries can come together on a common platform to reverse the flow of technology from the South to North.

It can be said that the world is divided between the North and South, between developed and developing countries, and the First and The Third World by four major factors viz., i) finance, ii) technology, iii) trade and industry and iv) development level. The paradigm that has governed the world economic system for so long has been based on the superiority and maneuverability space provided by these factors to developed countries.

For example, in the existing paradigm, technology has been used as a very potent instrument for keeping the Third World at a poor level of development. It has always been a one-way flow of technology from the North to the South. A very highly restricted regime of technology transfer has governed the relations between the North and the South. Developing countries have always been and deliberately kept as dependent. More importantly, technology issues have always been attached to trade, aid, investment, and to a large extent, strategic factors like security.

For the first time, this regime is likely to undergo some change as indicated by the large scale information-related transfer of technology from the South to the North. Some of the countries in South Asia are emerging as major exporters of both software and professionals. For example, out of the US' global outsourcing of IT software, almost 19-25% originates in India alone. India's IT related software exports are expected to be roughly USD$50 billion by the year 2008.

So for the first time there seems to be a reverse flow of technology from the South to the North - a direct outcome of the reforms and globalisation process.

At the international level, two major issues have again come up.

Firstly, the IT software exports are too US-centric thereby making exporters very vulnerable to any instability in the US market and system. This came up very prominently after the Sept 11 terrorist attack on the World Trade Center and the subsequent slowdown in the US economy.

Secondly, developed countries have always closed the gates for entry to natural persons, including professionals, from developing countries. Will they now accept the movement of natural persons to their countries, particularly in the services sector?

The fact remains that this new paradigm of technology transfer is also driven by developed countries.

At the regional level, two very serious challenges have come up in terms of the 'digital divide'. Within the same region, some countries are distinctly deprived of gains from the IT boom. This will bring a major divide among the countries within developing countries. The least developed countries like Bangladesh, Bhutan, Maldives, Laos, Vietnam, Myanmar and Nepal will be further marginalised.

Within the IT exporting countries also, the accessibility to new technology, computer and knowledge is limited to a very microscopic minority both at the regional and local level. For instance, in India personal computers are available to 2.7 persons per thousand, in Pakistan 3.9 persons and in Sri Lanka 4.1 persons. Similarly, the Internet is used by 0.23 persons per 10,000 in India, 0.34 in Pakistan, 0.63 in Sri Lanka and 0.12 in Nepal. (6)

Most of these facilities are however, concentrated only in the cities and other big towns. This digital divide will therefore further marginalise the people who always remained in the periphery. Most critically, the people in the periphery have been the overwhelming majority.

Therefore, the fundamental question remains "reforms for whom"?

Are they for the microscopic powerful haves or for the traditionally deprived and marginalised have-nots?

Answers, approaches and strategies are yet to be found. Governments and States will not find these as they are the part of the game. It is the responsibility of the civil society, and in particular public intellectuals, to set the rules of the game right.

This requires a two way action:

i) Sensitisation and mobilisation of the masses along with the policy makers and;

ii) Creation of a pressure group of public intellectuals based on the sensitised mobilisation. This pressure group has to have a strong local identity, and equally strong cross-border linkages so that their actions could be well coordinated and acceptable. The greatest hope is the fact that these pressure groups are fast emerging in different parts of the region. They are already in

action in some other parts and have started making tangible difference.

Author's note: I would like to express my deep sense of gratitude to both International House of Japan and Japan Foundation Asia Centre for giving me this rare opportunity of working with a set of distinguished Fellows from other parts of Asia. I have immensely benefited in terms of intellectual exchange, experience sharing and community living. A very warm hospitality that is typical of Japan and Japanese society made our stay extraordinarily beautiful. This was my first visit to Japan. Before I went to Japan, I had this deep-rooted impression about Japan essentially as a developed market economy, characterised by all tantrums of capitalism. However, I have come back to India with a diametrically opposite imprint that Japan despite being a developed market economy has the Asianness as the basis and roots of its development. It is essentially an Asian nation in all senses of the term – its people, values, cultural practices, political institutions and natural attachments. Though the level, nature and pattern of problems and public debate are different in Japan, the issues discussed here are essentially the same as that facing any Asian country today.

It is therefore, in the collective thinking and action on all these issues that Japan can make a tangible difference in Asia. And in the process of re-inventing Japan as an Asian nation, other countries in Asia could contribute to the strengthening of modern Japan.

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The Paradigm Shift Towards Sound Globalisation: From Charity to Civil Rights, From Nation to Global Society

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Introduction

The wealth produced by today's world is the greatest ever in the history of humankind. However, the gap between the rich and poor countries of the world is becoming increasingly wider and many are trapped in the quagmire of poverty with no way out. According to a report issued by the IBRD, the difference in income between rich and poor countries most drastically increased after the Cold War during the 1990s when neo-liberal economic policies came into practice. Not only that, the gap in incomes between rich and poor within a given country is becoming increasingly wider.

This disparity in the distribution of wealth among Asian countries, which suffered terribly from the foreign currency crisis of 1997 and the sudden outflow of short-term capital in those countries, is increasing at a critical rate. In the case of Korea, the number of households with a state of living below the poverty line increased by 50% in 1998 compared to that of 1997. Not only that, the Gini Coefficient of all households, including those of private entrepreneurs increased from 0.399 in 1997 to 0.440 in 1998. This reflects the critical disparity of the distribution of wealth in Korean society caused by the foreign currency crisis.

The reason for such increase in poverty all over the world, as well as the increase in the disparity of the distribution of wealth lies in a globalisation process which has been ruthlessly pursued by neo-liberal economic policies that promote unlimited competition and place an overly strong emphasis on winning and success. The rapid spread of market consumerism and neo-liberal economic practices has caused the market to become an idol, leading economists and policy makers to place everything at the mercy of market forces, thereby forcing humankind to live not in an ordered society but in an economic realm where the winner takes all and the loser is left with nothing.

As a result, the majority of the world's population – except for those in the few countries which have benefited thus far from this process of globalisation - regard globalisation as a force which threatens their lifestyles, their living environment, and their forms of government which exist to ensure their security and well being.

Samuel Huntington diagnosed the reason behind the September 11 incident as that of a 'clash of civilisations'. Some view it as a religious conflict. However, the

true reason and cause of that incident was poverty. In other words, the root cause of the September 11 incident was the despairing state of poverty for those who have been excluded and marginalised from the process of globalisation because of their religious or cultural backgrounds. Thus, the correct response would be to address the issue of poverty and to eradicate the causes of it. However, the response of the US was rage, violence, war and murder. Because of the successful military campaign in Afghanistan, it seems as if the US has been able to retaliate against those who oppose the American style of globalisation and the American dominant world order. It further seems that the US regards its success in Afghanistan as a 'green light' that allows it to pursue and accelerate the American style of globalisation, with no strongly opposing forces or groups.

Surely, there is no denying that the September 11 incident has raised the alarm to rethink the problems of a neo-liberal globalised society that allows excess production to dominate, and increases the disparity of wealth. It has also revealed that the US, with its state-of-the-art military weapons and best-equipped armed forces was not without its soft spot and could be vulnerable to a few men armed with knives and a willingness to sacrifice their lives to gain their objectives. The military attack and invasion of Afghanistan by Americans has only aggravated the issue and turned many more people against them. The path that the Americans have chosen to take is like trying to cure a liver cancer patient who has jaundice with facial powder. Although the light facial powder applied to the patient means the symptoms of jaundice cannot be seen, it does nothing to really treat or reverse the symptoms. It only puts off the inevitable dark facts of reality.

In the process of globalisation in accordance with neo-liberal economic policies, and when Asian countries suffered the dramatic financial crisis of 1997, many people committed suicide because of their losses in the stock market. The middle class of society collapsed and disappeared. Numerous people became jobless as a result of downsizing. Hundreds became homeless and entire families were scattered before the strong winds of economic devastation.

The number of those affected and victimised by such economic devastation far exceeds, by hundreds of thousands, the number of those who lost their lives during the September 11 incident. If we define terror as the sudden and violent killing of innocent civilians, is it not fair to call the suffering people in these countries the victims of terror committed by international hedge funds? Of course, many of the people who call themselves investors would jump and say, "What are you talking about? All I did was make a sound financial decision". The very fact that such 'innocent' financial decisions on the part of totally good-willed investors in one part of the world can have such devastating and catastrophic life-taking results clearly points to a major deficiency in the current system of neo-liberal capitalism. The possibility of this deficiency causing another fatality any time in the near future continues to exist.

Even after four years have passed since the 1997 crash, there has been no common consensus or agreement that there is even a defect in the current neo-liberal economic system, let alone any preventive measures to ensure that such a fatal incident does not occur again. Even more alarming is the fact that various transnational companies have stepped up their level of despotic economic activities. Of course, the perpetrators of the September 11 incident conducted their work with malicious intent, and so they are in a way different from the short-term operation of speculative capital, and as such subject to criticism. However, the fact that their specific target was the World Trade Center, which is the de facto symbol of today's global market capitalism, must be understood as a message urging us to address the problems and flaws of globalisation and to bring new order to the economic system.

In all fairness, we must admit that it makes no sense to bring the globalisation process to a halt and scrap everything because of the rapid increase in the development of information and communication technology in today's society. However, the current process of globalisation inherently has many problems – it lacks any sense of community amongst participating members, has no systematic process and practice of regulating the excessive strength and abusive behaviour of developed countries and transnational companies which operate in a political climate still based upon their geographical nation states.

The current practice of globalisation allows for the free movement of capital across national borders (while products are regulated through the use of the quota system), and transnational companies have the freedom to relocate anywhere in the world. All of this freedom of movement is in areas where the developed countries have a comparative advantage.

However, in areas where the developing and less developed countries have a comparative advantage – most notably in the area of human labour – strict limitations enforced by the immigration laws of each country effectively stifle any productive movement. Not only that, transnational companies can invest and produce their materials in any country in the world. Yet the taxes from their income and production are only paid to the country where their head office is located.

No welfare benefits exist for the hundreds and thousands of poor that live in those other countries that bring about such income.

As such, the global market is nothing but an uneven playing field where the rich and powerful countries and companies with their economic power exploit and rob the poor peoples of weaker countries.

It is only when we appropriate a system which equally develops the areas of economics, politics, and social welfare, and put in place a safeguard which works to alleviate the defects and market failure of the global market capital system

(so that those who are stronger actively seek to further the common good rather than simply their individual wealth) that we can progress to a healthier and wholesome form of globalised society.

As we stand on the threshold of a globalised society, the greatest task before humankind is the establishment of one that is balanced in the areas of economics, politics, and social welfare. However, it seems this is a far off dream for us at present. To address the reality of a less developed political and social welfare system in today's global society, we must slacken the speed of economic globalisation currently being relentlessly pursued by the forces of capital and transnational companies. We must allow for the development of the other two aspects – politics and social welfare – to catch up, and thus balance the tripartite columns that are needed to secure a sound and stable global society. This is imperative if we wish to prevent the fatal incidents of September 11 and another Asian economic crisis. Also, the formation of blocs among regional countries must focus not only on the unification of the product and financial markets, but also the labour market, much like the EU. The regional blocs, as a network, must seek to unify the political and social welfare aspects of society. This process of formulating regional cooperative blocs can naturally lead to a better process of globalisation and a more unified global society.

The network of solidarity and globalisation of non-governmental organisations which is a centre for the protest against the current way of globalisation is something which is developing in parallel with the globalisation of the financial market, the Internet, communication and modes of travel. As yet, there has been no charismatic leader to emerge from the anti-globalisation camp. However, five years ago, when a global solidarity network against the powers of globalisation seemed like a dream, large-scale protests in Seattle, Washington DC, Davos and other areas pointed to opposing forces of globalisation with some financial power and cohesiveness as a group. (Perhaps they will be acknowledged in due course.) If the current process of globalisation continues to aggravate the poverty of peoples and increase the disparity of wealth among nations and among people within nations, the cohesive resentment and repercussions of anti-globalisation groups will become volatile. This may well result in bringing the golden tower thus far erected over the past 50 years by the market economic system to a spectacular crash.

This article will seek to address the problems related with the neo-liberal process of globalisation as well as review the current disparity between the poor and rich in order to propose a healthy direction for the future development of globalisation – one that enhances political and social welfare areas of society, a balance between efficiency and equality, while at the same time reduces the current speed of economic globalisation. There is an alternative that properly addresses the deficiencies of the free wheeling market system, a basic flaw inherent in the current capitalist system of globalisation.

The writer will also propose a new understanding of welfare from the current form of charity to one which regards the pursuit of well-being as a basic civil right, regardless of one's ethnic, geographic, religious or cultural background. Such an understanding can provide for an alternative form of proper and healthy globalisation. Also, the writer will seek to propose a paradigm shift in welfare policy practices from a national level to a global level. Finally, the writer will seek to discuss how to put the proposed new paradigm into effect.

The Causes of Poverty and Inequality

One Economic Unit, Many Social Units: In order for us to truly move into a unified economic system, humankind must commonly possess a sense of membership in one community. A unified economic system must be based on this sort of social consciousness. According to the logic of neo-liberalism, as the market becomes unified into one single market without restrictions and without the burden of having to provide social welfare benefits or labour unions, there will be an increase in investments and productivity as a result of the strong market forces. The market itself will increase consumption of goods, which will increase the size of the 'pie', thereby increasing jobs and incorporating the jobless into the market. And this will bring about a better society for all.

However, such logic is only applicable when the economic society and the political society are closely integrated into one unit. In the current reality where the mega industrial and financial powers are the de facto regulators of global economy and one super country, the 'US' seeks its own country's selfish prosperity only – idealistic globalisation is impossible.

So long as the political realm is still limited by the borders of nation states, globalisation is *asymmetrical*. We cannot say that we live in a global society, and as such, no matter how large the 'pie' gets, there is no system by which the benefits of this pie can be shared among peoples across national boundaries. Before opening the gates to economic globalisation, people in the world should share as being members of one global community. Patriotism based on nation country should be changed to philanthropy based on love of neighbours in one 'Earth village'.

The Asymmetry Between Economics and Politics: The current process of globalisation is a process based on a neo-liberalism, driven mainly by the US. The US has increased its pressure on other countries to open their markets to market forces. Not only that, the US is increasingly attempting to incorporate less developed countries' economies into the larger industrial-financial capital system, utilising these countries as production bases and at the same time seeking to increase income through exploitation of these countries' financial markets (including the areas of insurance and the stock market).

This current process of globalisation has brought about unexpected repercussions such as when the foreign exchange rate of South Africa dropped by more than half during the war in Afghanistan. The decision made by US President George W Bush to project his country's power and to regain his political position inside the US was the cause of much grief and pain for numerous people in countries with no political relation with the US. Indeed, this was the cause of a wipe-out of half the wealth of the people in South Africa. The people of South Africa had no way of addressing their grievances to the US President, nor did the suffering and pain of the South African people have any channel to affect the deliberation of George W Bush before he gave the order to begin bombing Afghanistan. In such a way, while political activities remain limited to the nation state, the liberation of economies in the global society reflects a system that can only bring about unexpected adverse side effects. These effects come from globalisation in disequilibrium. Without remedy to achieve balanced globalisation between economy and politics, world peace cannot be maintained.

The Asymmetry between Capital and Labour: There are two ways of accumulating wealth in the capitalist market economy. One is to work hard and earn one's money through sweaty labour, and the other is to accumulate wealth through capital gain that does not involve any difficult form of manual labour. The current practice of globalisation allows free movement of capital across national borders and easy relocation for transnational companies anywhere in the world for the cheapest forms of labour. As mentioned, all of this freedom of movement is in areas where the developed countries have a comparative advantage. In developing and less developed countries, however, strict limitations enforced by the immigration laws of each country effectively stifle any productive movement under the premise of protecting the country's industries. Such policies as the Industrial Trainee System, or limiting the inflow of foreigners through the issuance of tourist visas and other forms of immigration restrictions are increasing the number of immigrant workers with 'undocumented' status. This allows governments to ignore or simply deport them when they become a social and political liability. Therefore, most of the migrant workers who cross borders into other countries are subject to serious cases of human rights abuse. In such ways, the current process of globalisation allows for total freedom on the part of the rich and powerful while constricting the freedom of poor labourers who are at a comparative disadvantage, thereby bringing about disequilibrium. Balancing these disequilibrium of globalisation is the first thing to be straightened out.

The Damage Caused by Speculative Hot Money: The people who benefit the most during the current asymmetrical globalisation period are those who operate short-term speculative capital investments. The financial capitals of developed countries have invented new kinds of financial derivatives – for example, swaps, futures, options – and manipulated the international financial market to their advantage, transferring vast amounts of borrowed money

through electronic methods into new derived financial accounts, thereby accumulating massive gains. Further to money market speculation, they go into company speculation with junk bonds. And while they do these kinds of transactions, mass labourers are made unemployed. Not only that, the speculative capital invades the weaker financial systems of less developed countries, wreaking havoc among foreign currency markets and the foreign exchange of that country. Of the total USD$1.5 trillion transacted through financial markets globally each day, only two percent is for realistic trade in products and services. Ninety-eight percent is speculative financial capital transactions seeking capital gains.

It was just such speculative foreign financial capital that shook the Asian economies in late 1997. They were in no way able to stand against the massive weight of these funds entering and receding from their financial markets. Not only did these financial speculators wreak havoc among the Asian economies, they showed no remorse for their actions and blamed the chaos as a lack of 'competitiveness' and 'knowledge' in regards to the international financial market system. Not one cent of their capital gain, which was taken from the less developed countries without any labour input, was returned to these countries in the form of taxes. This is because the less developed countries are powerless to levy taxes on these international financial transactions. Global society is unable to develop an alternative to tame the tiger of international financial capital, or the US that is currently wielding super power over the world.

The Asymmetry Between Economics and Welfare: As long as national boundaries and country borders exist to separate the global community politically, despite the massive amounts of wealth accumulated by trans-national companies which operate anywhere in the world with impunity and the unregulated freedom of the international financial market, all proceeds from such income will only be used as the financial assets of the countries where the headquarters of companies are situated. Not a cent will be available for the welfare of the hundreds of thousands of poor in less developed countries where the profit was taken. There will only be a small trickling of financial support in the form of charity. In the current situation where political society remains divided according to nation states, and where a welfare system at a global level is non-existent, the movement towards globalisation of economic society will only be imbalanced. It will simply be a 'heaven' for those transnational companies and limited number of countries and people who have the 'competitive advantage' while being a 'living hell' for the majority of the masses.

Market Instability: According to the advocates of the 'Butterfly Theory', a butterfly flapping its wings in the US can be the cause of a typhoon in China, half way around the world. However, current experiences – of the collapse of financial stock markets all over the world, the speed and degree of economic recession in countries throughout the world, an increase in unemployment as a result of the aftershock of the September 11 incident and the war in Afghanistan

– lend credibility to this 'theory' being more of a reality. Within the current system of globalisation, the economic situation of one country is closely linked with the economic situation of a neighbouring country. Each has an effect on the other, which makes recession a contagious disease among countries. Again, this is because globalisation has only taken place in limited areas of economic activity. The political activity of countries is encapsulated within their geographical boundaries and no global safeguard or social safety net is available. Without building up many gates to protect market instability at the global level, it will be difficult at times to control the galloping horse that is the market economy.

Lack of True Virtues: The accelerated process of globalisation after the 1990s has become a force which has converted the value and worth of humankind into monetary terms, enforcing a 'marketisation' of our entire society into a world so that it regards monetary gain and profit as the highest motivation. The virtue of freedom – a value in modern society – has been relegated to be the ensuring force for private possession in the globalisation process, thereby simply becoming a freedom to own and exploit at one's will. Not only that, the very virtue of equality has been corrupted within today's world of unlimited competition – to the extent that it is simply an equality which is relatively applied according to one's capability to adjust to the market mechanism. Also, the current process of globalisation tends to identify society and the market as one entity. So that the only ability, which is regarded as ability, is that of profit gained through the most expedient means. It seems to be that we live in the market, not in society.

As a result, areas of theology, philosophy, ethics, spirituality, and morality are no longer regarded seriously and the ability to gain profit or 'make money' is the primal virtue in today's society. It is a well known fact that the work of great thinkers and artists who left a lasting impression in the history of humankind, such as Socrates, Galileo, van Gogh, Mozart, and Marx remained unrecognised during their lifetime, often living in poverty and hunger. All this goes to show that the market system does not have an ability to properly assess and evaluate the worth and value of products and services provided through human labour.

The greatest flaw in the capitalist system is that it leaves determination of the value of human individuals to market forces. Although the encouragement of virtues and values is sorely needed, there is little possibility for the development of such values within the current atmosphere of the market-dominated neo-liberal society. Not only that, we are currently committing the fault of driving out counsellors from the labour market – counsellors who may lead us to alternatives for social problems faced in the areas of spiritual and moral virtues.

As a result, social philosophy, which forms the basis of social structure, has been weakened and the spirit of community has given way to 'jungle capitalism' where only the fittest survive. The global society patterned according to the neo-

liberal globalisation process cannot put forth alternatives for the social contradictions of capitalism, the flaws of the market system or the failure of the market. It cannot posit alternative values and virtues, or enable true ethics and morals to take root. It is a society which is structurally contradictory and which only aggravates division and disparity.

The biggest reason why globalisation is not properly taking place is because the majority of individuals in the world still think along national lines and they are mainly concerned with their individual survival. The more than six billion people of the world all possess different characteristics, abilities and skills, while each country and nation have their own specific history, culture and religion. The lifestyles of some communities in the most remote parts of Africa and Asia still resemble that of the Stone Age. If all the individuals who currently live together in the world truly wanted to prosper together in a global society, they would have to share a common consciousness as global citizens and be willing to sacrifice some of their individual benefits for the sake of the whole global society. It is only when those who reside in more developed and prosperous countries are able to step beyond their personal interests and to stand in solidarity with the suffering peoples on the other side of the world that we can say the basic infrastructure for a truly healthy and global society has been established.

Longing for An Equal Society: If we do not formulate a system whereby we can support the social welfare policies for the benefit and protection of the weaker members of society on a global scale and simply seek to pursue market efficiency for the profitability of the capitalists and transnational companies, we will only succeed in formulating a global society which strengthens profits of the stronger and more developed countries while impoverishing the majority of other countries and peoples in these countries. If we fail to balance the disparity of the current process of globalisation, the gap between the rich and poor will become worse.

The continuation of this form of globalisation will only breed, in the heart of the excluded and marginalised majority, a 'yearning for a society where each individual works according to one's skills and receive according to one's needs'. The cause of the September 11 incident can be analysed as a desperate action taken by those who are suffering in the quagmire of extreme poverty because their way of life and their cultural background do not match the religious and moral trend of jungle capitalism's globalisation. Having no legitimate way of expressing their desperation or having their grievances properly addressed, they chose to vent their frustration in the only imaginable way they understood could have an effect on the current trend of globalisation. Although the US may feel that they have done justice to the terrorists by winning the battle in Afghanistan, they have only increased the 'yearning for a society where each individual works according to one's skills and receive according to one's needs'.

Possibility of the Downfall of Mankind: The September 11 incident has shown quite clearly that a small number of extremists can carry out simultaneous acts of terror, which can bring about a global economic recession. Even groups without any financial ability and limited learning can come together as a volatile force against the process of globalisation if they consolidate their strength to protest against the current system which places the lives of the majority under the suffering yoke of poverty.

Humankind produces enough goods and services for all if we are willing to share with one another. Humankind has no other natural enemy except itself which is caught in a dangerous conflict due to the present process of globalisation. The fittest survive according to the law of competitive selection. However, the fittest should know that nobody wants to lose. When there are many losers, the only way for them to challenge a few winners is to conglomerate their powers and fight. It is also the law of natural survival. In an era where even those who are limited in financial resources and scientific knowledge are able to manufacture nuclear weapons, bio-chemical weapons and other weapons of mass destruction, the conflict and tension between rich and poor, developed countries and less developed countries, can bring about the unthinkable possibility of the downfall of all of humankind. The best way to prevent this disaster is to share the wealth and opportunity of life with less competitive people and help underdeveloped countries to be in line.

Poverty & Inequality in The Process of Globalisation

Situation in Korea after the Foreign Exchange Crisis

After the sudden currency crises in '97, many Asian countries experienced serious recession. Korea was no exception. People suffered from unemployment, poverty and inequality. In this section, I look at how globalisation caused Asian people's lives to deteriorate. I will be looking at newly evoked problems in Korean society under the IMF relief loan system.

Povertisation: <Table 1> outlines the poverty rate in the period following the outbreak of the foreign exchange crisis. According to the table, the poor people among urban working households increased dramatically from '97 to '98. In one year, absolute poverty rate increased to 21.3% from 13.7%.

<Table 1> **Poverty Rate**

	'97	'98	'99
Absolute Poverty Rate(%)	13.7	23.5	20.1

Source: "Poverty Conditions for the Rep. of Korea in the Aftermath of the Financial Crisis", PSPD, 2000. pp38.

According to <Table 2> the poverty population increased from 5.4 million to 9.5 million in one year from '97 to '98. This figure clearly shows how international hot money affected lives of Korean people in the aftermath of the financial crisis.

<Table 2> **Yearly Scope of Poverty Population**

(Unit: million)

	'97	'98	'99
Poverty Population under the Absolute Poverty Line	5.4	9.5	8.1

Deterioration of Distribution Structure: As shown in <Table 3>, the Gini coefficient among all households using estimated income based on expenditure for non-salary worker households in '98 was 0.440: much higher than 0.399 in '97. Also, the Gini coefficient among salary worker households went up from 0.28 to 0.320 during the period. Although the economy was better in '99, inequality was exacerbated.

<Table 3> **Income Inequality**

Gini Coefficient	'97	'98	1/4 qt. '99	2/4 qt. '99	3/4 qt. '99	4/4 qt. '99
Among All Households Using Estimated Income Based on Expenditure for Non-salary Worker Households	0.399	0.440	0.453	0.423	0.436	N/A
Gini Coefficient, among Salary Worker Households	0.283	0.316	'99 0.320			

Source: Quality of Life of Koreans, Korea Institute for Health And Social Affairs, 2000.

As shown in <Table 3> the richest 20% households' income was 4.3 times more than the lowest 20% households' income in '97 - and increased to 5.7 times more in '99. In the case of the US, it was 5.3 times in 1980. However it was increased to 10 times in 1992. This increase shows that the distribution structure has been Americanised along with the spread of neo-liberalism after the financial crisis.The gap between the rich and the poor will widen still further.

<Table 4> **Income Gap**

	'97	'98	'99
Upper 20% Strata's income divided by lower 20%	4.3	5.1	5.7

Source: "Poverty Conditions for the Rep. of Korea in the Aftermath of the Financial Crisis", PSPD, 2000.

The Inequality of Education: According to the results of my analysis using urban households survey data from the National Statistics office, the average household education expenditure of the richest 25% households was 4.6 times that of the lowest 25% households in '96. It went up to 9.5 times in the third quarter in '99. The rapid rising gap will lead to hereditary poverty and a vicious cycle of poverty and forecasts of unstable social mobility.

Information Divide: According to the White Paper (1999, National Computerization Agency of Korea), in the three year period from '96 to '99, the gap of computer use between the highest income group (monthly income over four million Korean won) and the lowest income group (monthly income less than one million Korean won) dramatically increased from 1.56:1 to 2.83:1. PC communication use went up from 3.03:1 to 3.63:1, Internet use from 3.45:1 to 4.11:1. From this result, we will see the difference in financial ability to buy communication equipment, pay for Internet fees and learn computer operations to make the labour market competitiveness gap bigger between the rich and the poor. In the upcoming digital intelligence society, rich people can develop their potential ability without money constraints. However, poor people's access to computers is restricted by poverty. This forecasts the possibility of hereditary poverty and the fixation of poverty.

The change from regular workers to temporary workers: The Korean government tried severe structural readjustment under the supervision of the International Monetary Fund. In the process of restructuring, many regular workers changed their status to temporary workers. Women workers' temporisation was especially common, meaning less salary and more insecurity. Temporary workers are not covered by social insurance, unemployment benefit or retirement benefit. As this process went on, the number of people in insecure employment increased so that in 2002, the total percentage of temporary workers was 53% of total labour. Povertisation of temporary workers is a big social problem in Korea together with the temporisation of labor.

Early Retirement: As structural readjustment processes went on, many workers aged in their 50s were forced to retire. (The retirement age has been increasingly lowered, particularly for women.) Most of these middle-aged unemployed are heads of households and the loss of their job not only means financial problems, including reduced capability to educate children, but also loss of dignity. These people's opportunity to get a job is so low that they are

becoming the poor in despair. Most Korean men start working in 30s because they have to serve in the army. If they retire at the age of 55, considering mortal age (75), they could be employed for only one third of their lifetime. Women's participation in economic activity is only 48%. This situation means that only about 20% of the total population works, and supports the remaining 80%. Those aged 30-40 who survived restructuring have to face severe competition and they are working under extreme stress. Even if someone is young and competitive, his or her quality of living is low because of the high stress and the necessity to take care of many family members or pays high tax for social security. For whose quality of living was this restructuring?

Migrant Workers' Human Rights Problem: In order to survive, industries desperately sought to save on labour costs. Many migrant workers are hired as a result. There are 570,000 migrant workers in Korea from 40 different countries all over the world. Without the help of these migrant workers, marginal industries in Korea could not survive. The Korean government accepted taking advantage of these low salary migrant workers – 46% of whom are undocumented. This is much more than 30% in Japan, and five percent in Taiwan. They suffer in the 'blind spot' of human rights.

World Provision

Povertisation & Exacerbation of Distribution Structure: Due to science and technology development, the total wealth produced in the world is bigger than at any other time in history. However, 2.8 billion people, who are about half of the total human beings living in the world, are living on USD$2 or less in a day (IBRD). Although information technology develops at a high speed, about half of the people living on earth have never used a telephone. According to a UNDP report, in 1961, the richest people at 20% occupied 70.2% of the total wealth accumulated by all human beings. However, in 1991, this figure jumped to 84.7%. Also, in 1961, wealth owned by the richest 20% people was 30 times that of the lowest 20% of peoples' wealth. This figure increased to 60 times as much in 1991.

These statistics show how fast inequality is deepening as globalisation goes on. Expansion of jungle capitalism, or globalisation based upon neo-liberalism, seems to worship the market god and doesn't care about poor people's quality of life. The market is creating 20:80 societies. By ignoring reasonable complaints of the poor, the inequality will surely exacerbate the discontent and bad morale that already exists in the world.

Poor Countries' Povertisation & Debt Problems: The core cause of povertisation in underdeveloped countries is Debt. According to a WCC report, poor countries' debt to IBRD, IMF, etc in the years from 1980 to 1990 amounted to USD$972 billion. Although they have already paid principal plus interest amounting to USD$1,400 billion which is much more than the money they borrowed, USD$1,650 billion are still due. These countries borrow money

to pay debt and the debt snowballed. Also, multinational business houses go to these poor countries and compel them to produce farming products for export. They pay low wages, move air and river-polluting factories in, destroy the environment and deprive local people of their land which is the base of their lives. As globalisation accelerates, this trend is getting severe.

Migrant Workers' Human Rights: Nowadays, more than one million people have left their own country and work in other countries. The reliance on foreign labour is likely to grow, due to the increasing unwillingness of developed countries' workers to take on so-called '3D' (difficult, dirty and dangerous) jobs. But most of them are undocumented and work illegally. Governments in developed countries seem to ban foreign workers however, although they open the gate for them as tourists, trainees, etc in order to protect marginal domestic industries. Developed countries' governments and employers exploit migrant workers severely by paying them low wages, letting them work in dangerous environments, which include beatings, rapes and not paying salaries. Developed countries' marginal industries are surviving at the cost of migrant worker's sacrifices. Developed countries are enjoying prosperity based upon this exploitation and deprivation. In 1990, the United Nations promulgated *The International Convention for the Protection of the Rights of All Migrant Workers and Members of Their Families*. The most effective safeguards to the rights of migrant workers would be to ratify this convention. However, not a single developed country (which consider themselves civilised and guardians of human rights) have ratified the 1990 UN Convention.

Paradigm Shift Towards Sound Globalisation

No other alternative except Paradigm Shift

With the rapid development in the areas of communication and information, the process of globalisation is something which cannot be reversed, nor can we attempt to bring it to a total stop. Therefore, this article will not attempt to assert the position of anti-globalisation but rather to propose an alternative of sound globalisation.

The process of sound globalisation is based on a love for humankind and a sense of charity. It seeks a change in paradigm to that which attains a level of public service on a global scale, along with a consciousness of solidarity among inhabitants of a global society thereby ensuring civil rights of individuals from a global social perspective. It also involves a shift in paradigm to allow for the construction of a public welfare society at a global level, reorganising political and social systems that are currently divided according to nation states.

Many people voice their concerns of whether a transnational level of social welfare is possible in today's reality of complicated and intricately related diverse interests of different nation countries, religious groups and races. They

question whether we have already opened the Pandora's box. However, the modern form of democratic society, as we know it, was not simply a one directional development, but a process with progression and regression, continuity and discontinuity, according to the opinions of people who form society. Not only that, learning from the history which our ancestors went through, it is possible to diagnose current problems and to forecast the future pattern of social change in such a way that will allow for proper adjustment.

It is true that the possibility of changing the paradigm of social welfare from that of charity to the protection of citizen's social rights, and from a national level to a global level, seems unsurmountable at present. However, if we truly wish for world peace, we must take the first step and be willing to take the necessary steps afterwards to formulate a system that will be beneficial for the whole world. We must realise that it is only when the richer countries and the richer people of a global society are willing to bear some sort of sacrifice and share their wealth with the poor – and try to resolve the disparity problem that currently exists so that the basic rights of marginalised people are secured and there is hope for living conditions to improve – that we can avert a violent confrontation.

When the idea of eight hours of work in a day or public education was first presented by Communists, it seemed to be very radical. However nowadays, it is common. We made this common after making such a big sacrifice with the Communists. Now in the early stage of globalisation, we human beings are facing a similar situation. If we are smart enough to learn lessons from the Communists' rise and fall, we should hurry to shift paradigms before being challenged by the exploited people's rise up. This seems impossible right now but we have to make it possible to prevent disaster. If the current way of globalisation goes on with continued abuse of power by the rich and rich country market societies, rampant lawlessness and disorder will bring about its ruin, not to mention its non-development. There is no other alternative but to make a paradigm shift.

From Charity to Protection of Civil Rights

Although we can allow for the capitalist competitive system to rule our markets, we cannot allow it to rule our societies. True globalisation must secure the basic right to a humane way of life as a member of one society, even if that individual may not be able to participate fully in the market system due to failure of endeavour.

In the past, European countries provided a form of social security, which protected the quality of life of the citizen from the cradle to the grave, indeed even from the womb to the grave. However, along with rapid changes which came about as a result of the neo-liberal globalisation process, the European countries, under the logic of reducing the role of government, began to reduce

the budget for public expenditure – such as for education and health services, and others on behalf of socially weak and marginalised peoples.

For most of the less developed and developing countries, the idea of citizen's social rights has not firmly taken root yet. And due to the budgetary constraint and lack of consciousness of 'Basic Social Rights', there is no legislation that secures the rights of the people. Therefore, for most of the people who lose their jobs in the developing and less developed countries as a result of the structural adjustment or downsizing of companies in accordance with the market policies of neo-liberalism, it not only means a loss of job, it means jeopardising basic human rights of survival. By establishing a social realm, which is not affected by the forces of the market, we can be protected against disaster caused by marketisation. We do not live in the market, but a society, and it is imperative for a society to secure the basic civil rights of its members. In contrast to the neo-liberal logic which places all the blame of market failure on the individual and which asserts a reduction of public expenditures, deregulation, privatisation and the abolishment of public morals and community consciousness, we should build up public areas.

Until now, assistance accorded the poor has been from the perspective of charitable giving. We must now seek a shift in our paradigm so that we recognise the security of a minimum standard of living as an essential human dignity to be provided by society. This section will seek to present the theory of civil rights as a basis for reorganising the social welfare system and increasing social welfare programs, as well as an alternative argument for a community which transcends neo-liberalism.

Civil Rights: The civil right of an individual includes his/her right to participate in the decision-making process of the community as one of its members. TH Marshall describes civil rights as having three dimensions, namely civic rights, political rights, and social rights. Civil rights include the right to welfare, as well as social rights that incorporate all the areas of rights related to the way of life for humankind in a cultural society. In other words, this includes the right to receive public service, the right to be protected from the violence of the market and its unequal structures, the right to equal treatment of women, the rights of children, the right not to be discriminated against because of one's geographical background, as well as the right of the weak in the labour market. Civil rights is an aggressive right in that it is the right to be protected from all unequal structures and the violence of the market which causes discrimination regardless of one's social class.

Labour Rights: In a broad sense, labour rights are the right to participate in the labour market, the right to association in labour groups as and when necessary, the right to participate in political procedures as a member of a group, the right to participate in social policies and the right to receive welfare benefits of social security programmes. In a stricter sense, labour rights are the

right to participate in productive activities according to one's abilities and to receive proper payment for one's work – in short, the right to be protected from unemployment.

The Right to Life: In a broad sense, the right to life means 'the realisation of the right to live as a human being'. In the stricter sense, the right to life is the right of those who are living below the poverty line to be recipients of a standard of living that reflects the minimum sustenance needed in that society. Therefore, this is a right which ensures that whether a person is unable to be the beneficiary of a job in the labour market, or is not working, that person is still eligible to receive some income from society.

Civil Rights and Welfare Policy: The right to financial support or the provision of services that satisfy the need for one's welfare is a specific basic right that each individual can claim or demand of the government. If a country is serious about securing its citizens' civil rights, then the right to life must take precedence over any other legal rights, such as that of right to private possession. Citizens' social rights must firstly be secured in the distribution of resources through the budgeting scheme of the government over any other priority. Also, since the welfare-related expenses necessary to maintain the integrity of civil rights is a necessary expense which the government and all citizens must bear in order to maintain their community, the government must work to collect more taxes in the event that the national budget does not provide the sufficient resources necessary. However, the process of setting a national budget must go through the decision-making body of a national assembly or congress of elected officials who must overcome those welfare theorists who are more aligned with the market mechanisms, as well as those conservative politicians who speak on behalf of the profit of large businesses.

The path of gathering more taxes acts as a burden on the majority of the people, and so the policy of using public funds to support social welfare may meet the reluctance of citizens to pay more taxes. A method which allows the government to circumvent such opposition, while at the same time ensuring civil rights and securing the necessary financial resources for social welfare, would be to make full use of social security policies such as the utilisation of public property, social insurance, and various stipends.

The realm of civil rights security can be separated into the areas of food, clothing, housing, medical care, education, transportation, and household appliance use. Among these, the areas of food and health are those which must first be addressed in order to alleviate absolute poverty. Also, with the spread of neo-liberal market policies, there is a growing disparity in the areas of housing, education and communication among individuals in a society, thus highlighting these areas as problem areas. The following is a more detailed look at these problem areas.

Food/Medical Care: Nearly one half of the world's population lives on an income which is less that USD$2, and numerous people in Africa and Asia suffer from hunger. Food and medical care are both essential basic necessities which are needed to secure one's right to life, and as such, the provision of basic foodstuffs must be the first priority. In developed countries, nearly all citizens receive the benefit of medical insurance. However, with the adoption of neo-liberal economic policies, the privatisation of health related sectors is on the increase. This implies that countries are moving in a direction that is opposite to that of ensuring the basic right to medical care for poor people. The basic rights of the masses must be secured by the society. The number of people in Africa and Asia who die because they are unable to receive proper medical care is so large as to be incalculable.

Housing: Many countries face a shortage of adequate housing for their citizens. As such, poorer people who are unable to own homes have to contend with high monthly rent fees for inadequate living quarters. Even in the richest cities such as Paris, New York and Tokyo, there are numerous street people. We cannot say that civil rights (in this case the right to housing) are properly being secured for these people in such a situation. Despite these dismal housing conditions in many countries, most governments do not regard the lack of housing as a violation of a basic civil right of their citizens that should be addressed through appropriate social policies. Therefore, these governments regard housing as a market commodity. They attempt to provide financial support for homebuyers and reduce the shortage of housing by encouraging private construction companies to build more homes for sale on the market. This is why the general public mistakenly regards houses not as homes or places of abode, but as investment assets. In such countries, those above the middle class of income, who have the freedom of extra financial resources and can invest in buying houses, are able to secure themselves from any losses that may come from a high rise in inflation or rise in rent. Those in the lower income situations must continuously struggle with high rent with little hope of breaking out of this cycle of poverty. This leads to a situation where people build illegal homes on other people's property, as well as those who occupy other people's homes, which does become a social problem. In order to properly secure the basic civil right of housing, we must place a higher priority on securing the right to life for the poor, rather than the right to private possession for the rich. In more specific terms, land and buildings that are not being utilised to their full potential, should be made available for public use in accordance with the need of society. The assertion of people and groups to utilise empty warehouses, buildings and land for social, productive and cultural activities is not only a demand to secure the right to life for the poor, but also to stand against the speculative activities and waste of resources that have become a part of the capitalist way of life.

Education: In many parts of the world, there are still countless numbers of people who are unable to receive education because of poverty and who as a

result are illiterate. With the emergence of English as the language medium that is most widely used in the world, the ability to articulate one's thoughts in English has become a basic necessity in today's globalised world. Those children who are growing up in countries where English is used in daily life require no extra money to acquire proficiency in English. However, those children who live in countries that do not use English for daily conversation must pay for expensive tutoring and lessons. In order to properly address this unequal situation, it is only proper that the countries where English is a public language should be asked to support the education of young people in countries that are not. The student from a non-English speaking country who goes to study in an English speaking country should also receive financial support for his/her studies there. However, the current situation of national level politics has put the greater burden of the cost of education upon students from other countries. The more developed countries invest vast amounts of capital in information education while some poor students in developing countries have no access to electricity, let alone computers. The increase in unequal access to education opportunities will act as a cause for the fixation of poverty and the inheritance of poverty among the poor.

Social Reform Activities for the Protection of Civil Rights: A Case of Korean NGOs.

Background: From the 1960s until the mid-1990s Korea averaged an annual eight percent GNP growth rate with close to full employment. The problem of poverty had not been seriously considered in Korea prior to 1997 and any direct government attempts at reducing poverty through social welfare policy were not seriously undertaken.

However, the social and economic shock from the foreign exchange crisis in '97 was something never experienced and the problem of poverty in Korea entered a different phase. It is deemed quite problematic that the poverty and distribution disparity was dramatically aggravated.

Poverty countermeasures taken by the government before 1999 were carried out through the Livelihood Protection System. This is a system that provides a subsidy to the extremely poor who are incapable of working i.e. elderly, disabled only. It neglected the unemployed poor who are capable of working. The advent of the foreign exchange crisis in 1997, the increase in unemployment and the growing number of poor people proved the ineffectiveness of such governmental poverty countermeasures in dealing with the poverty problem.

Many criticise the welfare policies of the Kim Dae Jung government as being inadequate to deal with the rapid changes in today's society. Some criticise the enlargement of the welfare policy by saying that it is ineffective and counter-productive. NGOs urged the government to seek a new social policy paradigm. The new social policy paradigm should present a vision for a new social

structure, not remaining at the level of simply improving the present system and increasing the provision of welfare by the public sector. More specifically it must 1) be based upon the protection of citizen's social rights; 2) increase the national welfare coverage; 3) readdress the current government spending which is primarily oriented to economic progress and the military; 4) restructure the tax system (which increases direct and progressive taxes).

In order for such a new paradigm to be effective in redistributing the wealth of society and eradicating the social problem of poverty, the civil and labour sectors of society pooled together to strengthen and consolidate their positions. They needed to secure the basic social right – the right to a dignified existence in society – and present this as the new social policy paradigm.

NGOs succeeded in enacting legislation: The Basic Life Protection Act (BLPA): In order for a new paradigm to be in effect, civil organisations had been demanding that the government establish comprehensive and systemic poverty countermeasures. The Peoples' Solidarity for Participatory Democracy (PSPD), one of the most influential civil organisations in Korea, had first demanded in 1995 that the government enact a law called the *Livelihood Guarantee Act* which was similar to the BLPA. Before the foreign exchange crisis, the public demand for enacting such a law wasn't noticeable, and the government's lack of volition to enact such a law prohibited it from coming to pass. However, as the unemployment rate after the crisis surged, followed by the rise in the number of the poor, about 60 NGOs got together and organised the Basic Life Protection Solidarity, a strong movement to enact the BLPA.

The Act was to guarantee a minimum living standard through provision of a public transfer to all households whose household income is lower than the poverty line, regardless of the possession of work capability. There was widespread public support for such measures. Indeed, it was obvious that the crisis had aggravated poverty conditions and functioned as an inducement to the Act's passage. The NGOs' effort was successful and the Act was passed in the National Assembly in August 1999, taking effect in October 2000. Passage of the Act signifies the protection of citizens' social rights by the public sector with efforts initiated by civil organisations undoubtedly an important contributing factor.

Theoretical Base of BLPA: It is a citizen's basic social right "to live maintaining human dignity" and it is the government's duty to "protect the basic social rights of the people". In passing BLPA, an individual citizen's social right to maintain a decent and humane standard of living had been legalised. As such, it provides an ideological and legal basis for government policy to place a priority in the national budget on welfare programs. Indeed, the passage of this Act can be interpreted as a new vision for social policies: a paradigm shift from an extreme right side capitalistic policy to a Korean 'third road'.

Poverty Issues after the BLPA Enforcement: As it is clearly written down in the BLPA that it is the government's duty to guarantee a minimum living standard to all households whose household incomes are lower than the poverty line, regardless of the possession of work capability – a citizen can sue the government if it doesn't perform its duty properly. However, when the Enforcement Ordinance and Detailed Regulations for the application of the BLPA were announced, people were shocked because it was far from the BLPA's spirit of legislation. People were even more shocked when the law took effect in Oct 2000. The government's subsidy was too small. So the protection level was far too low to maintain the minimum living costs. Coverage was restricted to 1.5 million people: only 15% of the total number of the people under the minimum cost of living (about USD$700 per month for four member households). The budget for the protection of a minimum living standard was cut down to a level even less than the previous year. Effectively, the Kim Dae Jung government couldn't control the bureaucrats. Also, it became clear that while the majority of Korean people agree with the basic idea of the Act, they don't want to open their wallets. As a consequence, poverty issues in Korea went into different phase. NGOs now had to focus to secure a higher budget allocation. In 2002, a considerable increase in the budget amount was announced. However, it is still not enough to protect all the eligible people. The NGOs protest is still going on.

Global Perspectives: The current model of development, which has been in place from the 1960s onward, has exploited and marginalised the weak and has kicked less competitive peoples into a slough of poverty. The neo-liberal economic globalisation ideology weakens the power and influence of nation states, privatises capital, and abandons the social security systems of societies to wallow in the waves of its wake. It is now time for us to put a stop to it. The new paradigm is to build up the public sector, which is not ruled by the market principle. So far, Korea is the only one Asian country that has shifted the social welfare paradigm from charity to protection of the citizen's social rights. However, this is the way to build up the areas where the market principle doesn't apply and how to supplement the defect of market system. Without such a safety net, social solidarity is in jeopardy. Japan's per capita GNP is the second highest in the world. However, the concept of social welfare is still 'charity'. Protection of the minimum cost of living by the public sector is not legalised yet. Other countries need to share a common perspective and prepare counter measures similar to BLPA in Korea. People in the 'global village' should consolidate together to protect basic social rights. People in the global village must get together and try to make systems to protect citizens' basic social rights. Preparing proper welfare systems in each country, in each bloc, and ultimately throughout the Earth village, is the only alternative to a sound globalisation. Although it looks far and difficult for the dream to come true, we haven't got any other choice. We have to build up a global village, which is balanced between efficiency and equality.

From Nation Country to Global Society: Alternatives for Attaining a Paradigm Shift

Seek Co-existence: The current practice of operating social welfare policies within the boundaries of nation states has made social welfare something which is limited to a few who live in richer developed counties. Similar social welfare is far out of the reach of those in the poorer, less developed countries. In order for humankind to live peacefully together, it is essential to seek co-existence. We have to try to recover humanity based on love and extend social welfare system for the less developed countries in Asia and Africa.

Most of the poor countries lack money to build up a welfare system. However, if we were to live in one globalised society, poor people in poor countries should be recipients of a global welfare system. They are eligible poor for negative tax (welfare subsidy). Due to the lack of love and consciousness as a member of the same society, developed country people are very indifferent to the poor country peoples' pain caused by poverty.

The deep root cause of the September 11 tragedy is rich country peoples' lack of understanding and sympathy for the poor in other countries. In order to prevent the catastrophe of unilateral destruction and seek a productive way of communal existence in the era of globalisation, we must strive to establish an international level welfare society where everyone lives together in the spirit of sharing. In order for us to progress in that direction, we must diagnose the problems existing in the current process of globalisation. Political & social communities remain in the conventional nation state, while global marketisation speeds up, ignoring all nation state boundaries. Hence, we must take concrete steps forward to build up a 'welfare Global Society'.

The Red Light to an Extensive Pursuit of Efficiency: If we do not slow down the current tempo of neo-liberal globalisation and rapidly work to supplement our current social systems with a way of life that secures the communal existence of marginalised countries and people groups – even at the risk of reducing the level of efficiency we have attained and would like to maintain – the world will fall into a severe conflict between rich and poor countries, in the end leading to the downfall of all of us. We must regard the September 11 incident as an event where the fuse has been burned down. It is the sound of alarm in regards to the crisis of integration that an extensive pursuit of efficiency can cause. The war against terrorism is only a reaction that will aggravate the current situational crisis. The only fundamental solution that can prevent the overheating of the entire world is to enhance the process of globalisation in the areas of politics, society and welfare even if this means that we sacrifice the profits of the efficiency. We must reduce the tempo of economic globalisation until the other areas of globalisation has progressed to a similar level and work to support and develop the less developed countries.

Strengthening the Morals, Consciousness and Responsibilities of the Rich: After the collapse of the Soviet Union and the Eastern Bloc countries in the 1990s, the US became the sole superpower country in the world without any serious contenders. The more developed countries of the world that have the advantage of possessing vast financial resources, the infrastructure to allow them a decisive advantage in the gathering and utilisation of information, and the language (English) skills needed in today's world, have a marked position which is beyond anything that the developing or less developed countries can ever hope to attain. Despite this marked advantage, the US is forcing weaker countries to enter the ring to engage in an uneven game which takes no regard of the differences in the 'weight class' of the contenders in the ring. This 'game' is an all out unlimited form of competition, which not only pits individuals against each other, but also puts nation against nations in a no-restriction game of survival. This game is structured in such a way that only the developed and stronger countries can win. The process of dragging weaker developing countries into the ring of globalisation where only the stronger developed countries have any chance of winning is resulting in the exploitation of the poorer developing countries and impoverishing them, thereby leading to a shortage in possible consumption which is not appropriate for developing nations.

The intellectuals, entrepreneurs and politicians of the developed countries who hold the key to globalisation must rally behind the values of moral consciousness and ethical renewal with an accurate awareness of the current contradictions present in the process of globalisation. In order to encourage the establishment of a welfare society which can prevent the bloody confrontation and conflict among humankind that we have already experienced (such as during the birth of Communism), the world must heed the warning of the red light that is alerting us of the crisis toward which all of us are heading. The September 11 incident is a signal we must take seriously and begin to utilise our wisdom to put forth alternatives and measures that can rectify the problems inherent in the present process of globalisation.

Only when the developed countries begin to decide their policies, not merely from a country-centred patriotic perspective, but from the perspective of exercising responsible citizenship with a moral responsibility to step beyond the simple pursuit of their own benefits to seek the well being of the whole global society, can a solution be found.

Restoration of Virtues Based on Community Awareness: When capitalism was first introduced, the basic contradictions inherent in it – such as the excessive use of force, exploitation of labour, and the impoverishment of weaker social groups who were unable to adjust to the market system – became a serious social concern. As a result of social conflict resulting from such contradictions, Communism was born and the world became engulfed in a bloody battle between these two ideologies. Western capitalistic countries

realised the truth, after observing the threat of Communism, and began to strengthen their welfare policies in order to lessen the economic disparity between the rich and the poor. Because the strengthening of welfare policies entails richer individuals in society forfeiting an increasing amount of their income as taxes, the implementation of such policies is not possible without self-sacrificial ethical rules that form a sharing community which works to ensure the survival and well-being of all its participants. By supplementing the flaws in the capitalist market system through the strengthening of welfare policies, capitalism was able to overcome the threat posed to it by Communism. This was possible because the Anglo Saxon culture of the Western countries was rooted in Christian faith.

Restoration of virtues based upon love of humankind, sense of solidarity with the weak, and the willingness to work toward an equal and sharing community is the only cure. As we are entering into the era of a globalised society, we need to encourage the growth of a sense of community among the societies of the developed countries, and seek ways to supplement a global social system on the basis of humanity and love, and establish a welfare system on a global scale which will alleviate the problem of poverty.

Alternative for Preventing the Re-emergence of Communism: Through the process of evolution, humankind has come to stand at the pinnacle of the food chain. There is no natural enemy who can dare to threaten humankind. The only threat to humankind is humankind. In such a situation, if the process of globalisation continues to simply benefit the minority of 20% of people who have got a competitive advantage living in developed and stronger countries, there will come a time when the rules of natural survival come into play on the part of the poorer majority who will fight to claim their portion. Driven to the extreme, one may even say that the possible form of globalisation, which can benefit all of humankind, is the globalisation of Communism. However, the inefficiency of the Communist system and the fact that Communism only works to downgrade the living standards of everyone in society under the name of equality has already been proven to us. Nevertheless, the slogan that the Socialist system brings equal distribution of wealth to all is a sweet enticement to the majority of those who are being marginalised because they are deemed 'uncompetitive' in the market.

The extreme exploitation of the so-called uncompetitive members of society and the poor countries during the early stages of economic globalisation, as well as the lack of understanding and sensitivity for the differences in culture and religion of diverse people have acted as primary forces which have festered a resentful group of terrorists and anti-globalisation activists. This is similar to the situation during the early stages of capitalism when the extreme exploitation of the workers gave cause for the rise of Communism. In another way of expressing the same phenomenon, the ideals of equality and efficiency are contradictory to each other. Therefore, if we seek to increase the efficiency of

the neo-liberal competition system, we will increasingly aggravate the problem of the disparity of wealth distribution. Continuously seeking to increase the efficiency of the system, without taking any measures to rectify this fatal flaw in the market, will only increase the resentment and resistance of the world's people.

We must strive toward a win-win society where the people of the poor countries also have an equal opportunity to life. The world, and more especially the politicians and intellectuals of the Western world, must realise that this is the reason for the rise of terrorist activities and is creating a crisis in the integration of society into a truly global one. We must curb excessive pursuit of competition and set up a worldwide sharing community to prevent re-emergence of Communism.

Support Development of Poor Nations: If the vast amount of financial resources that had been expended during the war in Afghanistan and the money which is currently being used in Afghanistan had been utilised as resources in that country before September 11, there would not have been any act of terror which caused so much grief and pain to so many people.

If we do not heed the warning lessons from the September 11 incident and present a revolutionary alternative to the people in the world, there will be more catastrophic events taking place. We will stand to lose more money, and more lives as a result. Didn't even former US President Bill Clinton say that we would only have to invest a total of USD$1.2 billion to resolve the issue of poverty and lack of development for the Middle East?

The level of support accorded to the poor must also be elevated to that which not only provides material support to alleviate their situation of absolute poverty, but that which also provides an opportunity to overcome their sense and social situation of being marginalised and excluded. The type of support provided must not only be limited to material support. It must also be personal and spiritual, helping to restore their sense of social dignity and empowering them to overcome their situation of poverty. Something more important than the simple supplying of material resources for poor people is moving toward a society where their integrity as human beings is respected and their human rights secured. It is most important to endeavour in strengthening these countries to improve their current policies and structures so that the people themselves can stand to shake off their poverty and work and live as proper citizens. We must support the training of individuals, the support of people's resistance against corruption and injustice. The support of human rights movements must be placed as a priority alongside of, or even before the provision of material support.

The developed countries should also write off the debts of the poorer developing countries as a way of supporting these countries' economic

development, and initiate a planned programme to support the economic development of these countries, much like the Marshall plan after World War Two. We must also move away from the World Trade Organisation system, which is more beneficial for developed countries. Developed countries should be encouraged to open their markets fully to products from developing countries. Also, the developed countries must increase overseas development aid in order to eradicate the social issue of poverty in the Third World.

The Dispossession of Women and the Socially Weak: Women are the most representative of those who stand oppressed by neo-liberalism. Nearly 90% of the world's income goes to men, and the majority of women are unpaid workers. The reduction in social welfare expenditure is especially difficult to women. Increase in competition is placing more power into the hands of men. The neo-liberal economic theory is an abstract, general social idea which regards the reality of men as being above that of any others, and which deems the need of women as simple secondary programmes. The world's victims of violence (in the home, cities, and in war), discrimination (in education, wages, and employment opportunities), and prostitution are all women. The suffering of the socially weak, such as children, workers, those who have experienced early retirement, the physically and mentally disabled persons, and the indigenous people are also at a critical level. The global community must regard the difficulties that these people face with brotherly love for their neighbours, and develop social security measures that ensure their civil rights.

Increase of the Role of International Organisations: In order to expand the effectiveness of general and human values and virtues in a global society, the role and strength of international organisations, such as the UN, the International Tribunal, IOM, UNHCR, ILO, UNEP, UNDP, UNFIP, UNICEF, and WHO must be substantially increased and enhanced. These international organisations must be given sufficient strength and authority so as to be able to override the strengths and influences of the stronger developed countries like the US.

The WTO and MAI have enough power to minimise legislation in any given country. Contracts and agreements which function on behalf of transnational companies and a limited number of developed countries should not be the only ones able to override the powers of a country's internal legislation. Contracts and agreements that work to secure the citizen's civil rights and protect their right to life, must also receive the same privileges. Free trade agreements (FTAs) must also be restructured so as to protect the integrity of creation, the rights of migrant workers and the right to food as a national security issue. It should also incorporate a methodology that will help to enhance the development of the poorer countries. In order for such restructuring of the FTA to take place, we must include social clauses, which will allow room for free movement of labour. They should accept the market price of labour like the market price of other commodities and break down barriers that restrict the

movement of human labour. Labourers in more developed countries must realise that the process of globalisation may mean a decrease in their wages and they must be ready to accept this as a fact. They must also work to unite in solidarity with the workers of other countries globally so that together they can stand up against the oppressive powers of the capitalists and transnational conglomerates and fight to attain their rights. The solidarity of workers is the only possible force that can work to move society to a healthier global society.

The WTO, IMF, IBRD, OECD, APEC and other international organisations must encourage developed countries and transnational companies to abstain from endlessly seeking short term profit at the expense of sacrificing the people of poor developing countries and their quality of life. International organisations, NGOs and religious organisations must work together to secure the public sectors of society and to initiate a global social welfare policies, which will support the position of the weaker countries and poorer people of a society. They must work together to encourage the governments of each country to work together in this direction.

Building Up Regional Community and International Standards: Before moving to a global society, we must encourage the establishment of regional communities, such as the EU, and create an international standard which can work as a basis for responding corporately to welfare needs such as the disintegration of families, unemployment and poor working conditions. The European countries began to integrate their currency to the Euro from 2002 and the ASEAN countries have also entered into negotiations for an FTA in the region. Japan and Singapore have signed an FTA, and the Prime Minister of Japan has proposed a trans-Asian economic bloc, which includes Australia and New Zealand. China has entered the WTO and is increasing its move to enter into an FTA with countries of ASEAN. Such regional communities should not only seek to unify the market through free trade but also establish a true community within the region with free movement of products and labour, and a new standard for welfare policies.

Supporting NGOs: It would be most appropriate if the work of the international organisations and national governments would lead us in forming a healthy society where the people live together in harmony However, the current situation where the transnational capitalists and the US possess the initiative in deciding the direction of globalisation, this does not look so hopeful. The NGOs are the only ones who are able to assess the nature of the problem, to act as speakers on behalf of powerless people, and to try to affect some sort of change. However, the nation states are not heeding their warnings, and there is no path where their voices can be heard or their ideas incorporated into the policy decisions of governments. This is why many of the NGOs feel they must express themselves through demonstrations in places such as Davos and Seattle.

The international funds that are at the disposal of developed countries and international organisations must go to supporting and consolidating the work of international NGOs that are working to develop alternatives. There must also be measures that will include NGOs in international conferences and consultations, lending ears to their positions and concerns in the decision-making process of these meetings.

Directions of NGOs' Movement: Presently NGOs are working hard to do activities against globalisation. However, globalisation itself is not wrong and for NGOs, it is almost impossible to stop it. Curbing directions and preparing complements is more attainable than stopping. NGOs shouldn't deny total globalisation. They should develop positive alternatives rather than driving an anti-globalisation movement. They would do better to do research and develop short-term and long-term strategies for their goals to be attained. Positive advocacy activities are more easily attained.

In order to be efficient, NGOs should build up organisations covering all over the world, elect representatives of civil society and let them contact international organisations and presidents of developed countries. Also, NGO activities should be diversified. For example, consumer movements preparing lists say, of bad transnational companies that destroy the environment or that treat local labour or migrant workers badly, plus conducting campaigns to boycott products of aforementioned companies are just two examples. Students in non-English speaking countries can get together and refuse to enter schools that don't provide discounted tuition for non-English speaking countries until they reduce tuition. Media campaigns, utilising all media in the Third World to change peoples' minds is one of the most important areas to start.

Alternative Media: After the collapse of the Soviet Union and up to the time of the September 11 incident, the value system of the American people was something, which seemed to possess some degree of generality and appropriateness. Although American culture had characteristics of consumerism, racism and narcissism, there was no strong worldwide opposition to the spread of American culture on the basis of openness, standardisation and mass culture.

However, now there is a great increase in the resentment and resistance against American culture represented by names such as McDonalds, CNN and the massive outflow of pornographic material through the Internet. More than 1.2 billion people in the world who witnessed first-hand the September 11 incident and the ensuing war on Afghanistan as portrayed according to the perspective of CNN – a perspective, which was evidently American – even distorted the facts. CNN is an American-owned and-operated media, which benefits American people only. Thus, it cannot be regarded as a form of media that can properly lead and represent the global public consensus.

The majority of the world, unfortunately, hasn't got any alternative media and relies upon processed information that comes from agencies which operate on the basis of market journalism and which work to serve the supremacy of America. This is resulting in a distorted portrayal of globalisation, one that justifies the supremacy of America. There is a dire need to rectify the monopoly that CNN has over international broadcasting networks. In order to move to a balanced and healthy global society, we must work to enlighten the people of a country to think as 'global citizens' and to transcend their national boundaries. Such transformation of modes of thought must be conducted through the work of public media. The international community must formulate a public alternative television broadcasting company.

Levying Tobin Tax: The fact that of the three basic elements of economy – land, labour and capital – only capital is allowed the freedom of moving across national borders without any limitation of taxes is symbolic of the imbalanced globalisation of today.

The results of this imbalance are quite critical. Today, 28% of the world's population believes in Islam. According to the doctrines of Islam, it is immoral to acquire interest on monetary transactions. The more developed countries and capitalists must respect the different cultures and value systems of these cultures. They must conduct globalisation within boundaries and not invade the lives of people who believe in a different God.

In order to reduce the abuse of financial capital, and more especially that of short-term speculative capital, we must first introduce the Tobin tax. The Tobin tax can provide a financial basis that could be utilised for establishing a global level of social welfare policies that could support the common well-being of global citizens, especially the poor people in Africa and Asia. Intellectuals and the media must work to enlighten people to the benefits of this tax system. The UN and other international organisations should more aggressively counsel developed countries to incorporate this into their system, and support the work of the NGOs to introduce the Tobin tax to governments.

Ensuring the Labour Rights of Migrant Workers: The society where the process of globalisation has been appropriately conducted does not place a barrier between movement of people from lower wage labour areas to higher wage labour areas. In the international arena, low wages are a basic property, owned by labourers in less developed countries – low wage labour is the only economic resource they have as a comparative advantage. As such, globalisation, which limits flow of labour movement, is an unequal form of globalisation. The violation of human rights and labour rights of migrant workers is happening in almost all the developed countries of the world. This is because the owners and workers in the more developed countries view the migrant labourers from the perspective of their selfish national interest and don't regard them as human beings having the same human rights as themselves.

The freedom of movement and the ensuring of labour rights, which allow individual labourers to be properly compensated for their work, is something that must first be secured. The developed countries must endorse the *United Nations Compact on the Rights of Migrant Workers and Their Families*, dismantle their unjust industrial trainee system and incorporate a labour certification policy so that foreign migrant workers are allowed to properly receive their civil rights.

In order to ensure such free movement of labour and the labour rights of migrant workers, we must first reach a stage of global citizen consciousness. We need an educational campaign that can transform the consciousness of the general public. Migrant workers are the weakest of social components. They suffer from unequal policies resulting from the self-centred decisions of developed countries, racial prejudice and cultural indifference in the process of globalisation. These migrant workers do not receive the benefits of social welfare policies in either their own countries or the countries in which they work. They cannot receive basic health treatments when they are sick, and are thus denied their basic right to health. An international fund to support medical costs incurred by foreign migrant workers should be set up globally.

Global Compact: As a result of many transnational companies coming under criticism for their excessive unfair trade actions there is a movement, which was begun to form a global compact to encourage companies to abstain from pursuing excessive profits. This Compact was proposed by Kofi Annan, Secretary-General of the United Nations in the World Economic Forum in 1999. The Global Compact is an ethical principle for transnational companies to ensure that the benefits of globalisation are shared with all. This Compact comprises nine articles, which include protection of human rights, abolition of child labour, allowing the right to association by labourers, and the development of eco-friendly technology. International organisations, as well as civil organisations, religious organisations and medias should aggressively pursue transnational companies to sign the Global Compact and actually adhere to it.

Consideration for Non-English Speaking Countries: In order for non-English speaking countries to compete on an equal basis with English-speaking countries, there must be some special support to assist their learning of English. Developed countries and English-speaking countries should also provide subsidies for students who are studying in their country.

Despite having very good human resources, many developing countries cannot exercise leadership because of their handicap of English language. We must support a programme of training in English for those leaders who possess potential for providing world-class leadership so that they can break out of the language barrier and contribute equally to globalisation.

Conclusion

As we stand at the dawn of the 21st century and a global society, we have not been able to establish a healthy global society where the areas of economics, politics and welfare are balanced. The present process of globalisation is only enjoyed by a limited number of transnational corporations. Not only that, in a system that does not have a structure which can regulate the self-centredness of the developed countries and the large transnational companies, human beings are racing in the direction of unlimited competition of economic globalisation. The resentment and resistance of such globalisation has resulted in terror. War is the consequence. The US President has even gone so far as to label the countries of Iran, Iraq and North Korea as an 'axis of evil' which reveals a frightening possibility of further war and violence. Although the US owns the majority of weapons of mass destruction, they are still adamant on regulating the possession of weapons by other countries. The dualistic attitude of the US that pits countries as 'either for us or against us' was enforced on the world. There was no country, group or international organisation that had the sufficient strength and voice to curb such arrogance on the part of US President Bush.

Sound globalisation is based on love of humankind and brotherly solidarity, seeking to secure a global public realm of society, which can work to establish a global public welfare society. In order for us to progress toward such a global society, developed countries, transnational companies and the international speculators of capital must have a sense of self-sacrifice for the benefit of the well-being of the entire human race. They must pursue their profits at a level that does not harm the public well being of global society, and give back a portion of their earning for development and social welfare for other participants of global society.

In order to establish a global level welfare policy, each country should contribute to the establishment of an international organisation, which would enforce a system of negative taxation. Each country would be allocated a portion to support the common pool. This common pool of financial resources would then be used to formulate a welfare system for our global society. Most especially, we must levy taxes on the profit gains of short-term international speculative capital and utilise those funds to support the global welfare policy so that it can help to eradicate poverty in the countries of Africa, South America and Asia. It is only when we have put in place such supportive measures for the weak that we can move toward an equal and sharing community where we live together in peace.

The paradigm shift from the current system of conducting social welfare at a national level to a paradigm of conducting social welfare policies globally may seem an impossible dream at present. However, if we truly want to realise world peace in our lives, we must take the necessary steps, which would allow

us to move toward such change. There is no other alternative option for us. If we do not exercise our wisdom and gain the support and willing sacrifice of developed countries and transnational companies to establish a social structure which is above the 'survival of the fittest' market logic of today's globalisation process to formulate a win-win society where community life in harmony is possible, then the social integration which we hope to achieve through globalisation will not only be impossible to attain, but we will all fall into chaos and destruction. We must realise that such provisions for peoples' livelihoods and the giving of hope is the only way that we can prevent global social unrest. Toward this end, we must strive to rectify the current imbalance in globalisation.

At present, hope for change buds out from the NGOs movement. However, their basic understanding of globalisation is quite negative. They try to stop globalisation rather than curve it to the right direction. Globalisation itself is not wrong. They should develop positive alternatives rather than driving an anti-globalisation movement. They should suggest alternatives and develop strategies to attain alternative goals. The first two steps toward sound globalisation are to build up medical funds for migrant workers and to levy Tobin tax on internal financial transactions.

A New Paradigm for the 21st Century for Peace, the Alleviation of Poverty and People-Centred Democracy

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Introduction

This document is a result of the synthesis of my community development experiences from my university days to the present. As a student leader at Chulalongkorn University, I was directly involved in community development activities. After graduation, I worked with friends to establish an NGO to assist poor communities that did not receive opportunities for direct development in participatory community development. The first 20 years of my professional life have been involved in community development through NGO activities at community, local and policy levels. I participated in campaigning at the policy level for community development and was involved in the process to stimulate non-government organisations (NGOs) and community participation in the National Economic and Social Development plan from the 5th Plan in 1986 onwards. In the past 10 years, I have collaborated with civil society organisations gradually established by the middle class in Thailand. The activities in which I have been active include: drafting the People's Constitution, mobilisation for social reform from the grassroots with an emphasis on empowerment of the people to determine solutions to their own problems, and mobilising communities, NGOs, civil servants, businessmen and the media resulting in a participatory social movement at the grassroots level.

In Japan, I was provided the opportunity to meet with Japanese academics and NGOs in Tokyo and various other cities resulting in my understanding that the direction for social and civil society development is similar to that of Thailand. Despite the similarities, however, Japan and Thailand have many diverging issues. Moreover, the limitations of the two governments are dissimilar. These similarities and differences lead to many interesting issues that will be presented in this paper.

During the course of my stay in Japan, I was able to exchange ideas with friends, academics and Fellows from other countries concerning the attack on the World Trade Center on September 11. As a result, this paper also includes a synthesis on the international consensus that, in the age of globalisation, the occurrence of such an incident has made a great impact on the dominant international conceptual framework and paradigm.

I sincerely want to see the 'essence' that I received in Japan over the past two months tangibly extended as an infrastructure to policy level. Moreover, I am sincerely committed to participating in all the proposals suggested in the final chapter of this paper and would like to collaborate with the other Fellows and Program alumni and concerned parties in successfully implementing the proposals.

The Civil Society Movement in Japan and Thailand

Paradigm Shift in Japanese Civil Society: Key Values and Core Paradigms

During the two months in Japan, the Japan Foundation and the International House of Japan provided the seven Fellows from India, China, Korea, Indonesia, Philippines, Thailand, Malaysia and Japan with the opportunity to visit Japan, exchange learning among themselves and to meet with various Japanese resource persons and organisations. The following seven cases are presented to illustrate the fight for survival based on the consciousness of the Japanese communities.

Case 1: Rainbow Plan (Nagai City)
The Rainbow Plan was an attempt by local organisations and the Nagai Municipality to foster relations between rural and urban communities, utilising a paradigm shift through the collection of decomposable food wastes from each household to be processed into compost fertiliser and sold to vegetable farmers at subsidised prices. In turn, the farmers would sell their produce to the communities.

The inherent value of this project is the desire to coexist and create mutual benefits for urban and rural communities through activities that make it possible for communities to maintain their traditional way of life.

Case 2: International Contribution Club Forum (Ishinomaki City)
Ishinomaki City is a port city where foreigners co-exist with local Japanese residents in a predominantly Japanese environment. With the presence of foreigners such as Chinese, Thais, Koreans and Filipinos, the occurrence of intermarriages with each other is a natural turn of events. Thus, the main issue that concerns those working in a foreign environment and those entering into cross-cultural marriages is that of cultural differences.

Fortunately these differences are not insurmountable due to the presence of a group of women volunteers who attempt to foster good relations between the different cultures by focusing on the positive aspects of each culture and emphasising the values of love and compassion for mankind above and beyond nationality.

Case 3: "Kotobukicho" Marginalised Community (Yokohama City)
This community is located in Yokohama City which is a port city that employs immigrants as day labourers (from countries such as Korea and the Philippines), many of whose visas have expired and are therefore of illegal status. The reason for the need for these informal sector labourers – despite the fact that the world is moving towards borderless nations and higher minimum wage rates – is that the population in Japan is aging

and these labourers make it possible for Japanese products to be competitive. Due to their questionable legal, social and economic status, they reside in slums and are neglected by Japanese society.

The main issue is that Japanese law can only provide protection for wages, but cannot provide protection for social welfare, work permits or visas. Moreover, government mechanisms such as immigration, labour laws and social welfare provided by the central and prefecture governments are unable to respond to their situation. Thus, some Japanese NGOs and community organisations have attempted to alleviate the pressures on these illegal or undocumented immigrants by facilitating their social, economic and legal survival. Assistance is provided through the stimulation of the awareness of the values of mutual assistance and human dignity, and downplaying the issue of cheap labour. In addition, organisational collaboration was fostered through the Ka-La-Bow-Nok-Gai movement headed by a religious leader committed to providing care without regard for nationality but emphasising the value of being human.

Case 4: Isahaya Bay Land Reclamation (Isahaya City)
Due to the desire to increase agricultural output in Isahaya Bay, land was reclaimed to ensure that enough rice was produced for local consumption. Finally though, the government decided to cease land reclamation and constructed a dam. The construction of this dam resulted in the destruction of the largest wetlands area in Japan that has great bio-diversity and is the resting area for over 100 species of migrating birds prior to traveling over the Pacific Ocean to Siberia. This area is the most appropriate location for the maintenance of a high level of bio-diversity and is the location of small fishing villages and communities surrounding the bay. A resulting conflict arose between the central government's focus on agricultural and economic issues and the local people whose focus is on human relations, bio-diversity and the ecosystem of the wetlands area.

The perspective of the local residents is that land reclamation and human interference create negative impacts on the ecosystem that escalate problems, rather than supporting long-term sustainability. They perceive that environmental assessments by the central government, carried out by academics, were not participatory or holistic in nature. This conflict illustrated the paradigm shift of the local people – including fishermen, the middle class, those with parochial ties, and environmental enthusiasts – away from acceptance of the central wisdom to commitment to a holistic paradigm in which the values of the locality are paramount.

Case 5: Bell of Nagasaki: Atomic Bomb Museum (Nagasaki City)
It was discovered that the Japanese endured the most devastating experience of human history in 1945 when the US government decided to use atomic bombs on Hiroshima and Nagasaki, instantaneously killing

hundreds of thousands of people. The lessons learnt by the Japanese was that they were capable of overcoming their losses through their faith in each other, and their commitment to non-violence as they were ashamed of their part in the escalation of World War II. The values that emerged from non-retaliation and their determination to rebuild the nation were that of the peace movement and the desire for the end of atomic warfare. Despite the lessons of Japan, the world is still swimming in the quagmire of violence as is evident from the attack against America on September 11, when terrorists commandeered commercial airplanes and deliberately crashed into the World Trade Center in New York City.

Case 6: EGAO: Aging People Club (Fukuoka City)

As Japanese society is entering an era in which the growing proportion of the population are elderly, the economy will have to rely on youths, the middle-aged or foreign immigrant labour in the next decade or two. Due to their awareness of this situation, the current trend is for healthy retired individuals to volunteer their services and provide care for more elderly individuals. Thus, the direction for the provision of volunteer services crosses age barriers where middle-aged people provide care for the elderly.

Case 7: Fukuoka Citizens' Volunteer Center / NPO Center (Fukuoka City)

The Fukuoka Citizens' Volunteer Center attempts to stimulate sister or friendship affiliations between cities and to promote inter-city cultural exchanges and collaboration between the prefecture government and non-profit organisations to provide social welfare for the elderly and the disadvantaged.

Conclusion

The cases presented above clearly illustrate that Japanese society is steeped in local values, parochial ties, compassion for mankind and peace. Moreover, the people are concerned with issues beyond the framework of age, culture, nationality, race, cities, rural areas, the present, the future, species and geography. However, these values do not seem to be reflected in the government perspective. Thus the Japanese, as well as other nationalities, are conscious of a paradigm shift in accordance with basic values of goodness that include parochial ties, love for mankind and natural resources.

Development of the Thai Civil Society Movement

The major change that enabled the emergence of the educated segment of the people sector occurred in 1932 when the military and the people united to overthrow the absolute monarchy in a bloodless coup, and persuaded the King to accept the introduction of a constitutional monarchy. From this coup, real

democracy has yet to be achieved.

Between 1971and 1973, two movements comprised of students, labour and farmers adapted themselves and joined forces to participate in demonstrations to demand true democracy and to protest against military rule. The first demonstration occurred on October 16, 1971 and the second one on October 6, 1973. These attempts to demilitarise the government and foster people's democracy were the genesis of civic activists and the Thai non-government sector. After the occurrence of these events, the students split into two groups. Some joined the Communist party, while others worked with NGOs concerned with urban and rural development. This was the era for change in the grassroots civil society sector through participation in the social movement and rural development. This was the first time that the informal or traditional sector adapted itself and participated in modern democratic activities.

The change that occurred in 1992 was a result of globalisation that was initiated in 1980 as a result of the Washington Consensus – the American policy shifting in the new era of international politics and economics into the borderless realm. Moreover, the fall of Communism and the end of the Cold War reinforced this direction. The resulting impacts on Thailand were the growth of democracy in urban areas and rapid economic growth through foreign investment, resulting in the immense growth of the middle class. Additional impacts include the inability of political parties to match middle class growth, and the state of affairs in which the government was riddled with corruption. Moreover, it seemed as though the government was colluding with foreigners by facilitating their monopoly of the market in order to maintain political authority.

This situation led to the military coup in May 1992, which triggered public unrest and demonstrations, resulting in bloodshed. The lesson learnt by the middle class was that there were no guarantees for democratic government as the Constitution was constantly being amended or rewritten. This led to a national consensus to draft a Constitution that would prevent military coups, corruption and authoritarian government, and the establishment of the Democracy Development Committee under the oversee of Parliament. During this period, the civil society sector was very active in supporting community organisation activity at grassroots levels. Such activity was non-violent and was based on conceptual interaction and public debates, leading to tangible policies proposed through the Constitution.

In 1996, the People's Constitution became effective and new organisations such as the Election Commission of Thailand and the Constitutional Court were established. Associated laws to balance the power of the government and the parliament were also drafted. It became evident that the Constitution was being interpreted during this period of time and civil society was perceived as the major player in balancing the power of the State. In addition, the direction of democratic activity by the peoples sector was to promote grassroots participatory democracy

rather than the traditional system of parliamentary democracy.

From 1997 to the present, Thailand has been faced with an economic and social crisis as many businesses and financial institutions have failed and the government unsuccessfully expended an enormous amount of money to defend the currency. During the past four years, the civil society sector – like the middle class, rural and urban civic leaders – has been very active in stimulating the economic and social self-reform movement, particularly to protect the disadvantaged. There was a major movement to mobilise social capital and stimulate conceptual frameworks and values from the grassroots resulting in the following changes:

- Paradigm shift in development concerns from policy level to implementation level.
- Emergence of the third track comprised of civil society organisations (CSOs), NGOs and the media.
- Reform from below as a result of self-determination.
- Creation of a grassroots social safety net through community organisation networks with support from the Social Investment Fund.
- Determination and mobilisation of local social capital by communities and the middle class through new public discourses by civil society organisations based on cultural values, social values and bodies of knowledge. This social capital was used to determine social rehabilitation.

Practical Framework: Thai Civil Society

The experiences of the Thai civil society have led to innovations that form the basis for public (micro) and policy (macro) discourses.

Public discourse illustrated the ability of the people and civil society to act in accordance with their conscience during the crisis, rather than wait for the central or local government to alleviate their troubles. Those impacted by the crisis were able to rely on their social capital, local resources, inherent knowledge and local processes to implement proactive self-reform and determine solutions to problems. During the crisis, grassroots communities were able to grasp the opportunity provided to care for each other and protect the disadvantaged, creating local social safety nets and strengthening communities. The balance in the power structure was (and is) ensured by the participation of informal community leaders such as elderly leaders, religious leaders, women leaders and youth leaders in determining of their own problems, strengths, weaknesses and capacities.

This proved to the country, the government and world that a poor country, or poor people, may be economically poor but rich in social capital, culture and tradition – that these may be used to create social gains and benefits that are

not monetary in nature.

The production of community master plans are a major change in Thailand, indicating mainstream acceptance of the capacity of the people sector and informal organisations to collaborate with local authorities in the planning process. This process, in a quarter of the sub-districts in the country, is being expanded. Previously, the central government, politicians and high-ranking civil servants determined all policies.

Policy issues were presented to politicians, parliament and the government during the campaigning period prior to the last elections (January 6, 2001) and during the current government's initial weeks in office. It should be noted that these community organisations effected change through their ability to interact and engage in discourses with politicians and the National Economic and Social Development Board – in public. They were also able to collaborate with the media to assist learning at the national level.

Policy discourse has provided the platform for the drafting of the new Constitution – the framework for the structure, direction and balance of power in Parliament and limits the power of the government. In addition, the Constitution has provided measures to deal with Parliament or the government in case that they do not abide by the provisions of the Constitution. Moreover, this Constitution provides the people sector with the opportunity to foster participation and the right to demand their due in self-government, such as the management of education and development. Other rights include the right to information, community rights, human rights, cultural rights, rights of the disadvantaged and the use of government media. The middle class civil society sector in urban areas, particularly in Bangkok, has been active in the stated issues to ensure that the laws enacted are consistent with the principles of the new Constitution, and the people's right to demand their due.

It should be noted that the National Economic and Social Development Board is collaborating with grassroots communities at the sub-district level in transforming the *9th National Economic and Social Development Plan* (a five year plan) to be a bottom-up plan through the production of community plans at sub-district level. These plans will be incorporated into the *9th Plan* and transferred to the local authorities.

Another change that should be noted is that a number of the Thaksin government's policies are actually responses to people sector initiatives such as the policies of the Village Fund, 1 Sub-district 1 Product, Farmer's Debt Moratorium and Community Economy. The Social Investment Fund is another innovation, initiated by a number of leaders, to create a system through which the government budget can be distributed through a third track, directly to community organisations in support of community activities. These activities are determined, designed and implemented by the community organisations

themselves, and provide benefits to the general public, resulting in the rehabilitation of their society, economy and locality.

Critical Driving Forces of Civil Society and the Social Movement in Thailand

This synthesis of the experiences of the Thai civil society sector concerns a paradigm shift in adjustments to the structure of social change for middle and long term reform at micro and macro levels.

At the micro level or public discourse level, it is evident that the structural change of grassroots society has to comprise the following:

- The creation of knowledge to be used for grassroots social change is not initiated through the use of emotion, force or pressure. It can only be realised through reasoning, based on local wisdom, local values and local social capital, that has been adapted to fit with modern global values. Change can only come about as a result of the identification of existing resources and public discourses to modernise or add value to the resources in order to extend the benefits derived from the resources, rather than focusing solely on the problems to be faced. It is necessary that implementation be undertaken collectively in order to foster participatory learning, lessons and benefits, sense of caring, new leaders, new organisations and summarisation of learning and extension of results.

- Creation of public action in public fora and activities results in linkages of various groups from the traditional sectors such as religious organisations, senior citizen organisations and other informal groups like women's groups, environmental groups, occupation groups, handicraft groups, NGOs and civil society organisations. In addition, the community enterprise groups initiated in various areas, particularly in the 1 product 1 sub-district policy, will be able to gain entrance. Moreover, the civil service sector will also be able to participate. This change provides all sectors with the opportunity to work together at a horizontal not vertical structure, based on power, line of authority and budget as the main factors influencing participation. The mobilising factors for participation include the desire to be involved, shared values, personal commitment and participatory learning. This results in a new structure of the third track or civil society sector with networks at local, regional, national and international levels.

- Extensive changes in the grassroots level and structure will not be possible without the use of the mass media. In Thailand, public announcement towers in the villages have been linked to local radio at the provincial level with participation by the public relations

department, the media of the government sector, to arrange programmes using local content, personnel and civil society facilitators. During the campaigns for democracy, government policies and the Constitution, television programmes and cell phones were used greatly. Currently, information technology (the Internet) is being considered to link with local radio programmes and local television. This is a use of the media in its various forms to foster horizontal human communication between people, groups of people, networks and sectors.

The three factors stated above are equally important in driving change at the micro level. However, in the age of globalisation, where there are no national borders, where markets are open and where regions have to determine themselves in order to be competitive, success would not be possible if collaboration was not fostered at the macro or policy level. Such collaboration includes:

- Participation in political power and state authority to ensure the coordination of benefits for mutual advantage ('win-win'). In the past, the traditional paradigm of the Marxist framework perceived the state as the enemy. In addition, it was the responsibility of the middle class or labour to overthrow the state and install a new regime to manage or direct the nation. However, in the present, it has become imperative that there be collaboration between the state, markets and regions while maintaining their identity so that benefits are provided for all concerned parties.

- Creation of a social movement of the people with parochial consciousness, public leaders, public consciousness and public action for public benefits such as planning, self-determination, economic rehabilitation, democratic campaigning, policy campaigning and anti-drugs campaigning. When the people work together consistently on public issues, learning and awareness is fostered. However, this learning cannot be extended unless the learning is synthesised and linked to universal knowledge.

- Synthesis of learning and linkage with universal knowledge integrates and modernises local knowledge and leads to the synthesis of civil society knowledge that is then transferred to the various movements, and linked to policy level initiatives. The transfer, synthesis and linkage of knowledge results in a change process which, in Thailand, occurs during political engagement via public, parliamentary or media fora. Thus, important changes have to rely on political power in the decision-making process to provide benefits for all parties (win-win) – yet, without resulting in directional losses by the civil society sector that is protective of its independence and self-direction.

The three factors – participation in political power and state authority; social mobilisation and on-going synthesis of knowledge as a learning organisation – plus promotion of linkage between international knowledge with that of the locality are important lessons that caused the current paradigm shift, and are the important driving forces in Thailand.

Shifts in the Mainstream Development Paradigm

This section attempts to appraise and analyse the social, political and economic determinants of dominant mainstream development paradigms. In addition, the issues of conflict and challenge will be illustrated in order to examine the validity of the current paradigm dominating all governments.

Through dialogue with Thai and international academics, the consensus is that after 1945, the mainstream paradigm of the world evolved through three periods of paradigm shifts as follows:

The First Shift

After World War II and the use of the atomic bombs, the important shift in the global paradigm came about due to the realisation of the power of atomic weapons, resulting in a balance of power in favour of those countries with atomic weapons. In addition, the economic order shifted to the creation of the State as the mechanism for nationalist development. Thus after World War II, capitalist nations based their economic indicators on gross domestic product (GDP) resulting in the formation of the group of developed nations known as the G7. Socialist countries based their economic development on the socialist system and social reform. The result of these diverging economic and political orientations was the start of the Cold War between capitalist and socialist camps.

The Second Shift

In 1980, the US initiated the Washington Consensus which is a neo-liberal policy that supports the shift in the global economy to that of a free market, where all countries should be able to cross borders in developing their economies. From 1980 onwards, the impact of the Washington Consensus resulted in the fall of East Germany, the Soviet Union and the end of the Cold War in 1987. During this period, the free market and globalisation concepts within the framework of the Washington Consensus directed global policies.

After the Cold War, the important factors that have enabled the development of the world and capitalist nations are state power, and money based on market determinants. However, it was discovered that in many cases, the state was corrupt and dominated by the superpowers. Moreover, the markets were still capitalistic monopolies.

From 1987 onwards, the age of globalisation flourished with the free flow of funds, information and communication technology. Globalisation changed the world paradigm because it opened state borders and transformed markets into free markets, where commercial and financial markets were liberalised. This resulted in a situation of the 'survival of the fittest' where advantage was taken of unprepared nations that were relatively new markets, such as Korea, Japan and Thailand. The impact on Asia was the financial crisis in Japan in 1990, and in Thailand in 1997 – the latter spread to Korea, Malaysia and Singapore and a number of countries in East Asia.

The Third Shift

On September 11, the global paradigm shifted again as a result of the attack on two important American symbols – the World Trade Center in Wall Street, which is the centre of financial power, and the Pentagon or the centre of military power. In addition, an unsuccessful attack was apparently aimed at Capitol Hill/the White House or the centre of American political power. This was a new form of warfare undertaken by the civilian sector, resulting in major losses to the civilian sector and humanity in America and the world. More importantly, this was an attack on symbols and included the use of biochemical warfare (anthrax) on unsuspecting civilians. In addition, the coverage provided by the mass media (CNN) resulted in simultaneous global access to information and simultaneous horror for two months after the incident. The effect of the attacks was the exacerbation of negative impacts on the global economic system that are in recession – finances, airline industry, tourism and consumer goods. Thus the important paradigm shifts of 2001 are as follows:

- The creation of a bipolar system made up of America and its allies on one side, and terrorists on the other, a world without borders or clearly defined enemies, and a constant state of emergency due to attacks on all fronts-media, weapons, chemicals, psychology and information – without prior warning.
- Creation of coalitions through state agreements.
- Knowledge-based economy where the information and communication revolution has shifted the balance of power to those countries with knowledge and technology. These countries are able to influence the less developed countries. In other words, the poles are shifted to those that have and do not have information and communications technology.

From the paradigm shifts presented above, it is clear that the state has to maintain democracy as the base for building state power, and that economies of the various countries are being linked into globalised free markets. In this framework, the state and market power in trade blocs, treaties or free trade coalitions emphasise strengthening the GDP – that is, measurement by capital or economic value alone. This use of capital or an economic value as the indicator of power or wealth

determines that the global paradigm views humans as goods. More importantly, the factors of production – market, capital, labour – are globalised and dominated by the superpowers. America and Japan are the two countries with the most economic wealth as they monopolise 40% of the world's GDP. In addition, they dominate the political, social, religious, science and technology, and information and communication revolution. This results in a bipolar conflict between the digitised and non-digitised areas, or the Islamic and non-Islamic worlds.

From the lessons presented in the section on the Civil Society Movement in Japan and Thailand, it is evident that emerging and fringe transnational civil societies in these countries place emphasis on social capital rather than economic capital. They emphasise popular values, interpersonal interaction and human interaction with the environment and the market, and are concerned with peaceful coexistence, compassion, human dignity, independence, desire for justice and equality. These are the conceptual values of civil societies. They emphasise social capital that has value-added end values rather than volume-added economic capital. Activities undertaken are based on the context of the locality with the intention of supporting self-determination, and freedom from states and markets. On the other hand, the capital being globalised through the superpowers is directed and can result in use of force or world war.

It is obvious that the two emerging forces are opposing forces – 'bottom-up', non-violence, human relations, the horizontal versus 'top-down', conflict-oriented, the vertical. This is the paradox that is being faced. The challenge is the integration of the two paradigms to result in grassroots initiation of activities (reflecting their needs) that is then facilitated by the vertical orientation of the state. Such integration will support the maintenance of capital, without reducing the value of man and environment to that of goods, while maintaining the diverse social capital of man, environment, transnational civil society and local civil society.

There have to be alternatives to the conceptual process, the value creation process and the self-determination of mankind in the 21st century. It has become evident that state policies are increasingly egocentric and nationalistic, and that states are using public media as mechanisms to promote political and economic propaganda to maintain the status quo. Civil society is unable to respond to the complexities of this situation. In such a situation, should the mainstream paradigm in Asia and the world be maintained? It is imperative that all states determine the most appropriate paradigm to be adopted for the next decade/century, and implement the corresponding reforms. In case these states are unwilling to learn from alternative paradigms, as illustrated in the section on the Civil Society Movement in Japan and Thailand, it may be possible to synthesise those paradigms into more acceptable alternatives.

Alternative Paradigms

Three alternative paradigms are suggested to stimulate the initiation of a new

public discourse for the Asian region. The three alternatives have been synthesised from actual players, lessons and knowledge in the context of Japan and Thailand (the section on the Civil Society Movement in Japan and Thailand) and exchanges with academicians.

The issue of utmost importance is peace.

If the mainstream paradigm of conflict – based on war and violence in order to eliminate terrorists through all-out war, psychological warfare, media warfare and chemical warfare – is maintained, how can world peace be attained once emotional rage has passed?

If one learns from the experiences of the Japanese who have lived through the effects of the atomic bomb and the religious, traditional and social values of Asian communities to peacefully co-exist and maintain human relations, peace and wisdom can be achieved without having to rely on state agreements. Thus, would it be possible to initiate discourses to determine a peace paradigm that places value on true peace, based on love, forgiveness and the desire to co-exist?

Such a paradigm may not be attained if the state is the sole actor in this issue. Peace is an issue that is beyond the authority of the state and superpowers as there are many new mechanisms, leaders and institutions concerned with this issue. In addition, these new actors are transnational in nature and are capable of initiating dialogues.

The initiation of a peace campaign, with appropriate participants, is an important step in creating a peace paradigm in Asia. This is the challenge in the environment of global tension between Israel and Palestine, and the situation in Afghanistan and South Asia.

In order to integrate peace, it may be necessary to formulate a paradigm and driving force to create collective social 'soft power'. In the past, the mainstream paradigm relied on 'state power' which results in the use of legal, market and military powers: 'hard power'. At present, the civil society sector in Japan and Thailand has discovered social capital. They are in the process of self-liberalisation through the use of social and cultural capital. Such liberalisation facilitates management through local wisdom and collaboration, participatory implementation by localities, the linkage of diverse networks and institutes, the use of media to create participatory learning and the accumulation of human capital, resulting in the participatory social process – an important social power. This is occurring at local, national and international levels, resulting in shared interests in the international arena. This new paradigm can be used to influence social change and to balance or soften the 'hard power' used by countries in order to stimulate peace.

After the Washington Consensus, Asia has received negative impacts,

particularly in the areas of economy and digital technology in which Asia is somewhat lagging behind. Currently, the economic paradigm in Asia is to create regional collaboration through the establishment of an Asian Monetary Fund (AMF), to create a free trade area, and to take care of least developed countries in Asia, by Asian countries themselves, without external influences.

Asia has the opportunity to determine its own direction through the collaboration of social, economic and peace movements via learning, cooperation and the design of an Asian paradigm. If Asian economic cooperation is moving in the direction of collaboration between Asia and Japan, China and Korea (say, ASEAN + 3), then this paradigm can be expanded to a transnational economic level, based on common issues such as transnational labour, drugs, free flow of capital and information. New mechanisms have to be designed to operate above the level of the state but under that of transnational civil society. If Asia has to deal with economic recession and the war on terrorism, then care for the needy and the poor may become the responsibility of both the state and a social protection system, developed by the transnational informal sector, that relies on the transnational civil society and NGOs.

These are alternatives that may stimulate the collaboration of countries, and enable Asia to have the freedom to determine its position on issues concerning peace, society and economy: the challenge for the next century.

Strategies for an Asian Paradigm

The development of a new Asian paradigm depends on the vision of the collaborators that may include the state, civil society and public intellectuals. If the paradigm is changed, without a vision for the country, region and people of Asia and a predetermined plan for the transformation of the paradigm into action, then the new paradigm will remain a dream or an academic document. Thus, a synthesis of a vision that should be useful for the Asian region in the social context is presented as follows:

Peace

It is important that a summit be arranged for diverse leaders from major Asian countries, including spiritual leaders and social leaders (currently, summits are arranged for state leaders who will naturally voice their support for the US in the War Against Terrorism). If a summit that transcends state borders, religious beliefs and national interests is arranged, issues concerning peace can be discussed that will be of much wider, universal interest.

The superpowers, in their perception of peace, do not understand the Asian perspective on religious, ethnic, racial and border issues. All Asian nations and social sectors should reflect and design an Asian initiative, and collaborate with the people, civil society and states in South Asia. Such an

initiative should be undertaken by Japan, which has the capacity to be neutral.

The primary actor in the Middle East issue has been the US while countries in Asia have not been able to develop their own position. In future, Asia should be able to reach a consensus and determine their position on this issue in the form of an Asian initiative. It is necessary to rely on the media and the new generation to initiate a peace movement that is not egocentric and does not rely on any religion, country or bloc. It is also necessary to utilise independent media unaffiliated with any superpower, or promoting propaganda for any group. The challenges to peace in the next decade are public media, the creation of the third track, and the new generation.

New Economy

While the Asian economy is in recession, the formation of the Asian Monetary Fund (AMF), trade agreements and the cooperation to fight poverty by Asian governments is imperative in order to provide guarantees for the people who are entering the transnational labour market. The mechanisms that will be designed will require international dialogue because it is necessary to draft international laws and systems to support the relaxation of borders and to facilitate the free flow of human capital.

New Social Mechanism

The creation of mechanisms – such as a transnational civil society or institute that does not rely on the United Nations (UN) or national bureaucrats but instead adopts the management style of civil societies – should be established to support cooperation. This is a new transnational initiative that is not based on national identity or loyalty and does not have to mimic the operations of the UN, which was established and is dominated by the West.

New Equilibrium

The development direction of Asia has to be adjusted to be more balanced: with equal emphasis on social capital and economic capital. In addition, importance has to be placed on the issues of humanity, peace, and human development, particularly that of the poor. The proposal is for Japan to initiate collaboration with Asian countries in order to establish a Human Development Centre.

The objectives of this Centre may include the development of human development indicators to be used in the next decade, promotion of international cooperation to deal with crossborder migration of labour, and other social issues. In addition, this Centre should seek the cooperation of the Official Development Assistance (ODA) in Japan in determining solutions to these 'software' problems. The Centre may

create a system for the protection of the disadvantaged such as marginalised people, neglected senior citizens and escalating gender issues in some countries. It is clear that Asia and transnational civil societies need operational mechanisms and that ODA may facilitate the initiation of development in collaboration with other countries that are prepared to cooperate but may lack funding.

If the visions in this section are to be realised, countries and Asian civil societies have to mobilise transnational peace and collaborate on economic and human security factors for the development of East Asian countries. They must also move towards the development of human resources in poor countries. The best alternative would be the integration of the three visions through the formulation of an implementation plan to be carried out collectively.

In the course of the group work period of the Asia Leadership Fellow Program, the seven Fellows perceived the necessity for the development of strategies and frameworks for implementation that could support the paradigm and the collective vision to be created. These could be summarised in the following suggestions:

* The important challenge in the shift – in national and international paradigms by public policy leaders, political leaders, public intellectuals, development leaders and business leaders – is the development of a strategy to sensitise state policy leaders, public intellectuals and public media in the international area to the paradigm shift process. Currently, it is possible to undertake research in important issues that impact the Asian paradigm such as peace, social capital (soft power) and transnational civil society that should lead to concepts on human centred development. The availability of such research in a group of concerned parties should then lead to change at the policy level. Research will have to be done on the lessons of the countries that have successfully implemented sensitisation such as Thailand, Philippines and Japan.

* Creation of conditions and processes for the state and international organisations to link with transnational civil society organisations concerned with issues such as nation, race and religion, and committed to the transformation of Asia through the provision of impetus and support for the following:

The exchange process of public intellectuals or innovators across countries, sectors and boundaries in Asia such as the Public Intellectual programmes initiated by Japan.

Collaboration of public intellectuals and public media in order to mobilise public issues that will result in policy level discussions such as peace, foreign labour, transnational environmental issues, and drugs. Moreover, public intellectuals, public media, public space and policy dialogues can foster collaboration, resulting in the networking of local civil society and group civil societies that have far-reaching vision.

The liberalisation of the civil society movement that is being established in various localities in Japan and Thailand. These local civil societies have limited vision as their consciousness, development and establishment are only locally oriented. As a result, they have to be liberated and induced to form transnational networks in order to tackle more complex issues. In addition, the provision of support for training, study visits and funds by a third track organisation such as the Social Investment Fund, Thailand will enable emerging civil societies to grow and become a strong third track in the future.

Interstate cooperation should be fostered through collaboration with the media, lawyers, and policy makers in order to facilitate interstate administration and determine the necessary adjustments of laws and policies to deal with issues such as cross border migration, drugs, flow of funds and property rights.

With the acceptance of these suggested strategies, it would be necessary to establish a mechanism for transnational civil society to implement collective action. The activities are likely to go beyond state management capacities. The foundations for the transnational civil society mechanism rely on the provision of support for the following:

The creation of a forum for the exchange of learning, and the creation of a network of public intellectuals committed to social reform beyond countries, borders and religious. If these fora are created and expanded, the number of public intellectuals will be increased in the transnational system.

Support for research and development and determination of knowledge and situational analysis of transnational issues such as foreign labour, the environment, and neglected people. In undertaking transnational research, the knowledge accumulated will lead to the ability to determine solutions at the local and international levels.

Dissemination of findings of transnational research through public media in order to accelerate the extension of knowledge and the sensitisation of the consumers. The public media will be encouraged to advocate Asian social issues rather than just focusing on political, economic and market issues. This is the cultivation of the seeds of the transnational concept in journalists of the public media, by providing them with a platform for collaboration in the international context.

Provide public media and public intellectuals with the opportunity to interact with national leaders in public or policy fora on Asian issues. Such international policy fora need not rely on the UN forum. Thus, it is necessary to provide support for the collaboration of the various sectors and civil society and their networks across borders and issues.

Implementation has to be undertaken collectively in a limited area that is not administered by a country or an NGO resulting in the elimination of borders. The participating fellows in the Asia Leadership Fellow Program discussed collectively undertaking two projects. The area of the first project is in the Mekong Delta River Basin requiring the cooperation of South China, Burma Laos, Thailand and Kampuchea while the area of the second project is in South Asia where there is heavy migration of labour. In addition, this area covering India, Pakistan, Sikkim, Bhutan and Nepal is very sensitive to terrorism. These two areas are challenging areas in which to work without being bound by borderlines.

These are initiatives from collaborative implementation that would determine mechanisms and organisations to adjust the conceptual framework across boundaries of the existing paradigm that have been in place for over 50 years.

Conclusions

The next decade is one in which there will be great change. It is not possible to forecast all the changes in the future as the changes that are being faced in the present, such as that of the economy and war, are complex and uncertain. In addition, it is not possible to determine the attainment of peace as our national leaders are using military power and war as the mechanisms to force peace and eradicate terrorists. The current situation is that of fear, economic recession, biochemical weapons attacks and terrorism. Moreover, the political mechanisms and institutes in existence are approximately 100 years old in the West and 50 years old in the East. These mechanisms and institutions may not be the best alternatives to lead mankind into the 21st century, as more people are capable of self-determination, via public discources, and generally being active citizens.

This leads to the conclusion that there are two alternative paradigms for the 21st century. The first one is that of the mainstream paradigm in which capital is determined by globalised markets and Asian countries are dominated by some superpowers.

The second alternative, initiated by civil societies, is the use of social capital that is still in existence and the liberalisation, re-identification and reinvestment to add value and stimulate social processes or interaction from which civil society sectors will rise in the regions. In addition, civil society processes will resolve the problems of the mainstream paradigm and values resulting in the development of participatory democracy or peoples' democracy. The direction to be taken is to manage the problem and liberate people through the process of increasing their inherent values and providing them with tranquility, compassion, commitment to the homeland, formation of group and community ties – and reduce their economic poverty.

In the next decade, civil societies will not be able to limit their work to the local area nor can their work be based solely on social capital. If they limit themselves, they will not be able to keep pace with globalisation. Moreover, they will not be able to respond to the complexities of the mainstream paradigm dominating the world. This paradigm is leading to the use of force and war: the use of state power by a few superpowers, and an economic system that is dominated by advanced countries, controlling property rights that are being sold to developing countries.

The civil society sector will have to unite at the transnational level in Asia to create an Asian initiative to advance the economy, peace and society. This will be a historical milestone in that it is an initiative determined by Asians rather than by the superpowers. This will be possible if there is collaboration in the following:

Creation of the process for identification of knowledge and local wisdom in Asia across boundaries.

Creation of civil society social movement across boundaries.

Creation of linkage and mobilisation of political policies in political mechanisms in Asia to institute policy changes that go beyond national interests, loyalty and boundaries.

These three factors form the triangle of social change that the transnational civil society has to undertake, research and implement, based on a transnational paradigm in Asia's next decade.

Finally, this is undertaken with the hope for change in the state power in Asia. In the end, the Asian state will be more democratic, transparent and have good governance. More importantly, there will be collaboration that creates countries incorporating economic, social, human, and peace and non-violent values. This is the conclusion that has been reached based on the commitment to collaborate with those who are equally committed to the same principles of peace and respect for mankind.

Recommendations for Japan and Transnational Civil Society

This synthesis is oriented towards the construction of a new social infrastructure, or a new mechanism in Asia, and the important role of Japan at policy and organisation levels. This mechanism is the foundation for the emergence of network communities and intellectuals that will assist the stimulation of the emergence of civil society in the area of Asia.

The reason for highlighting the role of Japan in Asia is that the next decade heralds the era in which civil societies in Asian countries will have to assist each

other in forming, organising and establishing themselves. It has been determined that there are three main areas in which Japan could collaborate with countries in Asia in the establishment of an Asian Initiative as follows:

> In the past 50 years, the people and the government of Japan have overcome a great loss that other countries have never experienced – namely, losing World War II, two atomic bombs, numerous war casualties and deaths and guilt as war criminals. The result of these experiences is the institutionalisation of a passive society. The Japanese have been able to overcome their suffering and have been able to rehabilitate their people and country without the desire for vengeance, retaliation or use of force. In the 50 years after World War II, Japan has been committed to 'true peace' as they are well aware of the pain and suffering of warfare, such as in Hiroshima and Nagasaki. Japan is committed to disseminating information on human suffering caused by the atomic bomb in order that the bomb will have been used for the first and last times in Hiroshima and Nagasaki. This deep-seated commitment to peace cannot be found in any other country. The Japanese experience is unique.
>
> The accumulation of this sentiment over 50 years is a strength that should be transferred to Asian society. It has to determine alternatives to the violence that is emerging in the management of the war against terrorism. This violence is gradually escalating and may occur in non-visible forms such as biochemical warfare, fear, uncertainty of safety and uncertainty of economy, financial markets and investment markets. With conviction in peace and the peace process from the Japanese lessons, the alternatives to violence may be determined more rationally.

Even though Japan has been in economic recession since 1990, Japanese society is still strong. As such, Japan has two strengths or comparative advantages of which Asian countries should be aware. The first strength is the stability of Japanese economic institutions when compared to other Asian countries and China in particular. Even though China is developing, China's strength lies in its domestic market, while that of Japan is its ability to enter the international market. This economic strength is an advantage that enables Japan to know Asia through its economic infrastructure of markets, products, investments and people residing in Asia. The second strength lies in the fact that Japan will probably not suffer unduly if the economic recession carries on. Thus, the strengths of Japan should be able to facilitate the realisation of an initiative of the Asian people and governments for the advancement of Asian unity and wealth.

We normally hear of Japanese aid to other countries and of Japanese investments in other countries. However, currently there are NGOs working in Japan concerned with international development and fostering relations between Asia, Europe and America such as the Japan Foundation and the

International House of Japan. In addition, there are other organisations that are concerned with the linkage between the grassroots levels, NGOs and policy levels, between the people sector and the civil society sector in Asia and between international organisations and the Japanese Government organisations (JICA and Official Development Assistance) to foster collaboration in Asia. These organisations include the Japan Information Center (JANIC), PARC – a resource sector-information-research organisation in the Pacific Rim, JVC – a volunteer organisation, Asian Community Trust – a funds mobilisation organisation for grassroots activities and the Nippon Foundation. These seven organisations have been active in the past ten years, stimulating collaboration and human development, particularly that of Asian leaders.

The work undertaken by Japanese NGOs in the past ten years is a very important step in enabling us to collaborate.The project to be proposed to the Japanese Government and other organisations is as follows:

> Creation of mechanism, institute or social infrastructure at the regional or international level in support of the paradigm, vision and strategy to create Asian peace. The social infrastructure that can be initiated by the Japanese Government, the seven NGOs and the organisations and governments of the various countries are as follows:
>
> Collectively design a financial and social architecture that is independent of the World Bank, the US and Europe. Currently, Japan has established the AMF. In the next five to ten years, the Asian region will be facing a more severe crisis, thus all the countries or all the poor, the NGOs and the civil societies will have to rely on the World Bank or Western NGOs. An Asian Social Fund (ASF) should be designed and established. This fund will be a financial organisation that does not provide state to state assistance, and is not administered as a government bureaucracy as in the case of JICA and the UN. The Fund should be administered through participatory management of the civil society sector of many countries with donor representatives.
>
> This fund should be independent of country politics or national political decision-making mechanisms with operations undertaken by an autonomous organisation similar to the UN. The proposed organisation can be differentiated from the UN in that it will ally itself closely with the people and civil society sectors, rather than being state-oriented and undertaking a diplomatic role.

The ASF, which is established through participation of many governments and sources of funds such as business, social and government organisations, should allocate funds for liberation and creation, to enable the grassroots people organisations facing problems of poverty and impacts from the crisis to directly utilise funds. In addition, NGOs, government agencies and civil society

organisations should only act as sponsors. Operations will not be implemented at country level but will be undertaken across countries in order to deal with transnational problems such as drugs, labour, AIDs and marginalised people that is not the oversee of any one government.

This suggestion is for the creation of a new social initiative through the establishment of a fund. However, fund mobilisation is an issue that has to be discussed further.

Extension and spread of the genesis of the civil society sector that is happening in the Philippines, Thailand, Indonesia and many other countries in which the middle class is the main driving force. The main activities are determination of economic direction and extension of activities in social affairs, in collaboration with the central and local governments. If each country is to implement activities independently, the growth of the transnational civil society will be impeded.

As Japan has seven organisations that are active in the creation of public intellectuals, international research and linkage of networks, in the next five to ten years, these organisations may establish nodes in East Asia (China, Japan, Korea, Hong Kong and Taiwan), South Asia (Bangladesh, India, Pakistan) and in India and Southeast Asia (Thailand, Laos, Kampuchea, Vietnam, Singapore, Malaysia, Indonesia, Philippines and Burma). With the establishment of these nodes, the chances of stimulating the emergence of civil society in SEA and the cultivation of the concept of transnational civil society, will be increased. This in turn will prevent the cold war mind-set from being an obstacle to the establishment of a transnational civil society. In addition, Japan will be able to collaborate at the policy and implementation level in Asia and with local civil society organisations and NGOs in determining strategies. Moreover, Japan and the nodes of operations can stimulate unity, exchange and networks and then link with Japan. Thus Asia will have a superstructure that is made up of the three sub-regional nodes, comprising transnational civil societies working towards Asian unity. The activities of the sub-regional nodes include:

- research in the growth of civil society for determining solutions to the problem of poverty with country focus and transnational orientation;
- human development training and leadership building;
- creation of media to extend learning, stimulate social consciousness and foster cross cultural understanding across borders;
- create and extend horizontal public intellectual networks that can link with public intellectuals in Japan.

In support of these activities, Japan should increase support for local NGO activities while Japanese NGOs should focus on forming transnational links and networks.

This can include the creation of social infrastructure to support policy dialogues at the government level and tripartite dialogues between:

> Government representatives of each country from the policy sector, collaborating for social reform to alleviate the current social crisis in order to provide for the poor;
>
> Representatives of NGO and civil society sectors and;
>
> Media working at the regional level active in social and economic policies without focusing on government interests.

These three groups should have permanent representatives to work consistently in creating policy dialogues to support peace, human security, the reduction of poverty in Asia, and the creation of the civil society sector as the third track in Asia. On-going dialogue at national, regional and international levels is an important issue. The seven Japanese NGOs could be the key organiser in collaborating with national NGOs and civil societies.

Proposal for the creation of a structure for the academic and conceptual exchanges among public intellectuals. A new generation of leaders at the sub-regional level should be encouraged to exchange learning across borders to reduce national barriers and be the conduit to the establishment of transnational civil societies in the next decade.

These four proposals are suggestions for the consideration of policy organisations in Japan and organisations concerned with creating social unity in the Asian region.

The final suggestions are for the Japan Foundation and the International House of Japan. These suggestions are synthesised from experiences garnered concerning the spirit, concept, vision and conviction in the direction and new paradigm. It would be desirable if the experience could be extended as follows:

Extension of the results of the two organisations in the next year:

> September 11, changed global perception and resulted in the declaration of the war against terrorism. Thus in 2002, if the Asia Leadership Fellow Program were to arrange another forum and the global perception is still based on the use of war to manage terrorism while the world and Asia prefers a conceptual framework that is more civilised, the theme of next year should be 'Peace in Asia'. This topic should transcend state, culture, religion and non-violence. The resolution of the Fellows and scholars at the forum next year could provide alternatives for Asian collaboration that may be presented as a policy alternative.

The Japan Foundation and the International House of Japan should arrange an Asian forum for peace in early 2002 with the focus on the three sub-regional nodes – namely, South Asia, Southeast Asia and East Asia. Key leaders from the civil society, academic, government, and people should be invited to discuss the issues facing Asia as a result of international policies, the issues of peace, unity and the rehabilitation of the crisis and provision of care for the poor. If a forum was arranged in the three sub-regional nodes the output should be:

Identification of issues of sub-regional concern to be discussed during the Asia Leadership Fellow Program towards the end of the year.

Identification of leaders that can lead the transnational civil society on the issues of peace, poverty, democracy etc. at the sub-regional level. These leaders may initiate activities in the future and may be resource persons or facilitators for the Asia Leadership Fellow Program 2002.

Identification of leaders to participate in the Asia Leadership Fellow Program, resulting in the distribution of leaders, resource persons and participants in the future.

The results of the three sub-regional fora will provide the Program with raw materials, and if the Japan Foundation were to arrange a follow-up symposium focusing on peace in Chiang Mai in October 2002, it would be possible to use the raw material received as input. Thus the arrangement of the three sub-regional fora would build up to the final fora at the end of the year.

Proposal to the organisers:

In 2001, the Fellows designed the Remapping Migration Project and hope to carry out the project together next year despite the fact that they reside in different countries. The Remapping Migration Project would appreciate funding support from the Japan Foundation and the International House of Japan for the initial work to be undertaken in early 2002. This initial work includes the study and survey of the situation in the areas of South Asia, Thailand, Burma, South China and Korea.

Request for a facility for public intellectuals that were alumni of the Program to exchange ideas, extension of the lessons of the Fellows, and increase in the number of Fellows. The proposal is to establish an Asian Transnational House in Chiang Mai, Thailand as the first node for the Southeast Asian area. This would be a facility that facilitates meetings, linkages and cultivation of Southeast Asian intellectuals at least in Laos, Thailand, Burma, South China, Malaysia, Indonesia and Vietnam. Thus, the Japan Foundation and the International House of Japan is requested to provide sponsorship and advice.

Next year will be an important year for peace and the emergence of the civil society sector if Japan, the Japan Foundation and the International House of Japan seize the opportunity to collaborate with the Japanese government and other governments in the region. The seven organisations in Japan can form task forces to study the Asian Peace Fund and Asian Social Fund as a new financial architecture that can facilitate the establishment of Asian transnational civil societies through dialogue, financial architecture design, identification of an administrative organisation – independent, across borders, respects the diversity of Asia. The identification of the format and the administrative organisations is not easy and consultation with the Japanese Government and ODA is not easy. It is understood that the Japanese organisation has already initiated talks but the objective should be the construction of a financial infrastructure concerned with social and peace issues – this is an Asian Fund initiated by Asia. Next year, the Japan Foundation and the International House of Japan can collaborate with the seven organisations to appoint a task force and consultations on this issue. The author is willing to provide his experience with the Social Investment Fund with the World Bank backing.

Making a Cooperative Security System in Asia: For Stable Society & Prosperity

Shimada Kazuyuki
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Introduction

When we talk about security issues in the Asian region, we sometimes find ourselves struggling in a jungle of unique political terminology as follows:

- 'Autocracy' (non-democracy)
- 'Maldistribution' of national wealth (poverty)
- 'Politico-military' powers (coup d'etat)
- 'Unanimity'-based decision-making systems (inefficiency)
- Policy of 'non-interference' (isolationism), etc

Each of them indicates, to some extent, the socio-political characteristics of this region and traditional values of the Asian people. However, through these concepts, it is still hard for us to see the whole of the current security situation in Asia. This is because security issues in this region have become too complicated, especially after the end of the Cold War. What are the most appropriate words to express the current Asian security situation? We should start to find out the answers.

Regional Tensions

We have to say that the Asian region will be the world's most volatile and unstable area, with a large accumulation of military forces. The latest annual defense paper of the Japan Defense Agency (JDA), released in July 2001, says that since the end of the Cold War, it has been harder and harder to predict the possible military postures in this region. The main reason for this unpredictability is the fact that some potential threats among nations still remain, such as:

- Korean Peninsula (confrontation between South Korea and North Korea)
- Taiwan Straits (conflicts with China on the independence of Taiwan)
- Spratly Islands (territorial disputes among six surrounding nations)
- Indonesia (ethnic minority insurgencies)
- Nuclear Developments (rivalry between India and Pakistan)

Although the above-mentioned are called a "negative inheritance of the Cold War," nobody can deny the possibility that any of them might become large scale wars ('hot wars') in the near future. In this context, we need more work done to express the current situation of Asian security in relevant ways.

- Instability (unforseeable confusion)
- Threats (ongoing conflicts)

The crucial problem with which we are now confronted is that we have no regular regional fora to discuss the instability and threats surrounding us. When we wish for eternal peace, we must get rid of current confrontations that erode regional security. Unfortunately, political ideas of making a solid security framework to terminate regional conflicts have not matured in this region. No collaborative action of regional leadership has been taken so far.

Surely, any potential threat around us no longer remains just within a level of regional issues, but goes beyond to a global level. After all, what should be discussed is a peaceful solution in the world community. But we must know that we cannot avoid disastrous results when actual clashes happen anywhere in the region. Is it fair to think that direct dialogues among nations concerned can lead to a peaceful solution? According to the political history of the region, the answer is clear. It is "No." There has been no precedent of direct diplomacy in this region on disputed national security issues among confronted countries. We should now make full efforts to build up a solid regional cooperative security system that focuses on the method of nonmilitary-based conflict prevention means.

There is a good example of a regional cooperative security framework: the Organisation for Security and Cooperation in Europe (OSCE). OSCE has been achieving many successful results on Confidence-Building Measures (CBMs) in the last 29 years, such as establishing the yearly summit meeting of member states, the Conflict Prevention Center (CPC), the Office of Democracy and Human Rights, and the Higher Commissioner for Minority People.

It is reasonable for the Asian region to follow in OSCE's good tracks. We are not necessarily required to establish a brand new organisation, but rather, to make effective use of an existing framework: to modify the ASEAN Regional Forum (ARF). How can ARF be developed into a reliable security forum like OSCE?

Post-Cold War Process

ARF was established in 1994. After the collapse of the Soviet Union in 1991, military tensions between the US and the Soviet Union seeking politico-military hegemony in Asia during the Cold War era, were drastically reduced. This produced a 'vacuum of powers' in the Asia Pacific region. A possible threat for most regional countries was China's expansionism to fill up the vacuum through its military force, and countries in the Asia Pacific region agreed to build up a multinational organisation working against Chinese military threats.

Because the main idea of establishing ARF was recognised, the US, Russia and China – besides ASEAN countries – became starting members of the newly-

born organisation. Furthermore, North Korea (DPRK) joined ARF as the 23rd member state in 2000. The participation of DPRK helped to expand the role and significance of ARF as a working institution to talk on regional security matters. It can be said that ARF provides some important characteristics as a security forum in the Asia Pacific area.

Firstly, all major countries in the region now participate, with the exception Taiwan, Hong Kong and Pakistan. Secondly, the objective of the organisation is focused on the institutional function of conflict prevention measures. Thirdly, if military clashes have happened somewhere in the region, the organisation is expected to be a fundamental tool to stop the expansion of such conflicts.

The ARF-type regional security forum is going to work effectively, especially in East Asia, where real military tensions still remain – such as in the Korean Peninsula and the Taiwan Straits.

It was in the second annual meeting in 1995 that ARF set up the definition of its institutional functions for a cooperative security forum. The programme of ARF functional developments was/is as follows:

First stage	---	establishing CBMs
Second stage	---	profess preventive diplomacy
Third stage	---	capability of conflict solution

The first stage was achieved to great effect during the years from 1995 to 1998, when CBMs among member countries were developed, namely:

- Practice of security talks not only through Track 1 level, but Track 2 as well;
- Development of military interchange (personnel exchange, military exercises);
- Participation with the United Nation's Registration System of Military Equipment;
- Regular publications of the National Defense Report, etc

Then in 1999, ARF set up the particular items of the second stage as follows:

a) Establishing a common perception on the principle of preventive diplomacy
b) Enforcement of the ARF Presidency role
c) Making an 'Experts Bank' on national security issues

Unfortunately, none of them have yet to be realised because of many difficulties among member states, especially on items (a) and (b). The strategic ideas of preventive diplomacy depend upon a geopolitical situation in the region. To enforce the role of organisational presidency may produce a regional hegemonism.

It is not easy for a multinational organisation like ARF, which contains significant rivalry and confrontations among member states, to come to unanimous agreement regarding national interests and regional leadership. ARF still stands short of implementing its second stage of preventive diplomacy.

For a Solid Framework in Asia: Multi-layered Security Systems

How should ARF restructure itself to be the desirable security organisation? We had better take a brief look at the present security situation in East Asia.

The unprecedented summit meeting in June 2000 between South Korea (ROK) and DPRK produced an atmosphere of appeasement in the Korean Peninsula. Both the US and South Korea recognised the situation after the historical meeting: that the immediate threat of military clash had gone, and a détente will come soon to the Peninsula. In particular, ROK, which maintains traditional bilateral alliances with the US and Japan, gained confidence to establish other diplomatic ties with China and Russia in the early 1990s to consult on common security concerns. Both China and Russia have been keeping a good relationship with DPRK since its independence after the World War II. These diversified diplomatic ties, linked with DPRK, can be considered to contribute to regional peace and stability.

The US, on the contrary, is reluctant to make immediate changes in its military presence in the Asia Pacific area. The Bush administration announced that US military forces based in ROK had been functioning as 'the regional stabiliser' and as such, it would not comply with any forced reduction.

However, if the détente in the Peninsula is developing, and economic cooperation between South and North is further promoted, the US-ROK military alliance, which regards DPRK as its 'potential hostility', will lose its strategic objective. It is thus inevitable for the US to respond with a military presence. The fundamental structure of the US-Japan military alliance must be affected as well, which would result in a possible forced reduction in the Japan area.

Like the US-ROK or US-Japan military ties, the traditional bilateral security alliances structure of hub (United States)-spokes (that is, allied countries) cannot effectively respond to the changing situation in East Asia. The security framework of bilateral alliances is now obsolete and not enough for quick responses to diversified threats in this region.

We have to construct ARF to be a more reliable cooperative security system for the multi-layered framework in Asia; a system that encourages regional security dialogues among all countries concerned.

ARF has already been learning and developing its first stage of cooperative security process. Now, at the beginning of the 21st century, ARF should make

its next steps toward preventive diplomacy, namely:

- to establish an acceptable definition of 'preventive diplomacy'

- to get rid of some traditional Asian values to make management of international fora more efficient (such as an unanimity-based decision making system and the policy of non-interference).

- membership status should be reviewed for direct and more constructive dialogue among countries concerned. Taiwan, which is not a member of ARF but only a member of APEC, should promote its status up to APEC, ARF and the ASEAN Post Ministerial Council (PMC) to match China's current status. PMC is one of the core institutions of the Asia-Pacific multi-layered framework. DPRK should also be given ARF-PMC status. Pakistan should be granted ARF-PMC membership to balance the Indian seat as well as Afghanistan, which will be a key country to realise the regional stability. Both of them are currently out of the total security framework in the region.

  In short, Japan – as an Asian representative of G8 and equal partners with the US, China and Russia – should play a more substantial role to activate ARF's functions.

Restructured Model of A Multi-layered Framework in the Asia-Pacific Region



Summary of Activities

Ozawa Tomoko,
Rapporteur

Sept 3 **Introduction Session**
Visit to the Japan Foundation Asia Center

Sept 4 During this first round of workshops, the Fellows introduced their chosen area of research with some details of their personal and professional background.

Workshop I: Presentation by the Fellows (1)
David Celdran / Ann Lee

David explored the role of the media in the Philippines, especially television, which he considers to be the most effective means of reaching and influencing the mass public. In his presentation, *Surviving the Marketplace of Ideas in the Age of Electronic Media* he stated his wish to see more sociopolitical issues and debates delivered to audiences, despite an apparent trend for game shows and 'dumbing down'. The challenge remains to capture the interest of viewers who prefer entertainment and sensational graphic images to informative news and debates. David also shared his concern over interlocking interests of station owners and manipulation of programs. He gave suggestions to mix critical themes and social issues with professional television techniques, and debunked stereotypes of the passive and ignorant tele-viewer, based on quantitative and qualitative analyses. He noted the influence of developments in policy frameworks and the social environment for the increase of educational and critical content into television programmes.

Ann titled her presentation *Modern Mythologies in Popular Culture about 'Asian Values.'* She defined Asian values within various contexts; historical, contemporary and the perceptions of them as documented by various intellectuals, and also, as preferred by Asians themselves, noting that so far the articulation of 'Asian values' had been dominated by politicians, and – considering contemporary economic realities of recession – easily dismissed. She asked, but what of more general public perceptions about 'Asian values' and their validity? She expressed her opinion that while they may be intellectually demolished, Asian values are nevertheless popularly believed in. In the context of Malaysian mass culture, and using the understanding of mythologies first articulated by Barthes, Ann focused on the form of television commercials, particularly

'infomercials' and their articulation of certain values in Malaysia's case: particularly, racial harmony. According to Ann, while there are valid arguments that true racial harmony does not exist in Malaysia, nevertheless such harmony is widely aspired to. She showed clips of commercials – developed by Yasmin Ahmad, Creative Director of a leading advertising agency in Malaysia – such as one celebrating Merdeka (Independence), sponsored by Petronas, the national petroleum company, which had touched on a taboo subject (racial riots in 1969) but had nevertheless inspired widespread (constructive) dialogue in newspapers and on the street.

Workshop II: Presentations by the Fellows (2)
Huang Ping / Ryu Jeong Soon / Shimada Kazuyuki

Ping focused on his personal activities in his presentation *Intellectual Debates on Public Issues in 1990s China.* At the outset, he commented that scholars are not necessarily intellectuals, as the latter need to be concerned with, and possess an interest in public issues. Ping related his experience in research about poverty, having visited certain rural areas of China during the last ten years to work with local communities. (He shared his experience in helping to improve the quality of life of the poor, including changing sanitary conditions in remote mountainous regions without necessarily having to spend huge amounts of money, and by making gradual changes.) He related his experience editing, with others, the intellectual and multi-disciplinary monthly journal *Reading* (English translation) which has a monthly circulation of approximately 100,000 copies. Ping said it has been referred to as a 'symbol of enlightenment' and is certainly an open public sphere for intellectual debate and artistic writing in China. By sharing public space where ideas are exchanged, although solutions are rarely sought, Ping expressed his hopes to contribute by linking different perspectives and local experiences. He stated his great expectations of the younger generation to think in terms of transcending binary approaches to issues.

June (as she is better known!), discussed issues concerning Korea's homelessness and those living below the poverty line. Her topic was *Social Welfare Policy*. According to her, twice the number of government figures or 10 million people, one-fourth of the entire population, lives in poverty in Korea. She explained however, that providing housing and medical care are more serious problems compared with food and clothing needs. Christian organisations, especially Catholic groups, are actively taking part in caring for those who need assistance. June noted the vast unemployment of workable people, since the 97/98 economic crisis, had created the

'new poor'. She stated that more than three months of homelessness often results in a lifetime of being homeless. She considered the role for the mass media in the alleviation of poverty as critical since social issues can and need to be brought to public attention.

Shimada stressed the necessity, in his presentation, *Making a New Security System in Asia – For Stable Peace and Prosperity*, of political alliances in the northeast region of Asia in order to create a conflict-preventative system. He foresees as realistic, the possibility of outbreak of armed conflict surrounding the Korean Peninsula and Taiwan Straits, and stated the importance of promoting cooperative political dialogue between the US, China, Korea, North Korea, Japan and the far eastern part of Russia. He pointed out that if the two Koreas became reconciled, it would be a big step toward the creation of a co-operative security framework. He also mentioned that it is vital to make full use of existing bilateral relations. If mutual trust is enhanced, discussions can be broadened to address more serious issues. According to Shimada, until all vestiges of the Cold War are eliminated from this region, it is more realistic to keep pre-existing bilateral security alliances, such as those between Japan and the US, and South Korea and the US.

Welcome Reception

The Fellows introduced themselves and had the opportunity to meet with invited guests, including academics, social workers, representatives from corporations, NGOs/NPOs, the media, and other supporters of the ALFP.

Sept 5 Workshop III: Presentation by the Fellows (3) Mahendra P Lama / Anek Nakabutara

Mahendra began his presentation *Economic Reforms in South Asia: Prospects, Challenges and Concerns* by introducing the geographical, demographic, cultural features of India. The country's vast geography and demographic and cultural diversity were emphasised. Mahendra's major objectives for India (and the six other nations within South Asia) are the following: developing a high economic growth rate that is efficient and attracts foreign investment, and alleviating poverty. He noted that there have not been remarkable steps in fighting poverty in India, compared with other regional nations. He ventured that the social structure and people's aspirations are so diverse that no model has so far been effectively applied to counter battle India's poverty. Mahendra emphasised the need to reform the present delivery system in which only a small

amount of actual funds reaches the local people, because each bureaucratic level often takes a portion of funds for itself.

Anek raised fundamental concepts related to his work against poverty in his presentation *Social Capital and Civil Society Building and Networking:A Case Study of Thailand.* He stressed the significant role of 'soft power' or loving, sharing and caring that promotes mutual support in communities. With a paradigm shift including 'soft power', Anek believes a preference for dialogue, consensus and understanding emerges. By reexamining the meaning of poverty and what it means to live below the poverty line, Anek also pointed out the necessity of more precisely recognising each individual's skills, place of residence and local socioeconomic activities. The challenge, perceived by Anek, includes the creation of public spaces for enhancing interaction between intellectuals and local residents, and valuing local or bottom-up knowledge.

Sept 5–8 Field Trip to Yamagata / Miyagi Prefectures

The Fellows visited various organisations and public facilities in Tohoku, the northern region of Japan. This trip was organised in order to observe the relationships between local government and civic organisations in promoting the development of civil societies.

At Sendai City, Miyagi Prefecture, where NPO activities have been thriving, some of their activities were introduced and discussions were held to exchange perspectives on the meanings and roles of NPO activities. In relation to the globalisation of rural communities, the last stop at Ishinomaki City, Miyagi Prefecture was made to discuss the relationships of the government, NPOs and media and also to enhance the creation of new networks.

At the Nagai Son Juku (literally meaning 'Nagai village school'), Nagai City, Yamagata Prefecture, the Fellows were given a lecture on the city's demographic characteristics in relation to its welfare policies. In accordance with the national trend, Nagai, the home of approximately 32,170 persons, is experiencing unprecedented aging. An increasing number of the approximately 9,500 households are nuclear families, which necessitates facilities that provide care for the elderly. Financial support for nursing senior citizens largely depends on the insurance paid by the citizens between the ages of 45 and 65. However, the recipients of the care are still required to pay 10% of the actual cost, which at times can be too much of a burden for those relying solely on pensions.

Fellows were taken to observe the case of the Rainbow Plan, which has created an eco-friendly lifestyle for people by successfully circulating local resources. Local farmers and residents originated the plan as a means to improve the quality of Nagai soil, which they recognise as essential in producing nutritious

and safe agricultural crops. Since the beginning of operations in 1997, the Nagai residents have enjoyed more locally grown food, which had previously been exported from the community to urban areas. The city is retaining a higher self-sufficiency rate than in the past. Interestingly, the Rainbow Plan's office is located within the municipal government administration, reflecting the 'oneness' of the residents and government, a point also stressed by the residents. Kanno Yoshihide, one of the leaders of the Rainbow Plan, shared his personal life story as to how he was involved in the initial stages of the project, his perceptions and hopes. It was emphasised that the government and community residents have worked hand-in-hand and the idea of a partnership does not exist because there are no boundaries that divide the government from the citizens. Following a brief stop at the home and farm of Yuki Noboru, a local farmer who gave a tour of his farm and shared some of his farming methods, the Fellows visited the production site of the Rainbow Plan.

The multimedia and interactive library, Sendai Mediatheque in Sendai City, Miyagi Prefecture, was opened in January 2001 and is visited by approximately 3,000 to 4,000 people every day. Besides the traditional services of a library, Sendai Mediatheque provides Internet access, film showings in the theater and gallery space for exhibits and workshops. According to the librarian, to their surprise, they are witnessing a large number of senior citizens who come to use the library or participate in the workshops as volunteers.

The organisation El Park Sendai promotes gender equality and focuses especially on domestic violence against women and other social issues related to women. According to its representative, Kisu Yaeko, its main activities include giving lectures, consulting with both individuals and corporations, and providing publications and audiovisual materials. With financial support from Sendai City, the organisation spends an annual budget of approximately 44 million yen on its programmes. In 2000, the 30 staff members of El Park welcomed 17,000 visitors to its facility.

Professor JF Morris, Miyagi Gakuin Women's College, guided the tour of Sendai Castle that was built in 1611 by Date Masamune, the first lord of the Sendai Domain. Professor Morris explored some of the controversial aspects surrounding today's reconstruction plan, currently swayed by political interests of the city, the building industry and the local Chamber of Commerce. According to Professor Morris, the 'reconstruction' of the turrets to build a landmark for Sendai and improve its tourism, is being carried out with hardly any degree of historical accuracy, and distorts the original architecture of the castle. Since Sendai Castle was more of a ceremonial complex than a military defense structure, Professor Morris declared that it should have no turrets. Some of the Fellows related similar situations in their respective countries; the conflicting battle of attracting tourists without any consideration for the local history or natural environment, or proper restoration of meaningful sites.

At the newly-opened Sendai NPO Plaza, moderated by Dr Hagiwara Natsuko, Vice Director-General, Environment and Lifestyle Department, Miyagi Prefectural Government, the representatives of the following seven NPO organisations briefly introduced their principles and activities; Sendai Citizens' Network for Seniors, Sendai Miyagi NPO Center, Akane Group, You & I, Miyagi Children's Network, Water Environment Networking in Tohoku and Media and NPO. While both NGO and NPO groups deal with pursuing the interest of the public, the Fellows learned that the term NPO serves as an umbrella which encompasses all civic organisations. A Fellow inquired about the legal status of NPOs and was told that NPOs are legally restricted from participating in any political or religious activities.

Following a brief stop at Matsushima Bay, the Fellows traveled to Ishinomaki City, Miyagi Prefecture, including the Ishinomaki Fish Market, where about 200 different types of fish are unloaded at the ports.

At Miyagi's Sant Juan Bautista Museum, Endo Sachiyuki, Assistant Head of the museum, welcomed the Fellows. Nearly 400 years ago, the Sant Juan Bautista, the first Western-style ship to make two roundtrip voyages across the Pacific Ocean, was built by the orders of Date Masamune. Endo dwelled on the pioneering spirits that motivated Japan's first diplomatic mission to Europe. The museum's simulation theater 'recreated' the journey Hasekura Tsunenaga, Date's vassal, and 180 crew members took in 1613.

In the afternoon, the Fellows participated in a workshop titled *Local Strategies for Globalising Ishinomaki City in the 21st Century* at the office of a local newspaper, Kahoku Shimpo. Sugawara Kohei, Mayor of Ishinomaki City, greeted the Fellows by relating the city's long history of active international exchange. A local organisation called Foramu, with 30 members, related how it enjoys cultural diversities while maintaining respect for each other's values and experiences. It was explained that only one third of the members have had any real intensive contact with foreign countries or persons, but still manage to enjoy multiculturalism in their community. A Fellow inquired about the organisation's linkages with foreign institutions and individuals, and commented on the importance of having the local administration's support. Another Fellow commented on the treatment of foreigners which often reflects the nation's economy: foreign workers are usually welcomed in times of labour shortages, and then treated as scapegoats for society's problems when the economy is less prosperous. Another topic of discussion was the issue of stereotypes perpetrated by the media. The media coverage of economically less-well-off nations only tends to make the headlines in natural disasters and other news that portrays negative images. While globalisation is almost a synonym for losing an identity rooted in local traditions, the fact that Ishinomaki citizens seem to share a global spirit, without devaluing their cultural heritage, was another observation made by a Fellow.

The Fellows were especially pleased to meet local residents and detected a sincere connection between the people and local government since neither side was trying to claim sole credit for their successful results in various activities.

Sept 11 Workshop IV: Discussion on Future Directions

The Fellows were invited to make comments on the astonishing footage each had seen on CNN and local media about the World Trade Center towers. A workshop was postponed in view of the events.

Sept 14 Visit Asia-Japan Women's Resource Center

Representative Matsui Yayori spoke about the exploitation of Asian women in the Japanese sex industry. The Fellows inquired about the organisation and learned that the Center depends on an annual membership fee of 8,000 yen collected from its 900 members – most of whom are middle-aged – and the efforts of volunteers and interns. According to Matsui, women from Thailand, Philippines and other countries are often trafficked to Japan without proper documents, leaving them vulnerable with no other choice but to become prostitutes under the surveillance of traffickers. Matsui repeated that their organisation is mostly concerned with the most marginalised and most abused, when a Fellow suggested that the legalisation of prostitution as a legitimate profession might ameliorate the situation for female prostitutes. In response to another Fellow's question, Matsui explained that the Japanese government has done virtually nothing to improve the situation.

After explaining about the Women's International War Crimes Tribunal on the Japanese military's 'sex slaves' and the activities of another organisation, Violence Against Women in War-Network Japan also headed by Matsui, she lamented that the influence of the right wing in Japan is becoming more visible. The Fellows were told that the Tribunal judged Emperor Hirohito, who was never been brought to trial in a court of law, to be guilty of war crimes.

Sept 18 Workshop VI: "Introduction to Consumer Science"

June's presentation, *Introduction to Consumer Science*, was on theoretical concepts and specific examples of consumerism. In order for the public to receive better service, June declared that the amount of supply must exceed the people's needs. Although it is this competitive environment that would bring benefit to the consumers with cheaper prices and better qualities, the government should function its regulatory role as protectors of social minorities and domestic industries. June referred to political theorist John Rawls, who sketches a complex notion of how a state could make a positive impact in terms of being 're-distributively just' – that is, how a liberal democrat state can ensure that its community members are provided with basic rights, and more or less equal opportunities. June also gave several specific examples of how fashion

statements and trends reflect an individual's sociopolitical stance in a historical and contemporary context. In conclusion, June suggested that consumer leaders ought to be trained as activists.

Workshop VII: "Strategic Communications"

Ann shared her experience as a strategic communications consultant, working in advertising, design and public relations (and that in modern terms, these disciplines are being broken down so that agencies and consultancies now provide multiple services). She expressed her concern that too often, organisations with important messages to communicate do not consider advertising techniques as a valid way to get those messages across – particularly some NGOs with left wing backgrounds. She expressed her opinion that the same methods used for promoting shampoo can be used for promoting issues such as racial harmony, pro-environment, anti-apartheid, etc. She showed examples of branding for consumer products, private and public sector organisations, and 'issue-management' campaigns she has worked on, including a voters education campaign which was used by the African National Congress for the first democratic elections in South Africa.

Sept 20 Workshop VIII: Discussion with Kato Mikio, Executive Director, International House of Japan

Kato Mikio, Executive Director of the International House, shared his thoughts on public intellectuals, the past activities of the International House of Japan and some social features of Japan. Even before the buildings of the International House were constructed, intellectual exchange, especially between the US and Japan, was one of the distinguished activities fostered by the founders. The phrase 'public intellectual' had not been commonly used at the time, as an intellectual was simply a 'man of knowledge.' Kato advised the Fellows to consider what it means to be a public intellectual in the process of defining their role. He expressed his opinion that a public intellectual needs to be well learned, informed and concerned about political and social issues with objectivity. Furthermore, it is essential to correctly perceive one's distance and relationship with the powerhouse or political entities.

Sept 21-23 Weekend Retreat in Tateshina

The Fellows attended a weekend retreat at Tateshina Forum, Nagano Prefecture. They engaged in discussion with ten Japanese participants from academia and organisations. There were three attendees from the Japan Foundation Asia Center and four from the International House of Japan. Following greetings given by Komatsu Jun-etsu, Managing Director of the Japan Foundation Asia Center, the Fellows gave their presentations, which were essentially developments of their initial thoughts stated at the outset of the Program. All made comments about the September 11 events though June focused on the events entirely in her

presentation *The Role of Asian Public Intellectuals After the Terrorists' Incident*. Critical of America's intentions to retaliate, June was concerned to revisit the definitions of freedom and justice, and encouraged Asian public intellectuals to voice their opposition against violent and destructive retaliation.

Sept 25 Resource Person Seminar by Prof Sakamoto Yoshikazu "Transnational Civil Society in Asia"

The concepts and relationships of states, the globalised market economy, civil society and international organisations were covered in Professor Sakamoto's lecture. Geographically, he focused mostly on East Asia because of the region's strong economic ties and cultural affinities. According to Professor Sakamoto, a comparison and contrast between the capital market economy and democratic civil society include commonalities such as the maintenance of order and market liberation and/or regulation. The fundamental difference lies in the fact that while the market refers to the commodification of social relations, civil society is oriented toward the humanisation of social relations. As for the future of East Asia, Professor Sakamoto explained his ideas for a regional union or association, based on transnational civil societies. He stated that too much emphasis should not be place on institutionalism. Instead, the focus ought to be on empowerment.

Sept 26 Visit Kalabaw-no-kai

Headed by Reverend Watanabe D Hidetoshi, the apartment-turned-office of Kalabaw-no-kai (Association in Kotobuki for Solidarity with Migrant Workers) is located in the centre of 300msq of Yokohama City, Kanagawa Prefecture where the 'urban poor' assemble, including street dwellers and day-workers. The Fellows had the opportunity to hear from the manager of a building built by the city to house support groups and activities for the less privileged in this area. It was emphasised that support networks, loosely formed among the street occupants, function as safety nets. Although there are no exact figures, Reverend Watanabe speculated the number of street dwellers to be around 6,500, of whom 90% are single males. Their main source of income is earned from obtaining work on a daily basis in mostly construction sites, while others conduct 'shadow work', or non-economic contributions, to their mutual support groups in ways that they can. In response to questions from the Fellows, it was explained that the traditional Japanese mentality of perceiving shame in accepting welfare is common among the older generation. Racial conflicts have also increased.

Sept 27 Resource Person Seminar by Prof Fujiwara Kiichi "History and Nationalism in Post-war Japan"

Professor Fujiwara lectured on Japanese pacifism, "clashing memories" of history and the Japanese intellectual circles before and after the Second World

War. By introducing the visitor's reactions to the Hiroshima Memorial Museum, Professor Fujiwara exemplified the two modern beliefs concerning war: one is aspiration for absolute pacifism or the total denial of war, and the other is the call for "a just war against evil powers." In the post-war period, Japan's experience was symbolised by Hiroshima, which fostered the concept of national pacifism. He also addressed the rising interest in history as a subjective narrative rather than an objective portrayal of the past, and the gap or distance between post-war intellectuals, state and society. The Fellows led the discussion with questions regarding the role of Japan in the Asian region and also the use of nationalism, which, according to Professor Fujiwara, is something people would not have to think about if they are provided with credible and secure governance.

Sept 28 Resource Person Seminar by Prof Okamoto Mitsuo "Peace Studies in Japan Today"

Before discussing his studies on peace, with a special focus on Hiroshima, Professor Okamoto briefly explained the histography of Peace Studies in Japan. In the early 1960s, scholars began to analyse peace, the causes of war and conditions for peace. Professor Okamoto classified peace research and education into the following five categories; 1) war and military (critique and conquest of violence manifested in physical conflicts), 2) political, economic, cultural, religious and racial liberation (critique and conquest of violence against the weak), 3) re-inventing lifestyle (critique and conquest of violence against nature), 4) learning process and attitude formation (critique and conquest of psychological / educational violence), 5) philosophical, ethical, theological and religious peace thinking (systematisation of Peace Studies). Answering a Fellow's question concerning Professor Okamoto's focus on the atomic bomb, it was repeatedly emphasised that regional, social and historical variances reflect an individual's research in the field of peace. A Fellow commented on the nation-state system that has institutionalised and industrialised wars making them violent as never before.

Oct 2 Resource Person Seminar by Prof Harashina Sachihiko "Environmental Impact Assessment (EIA) in Japan"

In 1983, the draft legislation for a national EIA Act was defeated in the Diet. However, in 1993 the government introduced the Basic Environmental Law for pursuing sustainable development and in 1997 the EIA Act was finally passed by the Diet. According to Professor Harashina, transparency or the disclosure of information to the public throughout the process and communication, consultation and participation from both sides of the proponents and public are essential. The Fellows had various comments; difficulties in overcoming commercial ties between the government and developers, and between governments. Professor Harashina pointed out that Japanese regulations do not apply to overseas manufacturing.

Oct 3 Workshop IX: Discussion on the Public Symposium (1)

Oct 5 Resource Person Seminar by Prof Tom Gill "Japanese Popular Culture"

Following a historical overview and tour of the University of Tokyo by Professor Fujiwara, Professor Gill discussed Japanese popular culture. Several widely-read weekly and monthly magazines were introduced along with Professor Gill's comments, one of which was on the popularity of adult 'manga'. Following a Fellow's question, Professor Gill explained that the popularity is rooted in the historical entertainment of story-telling using slides of pictures. He said adult 'manga' or comics loaded with violence and pornography seem to be an outlet for repressed people. Professor Gill referred to the 'bento box' metaphor to illustrate how diverse tastes or genres are accommodated together within Japanese popular culture.

Oct 6-9 Field Trip to Nagasaki / Fukuoka Prefectures

The visit to the Nagasaki Atomic Bomb Museum was made with Professor Takahashi Shinji, Nagasaki University who later led the tour through the Peace Park. Professor Takahashi explained that Nagasaki's A-bomb experience is often symbolised in the phrase: "anger of Hiroshima, prayer of Nagasaki." In response to a Fellow's question concerning Nagasaki's postwar demands or hopes for retaliation, Professor Takahashi reflected on the general feelings of non-retaliation among Nagasaki residents. To begin with, they had no A-bomb or other weapons equivalent to the destruction causable by a nuclear attack, and the San Francisco Peace Treaty dissipated Japan's right to strike back. Professor Takahashi also focused on Nagasaki's historical Christian heritage, which is considered to be a contributing factor in perceiving the bomb drop as God's providence, and the aftermath as a God-given trial, extracting and crystallising endurance. Another Fellow asked whether visitors from different nations have particular reactions to the exhibit. According to Professor Takahashi, after touring the museum, Japanese visitors generally commit to "no more war", while a proportion of visitors from the rest of Asia claim the exhibit to be self-righteous, not exhibiting the conduct of the Japanese Army and events that led to the war. He also spoke of an American couple's reactions and their naïve sympathies, and Japanese students who literarily run through the exhibit because of their incapability to deal with any kind of atrocity.

The Fellows visited the actual site of the Isahaya Bay Land Reclamation Project with members from the Japan Wetlands Action Network, a pro-wildlife group. During the workshop attended by the Fellows, Nishimura Kiyotaka a member of the City Council representing pro-reclamation and local residents from the anti-reclamation side exchanged their views. Disaster prevention, water drainage, farming and fishing were the main concerns. It was generally agreed that the local residents ought to take initiative in reviewing the entire project

instead of having the national government decide what is supposedly in their best interest. Keisen University Professor Ohashi Masaaki summarised that the worldwide challenge is to realise projects from the bottom-up. After the workshop, one of the Fellows shook the hand of a local resident and owner of a clock store who patiently protests by standing on the streets everyday for a hour holding a piece of board paper with a line of protest handwritten on it. The silent protestor claimed that knowing that something is wrong and not doing anything about it leads to a situation like World War II, and it is something he refuses to submit to.

In Fukuoka City, Fukuoka Prefecture, the Fellows met the representative of Egao (meaning 'smile'), which organises and hosts social gatherings for senior citizens in the neighborhood. The volunteers, mostly homemakers in their 50s and 60s, prepare lunch for the senior citizens who pay 1,000 yen per visit besides an annual membership fee of 3,000 yen. In response to the Fellows questions, it was explained that the senior citizens who visit Egao are mainly women, and retired men are less likely to become interactive with the community. It was explained that war memories have cut deep in the psyche of every senior citizen because something about the war is often revealed in daily conversations.

At Yoriai (meaning 'get-together'), a care house for senile senior citizens, the Fellows were informed about the organisation's efforts to offer personal and flexible day and or night service to senior citizens. At the time of the Fellow's visit, there were three live-in citizens and about four short-stay citizens at Yoriai which can comfortably accommodate ten persons. The Fellows showed great interest in the organisation's income budget (40 million yen per year) and also the staff workers (nearly half the employees are part-time, wage-earners), their training (the workers are trained mostly on the job), earnings (for a full-time employee, no more than 4.6 million yen per year) and their mental and psychological welfare (preventing burnouts etc.; difficult issues).

Established by the Fukuoka City in 1999, the Fukuoka Asian Art Museum is the first museum in the world to collect and exhibit contemporary and modern Asian art. The Fellows had several general questions about the museum, which is managed by the City Hall and employed by 13 staffs and curators. As an exchange-oriented facility, the museum also invites and sponsors artists from other parts of Asia.

At the Fukuoka City Human Rights Education Center, established in July 2000, approximately 111 organisations have registered to use the facility's mailbox and other equipment – free of charge.

The Fellows attended a workshop with the representatives from Asian Women's Center, Fukuoka NGO Network, NPO Fukuoka and Fukuoka Citizen's Volunteer Center. Established in 1997, the Asian Women's Center counsels, supports and shelters battered women and their children.

Fukuoka NGO Network began its activities in 1993 with an aim to deepen the understanding between various NGOs in the Fukuoka region. They have 17 registered NGOs and no full-time employees. Established in 1999, NPO Fukuoka encompasses various scopes of activities, supporting and empowering different NPOs and individuals interested in NPO activities. Established in 2000, the Fukuoka Citizen's Volunteer Center conducts counselling, collects and disseminates information and publishes newsletters.

Professor Ohashi concluded that 'the third sector' has a major role to play in the future. Compared to the profit-making sector, NGOs and NPOs are able to provide swifter, inexpensive and better service, though serving a small number of individuals. In order to avoid becoming mere sub-contractors, an important role for the civil sector is in creating alternatives and becoming a watchdog that keeps an eye on the nation's power and money.

Professor Ogawa Takeo, Kyushu University, lectured on regional demographic changes in Japan based on statistics from the national census, focusing on the ageing population.

At the end, the Fellows were asked to give their impressions and comments of the field trip. The Fellows valued the informal gatherings that proved to be a valuable opportunity to exchange ideas on a wide range of topics. While more time to themselves could have been useful in completely digesting their experiences and touring other places of personal interest, the trip was considered, as one Fellow expressed as "truly educational".

Oct 10 Workshop X: Discussion on the Public Symposium (2)

The Fellows gathered to discuss the contents and title of the upcoming symposium.

Oct 12 Visit Dentsu Inc.

At one of the leading advertising agencies in Japan, the Fellows watched several recently aired television commercials and had a discussion with Hayashi Hisashi, a commercial planner for television. Some of the questions the Fellows asked concerned legal restrictions in broadcasting and the characteristics of Japanese consumerism. Hayashi said legal restrictions do exist but it is usually the clients who tend to remain conservative. According to his observation on culture, most Japanese people conform and have a follow-the-leader attitude.

Oct 16 Visit Fuji Television Network Inc.

Following the tour of Fuji Television Network Inc, the Fellows met with the producer of *Hodo 2001 (New Report 2001)*, a live-talk show dealing with current political, economic and social issues. The Fellows were interested in the various

political pressures, ratings and pressure from sponsors that influence the show. The producer of the show stated that at present, they are enjoying their highest viewer ratings of 7.7%(i.e. approximately 7.7 million households) since their first airing in 1992, but they are not too concerned with making high ratings because the programme can be sold to sponsors all the same. A Fellow asked how best to indicate a programme's success; a sense of self-achievement was the reply given by the producer.

Oct 18 Workshop XI: Discussion with Ambassador Fujii Hiroaki President, Japan Foundation

Ambassador Fujii Hiroaki, President of the Japan Foundation, exchanged his personal opinions with the Fellows. Discussions began with exchanging opinions on the September 11 terrorist incidents. Stressing the importance of avoiding conflicts between civilisations, Ambassador Fujii stated that a conflict of thinking had clearly emerged in the aftermath, between a new solidarity formed by the West and common feelings in Islamic nations.

Other broad ranges of topics such as Japan's reaction to the economic and cultural globalisation in recent years were discussed. With regard to the homogeneity of Japanese society, there is apparent diversification in opinions, and confusion in the political scene as evident in the different kinds of revolt at the highest levels of the government. At the same time, it was pointed out that Japan has not been completely tolerant to diversity. A recent shift in focus highlights individualism, or taking riskier, bold steps instead of passively seeking a safe haven in conformity or collectivity.

Oct 22 Resource Person Seminar by Prof Gerald Curtis "The Public Intellectual and Public Policy"

Professor Curtis lectured on the current state of Japanese politics, which he perceives is undergoing one of the most dramatic changes in modern history. Recognising the fact that fundamental changes need to be made, a new mood, led by Prime Minister Koizumi Junichiro and his messages often convey hope at the end of the tunnel. Japan is standing at a fork in the road; witnessing extraordinary social changes that have not yet been reflected in policy changes.

Professor Curtis believes that with a lack of intensive public discourse on Japan's future and what it should do, the role of public intellectuals is indispensable. A Fellow asked for Professor Curtis' impression of higher education in Japan and Professor Curtis mentioned that think tanks, critiques and researchers who can influence public policy are underdeveloped in Japan. He further stated that as for public intellectuals, at the heart of the problem is education, especially higher education and problems such as inadequate courses at universities, the Ministry of Education's overly intrusive demands to control universities, and business-oriented and affiliated think tanks that require drastic reforms.

Workshop XII: Discussion on the Public Symposium (3)
The Fellows met again to finalise content and other preparations for the symposium.

Oct 26 Public Symposium: "Rethinking Existing Paradigms: Public Intellectuals in Action"

The symposium *Rethinking Existing Paradigms: Public Intellectuals in Action* was held on the October 26. Koide Izumi greeted the participants and in his opening remarks Kato Mikio described the history of the programme and its objectives to promote the leadership of young public intellectuals. Kato also thanked Ishizuka Masahiko, Management Director of the Foreign Press Center, for generously moderating the symposium, which began with the Fellow's individual presentations, and ended with a presentation of the group project *Remapping Migration*, and some time for questions and answers. In conclusion, Ishizuka reemphasised that migration is a critical issue. He noted his suspicion that most Japanese do not understand the full dimensions of issues related to migration and expressed his hopes to see the project develop in a meaningful way.

As a surprise to their new friends and colleagues, the Fellows then sang (some also danced) a song representative of their own home country, and harmoniously recited a Japanese seasonal song with Christopher Blasdel, International House of Japan, on the shakuhachi (traditional flute).

Oct 29 Visit to the National Diet

The Fellows engaged in a discussion with Member of the House of Councillors, Yamamoto Ichita (Liberal Democratic Party) following a tour of the House of Representatives. One of the first questions posed by the Fellows was to what extent the people support Prime Minister Koizumi Junichiro. Yamamoto elaborated on his high esteem for the Prime Minister whose structural reconstruction plans speak to the heart of the Japanese people, in a time when the nation must regain its economic competitiveness in the world market. A Fellow pointed out Japan's passiveness in taking leadership in Asian affairs. Yamamoto stated his reluctance to see Japan in a greater leadership role because he believes Asia is not truly demanding Japan to play such a role. Admitting Japan's diplomatic ambiguities in Asia, he said Japan neverthless faces a task of widening its scope of relations with nations other than the US.

Oct 31 Evaluation Session

The Fellows met to make their comments and presented more detailed forms about their evaluation of the Program.

Resource Persons

Gerald Curtis	Professor, Colombia University; National Graduate Institute for Policy Studies (GRIPS)
Fujiwara Kiichi	Professor, University of Tokyo
Tom Gill	Associate Professor; Managing Editor, Social Science Japan, Institute of Social Science, University of Tokyo
Harashina Sachihiko	Professor, Tokyo Institute of Technology
Okamoto Mitsuo	Professor, Hiroshima Shudo University
Sakamoto Yoshikazu	Professor, University of Tokyo

Tateshina Retreat Participants

Hamashita Takeshi	Professor, Kyoto University
Iwabuchi Koichi	Assistant Professor, International Christian University
Kurokawa Chimaki	Managing Director, The Toyota Foundation
Lee Jong Won	Professor, Rikkyo University
Nagafuchi Yasuyuki	Associate Professor, Nagoya Institute of Technology
Nagai Hiroshi	Professor, Kanda University of International Studies
Soeya Yoshihide	Professor, Keio University
Suda Yuko	Associate Professor, Toyo University
Suzuki Naoki	Associate Professor, Seisen University
Takeda Isami	Professor, Dokkyo University
Terada Takefumi	Professor, Sophia University

International House of Japan

Koide Izumi	Program Director
Shimamura Naoko	Chief Program Officer
Sonoda Kimihiro	Assistant Program Officer
Ozawa Tomoko	Rapporteur

Japan Foundation Asia Center

Komatsu Jun-etsu	Managing Director
Takemoto Chiharu	Director, Intellectual Exchange Division
Machimura Akiko	Intellectual Exchange Division
Thomas Redwood	Intellectual Exchange Division

Concluding Remarks

Dr Huang Ping

The 2001 Asia Leadership Fellows feel deeply grateful for having had such a tremendous opportunity to share their experiences, ideas, and perspectives with their Japanese colleagues as well as amongst themselves.

The significance of interchanging ideas and communicating with one another is commonly recognised. Without such constructive interchange and productive communication, a minimal but necessarily basic mutual understanding, which is one of the keys for a more sustainable and more humane future, would not have been possible.

It is important to point out that communication via various means does not always mean people have to agree with each other. Rather than seeking for an agreement, precisely because in many cases people have different backgrounds and therefore various approaches to the commonly shared concerns, it is crucial for us to maintain intellectual communication and interchange.

In the age of globalisation and regionalisation which provides both chances and challenges from anywhere at any moment, the ALFP 2001 Fellows indeed agree that it is high time for public intellectuals in Asia to cultivate a lively atmosphere in order to build up a public space and/or an intellectual forum where more people, including marginal groups, can participate and benefit.

The ALFP 2001 Fellows have spent an incredibly meaningful time in both Tokyo and other parts of Japan, and an especially happy time with Japanese intellectual colleagues and the staff from both the Japan Foundation and the International House of Japan. The Fellowa have had a unique change to know and understand more about Japanese society and its culture, which would have been impossible for the Fellows if only coming for a short visit without comprehensive arrangements.

The ALFP 2001 Fellows are deeply impressed by the work done by different kinds of NPO groups and individuals in Japan. The work on peace, gender equality, and environmental protection are just a few examples that will have much wider and deeper implications beyond local boundaries.

It is worldwhile to point out that the Fellows all share the idea that a paradigm change is necessary in order to cope with the new challenges we are facing today; a change which goes beyond a binary understanding of East vs. West, past vs. future, we vs. the other, and development vs. underdevelopment.

The Fellows believe that it will be fruitful to continue their friendship by working more closely on issues of common concern. A closer relationship

between academic research, media reproduction, and NPO/NGO activities, is timely and significant. They are also very aware of the urgent need for linking their intellectual work with a wider association in Asia.

The Fellows also see the necessity for interchange programmes such as the ALFP, which is distinguished from many other scholarships in terms of its multi-disciplinary nature, and its close relationship between Fellows and local activities.

APPENDIX I

The Problem of the Intellectual

Dr Huang Ping
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The definitions of the term 'intellectual' are different, the theories of intellectuals are various, and the problems of the intellectual have been debated for more than a century. Amongst these problems, there are various usages of the concept (I) Where are the social locations of the intellectual? (2) What is the relationship between intellectuals' social locations and their political ideas? (3) Do they form a special class, or an independent classless stratum, or rather, do they belong to various classes? (4) Do their political ideas express or represent their own interests, or the interests of other classes separately, or rather, a complex of the interests of various classes?

Concept of Intellectual and Intelligentsia

(1) Intellectual

Various usages of the concept

Terminologically, 'intellectual' has been a widely used but universally ambiguous concept. Social scientists or sociologists have their own definitions and usages, which are nevertheless various. Amongst these, Edward Shils's statement is well known:

Intellectuals are the aggregate of persons in any society who employ in their communication and expression, and with relatively higher frequency than most other members of their society, nature, and the cosmos. (Shils, 1973:22)

According to Shils, it is not only those who produce intellectual works, who engage in their interpretation and transmission, who teach, annotate, or expound the contents of works, but also those who 'consume' – for example, read intellectual works in large quantities, and who concern themselves receptively with works – who are intellectuals. What is more, it is not only those engaged in the creation and reception of works of science, scholarship, philosophy, theology, literature, and art, but also those involved in intellectual-executive roles as well, who are intellectuals. (E Shils, 1968:399;Cf., SM Lipset and A Basu, 1976:119.)
Shils's understanding of the term of intellectual seems so wide that some other sociologists prefer to narrow down their definitions. For instance, Lipset defines 'intellectuals' as those who create, distribute, and apply culture – that is, the symbolic worlds of man, including art, science, and religion (SM Lipset, 1960:311; 1976:119). RJ Brym confers the title upon those people who get occupationally involved in the production of ideas, including "scholars, artists, reporters,

performers in the arts, science, etc, as well as students in post-secondary institutions, who are apprentices to these occupational roles." (RJ Brym, 1980:12.) A more concrete but narrower definition is given by E Etzioni-Halevy, who, following Lipset and Brym, not only defines intellectuals as those "who are professionally engaged in the creation, elaboration and dissemination of theoretical knowledge, ideas and symbols", but also points out that her definition includes the overlapping categories of university academics, natural and social scientists, research scholars, journalists, and writers. Whilst those who only, or chiefly, apply theoretical knowledge, such as engineers or medical practioners (if they do not engage in pertinent research), are not included, nor are students, though many of them are apprentices to the professional roles of intellectuals. (E Etzioni-Halevy, 1985: 9-16)

Some sociologists even emphasise that intellectuals should be more outstanding than ordinary educated people. In this sense, neither all academic persons nor all members of the professions are intellectuals. Max Weber limits them to those "who by virtue of their peculiarity have special access to certain achievements considered to be 'cultural value', and who, therefore, usurp the leadership of a community." (Weber, 1946:17.) Weber's argument, however, is not beyond criticism. Since there have always been at least two kinds of outstanding cultural men/women, i.e., the defenders of the status quo and the malcontents, and the latter could be frustrated with so-called "cultural value" and therefore be outside, or even at adds with, their contemporary cultural setting, should we treat these two similarly under the title of 'intellectuals', or reserve the title only for those with critical attitudes towards the status quo?

Coser seems to be amongst the group which claims that the title should be only given to the latter, for he argues that intellectuals, seemingly never satisfied with things as they are, "question the truth of the moment in terms of higher and wider truth; they counter appeals to factuality by invoking the 'impractical ought'." In other words, "intellectuals live for rather than off ideas." (Coser, 1965:VIII.) But Coser's definition, as Coser himself recognises, has a tendency to idealise the portrait of the intellectual. The same problem actually exists to some degree in many definitions of intellectuals. One example is Neumann's description, which is read as following: "The intellectual is, or ought to be, the critical conscience in each of its historical period." (FL Neumann, 1976: 423) It seems very reasonable: the people who define or describe intellectuals are at the same time intellectuals themselves, or more strictly, are considering themselves intellectuals. As Bauman points out, definitions of intellectuals, which are many and diverse, have one trait in common: they are all self-definitions (Z Bauman, 1987:8.)

More important is the problem that if we construct a definition of 'intellectuals' based merely on their psychological characteristics, without taking account of their social positions within society, we would be in danger of confusion. Can we simply name manual workers with critical spirits as members of the intellectual? Or should we say that all intellectuals must be critical, while not all

men with critical spirits are intellectuals? Theoretically and historically, the same or similar psychological characteristics can always be amongst various social members, whilst opposite characteristics can appear amongst members from the same social class or stratum. Thus, merely according to psychological characteristics, can we hardly find a person's social location?

Origin and shift of the term

To understand 'intellectual' better, it is necessary to survey the origin and shift of the term. 'Intellectual', as a term, was first used by Clemenceau in an article in *L'Aurore* on 23 January, 1898. As a consequence of the Manifeste des Intellectuals evoked by the Dreyfus Case, the term was widely used then in France. The right wing, anti-Dreyfusards satisfied the café-revolutionaries as 'intellectuals'. For example, Brunetiere used it derisively, referring to those artists, scientists and professors who presumed to represent the nation's conscience on basic political questions. To him, it was quite illogical to deduce that an educated person, who is remarkable in some specific subject – for instance, mathematics, or literature – should thus be justified to be the representative of a nation's conscience. Gradually in France, the term 'intellectual' came to mean those educated people – for instance, artists, literary writers – who had broken with tradition, order, and the wisdom of the ages, and who exhibited strong political aspirations by directly seeking to be state rulers, or indirectly influencing decision-making. (Cf., R Hofsadter, 1963: 38-39; Kirk, 1960; and W Martin, 1987:65.)

In the US, the first usage of 'intellectual' in the 1980s was interestingly similar: it was a pejorative rather than honorific term. An intellectual at that time was regarded as a misfit of the déclassé: a working man who read more than a university graduate, or a gentleman who came from an upper class family but rejected his origin, or an educated person who failed to complete his studies, who lacked discipline, who had intellect but not character, and so on. The scorned position of intellectuals did not change until the 1930s, when social scientists in general, and economists in particular seemed to have the capability to lift American society out of the Great Depression. 'Intellectual' became a rather positive word and was given to those social scientists, especially economists, afterwards. (Feuer, 1976: 48-52.)

In Britain, the situation was very different. Here, educated persons historically conformed to rather than criticised the social establishment. As A Swingewood points out, the peculiarities of English society and culture – such as profound conservatism, intellectual retardation, and hostility to social change – have effectively "created the conditions in which intellectuals function through the dominant discourses of the political and social structure." (Swingewood, 1987.87-90.) British graduates not only prided themselves on their Oxbridge background, which nurtured their minds with conservative attitudes towards reality, they also enjoyed special privileges. For example, they had the right to elect 12 members of Parliament, which continued until the 1950s. Because of the lack of the critical spirit amongst them, many British graduates, who were nurtured on Plato and

Aristotle, and who went out to work in the colonial service, to rule an empire as philosopher-kings, were scarcely to be regarded as 'intellectuals', nor did they see themselves as such. Bertrand Russell once declared: "I have never called myself an intellectual, and nobody has ever dared to call me one in my presence." (Cf., Kirk, 1960; and Feuer, 1976: 49-50.)

However, according to Shils, who insists that every society, including primitive ones, contains its own intellectuals, there were intellectuals in Britain in the mid-1950s who, unlike intellectuals in many other societies, fundamentally approved of their own society. "Never has an intellectual class found its society and its culture so much to its satisfaction." (E Shils, 1955:6; 1968:401; 1972:3-4.) It seems that whether intellectuals are critical depends more on their traditional culture and current social conditions than on their intellectual or academic levels.

Perry Anderson even argues that "a peculiarity of English history has been the tradition of a body of intellectuals which was at once homogeneous and cohesive and yet not a true intelligentsia." (Anderson, 1 964:42-43.) This raises two questions: (l). Is there such a thing as "a true intelligentsia"? and (2). If there is, what is it?

(II) Intelligentsia

As a term, 'intelligentsia' appeared first in the middle of the 19th century. It denoted "free professions". It was remembered that VG Belinsky and Peter Boborykin first introduced the term of 'intelligentsia' into Russian literature in 1846 and 1860, but Aleksander Gella finds that the first reference was made by the Poles Bronislaw Trentowski and Karol Libelt in 1844. (A Gella, 1976:12, 20; and 1987a. Cf., ME Malta, 1961:I.)

More importantly, social scientists have concerned themselves more with the social phenomenon itself than the concept of such a phenomenon, for "the coining of a new term by itself does not determine the existence of a new social stratum." They are more interested in knowing "when, where, and why the intelligentsia appeared". (Gella, 1987a.) They are generally in agreement that the 'classical intelligentsia' appeared in late 19th century Russia and Poland. It included those educated men/women without or with little property, who received Western ideas – for example, liberalism, nationalism, and socialism – but who were isolated not only from the mass, but also, perhaps more profoundly, from the political regime. Their education would not necessarily give them great careers; they were educated but distinct from other educated members of the upper classes. And more significantly, they sought radical changes to their social and political structure, or at least had critical attitudes towards the established social system, hoping certain kinds of social reform would be happening. They could be either Belinsky's "enlightened individuals", or Lavrov's "critically thinking individuals", or Lenin's "tribunes of the people". The intelligentsia could contain both admirers and critics of the West, both revolutionaries and reformers, but were by no means an educated vested

interest group or individual defenders of the established order - though most of them came from families of the nobility and the urban bourgeoisie. (Cf., Gella, 1976.9-27; 1987b; Malta, 1961:l-18; Nahimy, 1983: 3-18; Seton-Watson, 1960; and W Martin, 1987.64-66.)

It was a special, probably unique, phenomenon in economically-backward societies, like Russia and Poland in the 19th century, where Western ideas had already influenced some educated men/women who were still ruled by totalitarian regimes. This "true intelligentsia", however, had never constituted the majority of the educated people in Russian society, nor in others, but because of the classical usage of the term, many social scientists nowadays still differentiate intelligentsia from intellectuals. They used 'intelligentsia' to cover those self-conscious men/women in art and/or science who are alienated from, or have even revolted against, the established order, and 'intellectual' to classify individual in scientific and/or artistic circles who might be either critically opposed to, or conservatively in favor of, the establishment. (Cf., Gagnon, 1987: 5.)

The unresolved question is: if the intelligentsia or the "true intelligentsia" were united, neither by an economic standard of life and income, nor by their education and professional competence, nor even by their intellectual accomplishment, but mainly by their common ideological bounds – i.e. by their critical attitude towards the given society – how should we explain such a social group? (Cf., Gena, 1976: 13; Nahirny, 1983: 8, 16.) Should we thus treat 'intelligentsia' as a specific group of individual intellectuals, a specific stratum or even an independent class? "No recognised system of social analysis, either those known to the intelligentsia itself or those elaborated since by modern sociology, makes provision for a 'class' held together only by the bond of 'consciousness', 'critical thought', or moral passion." (Malta, 1961: 5.) Not all social scientists would adopt such differentiation in the usage of the term of 'intelligentsia' and that of 'intellectual'. R Michels, for one, makes no separation between the two terms; another example is Lipset, who makes a differentiation by taking 'intelligentsia' to mean creators and distributors of culture, while 'intellectuals' were a wider group, including not only these creators and distributors, but appliers of culture as well. Moreover, Mannheim considers the intelligentsia a "thoroughly organised stratum of intellectuals". On the contrary, Gouldner defines intellectuals as those whose intellectual interests "are primarily critical, emancipatory, hermetic and hence often political" but intelligentsia is "fundamentally 'technical'." (R Michels, 1932:1 18-126; Lipset, 1981:333; Mannheim, 1 940: I l; and Gouldner, 1979: 48.)

It is inevitable that much controversy is generated by the lack of agreement about the definitions of the terms 'intellectual' and 'intelligentsia'. It would be naive, however, as Coser says, to believe that once the terms have been properly defined and clarified, all differences will be automatically eliminated. (Coser, 1965: 248.)

Sociological Approaches to the Problem of the intellectual

'Intellectual' and 'intelligentsia' cannot be merely interpreted as concepts through exploring the origins and usages of them. As mentioned above, social scientists are more interested in understanding social phenomena than playing with words. To understand the phenomena of intellectuals and intelligentsia, several theoretical models have been set up, which will be summarily analysed below.

(1) Karl Mannheim's "Free-floating intellectuals"

First is that employed by those who maintain that intellectuals are capable of distancing themselves from, or transcending, social relations and practical lives, and can thus be, at least relatively, free to think, choose, move, and locate. Parsons claims that intellectuals put cultural considerations before social ones; Shils asserts that intellectuals are those "persons with an unusual sensitivity to the sacred, an uncommon reflectiveness about the nature of their universe, and the rules, which govern their society." (T Parsons, 1969:4; E Shils, 1969:25-26.) Yet it is Karl Mannheim who elaborates why and how intellectuals could be socially classless, or at least relatively so. In his various writings, Mannheim constantly used the words, "Freischwebende intelligenz" (free-floating intelligentsia), an expression borrowed from Albert Weber, to describe intellectuals' peculiarity. (K Mannheim, 1982:269; 1979:137; 1956:106.) Mannheim maintains that intellectuals form "a social stratum, which is to a large degree, unattached to any social class." In other words, they form "a stratum with no roots, or at least few roots, to which no position of class or rank can be precisely imputed." (Mannheim, 1979: 139; 1953: 127.)

Two significant characteristics of Mannheim's intellectuals can be seen in his *Ideology and Utopia*. One is their political heterogeneity. Mannheim finds that intellectuals are politically heterogeneous to such a degree that they can find arguments in favour of any political cause they may happen to serve. Another is their homogeneity, for they are all educated people. Mannheim treats education as a unifying sociological bond between all groups of intellectuals, which ties them together in a striking way and gives them the ability or power to attune – or dynamically, to synthesise – almost all political perspectives of various classes.

Mannheim's argumentation and exposition are so inspiring and controversial, that sociologists have been debating the problems that he raised and advanced for more than 60 years since he published his *Ideologie und Utopie*. Mannheim is therefore regarded as a path breaker in the sociology of intellectuals. There is, however, a contradiction of logic in Mannheim's argumentation, as Brym exposes: the combination of heterogeneity and homogeneity.

Mannheim emphasises that intellectuals are too heterogeneous in their political views to form a class by themselves, but at the same time, he stresses their capacity to arrive at a relatively homogeneous synthesis of almost all viewpoints

of various classes. “It clearly cannot be the case that the political attitudes of intellectuals are simultaneously heterogeneous and homogeneous.” (Brym, 1980:56.)

In reality, it is not easy for us to find political homogeneity amongst intellectuals. In 1929, for instance, when *Ideologie und Utopie* was first published, there were many academics who supported the Nazis; other radical intellectuals at Frankfurt's *Institut fur Soziaghrschung* were Marxist , and some in Berlin's *Deutsche Hochschule fur Politik* were liberals. It is reasonable to assume that Mannheim’s total synthesis, of political perspectives by intellectuals, is more a task that intellectuals ought to aim to fulfill than an accomplishment they have already achieved; more a hope than a fact, more an ideal than a reality. Mannheim really wishes that intellectuals, especially their “elites”, could put themselves in a position to develop a total orientation and synthesis. But such a synthesis has not come to pass. On the contrary, as Bottomore points out, “the intellectual elites, in most countries and at most times, is one of the least homogeneous or cohesive of elites, and displays a considerable variety of opinion on cultural and political questions.”(TB Bottomore, 1966:75.)

As far as the heterogeneity of intellectuals is concerned, Mannheim thinks that intellectuals can voluntarily affiliate themselves with one or the other of the various antagonistic classes, for in fact, intellectuals are to be found in the course of history in all camps. From here, Mannheim correctly points out that intellectuals are politically heterogeneous. The question is: how can we draw the conclusion from such heterogeneity that intellectuals are thus socially free-floating?

According to Mannheim, there are several possible reasons: first, intellectuals are “recruited from an increasingly inclusive area of social life”; second, they can “attach themselves to classes to which they originally did not belong”; and third, unlike workers and entrepreneurs, who participate directly in the process of production and therefore are immediately bound by class affiliations, intellectuals “can adapt themselves to any viewpoint” and they alone are “in a position to choose their affiliation.” (Mannheim, 1979: 138, 141.)

At least two questionable points are left here. The first is: the term ‘class’ basically means not so much the family backgrounds that people originally have, but more the social positions they are economically given. Though the former strongly influences the latter in many cases, theoretically, they cannot be simply or confusingly mixed up. It does not matter whether a manual worker comes from an impoverished peasant family, or a bankrupt landlord family, or even a noble family. He is a manual worker if, and only if, he is employed by his employer and doing certain sorts of manual jobs in a capitalist society. Furthermore, neither his family background, nor his own experiences can entirely determine his current class position in theory. A magnate could have been a peddler or a handicraftsman. Historically and logically, each first

generation of classes is recruited from others.

It would be much clearer if we focus our attention on the modern, advanced capitalist society in which social mobility is getting more and more frequent. As a result, not only intellectuals but also the members of other groups may have their origins elsewhere. Thus, neither the recruitment of intellectuals from an increasingly large area of social life, nor their affiliation to classes they originally did not belong to, can make intellectuals exclusively privileged members of a free-floating stratum. Can we say that because some members of a class came from other social groups, this necessarily means that they are socially free-floating? If so, there would be more than intellectuals who were free-floating.

The second point is: within the social structure, there are two kinds of people: those who directly participate in the process of production and therefore form the basic socio-economic classes, and those who do not. The latter consists of not only Mannheim's intellectuals but also others – for instance, governmental ministers and bureaucrats, army officers and soldiers, policemen and judges. Why do intellectuals alone enjoy the privilege to be in a position to choose their affiliation? Mannheim argued that education here plays a significant part. Education is emphasised by Mannheim to such an extent that intellectuals' participation in a common educational heritage progressively tends to suppress differences of birth, status, profession, and wealth, and to unite individually educated people on the basis of the education they received. (Mannheim, 1979: 138.)

The problem remains, however. There are not only Mannheim's intellectuals, but in modern societies, at least, politicians, army officers, judges, and many others who are often highly educated as well. Further, not only those who do not participate in production, but also some of those who do participate in it – such as entrepreneurs and engineers – are in diverse degrees, educated. Why, then, can intellectuals alone raise themselves above the attachment of class relations, and float freely over society, whilst other social members, who are also educated up to tertiary level, cannot?

Mannheim himself recognises such problems, for he always uses "relatively" in italics to modify his term of "free-floating intellectuals". Unfortunately, we are never told the exact meaning of "relatively". Mannheim, too, finds it difficult to discover a concrete social group, which correlates with his conception of "free-floating intellectuals", and felt the necessity of analysing the relationship between their ideological orientations and patterns of social mobility only a few years after publishing *Ideologie und Utopie*. This can be clearly seen in Mannheim's essays on the *Sociology Of Culture*. (Mannheim, 1956: 142--149. Cf., Brym, 1980:57; Renunling, 1975:73.)

(2) Alvin Gouldner's "New Class": Cultural Bourgeoisie

The second approach toward locating the social position of intellectuals is that

shared by those sociologists who treat intellectuals as an independent class, although diverging from one another on their exact placing of intellectuals within the social structure. Generally, there are two variants of this approach. One claims that intellectuals, especially Western-educated radicals in economically underdeveloped or developing countries, form a "ruling class". The other asserts that in both the West and the East, intellectuals are forming a "new class". (Cf., Gagnon, 1987:7.)

The first variant, influenced by elite theorists such as Pareto and R Michels, declares that in economically underdeveloped or developing countries – 20th-century Russia and China, for example – the social upheavals that have been defined as revolutions were actually '*coups*', and the Western-educated radical intellectuals and their elites became members of the ruling class after these so-called "intellectual *coups d'etat*".(H Lasswell & D Lemer, 1965:80.)

This is a more historical than theoretical approach. No matter whether the revolution in those underdeveloped societies are in fact "intellectual *coups*" or not, it is necessary to remember that, first, not all leaders of developing countries are intellectuals; and second, in countries such as Russia and China, where the leaders of the revolutions/'*coup*' were considered to be overwhelmingly intellectuals, what really happened was more complicated.

Just as Kamal Sheel claims, a revolution "cannot be understood in terms of the wisdom of intellectuals only."(Sheel, 1989:XIV.) To a large degree, we could say, it is not the intellectuals who brought revolution/'*coup*' into being, but rather, the increasing social conflicts between various classes and political forces which resulted in the upheavals (revolution or '*coup*'), and it is these social upheavals which created thier own leaders. As Barrington Moors points out: intellectuals, in spite of urban education and commitment to Marxism, were not totally alienated from their own additional environment, and they "can do little unless they attach themselves to a massive form of discontent." (B Moors, 1966:480.)

Taking top leaders of the former USSR and China, as an example, can show this. Before they became so-called 'professional revolutionaries', these individuals either went to university (Stalin and Mao, for instance), or completed their undergraduate studies (for example, Lenin and Zhou En Lai). Only after they joined in the masses of workers (in Russia) and peasants (in China), did the discontented intellectuals, in the long-term political and military struggle, learn to propagandise, mobilise, and organise the people, and then gradually occupy prominent leadership positions and become generally acknowledged.

Lacking such experience, the 'real scholars', Plekhanov and Chen Du-xiu, the first leaders of the Communist Parties of both Russia and China, had to be transient figures in the political arena.

More generally, there are plenty of Western-educated men and women in

underdeveloped or developing societies who are not revolutionary, but liberal or even conservative. In terms of their educational background, interestingly, these persons usually hold higher degrees than the revolutionaries. Should we thus strictly modify the statement to read: "intellectuals who hold relatively lower education degrees in underdeveloped countries become revolutionary, and then after the revolution ('*coup*') form the ruling class", whereas higher degree-holders do not? Supposing that all leaders of all underdeveloped or developing countries were intellectuals, and there were no other kind of intellectuals at all, that is to say, all leaders were intellectuals, and all intellectuals were revolutionary, should we thus say intellectuals in these countries formed the ruling class?

The identification of the members of a class is carried out, according to their common relationship with the means of production (to own or control the means for instance), their socio-economic position (owner, manager, or worker), rather than their educational background or their ideological orientation. It is possible in any society at any time in general, and in modern society, developed or underdeveloped, at the present time in particular, that nearly all the members of the ruling class are educated persons. But we cannot thus say that educated people or intellectuals, or their "elites" form the ruling class. There is no causality here.

The second variant of the approach to the intellectual considers it an independent class, as elaborated by Alvin Gouldner in his *The Future Of Intellectuals and the Rise Of the New Class*. Gouldner claims that in both the West and the East, intellectuals are forming a new class, which he labels the "cultural bourgeoisie", because they have the same relationship with the means of production, and share a common cultural background. (A Gouldner, 1979. Also A Gouldner, 1985.)

Let us examine the common cultural background first. The common cultural background is, according to Gouldner, the culture of critical discourse (CCD). The CCD is "a historically evolved set of rules, a grammar of discourse which (I) is concerned to justify its assertions, but (2) whose mode of justification does not proceed by invoking authorities, and (3) prefers to elicit the voluntary consent of those addressed solely on the basis of arguments adduced." In a word, CCD "is centered on a specific speech at: justification." (Gouldner, 1979:28.)

Gouldner claims the CCD, as the deep structure of a common ideology of discourse, is shared by both humanistic intellectuals and technical intelligentsia through education – or to be precise, through public school. This kind of education in public school proceeds at a distance from close parental supervision, and through the medium of a special group "teachers", who train their students to believe that the value of their discourse does not depend upon their differing class origins. "Public schools therefore are schools for a linguistic

conversion, moving their charges away from the ordinary languages of their everyday life and moving them towards the CCD."(Gouldner, 1979: 44. Cf., Gouldner, 1985. 30-33, 37-38.)

Secondly, let us explore intellectuals' common relationship with the means of production. Gouldner asserts that this common relationship is determined by the fact that, intellectuals as a whole, integrated by sharing the CCD, control the production and distribution of "cultural capital". Unlike money capital, cultural capital is not material but symbolic; but like money capital, it can be used to command income, status, and power.

According to Gouldner, classical capital, or the capital defined by classical political economists, is actually merely one kind of capital. More abstractly speaking, capital in general should be any produced object, used to make saleable "utilities, thus providing its processor with incomes, or claims to incomes defined as legitimate because of their imputed contribution to economic productivity; these claims to income are enforced normally by withholding, or threatening to withhold, the capital object." (Gouldner, 1979: 21)

Because of this, Gouldner insists that anything can be defined as capital, when it serves as the basis of enforceable claims to the private appropriation of incomes, and legitimised given their contribution to the production of economic valuables and wealth. From this, Gouldner concludes that education is capital simply because it provides incomes, because these incomes are enforceable, and because they are legitimated intrinsically, depending on the continued availability or withholding of their services and activities. (Gouldner, 1979:23.)

Now, Gouldner thinks humanistic intellectuals and technical intelligentsia can form one class. It is a class, which, like other classes, uses its special culture, language, and technique to advance its own interests and power, and to control its own work situation. But it is also a specific class, a "cultural bourgeoisie", which privately appropriates the advantages of a historically and collectively produced cultural capital.

It seems to me that the importance of education, in the process of teachers imbuing students with CCD and thus forming a New Class, is exaggerated by Gouldner. In order for this to take place, if it indeed takes place, first, there should be a prior autonomous, or at least semiautonomous, group of teachers who take the standpoint of the collectivity as a whole, and speak in the name of the nation, or even the universe, without any obligation to preserve specific class privileges in the new public education system. Second, if this was so, when children went to school, they and their parents' ideologies would begin to grow more divergent, and their parents would no longer be able to reproduce the values of their own class in their own children. And third, following Gouldner's logic, as soon as these children received the CCD "in one word, one meaning," it would be efficacious "for every one and forever." Yet, all these three factors

have not existed, and we cannot find such an education in reality. It has not happened that both teachers and students have been able to isolate themselves from society, and then transcend it. Moreover, and not surprisingly, teachers and students from the same school can simultaneously divide ideologically or politically into diverse sub-groups.

The more heated argument is centred on Gouldner's conceptions of capital and cultural capital. Firstly, as we have showed, the key to his capital is that it is the source of income. Gouldner asserted that "any produced objects used with the intention of augmenting utilities or wealth, whether hardware or skills may be capital." (Gouldner, 1979:23.) In this sense, both money and education, can be used as capital. But unlike money capital or economic capital, Gouldner's cultural capital, as Martin and Szelenyi point out, cannot be detached from the individual who owns it. Does this mean that the owner of cultural capital must thus put his capital into action himself each time it is used in the process of production? If so, how can his cultural capital be used as the "means of production" by others? (C f., B Maltin & L Szelenyi, 1987: 34--36.)

Secondly and more problematically, cultural capital, unlike economic capital, is inconvertible: it is unlike economic capital, which can be converted into money or its equivalent, and therefore used in the process of accumulation, which makes such valuation and convertibility of capital goods possible. A holder of economic capital could, of course, convert his capital by using money primarily invested in a shoe factory to a cap factory, whereas a holder of an engineering degree could hardly use his cultural capital in the field of political sociology of intellectuals. Should we still treat this degree as capital?

Thirdly, as Gouldner himself said, all classes possess cultural capital in some degree. Then the problem is: how does the New Class differ from others? Gouldner thought that the New Class could be differentiated in two ways: quantitatively, it possesses a relatively greater stock of cultural capital, and a relatively larger part of its income derives from it; qualitatively, its culture is a special one, that is, the CCD.

There are some problems here. The first is Gouldner's "quantitatively greater stock of cultural capital". It seems that Gouldner forgot that quantitatively, we can only stratify people into different strata rather than differentiate them into various classes. The second problem is, we do not know how much cultural capital can be calculated as "relatively greater stock". Should we say that a man who receives higher education possesses a relatively greater stock of cultural capital than a man without a higher education background? If so, how should we treat those great intellectuals, for instance, some literary writers, who never went to university? The final problem is, qualitatively, Gouldner did not show enough evidence that only the members of his New Class, ie, humanistic intellectuals and technical intelligentsia, possess CCD. As we have argued, while some members of other classes may also have critical discourse, some members

of humanistic intellectuals and technical intelligentsia may not necessarily possess it.

Gouldner fully realises that things like science, knowledge, technology, etc, are becoming central to production in contemporary societies. However, we cannot conclude from this, that humanistic intellectuals and technical intelligentsia, who specialise in the creation and sustaining of such things, will thereby eventually become dominant. If there is "cultural capital" indeed, Gouldner's theory does not elaborate why and how intellectuals can appropriate and dominate the rest of society by using their cultural capital.

As far as intellectuals in Communist societies are concerned, we must recognise that here, the social system causes a fundamental difference. There will be further discussions on this later, and in the following chapters when taking China's leading intellectuals as an example. Here a few words from A Giddens are pertinent:

Rather than being based primarily upon control of the means of production, the Party in such societies seems to derive their preeminent position much more from bureaucratic power... Yet power, which derives from participation in a governmental apparatus, is clearly not market power and the notion of "cultural capital" seems largely irrelevant to it. (Giddens, 1987: 272-273.)

(3) A Gramsci's Organic and Traditional intellectuals

The third kind of approach towards identifying intellectuals' social locations and their political ideas is originally found in *The Prison Notebooks* of Antonio Gramsci. He deals with the problem idiosyncratically while the questions he asks at the beginning of the essay on intellectuals are more or less the same. That is: "Are intellectuals an autonomous and independent social class, or does every social class have its own particular specialised category of intellectuals?" (Gramsci, 197 we: 5.)

Gramsci notes that there is a widespread error among social scientists. They define intellectuals by emphasising the intrinsic nature of intellectual activities, rather than the ensemble of the system of relations. But, Gramsci argues, it is in the ensemble of social system that intellectual activities, and therefore the intellectual groups who personify them, have their place. As a matter of fact, in any physical work – even the most degraded and mechanical – there exists a minimum of creative intellectual activity. In this sense, we could thereby declare: "all men are intellectuals." However, as Gramsci points out, not all men have the function of intellectuals in society. The function of intellectuals, according to Gramsci, should not be limited simply to the field of culture, and thus the term 'intellectuals' should not be understood to apply to those strata commonly described by this term, but more generally, to the entire social stratum which exercises an organisational function in the widest sense – not only in the field of culture, but also in the fields of political administration and production.

The question is not, who and how many kinds of professional people should be listed under the name of intellectuals. But rather, according to Gramsci, the questions should be: "What is their organisational function? And accordingly, what is the relationship between these intellectuals and social classes? Do they have a 'paternalistic' attitude towards the instrumental classes? Or do they think they are an organic expression of them? Do they have a 'servile' attitude towards the ruling classes, or do they think that they themselves are leaders, an integral part of the ruling classes?"(Gramsci, 1971:97.)

Gramsci recognises that the reality of intellectuals in the real historical process is complex: there are different categories of intellectuals. Or strictly speaking, every class, coming into existence on the original terrain of an essential function in the world of economic production, creates together with itself, organically, one or more strata of intellectuals which give it homogeneity and an awareness of its own function, not only in economic but also in social and political fields. (Gramsci, 1971:5.)

Gramsci names this kind of intellectual: "organic intellectuals". In other words, organic intellectuals are directly related to the economic and political structure and therefore closely tied themselves to the class they represent. Obviously, they are, by no means, an autonomous, classless stratum.

There is another category of intellectuals, however. Gramsci calls them "traditional intellectuals". This category consists further of two elements' (1) the creative artists and scholars, men of letters, who are additionally regarded as "true intellectuals"; and (2) the vestiges of the former organic intellectuals, who used to belong to a previous social formation. They are together called "traditional intellectuals" because they experience an '*esprit de corps*', an uninterrupted historical continuity and a special qualification. These traditional intellectuals presume that they themselves are autonomous and independent of the dominant social class.

Here exists a novel relationship, which has not been discussed before: the relationship between "organic intellectuals" and "traditional intellectuals". In fact, it results from the relationship between the dominant class and traditional intellectuals. The dominant class does not willingly let these traditional intellectuals run their own course. Any class that is developing towards dominance tries to assimilate and "ideologically" conquer traditional intellectuals. Furthermore, the quicker and more efficacious this assimilation and conquest, the more the class in question succeeds in simultaneously elaborating its own organic intellectuals.

According to Gramsci, on the one hand, traditional intellectuals – or at least some of them – used to be members, as organic intellectuals, of the former ruling class. On the other hand, organic intellectuals, or at least some of them, are assimilated from traditional ones. From this, Gramsci really opens up a new

path towards the sociological understanding of intellectuals, by examining their patterns of historically shifting positions. This process cannot be thoroughly understood without studying political parties. It is the political party that, Gramsci points out, elaborates its own component parts and turns individuals into qualified political intellectuals, and it is the political party, as well, that welds together the organic and the traditional intellectuals. As far as the process of the transition to socialism is concerned, the political party is the most important and crucial factor. Its members, as "collective intellectuals" are leaders and organisers of all activities and functions inherent in the organic development of an integral society, both civil and political.

Like Mannheim and Gouldner, Gramsci also discusses education and the school. But for him, school is not a fictitious land apart from society. For instance, he claims that the traditional school is oligarchic, because it is intended to train the new generation of the ruling class, destined to rule in its turn. However, there is another kind of school – the vocational establishment, in which the labourer can become a skilled worker, the peasant a surveyor. "It gives the impression of being democratic in tendency". But in fact, Gramsci argues, it is just an illusion, because democracy cannot mean merely that an unskilled worker can become skilled, and also, the vocational school restricts recruitment to the technically qualified governing stratum. The key to such schools is not their curriculums, nor their teachers, but the entire social complex. (Gramsci, 1971: 36-41.)

It is impossible to agree with Gramsci completely. For example, his denotation of intellectuals seems too wide, and maybe the classification of intellectuals into two kinds is still too simple. R Simon even thinks that the "traditional intellectuals" as a term is unnecessary. (R Simon, 1985: 97-98.) Nevertheless, Gramsci's theory of intellectuals is regarded as one of his most significant contributions to modern sociology, and he is considered to have been the first to recognise and analyse the complexity and malleability of intellectuals' social-structural ties, and the way that these ties influence their ideological outlooks. (Cf., A Swingewood, 1984: 21l; Brym, 1987: 204-205.)

(III) Intellectuals & Intelligentsia in communist societies

Gramsci did not have the opportunity to conduct empirical research into the complex relation between intellectuals and social structure, nor could he see the socialist societies in which, he thought, a new kind of intellectual would play a great part, and a new relationship between intellectuals and the masses of the people would replace the old one. According to Gramsci, the mode of being of the new intellectual can no longer consist in eloquence, "but in active participation in practical life, as constructor, organiser, permanent persuader, and not just a sample orator". He supposed that in a socialist society, all members of the Communist party would be organic intellectuals (ie, organisers and leaders of the people) functionally. They would not only win the additional intellectuals over, but also feel the elementary passions of the masses of the people, understand them, and therefore, explain and justify them in the particular

situation, and connect them to "knowledge". (Gramsci, 1971: 10, 16, 418.)

Gramsci's work, including his notes on intellectuals, as he himself said, is based on the following fundamental principles:

That no social formation disappears as long as the productive forces which have developed within it still find room for further forward movement; that a society does not set itself tasks for whose solution the necessary conditions have not already been incubated, etc. (Gramsci, 1971: 106.)

(1) Soviet-type Communist Societies

The historical praxis, ironically, is that nearly all 'communist societies', from Soviet Union to China, did not develop from industrial capitalism, but rather, they came from "Asiatic society" (for instance, China) or "Semi-Asiatic society"(Russia, for example). (Cf., Umberto Melotti: 1982, esp., chapters 14, 17.) These societies were called 'communist societies' not because they had already reached the 'Communist stage', but because the founders of these societies were considered to be communists rather than social democrats. In this study, I continue to call them "Communist", or "Soviet-type Communist", to describe those societies established, following the model of the Soviet Union, although the authorities of these societies usually claimed that their societies were "socialist".

Before the Communist revolution, in these societies, or in some of them at least, the centralising power of government had played a commanding role, which had interfered in both social and economic life since ancient times. State officials, bureaucrats, military officers, and mandarins, constituted a vast, privileged hierarchical ruling and exploiting group. Of course, there were many traditional and cultural differences between these societies. For instance, unlike Russia, China had for a long time been a society where religion was not socially as significant and dominating as it was in the West and Russia, whilst Confucianism became orthodox ideology. Even geographically and economically, we can easily point out some differences, for example, the variety of population, although both Russia and China were huge countries whose production was mainly agriculture. Whatever the differences, before the revolution, these societies were economically underdeveloped, and accordingly, both the bourgeoisie and the proletariat were qualitatively weaker and quantitatively fewer than those in the West. However justified, the revolution in these societies resulted more from the conflict between the common people in general and their rulers than the "conflict between the bourgeoisie and the proletariat", and more from the conflict between these nations and Western countries than the "conflict between the high-speed developing forces of production and the existing relations of production".

If we look at the process of the revolution in these societies, we can see that: (I) some radical members of intelligentsia were dissatisfied with the status quo,

and then (2) they received and believed in Marxism, (3) they further formed a Leninist party, (4) which established its own army recruited from workers and peasants, and (5) finally, the party and its army took power after severe military battles with both alien and home forces.

After the revolution, even before basic means of production were nationalised or collectivised, the party state was established in the name of the "dictatorship of the proletariat". Three characteristics could be generally summarised as: (I) state or collective ownership under which not only the means of production, but also labourers themselves became parts of the state or collective; (2) the dictatorship of the Communist party which controlled not only state organs, but also social and individual lives; and (3) official ideology (Stalinism, or Mao Zedong Thought, for instance) could be exclusively elaborated and developed by the authorities, but could never be criticised or argued against by others. (Cf., M Djilas, 1957: 164-172.)

One of the main questions we may ask from Gramsci's theory and the practice in these Communist societies is, as Swingewood points out, how a Soviet-type society, based on state-ownership, centralised power, and collectivist ideology, can retain an independent civil society and thus autonomous intellectuals. (Swingewood, 1 984: 214-215.) As a matter of fact, the relationships between organic and traditional intellectuals, between the intellectual and the communist party, between intellectuals and the masses of the people, which Gramsci thought would be totally new in a socialist society, became real "new" problems. Civil society, in a traditional sense at at least, no longer existed: under the control of the ruling party, everything was politicalised.

After the revolution, both organic and traditional intellectuals could no longer be considered to belong to the "free professionals", if they used to be. The majority of former traditional intellectuals – especially scientists and technicians – were recruited by the state as salary-earning scientific workers, while politically and ideologically, according to the party, they had been serving the old regime. They were still holding conservative and reactionary views to varied extents. As to the minority of traditional intellectuals, for instance, some famous scientists, artists, and writers – although their "bourgeois background" was by no means less obvious – were given privileged positions and living conditions, for the sake of pragmatic purpose of economic, as well as social construction. (Cf., Nicholas Lampelt, 1979.)

At the same time, though the term 'intelligentsia' remained in official vocabulary, and some of the former intelligentsia remained to be critical towards the status quo, the classical intelligentsia as a social group disappeared, and its role of being critics of the current time and independent spiritual leaders of the nation, was gone. This was simply because most members of the former critical intelligentsia now became officials of the ruling party and the state. In name and in reality, the ruling party insisted that the classical intelligentsia should be replaced by the

"new intellectual working men", who could be still critical, but according to the party, just towards the past and the West. (Cf., Gella, 1987a.)

More significantly, beyond Gramsci's expectation, not all the Communist party members were organisers or leaders of the masses, nor should they all be considered as organic intellectuals. But instead, they were the core elements of officialdom, more or less bureaucratised and privileged, and even in conflict with the masses of the people in many cases.

(2) Djilas and the "New Class"

Nearly all these Communist societies thus faced a new serious problem: the bureaucratisation of the former "revolutionaries". Interestingly, like Gouldner, Milovan Djilas also tries to develop the concept of a "new class". According to Djilas, this "new class" is different from earlier ones because it does not come to power to complete a new economic order but to establish its own; because it could be formed only after it has attained power, and because it could only be created in an organisation of a special type, the Bolshevik type. It is a special class, which is "made up of those who have special privileges and economic preference because of the administrative monopoly they hold." (Djilas, 1957:37-41.)

But unlike Gouldner, Djilas claims that it is not a cultural bourgeoisie, but a political bureaucracy. In other words, instead of intellectuals, it is politically bureaucratised officials who form the "new class" in the Communist societies. Djilas asserts that the social origin of his "new class" lies in the proletariat, which in economically underdeveloped countries, being backward, constitutes the raw material from which the new class arises. However, when the new class establishes its power and authority, it is interested in the proletariat only to the extent necessary for developing production, and "the monopoly which the new class establishes, in the name of the working class over the whole of society is, primarily, a monopoly over the working class itself". (Djilas, 1957:4143.)

Djilas considered it a class because in the Soviet-type Communist system, the political bureaucracy uses, enjoys, and disposes of nationalised property. In the name of the nation and society, it distributes the national income, sets wages, and directs economic development. (Djilas, 1957.44-47.) It is called the "new class" not only because it is newly born after the revolution, but also because it is a new type of class. In the name of the ownership of whole nation or all people, the political bureaucracy actually enjoys the ownership privilege, which grants itself both an exclusive right to use and dispose of nationalised property, and an absolute power to dictate state organs, control social life, and oppress the human mind.

According to Djilas, the core and the basis of the new class is created in the party and at its top, as well as in the state organs. Djilas further claims that in the Communist society, the ruling party, in fact, has replaced the state functionally. In other words, in such a society, the government is a party government, the army is a party army, and the state is a party state. (Djilas, 1957:39-41, 70-72.) Djilas

thinks that under such a party state, every action depends on the party, which makes independent thinking impossible.

Djilas's analysis of political bureaucracy in Soviet-type Communist societies was mainly based on his own experience in, and observation of, Yugoslavia and the Soviet Union. Though he did pay attention to ownership, he did not carefully examine the differences between control, use, and ownership, and he emphasised aspects of the central control and power of the party, rather than ownership. The problem remained unresolved when he said that to be an owner of the nationalised property in a Communist system "means that one enters the ranks of the ruling political bureaucracy and nothing else". Also, he did not explain why "not every member of the party is a member of the new class", and why only a special stratum of bureaucrats, those who are not administrative officials, make up the core of new class. Other officials are only "the apparatus under the control of the new class". (Djilas, 1957:40, 43, 61.) How can a person be an owner of the nationalised property when he/she joins the rank of the political bureaucracy? Why are certain party members of the new class while others are not? Why do political bureaucrats belong to the new class while administrative bureaucrats do not?

Michael Lustig points out that Djilas's analysis would have made a lot more sense, if he had claimed merely that the bureaucracy in the Soviet Union and Yugoslavia had unrestrained control over the economic life. "He could not stop at this point, however, because of his ideologically imposed task of demonstrating that the new elite was a new class."(MM Lustig, 1989:128.) In spite of this, however, Djilas is one of the first generation who critically analysed the problem of bureaucracy in Communist societies, and many of his criticisms turned out to be valid.

The reality of the Soviet-type Communist societies was, of course, more complicated than any theoretical generalisation. As we have said, Djilas's analysis was mainly based on his own experience. Nowadays, it is easy to tell the differences between different Communist societies in different periods. For instance, the post-Stalin Era is different from the Stalinist Era, and China is different from the USSR.

Moreover, intellectuals in the Communist societies, either Soviet-type or Chinese-type, were not just passively and totally controlled. Instead, they were still playing different intellectual roles in various fields to varied degrees.

(3) Do intellectuals and bureaucrats combine into one?

Noticeably, many critics of the Soviet-type Communist societies were from these very societies. These include former leaders: Trotsky, Djilas, scientist Sakharov, and literary writer Solzhenitsyn. Amongst their numerous criticisms, the book *The Intellectuals on the Road to Class Power*, written by the Hungarian sociologists G Konrad and I Szelenyi, is directly relevant to our interest.

Konrad and Szelenyi claim that in Soviet-type Communist societies, or, in their own term, the 'Eastern European state socialist' societies, since the 1960s, "the difference between intellectuals and bureaucrats were gradually disappearing", and, as a result, a new dominant class "has been composed of the intelligentsia as a whole rather than just the bureaucracy narrowly defined." (Konrad & Szelenyi, 1979:XIV-XV, 3.)

Konrad's and Szelenyi's approach to intellectuals is interesting, though they do not differentiate 'intellectual' from 'intelligentsia' very clearly. Firstly, it is not automatically acceptable that an intellectual can be anyone who has a defined store of knowledge, and engages in one of a number of defined occupations. It is always difficult to know how much knowledge is necessary for someone to be an intellectual, and what sort of occupations are considered to be intellectual jobs. According to them, 'intellectuals' should be understood both generically and genetically, both functionally and structurally. That is to say, a man is treated as an intellectual in his time – not because he has some general knowledge, but because he has certain specific knowledge, which is widely recognised, as necessary for an intellectual at that time, and by which he obtains his status. (Konrad & Szelenyi, 1979:24-25, 29-32.) Secondly, like Gramsci, they claim that everybody has certain knowledge, but not everyone should be thus considered an intellectual. A king probably needs to know a great deal to occupy his throne, a capitalist may need advanced economic, legal, and technical knowledge to run his enterprise, yet they are not intellectuals. "It is not merely knowledge which makes someone an intellectual, but the fact that he has no other title to his status except for his knowledge."(Konrad & Szelenyi, 1979: 28-29.)

Therefore a man should not be an intellectual, if he obtains his status because of his money capital, however much knowledge he has.

Obviously, it is true that different societies define intellectual knowledge in different ways. The question is: Why is intellectual knowledge so different and important that it makes those who possess it a dominant class under 'Eastern European state socialist' societies in the 1960s? The authors of *The Intellectuals On the Road to Class Power* think that the most important reason is the changing society itself. They agree that, in market economies, intellectuals do not form an independent class, but a stratum between the bourgeoisie and the proletariat. However, when capitalism developed into state-monopoly capitalism, intellectuals started being polarised, and even before the Soviet-type Communist state was established, intellectuals began to seek power. (Konrad & Szelenyi, 1979: 63-85.) But all of this did not make intellectuals form a class. The social basis of the emergence of a new intellectual class in 'Eastern European socialist' societies was: rational redistribution.

In such a system, it is the rationality of the redistributors' activity, that legitimates their authority. Konrad and Szelenyi claim that, unlike bureaucracy in market economy, "there is no longer any distinction between the political and economic

spheres (or any division of power spheres at all), no dualism of policy making and execution, no pluralism ends" under rational redistribution. Under this condition, "there appears the circulation of the bureaucratic elite, an important indication that the intelligentsia is being formed into a class." (Konrad & Szelenyi, 1979: 47-150.)

Here again, like Mannheim and Gouldner, Konrad and Szelenyi think that education diplomas make intellectuals homogeneous and their intellectual knowledge easily convertible, which is thus "almost as neutral as capital itself."(Konrad & Szelenyi, 1979: 150-151.) When we examined Mannheim's and Gouldner's theories, we already pointed out that, unlike money capital, education degrees or so-called "cultural capital" cannot be converted in the market, and unlike property, education does not make those who have received it socio-economically homogeneous to such a extent that they form a specific class. As a matter of fact, Szelenyi realised this problem when analysing Gouldner's "cultural capital", and clearly claimed that an education degree is inconvertible more than ten years later. (See Martin and Szelenyi, 1987.) Logically, we may ask: if education had indeed played such an important part in forming an intellectual class, why would this class not have emerged before the Communist period?

Another problem is that Konrad and Szelenyi, like Djilas again, have not explained why all members of the intelligentsia should be seen as members of the intellectual class when "the functions of central redistribution in the strict sense are carried out, not by the intelligentsia as a whole, but by a narrower segment of it – the state and party bureaucracy", and this party bureaucracy could even carry out "the vast, bloody purges" of the intellectual. Are these purges necessary in order to "make the intellectuals understand that early socialism did not mean their direct class rule"? (Konrad & Szelenyi, 1979:147, 185-186.)

Also like Djilas, they find that in Soviet-type Communist societies, the ruling party was not just one factor, or the most important factor in the political mechanism. Rather, it *was* the political mechanism. Furthermore, they point out that, though there were conflicts between individual bureaucrats, collectively, they shared a common interest, and the apex of the bureaucracy represented this collective interest. (Konrad & Szelenyi, 1979:152-163.) This is very clear when it is pointed out that a Communist state is a one-party state, in which the ruling party enjoys totalitarian authority, and all-important political and economic decisions are made by the upper level of the party bureaucracy.

In contrast, it is not clear at all to say that thus the party members and cadres – that is, the party bureaucrats – consist of intellectuals who, accordingly, form the class basis of the party, and those upper-level positions must be occupied by intellectuals. It is even more misleading to say that the ruling party should be considered a mass party of the intellectual class, and at the same time, a cadre party of the working class. Is this because intellectuals made up a higher percentage of the party membership than workers, while the proportion of

officials who were once workers, or whose parents were workers, was much higher? (Cf., Konrad & Szelenyi, 1979: 147, 179-180.) Even following Konrad's and Szelenyi's own definition – namely, a man is an intellectual only if "he has no other title to his status except for his intellectual knowledge" – we cannot reach such a conclusion, because in the Soviet-type Communist societies, including the Eastern European socialist states in the 1960s, it was not merely intellectual knowledge which made party officials, elite bureaucrats on the upper level. Former experiences before the party took power, political achievements before and after that, official positions in the power structure, and even personal connections to the top leadership, were all considerably significant factors as well.

In spite of some rash generalisations and conclusions, Konrad and Szelenyi do find many specific political-intellectual phenomena in those Soviet-type Communist societies. More significantly, they systematically demonstrate the differences between the Stalinist and post-Stalinist eras. (Konrad & Szelenyi, 1979: 192-200.)

The final question is, when the former Soviet Union and Eastern European socialist states no longer exist, where is the new class of the intellectual? Does it disappear together with the system, or is it the intellectual, as Szelenyi points out recently, who "no doubt played a significant role in the rather unexpected collapse of communism, in the bloodless 'velvet revolution' against the bureaucracy, and the astonishing readiness of the ruling elite to dissolve itself and its organisations"? (Cf., 1 Szelenyi & B Martin, 1991)

Intellectuals and Social Class: Theory and method

It seems to me that all the above theoretical approaches to the problem of the intellectual and intelligentsia, except Gramsci's perhaps, share one thing in common: simplistic generalisation. Intellectuals/intelligentsia were either considered "free-floating stratum", "cultural bourgeoisie", or "new ruling bureaucrats". Whatever differences, various kinds of intellectuals were put into one certain specific social place.

A new approach

My own approach towards the intellectual will be different: To focus more on their social positions, within a complex of economically and historically given social relations, in a certain period of each society than on any other factors. I would argue that intellectuals should not be treated as varied in both socio-economic positions and political/ideological orientation.

The general definition of intellectuals can be briefly stated as: all men and women who are occupationally producers of ideas concerning nature, society, human beings and cosmos, by virtue of any types of symbols in every given society. Accordingly, any person can be regarded as an intellectual, if she or he is a person of ideas, regardless of whether she/he has received higher education

or obtained a degree, and irrespective of her/his family background. As far as ideological orientations are concerned, intellectuals can be either conservative, or liberal, or critical, or radical; whatever ideological orientation one prefers, it is not entirely a matter of free choice, but rather, it is also socially conditioned by the position she/he obtains in the given social structure. In addition, of course, political orientation is more or less influenced by relations from one's past, such as social origin, educational background and work experience. What is more, social relations, to which intellectuals as well as others actually connect, are always changing. And, as a result, the various ideological or political outlooks of different intellectuals are not always immutable and invariable. In this sense, intellectuals are floating indeed, but not freely.

Intelligentsia, in contrast, may still be defined in the classical sense. It is a specific group of intellectuals, whose members are always critical towards the status quo, feeling a responsibility to change, or at least, politically, to influence the minds of the leaders and citizens of their society, and hence the society itself. Such an intelligentsia does not necessarily exist in each society in each period. And if it does, it is just a minority of intellectuals. How and why its members are critical depends greatly on their particular social and cultural surroundings, and their specific intellectual and political experiences.

Intellectuals in different societies, during different historical periods, can be different to such an extent that we cannot sociologically treat them as the same, by only using a general definition or description. On the other hand, however great differences exist amongst various intellectuals. They, like other members of society, are all conditioned by the social relations they are bound to. The remaining questions will be: If intellectuals are also conditioned by their social relations, how, and to what extent, can they be considered "relatively free-floating"? If they are indeed relatively free-floating, why and how are they forming a special social stratum and why is such a stratum able, intellectually rather than geographically, to go beyond social and cultural boundaries?

Author's note: This was originally drafted in 1987-88 at the London School of Economics where I was doing a Ph.D. thesis. It was revised in 2001 at the International House of Japan, Tokyo.

I am grateful for comments made by Leslie Sklair, Stephan Feustwang, and Alan Swingewood of LSE in 1987-88, and all Asia Leadership Program Fellows during the September-November 2001 period.

APPENDIX II

Remapping Migration: A Case Study Linking Research and Media

ALFP2001 Fellows – 'The Transnational Team'

The Fellows first drew up a strategic overview as follows:

MISSION

To build a lasting transnational network between seven ALFP2001 Fellows and other 20+ Fellows from previous years that will facilitate information exchange and projects (in research, training/education, advocacy, media and support services) within the region.

OBJECTIVES

To build a credible, manageable scope of work/services within the means of the seven ALFP2001 Fellows

To initiate and drive projects that will
- build bridges between people and places (transnational, beyond nation state)
- promote or incorporate a transborder, crosscultural research and implementation approach
- empower the individual/community or influence government and other agencies

To produce information kits, based on academic research and activist experience, for diverse audiences (particularly the media) to facilitate understanding about any given subject

RATIONALE

The ALFP2001 seven Fellows all agree:
- on the importance of a regional network
- that we continue the network built between ALFP Fellows
- research information is sometimes only circulated within 'limited circles' and may be vital for a wide variety of audiences
- The media (comprising television, radio, newspapers and others such as brochures, leaflets – total communications) is the primary tool of understanding for the public(s), and therefore it is critical that any intellectual undertaking to be 'put into action' should consider the role of the media
- We do not want to duplicate either the role of Institutes and institutions already providing intellectual research, or the role of NGOs already in existence

TARGET AUDIENCES

The target audiences for the ALFP2001 transnational network are diverse and would need to be focused according to each project.

Target audiences (not in any order) include:
- Local communities, individuals and groups
- National and provincial governments
- Transnational communities, individuals and groups
- International organisations such as UN, UNDP, ILO, World Bank
- Humanitarian/protection agencies, Human Rights groups, border managers and grassroots agencies
- Other policy makers and decision makers
- Business people
- The media
- Intellectual colleagues

STRATEGY

- To formalise and launch a 'virtual network' between the seven ALFP2001 Fellows and other ALFP Fellows on the Internet with regular gatherings to meet 'face to face'
- To prepare a three-year plan for funding for study, training and action
- To implement a pilot project – 'Remapping Migration'

RATIONALE

Why migration?

Migration is a critical issue for the region in coming years. On a personal and professional level, all Fellows are concerned about 'human capital'. In practical terms, four out of seven Fellows are already skilled in poverty research/migration-related activism. Three Fellows work in the media or have media skills.

Globalisation does not necessarily mean 'Westernisation' or 'Americanisation' but a new set of events and phenomena, a transnational flow of capital, technology, information, cultural symbols (both signified and signifiers) and people. This globalising age is an era during which economic, political and cultural changes take place at transnational, regional, national, local and community levels. The influence can be seen from transnational migration of labourers, children, the elderly, and either legal or illegal, documented or undocumented refugees, and terrorists. A globalisation without security will make people feel uncertain of it and hostile to each other. Examples can be seen from the rise of nationalism in many parts of the world, fascism in some – and further, from regional and international terrorism. The uncertainty felt by marginalised groups can be seen in that they do not (or cannot) adhere to

existing rules and regulations required or imposed by the authorities, and they cannot enjoy the benefits provided by the social welfare and social security systems. As a result, they do not have to be responsible for wherever they live and work. More seriously, many such marginalised people in Asia want simply to leave their land/country for a better future. Globalisation has become such a fashionable term all over the world and a new project in many places, within the system of nation-states. It is highly likely that Asia's rural 'surplus labour' and rural population will eventually go beyond their nation-state boundaries. Countries like Japan are experiencing an increasingly ageing society. If all nation-state systems continue to deal with migrants as cases of 'illegal' or 'overstay' people, and cannot cope with the lack of youth in an ageing society, the gap between 'the North and the South' will widen, and problems like fundamentalism and terrorism will be more troubling.

Remapping Migration: Linking Media & Research

International Migration: Impact, Implications and Management in South, South East and East Asia

By Dr Mahendra P Lama

The Problems

The proposed project in full aims at examining and assessing the nature, extent, composition and direction of international migration of population – both forced and voluntary – among the countries of South, South East and East Asia. These regions, including countries like India, Pakistan, Nepal, Thailand, Myanmar, Malaysia, the Philippines, South Korea and China, have witnessed one of the most unprecedented levels of international migration, leading to remarkable changes in the demographic profiles of bordering states.

There are varieties of reasons that have triggered cross border migration in these regions. These include poverty, environmental displacement, employment opportunities in fast developing countries, state-led violence and other ethnic and political clashes. On the other hand, these international population movements have several critical dimensions, ranging from purely legal to economic aspects, and from environmental and social implications to security and conflictual dynamics. The dynamics and implications are wide-ranging and require very serious theoretical enquiry and empirical research.

These migrations sometimes have led to open armed conflict, thereby impinging heavily on the regional security and peace process. The open and porous borders in many countries in South Asia – and poor border management in other countries – have, in fact, acted as the major facilitating factor in the entire migration process. These borders are unmanned and unregulated. For example, to travel between Bangladesh and India, one needs proper documents to cross

each other's border; in practice, simply because of the length and breadth of the border (over 4,080 kms of porous border), regulation becomes impossible. The involvement of an array of agencies in the cross-border migration gives this an organised dimension.

Many of the countries, from which the migrants have originated, have had a very low ranking in human development indices, indicating a low level of achievement in desirable socio-economic indicators, relevant to describe the quality of human life. A huge section of the population in this region lives below the poverty line, and has little or no food security. The ongoing globalisation-led economic reforms are likely to marginalise whole sections of rural and urban populations that may trigger off fresh migration.

Natural disasters make their lives more miserable. The capacity and resources of many of these countries are insufficient to devise a coherent plan of sustained development to provide reasonable food security for people living below the poverty line. This has resulted in large-scale migration of the population amongst the geographical units of this region.

Development projects, like dam construction, road development, hydro-power generation and mining, entail substantial displacement of populations to be resettled. This adds another dimension to population migration.

There are several examples of violent movements that are directly triggered by international migration. The locales of some of these movements are in strategic points that have large-scale security implications. A distinct characteristic of all these movements has been their remarkable parochial slants, followed by a two-way clash with state agencies and forces whom they think are opposed to their aspirations and demands.

Equally interesting has been their threat perceptions with regard to dilution of their identity. The 'sons of the soil' policy and subsequent human rights violations have been at the heart of many of the migration-related conflicts.

This has been aggravated by the rise of ethnic, parochial and militant nationalism in the wake of perceived lack of economic opportunities, the encroachment therein and the fast-changing demographic profile. In many cases, it's the religious slants that lead to rather hostile tolerance of migrants.

Many of these countries have also been hosting a significant portion of the world refugee population. The question of a security/instability framework brings in a host of issues that have turned out to be adverse to refugee-receiving countries. At times, they have acquired the dimension of a serious threat to both security and stability of the host nations. These situations are said to have set in when refugees i) are seen as a political risk, ii) perceived as a threat to cultural identity and iii) are considered as a social and economic burden.

Equally critical has been that of the management of migrants in terms of providing them with their basic needs, and extending them fundamental human rights. Many host governments clamp down on migrants in such a manner that directly infringes upon their human rights. The mass media remain largely mute in many of these cases, as they are not adequately sensitised in the area of migrants' rights. More than this, the skills to deal with some of these issues at the media level are not available.

Project Objectives

To assess the nature, extent, composition and direction of international migration in the region.

To examine the policy and legal framework of the selected countries' governments in the management of international migration.

To examine the push and pull factors including existing border regimes that have led to international migration.

To generate new information and provide fresh insights on issues and problems, the maintenance of balance in respect of detail and depth among the different country-specific components.

To look into the impact of international migration on demographic, political, social, cultural and economic structures in the countries of origin and the host countries.

To understand the dynamics and intricacies of conflicts and violence created by the international migration.

To suggest means to retain the migration-prone population in the countries of origin, including through economic development, natural disaster management and regional interventions.

To look into the attitudes of these states towards both international norms and conventions.

To suggest certain new approaches to conflict resolutions.

To examine the critical role the mass media can play in the proper management of the migrant population in various circumstances.

To suggest some media-related instruments that can be effectively used in dealing with the migrants.

In the fulfillment of all these objectives, the involvement and interventions of both governmental and non-governmental instruments (including civil society) as well as regional instruments are very essential.

Scope of the Study

1. State and international migration

i) Process of state formation and nation-building
ii) Constitutional arrangements
iii) Political/electoral process and political parties
iv) Administrative process
v) Leadership and elites
vi) International border regime
vii) Cross border connections of the agencies and institutions involved in migration

2. Economic, demographic and environmental perspectives of international migration and conflicts

i) Population growth and migration, their ecological implications and how they pertain to the use (and control over) physical resources, from international, national and sub-national perspectives
ii) National level development policy (centralisation, decentralisation, growth/equity, government interventions, market driven policy) and its effects
iii) Natural Disasters and migration
iv) Economic costs of conflicts
v) Unequal Distribution of the benefits of development

3. Migration and international-domestic linkages in conflicts

i) Global economic and strategic relations
ii) Regional economic and strategic relations
iii) Ethnic Diaspora
iv) Drugs Trafficking and international arms market
v) International/regional political linkages
   a) End of Cold War
   b) Rise of religious revivalism
   c) International organisations including NGOs
   d) Human Rights

4. Technical Perspectives of armed conflicts

i) International supply of arms to conflicting groups
ii) Inter-state destabilisation measures
iii) Irredentism and armed conflict
iv) Local level technology in the manufacture of arms and other destructive weapons

5. Information, mass media and public opinion

i) Domestic Media
ii) International Media and
iii) Information Technology

6. Approaches to Conflict Resolution

i) Retain the migratory population's economic development, social harmony, food security, empowerment, land and water management and minimisation of displacement effect.
ii) Political interventions including legislative changes, firm policies on ethnic minorities, minimisation of human rights violations and political persecution and violence.
iii) Empowerment of the poor, women and ethnic minorities.
iv) Natural Disaster Management including strengthening of Early Warning Systems and evacuation and rehabilitation measures.
v) Review of existing border arrangements and trans border linkages.
vi) Consider role of regional organisations like the South Asian Association for Regional Cooperation (SAARC) and Association of South East Asian Nations (ASEAN).
vii) Consider role of international organisations like the UNHCR, IOM, ICRC, UNDP and other international NGOs.
viii) Review the attitudes of these states on international norms and conventions, including the UNHCR Convention on Refugees 1951 and Protocol 1967.
ix) Enable institutional arrangements to protect minority rights.

The study is visualised as consisting of three phases:

Applications for funding will be made to carry out the following.

1) Discussion Meeting on the Concept Paper prepared by the ALFP2001Fellows. This will be attended by scholars/experts/professionals from the concerned region. This Concept Paper will have the comprehensive work plan of the proposed study. It will also have all the methodological and theoretical details including field visit questionnaires, locations and interview schedules.

2) First round of presentation of papers based on case studies and field visits in a workshop.

3) Final round of paper and synthesis presentation to the policy makers, intellectuals, politicians and media.

Methodology

This study will be based on extensive field visits, surveys and discussions with relevant persons, including border officials, political figures, policy makers,

leaders of migrated groups and other organisations. The research methodology will consist of the following:

- Literature surveys on each of the principal topics.
- Generation of new qualitative and quantitative data.
- Analysis of the data using appropriate statistical and other analytical techniques.
- Review of existing paradigms and hypotheses on migration and conflict in the region.

Expected Outcomes

- An integrated approach to the understanding of international migration and conflicts in the region.
- Contribution to the development of conceptual and theoretical constructs, concerning international migration and conflicts. Development of a database on international migration, the involved push and pull factors and the resultant conflicts in the region.
- Conflicts dynamics and approaches to their resolutions.
- Production of media information kits on migration so as to facilitate reporting needs in terms of simplicity, clarity and accuracy
- Production, if possible, of a volume containing authoritative reappraisals of international migration, conflict situations and approaches to the management of migrants.