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**THE ROLE OF PUBLIC INTELLECTUALS  
IN CHANGING ASIA:  
Asia Leadership Fellow Program 2002 Report**

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2003

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## Foreword

The Asia Leadership Fellow Program has been running since 1996, and this publication marks the seventh successful operation of this ambitious venture. The ALFP has been evolving year by year, but the basic style of having the Fellows spend two months together taking part in discussions and visits has remained the same. Apparently, the experiences of the Fellows, as well as the immediate visible outcomes, differ from group to group. How the chemistry among the members of each group turns out is often quite a gamble.

Each year, a general theme is set in order to provide a certain degree of coherence to the Fellows' discussions. In 2002, however, this very theme - which is also the title of this publication - was questioned and challenged from the beginning. Who are 'public intellectuals,' and what is their role? There had been a loose consensus about whom the ALFP meant by 'public intellectuals' and the term itself had never been openly questioned (though there were some who were skeptical) in the past programs. In addition to definitions by the renowned intellectuals (which are also reflected in some of the Fellows' papers in this booklet), there can be different versions of 'public intellectuals' according to one's philosophical/historical background or the socio-political system from which one originates. Although the discussions on this issue remained unresolved during the two-month program in September-October, 2002, the discourse has now moved on to this publication for further examination.

The ALFP was originally designed to locate and bring together Asian intellectual leaders to "enhance collaborative work to identify common issues and to set new value-orientations for the people in the region." The Fellows have been expected to move beyond their own fields of interest and contribute their thoughts to a much wider spectrum in "searching out solutions for our common agendas" and "developing new norms." In order to achieve these goals, various seminars/workshops and field trips as well as retreat conferences have been organized to accommodate uninhibited discussions on critical issues pertinent to the region. But in the course of developing the programs over the years, various questions have arisen: How can Fellows from diverse backgrounds go beyond exchanging and challenging each other's ideas? What is meant by 'collaborative work'? Is it really possible for them to work collaboratively in tackling the numerous problems that people and society are facing? There have been several examples of successful experimental ventures in collaboration among the Fellows, but they are of course not the same every year.

From the beginning, differences in each Fellow's ways of thinking have been apparent, and we sometimes witnessed moments of tension during the course of the two-month Program in 2002. However, we are reminded that it is only natural that we all think differently, and that the current global tensions occur partly because there are people or regimes that cannot tolerate such differences, resulting in hostility towards one another. This group of 2002

Fellows, however, respected each other's views, and the heated debate that continued even after official visits or seminars were over was not because one wanted to overwhelm another but was out of the desire to be exposed to other points of view and also to be heard. Although it is not always easy to have one's opinion contested or to accept opposing views, the Fellows of 2002 were able to acknowledge the diverse views each of them had, and all of us involved appreciated the fact that "we are all different and that is good."

The two sponsoring organizations, the International House of Japan and the Japan Foundation Asia Center, wish to express gratitude to all the people who have supported the ALFP, past and present. We are very thankful to all who have contributed their papers for this publication, especially to Professor Sakamoto for sparing his busy time in revising the texts of his informative presentation from the seminar. Also, our words of gratitude go to Vinod Raina for his tireless work of editing, and to Ann Lee, ALFP 2001 Fellow, who has kindly agreed to help us with the coordination of printing/distributing the publication for two consecutive years. It is particularly delightful that a collaboration between Fellows from different years became possible through this publication work.

We sincerely hope that the intellectual network created through this Program will be maintained and *will* prosper, and that the ALFP alumni in particular will continue to be committed to working and acting together with people from various walks of life to bring about change towards the betterment of this fluid world.

July 2003  
Naoko Shimamura  
Chief Program Officer  
International House of Japan  
(ALFP Secretariat)

## Editorial Note

*(In lieu of an Introduction)*

I have thought hard of a metaphor that may catch the essence of ALFP2002, or of ALFP in general. The easiest seems to be of five pebbles of different shapes in a tin box. But that doesn't fit. Because on shaking, the pebbles would rattle and make a cacophony, which is certainly not my experience of ALFP2002. Also, the tin box defines a definite boundary, but the best aspect of ALFP, as Maznah and Reiko say in their articles is its flexibility; the boundaries are distant and extendable. The main theme of ALFP2002 – 'The Role of Public Intellectuals in (a) Changing Asia' denotes such flexibility. Even the public symposium theme – 'Violence, Terror and Peace: Problems of Identity in a Fluid World' suggests that the boundaries of intellectual discourse are somewhat ethereal. The keywords and phrases that evoke the ALFP experience are perhaps: fluidity, intellectual passion in serene surroundings (as provided by the I-House setting), plurality of views - sometimes merging, sometimes not, community feeling, experiencing Japan in its myriad dimensions and so on.

The image and metaphor that would seem to fit such an experience is an evening in a rural area of large parts of Asia, when wood smoke rising from each house seems to make a statement about the identity of the inhabitants of the house, and the various smoke trails sometimes merge, sometimes separate, against the canvass of an evening sky, that looks definitive, but is actually extendable; just like the theme Public Intellectuals, or Identity Politics. ALFP2002 was a combination of such five definitive smoke trails - the Fellows, supplemented by many more of subtly different hues - the Japanese resource persons, and the ever-present pleasant breeze; the Secretariat.

The trouble is, how do you bind such a flexible intellectual memory between two covers? My impulsive and voluntary offer to edit the subsequent volume has been haunting me since. Everything done in these two months is so different that merging it together is a bit of an editorial nightmare. Take the main theme itself, which was originally given to us as 'The Role of Public Intellectuals in Changing Asia'. When I heard it the first time in one of our sessions, my ears pricked up a bit, since I wasn't sure Intellectuals had much role in changing Asia; we would have had to invent one! During the course of the discussions, it became clear that the Secretariat actually meant it to be 'in a changing Asia', which made much better sense and restored one's sense of involvement. But these are the vagaries of an intercultural and inter-linguistic discourse, where the particular use of the connecting language, English, can be a cause of major misunderstandings.

Given that people from at least five distinct language backgrounds – Chinese, Vietnamese, Malay, Hindi and Japanese spoke to each other, mostly orally, for two months in differing English, reflected in the final transcripts made from tapes, editing becomes a hazardous task, since there is danger that improving

language can completely change the intended meaning, as in the case of the missing 'a' in the main theme. That is only one of the problems.

The other is how to hang it together. The five Fellows and nearly another dozen Japanese resource persons had an intense interaction during the course of these two months. But the only thing common amongst them was that perhaps each one of them could be called an intellectual of some kind – public, functional, power or grassroots, as I have tried to categorise in my paper in this volume. What they spoke on is mind bogglingly diverse – Islam, American Literature in Vietnam, Environment Protection and WTO in China, Ecological Debt, American Medias' depiction of Terrorism. As for the Japanese speakers, the topics ranged from Leprosy, Intellectuals, 'Englishisation', Informal Communities, Peace Movements, Comfort Women, Pop Culture, Traditional Arts, Afghanistan, School Education, to Election Expenditures of an MP!

There is no doubt that the volume is likely to interest the participants, since as a written record, it can remain with them as their cerebral memories diminish. But they may also be furious if they find that editing has robbed their words of their intended meanings; for that the editor must take all the responsibility. But will the volume be useful or of interest to those who were not participants? That was my dilemma – how to make it interesting to a larger population. For example, the Resource Person seminars were very informative and opened up a whole lot of conceptual issues. But since they were not available as papers, except the one by Prof. Sakamoto, they appear in a very truncated form, as notes transcribed from recordings, with the danger that editing may have tampered with them somehow. Though the Fellows could find links in these diverse seminars as they experienced Japan more and more, to bring out such links in a volume like this is extremely difficult.

In the end, all one can hope is that this volume, in addition to satisfying the needs of the Fellows and the Secretariat to have a written record of the proceedings, might interest others too, given that the issues dealt in it: of Public intellectuals, Terror, Peace and the various dimensions of Japanese situation is of immense interest to many, particularly in the present turbulent times. More than that, one hopes that it will add to the meagre volume of interdisciplinary intellectual efforts of Asians, in Asia.

*Vinod Raina*

## Summary of Events (2002)

### Introductory Session: September 2, 2002

The Introductory Session on September 2, 2002 at the International House of Japan was attended by the Fellows (except Marian Pastor Roces, who couldn't join the program because of a family problem), Program Committee members Ishizuka Masahiko, Lee Jong Won, and Takeda Isami; Former ALFP Fellows Ohashi Masaaki and Huang Ping; Takemoto Chiharu and Machimura Akiko from the Japan Foundation Asia Center; Kato Mikio, Koide Izumi, Shimamura Naoko, Sonoda Kimihiro, Higuchi Keiko and Kuroda Yuko from the International House of Japan. Following an introduction from Program Director Koide Izumi, Kato Mikio, Executive Director, welcomed the Fellows and elaborated on the underlying question of what exactly is a Public Intellectual and what role they have to play in a changing Asia. He also voiced his expectation that the Fellows would share not only their hopes and aspirations but also their anxieties and fears; of globalization, and the destination of humanity in general. He hoped that the interconnectedness and networking of the Fellows would become important when after 15 or 20 years' time, this fellowship period would hopefully be one of the highlights of their career.

After the Fellows' self-introduction, the rest of the party introduced themselves with additional remarks about the program; Lee Jong Won stated the outline of the program and the importance of mutual understanding and formation of close personal networks amongst Fellows. Takeda Isami expressed his expectations of the outcome of the program and Ishizuka Masahiko stressed the positive impact and expansion of the intellectual network established amongst the past Fellows. Huang Ping from China pitched in with his positive experiences of his time as a Fellow, and Ohashi Masaaki, also an ex-Fellow, pointed out the two dimensions of the program, of having new encounters and creating a network of Fellows. Takemoto Chiharu, Director, Intellectual Exchange Division, Japan Foundation Asia Center explained the Foundation's role and history in international cultural exchange. Koide Izumi explained how this year's theme, 'The Role of Public Intellectuals in a Changing Asia,' had been decided because of its broadness to accommodate a variety of possible topics of interest. She also gave an explanation of the program schedule. Librarian Higuchi gave a brief explanation of the International House Library and afterwards, a tour of the Library. In the afternoon, the Fellows visited the Japan Foundation, where they met with Mr. Yoshino, Executive Vice President of the Japan Foundation and Mr. Junetsu Komatsu, Managing Director of The Japan Foundation Asia Center, who elaborated on the importance of this program and interaction among Asian countries. They moved on to The Japan Foundation Asia Center, where they were briefed about the objectives of the Asia Center. With a quick introduction to the Library, they later had an informal gathering with other staff members of the Asia Center.

**Workshop I: Presentation by the Fellows (1) September 4**  
**Presenter: Maznah Binti Mohamad & Vinod Raina**  
**Moderator: Reiko Kinoshita**

In relation to her paper 'The Role of Public Intellectuals in a Changing Asia' and the situation in Malaysia, **Maznah Binti Mohamad** first raised the question of how to define a public intellectual against the backdrop of current times. No clear answer could be given, which reflects the ambiguity of State development particularly after the Cold War. At present, while capitalism is globalized and the state increasingly moving towards the market, the Sept. 11 incident revealed that the only forces to challenge capitalism are coming from non-rational movements, such as Islamic fundamentalism. As there are no other cohesive social movements, this is a worrying element for the civil society. Today, where does social change come from? How can public intellectuals play a role?

Though different societies define public intellectuals differently, they can be generally classified as those who provide ideas and actually participate in social transformation, to fight for justice, to be a critical voice, to provide alternative views. Categorized into two groups, the 'Functional intellectuals' legitimize and give credence to the working system and official policies of the regime. They also have space and power to affect the thinking of the masses who enjoy the economic boom and comfortable lifestyles; with no urgent need for political, civil freedom, nor movements to challenge the State and the market. The media, academia, and marketplace are all controlled by the political and economic system, which gain legitimacy from these middle classes. On the contrary, the 'Critical or Oppositional intellectuals' provide skeptic, anti-hegemonic viewpoints to the ruling system. But they are increasingly losing public space and authority.

In conclusion, Maznah stated the importance of preserving a public space where oppositional intellectualism and an intellectual public can be cultivated. The public should be able to participate in the debate to carry forward the process of democratization. The present problem lies in the fact that the three parallel systems of 'global civil society', 'nation-state', and the 'national public' are not interacting, therefore not able to assert or influence social movements.

**Vinod Raina** presented his discussion points for the 'Role of Public Intellectuals' where he described the problems and hopes of public intellectuals in India, which claims to be the largest democracy in the world with many political parties and where public intellectuals seem to flourish. However, he asked, is it true that there is a plurality of views in the Indian civil society?

According to Vinod, democracy does not truly exist within the Indian society. One major obstacle of deepening democratic ethos within its civil society is the rise in identity politics, based on religious and ethnic identity. Consequently, conflict is rampant and tolerance has diminished. Such nationalistic politics, if unhindered, will ultimately lead to fascism and violence. The other aspect is the new imperialist globalisation, which has hooked the middle class to consumerism. The middle class is now an endangered intellectual species. The question to be asked is - Whether in a Marxist tradition or in a liberal democratic tradition, where are public intellectuals produced?

Traditionally, it was in the universities or academia, in places of learning as was the case in the 60s. Now the notion of the university is itself changing, where free flow of knowledge is under strain and intellectualism is a commercial property. Increasingly therefore, the location of public intellectuals seems to have moved from academia to the practitioners; farmers, and housewife; the resistance class, of gender, women, ethnic, indigenous groups, community-based dam fighters etc. In other words, the classical Marxist notion built on class has been overtaken by gender, environment, and movements based on other differentiating concepts and notions. Gramsci captured this notion as 'organic intellectuals'. Another source of public intellectuals in India is within the deepening parliamentary system with three more levels added in 1994 to the original State and National level government. One of them, the village level, is where Gandhi believed that governance should be conducted, and where participative democracy can be operated. In the last ten years, the result has been a rise of people who are truly representatives as politicians and intellectuals. Deepening of democratic process and rise of peoples' movements which displaced university-based intellectuals are hopes for the future. A true resistance force to ugly nationalism or to neo-liberalism is the 'public' and 'intellectual'.

Clarifying the term 'public intellectuals' and 'organic intellectuals', Vinod described the former as intellectuals who devote time for thinking and action for social justice, equalities, and rights, but might come from the elite class, where as the latter come from the marginalized class. Also, difference in the nature of the State was mentioned, between India and other countries, such as Singapore and Malaysia, where the State is totalitarian and dominant. A critical question was raised whether it isn't the role of public intellectuals to 'intervene' rather than to 'represent'. On the role of universities in India and the world, Vinod feels that there has been a transformation of its liberal space into a privatized, monopolized domain. What will happen to the production of knowledge then? He concluded the session by stating that we need to strengthen public responses by public intellectuals in the liberal fight against terrorism or extreme nationalism.

## **Workshop II: Presentation by the Fellows (2) September 4**

**Presenter: Nguyen, Thi Hieu Thien & Kinoshita, Reiko**

**Moderator: Maznah Binti Mohamad**

In her presentation titled 'New Educational Strategies in Vietnam: Reflections on the Reform of Teaching-Learning Methods', **Nguyen, Thi Hieu Thien** explained where public intellectuals now stand in the context of the Vietnamese society, and their challenges and opportunities; particularly in the field of education.

After the Vietnam-France War in 1945-54, intellectuals were divided into liberal, pro-Ho Chi Minh government, pro-French and patriotic intellectuals who were called 'socialist intellectuals' or 'communist intellectuals'. The latter were the source of inspiration to patriots during Vietnam War.

The implementation of the open-policy in 1985 subsidized socialist intellectuals in Vietnam to a market-oriented structure. The one-party political

system switched the economy to a market-oriented economy, whereas education, politics, and art remained communist-oriented.

Socially, Vietnam has transformed from a feudal society to a half feudal, half colonized society, and is still in its transition. Its democratic tradition is different from that of the West, and also has a different notion of freedom of voice, distribution of power, and the notion of democracy.

Vietnam is also facing challenges and opportunities towards radical educational reform. Classrooms are transforming from low quality, traditional teacher-centered monologue sites with passive and dependent learners, to learner-oriented situations where students are more independent to demand their individual needs. Recently, even state-run colleges and universities have become joint ventures with foreign investments, and overseas training is funded by both the government and banks.

In the ensuing discussion, other Fellows shared the view that the situation of public intellectuals and education in Vietnam could be related with other countries as well, including the United States. The fact that marketization does not bring liberation of the mind is evidence that the existence of public intellectuals and educational system depends on the regime. But what can a public intellectual do to change the situation?

**Reiko Kinoshita** presented her own analysis of Japanese public intellectuals and their challenges, in 'Clash of Educations: English-Speaking Asia and its Impact on Societies'.

Japanese public intellectuals were challenged when social changes occurred in the 90s and the wave of globalization made people realize the gap between national standards and internal standards. Often described as 'bureaucrats rule, politicians reign', the monopolizing public policy-making in Japan dissolved in the 90s. Also, people lost faith and confidence in its failing economic policy, foreign policy, and scandals involving government agencies. The 'lost decade', as the 90s is described, led to the notion of the need for a public policy community.

Another challenge to the bureaucrats, 'lack of public policy' entrepreneurs, and crony capitalism comes from the populist revolt. Until the 90s, quality media was the vehicle of public discussion. Now, delicate issues of public policy are displayed on talk shows in a superficial manner in media, such as on TV and manga.

But the core of the problem is that no one is willing to take risks. Here, public intellectuals can play their role to examine current policies and present alternatives. Their role is to examine and analyze the national order from an international and global perspective, and shed light on the domestic situation. The other task is to explain the challenges and express their experiences to the global audience. A drawback of public intellectuals in Japan is their lack in English proficiency.

According to Reiko, the function of public intellectuals is to harness globalization in order to make a difference, articulate their diversity and share their experience with the world. In this definition, she sees a new form of public intellectuals in Japan who are inspirational and spiritual leaders or role models.

As such, Ms. Sadako Ogata, NGO activists, activists from “Doctors without Borders”, practitioner Carlos Gome, and major league baseball pitcher Hasegawa can be defined as public intellectual figures.

### **Workshop III: Presentation by the Fellows (3) September 5**

**Presenter: Hu Tao**

**Moderator: Nguyen, Thi Hieu Thien**

**Hu Tao** reflected on the definition of public intellectuals in ancient, present, and future China in his presentation on ‘The Role of Public Intellectuals in a Changing Asia – Reflections from China’.

First, Tao noted that the term ‘public intellectual’ does not exist in Chinese, as it does not in Vietnam and Japan. ‘Intellectuals’ already implies people who should take social responsibilities. In ancient China, they were educated and knowledgeable people. Especially advisors, consultants, philosophers, monks, Taoist, hermits were considered important public intellectuals.

At present, the social structure of China is changing dramatically. Politically, it is changing from a centralized, authoritarian top-down policy to bottom-up democracy. Tao’s personal view is that reforms should be gradual. Economic development has brought in industrialization and urbanization, but in turn has produced environmental problems. New technologies such as IT and transportation have led to drastic changes in people’s lifestyles, particularly in communications with such a huge country.

In current China, the notion of a public intellectual is broad, including civil servants, officials, social scientists, engineers, and white collar brainworkers who may not even be conscious of public interests. Their roles cover management work at government levels, NGOs as critics of the government, to white collar brainwork involving social or non-social roles. The MPA (Master of Public Administrations) education system to train civil servants on how to write public budgets and deal with natural resources and environmental issues is required for the making of these public intellectuals. Prospective public intellectuals are in the middle class, or middle-low class.

For the future of Asia, the role of a public intellectual is open for everyone, to take up a role and responsibility in every aspect of public life.

### **Weekend Retreat in Tateshina: September 27 - 29**

During the weekend retreat at Tateshina Forum, Nagano Prefecture, the five Fellows engaged in discussions with thirteen Japanese participants from academia and organizations. There were also two attendees from the Japan Foundation Asia Center and four from the International House of Japan. Following greetings by Chiharu Takemoto, Director of Intellectual Exchange Division of the Japan Foundation Asia Center, the Fellows gave a brief self-introduction.

## Session I: 'Globalization and Environmental Security'

Moderator: Masahiko Ishizuka, Managing Director, Foreign Press Center

**Vinod Raina's** paper, 'Debt, Development and Environment' focused on the growing ecological debts that Northern industrial countries owe Third World countries and emphasized the responsibilities of the Northern countries to start calculating and paying their debts. He foregrounded this argument by first explaining the historical origins of how such debt came about. He noted that in the postwar period, 'gender' and 'access to resources' or 'environment' had become visible categories, in addition to class, even as economic, social, political, and cultural disparities have widened. Citing William Crosby's 'Ecological Imperialism' and Accion Ecologica's definition of 'Ecological Debt', Vinod explained how the expansion of biological species e.g. cereals and grain, the corresponding monopolization of biological knowledge and resources by privatization by European colonialism had led to a condition where the North had basically expropriated from the 'South' many of its resources. This, according to Vinod, is the basis for raising the issue of the North owing a historical ecological debt to the 'Original' Countries.

But how to categorize and determine the extent of Northern debt? Vinod suggests that we should consider pointing to a starting point of the 'clock' and then proceed to determine the appropriate method of calculation to be applied for quantifying debt. Vinod suggested the notion of 'Ecological Footprints' proposed about three years ago, which indicates the average per capita consumption of food, forest products, and fuel given in a geographic area; and as a starting point, it shows how much land should be available per person so that a person subsists.

Vinod concluded by stating that the value of science and technology is changing vis-à-vis political processes, and the notion of 'nature' as a backdrop is changing. Although doubts existed for patenting intellectual property for over 500 years, and the legitimacy of the economic market as a vehicle for development, rapid changes in these perspectives have had the impact of widening disparities. The ecological debt inherent in this process has remained hidden.

**Hu Tao's** paper was on 'China's Accession to WTO and Environmental Implications for Agriculture.' He explained that the Chinese leadership's supportive attitude towards globalization and China's accession to World Trade Organization (WTO) will affect her environment considerably, especially the agricultural sector. In his brief introduction on the history of China's inclusion in the WTO, Hu raised the question of whether this move will threaten China's environmental security. He noted that once China joins the WTO, her current agricultural policy of prioritizing food self-sufficiency will be challenged by changes in trade policy and production structure. The entry of cheaper imports and the shift in agriculture from production for a domestic market to the world market will surely affect the environmental condition of the rural areas. The shift in trade policy to import more rural products from abroad and produce less at home will particularly affect the production structure. There will be a change

from land-intensive production to labor-intensive production with corresponding expansion also in horticulture, livestock industry and countryside industrialization.

All this, according to Hu, inevitably will lead to the questions raised by Lester Brown: "Who will feed China?" and "Who will feed the United States and/or the European Union and Japan?" Hu argues however that these are not two mutually exclusive problems. In fact, the more China opens up to the WTO, the stronger the possibility that ecosystem degradation and biodiversity loss will be minimized. Moreover, he notes that the current Chinese leadership is well aware of the ecological consequences of China's full involvement with the WTO and has taken the necessary measures to prevent biodiversity loss. There may be some initial damage, but he argues, this will only be temporary and in the long run, ecological balance will be restored.

Hu gave three policy suggestions by way of making sure that the environment in rural areas is protected while opening Chinese agriculture to world competition, and China to the world market. First, he recommends that the agricultural structure be adjusted to include measures that will ensure sustainable development even as the government pursues high growth rates. Second, he recommends that the tariff rate quota for grains not be limited to 80 percent so that China's access to food products from abroad be unhampered. Hu argues that one possible reason why Chinese agriculture remains underdeveloped, is because too much government protection of local food products via subsidies and high tariff rates had stifled initiative among farmers to improve productivity and the quality of their produce. Finally, Hu recommends that the agricultural product tax be abolished so as to spur productivity. He concluded by stating that WTO will not threaten China's environmental security because Chinese authorities have already begun to implement appropriate policies to mitigate negative impact on the environment.

Responses to Hu's paper were varied, and these included apprehensions of pollution from industrial production and agricultural development affecting not only China but also the rest of Asia. Hu responded to these concerns by citing the need for China to overcome its poverty and deal with its growing population. The ensuing discussion raised the question once more of how to balance economic growth and ecological safety.

## **Session II: 'Cultural Values in Globalizing Asia'**

**Moderator: Aiko Kurasawa, Professor, Department of Economics, Keio University**

Speaking on 'Islamic Resurgence and Human Development in Malaysia', Maznah Mohamad proposed a way in which to understand the origin of Islam and its global resurgence against a backdrop of the social and economic development of Cold War politics and September 11 terrorist attack. The September 11 incident shocked the world and raised the question as to how capitalism can be challenged by an ideological cultural system. While Islam was seen by many as a benign alternative to Communism during the Cold War, it later on took on a more

critical stance as cultural and economic globalization spread, raising questions on such issues as the concept of a nation-state and the roles of state and citizens.

In Malaysia, the Islamic resurgence movement in the 70s came out of the prevalent identity politics, where Malays adopted and identified themselves more with Islam than Malay. Citing the anthropologist Ernest Gellner's classification of Islam into two categories – Low Islam which is rustic, rural-based, spiritualistic, and mediated by saints and ritual specialists; and High Islam, which is Quran-based and follows traditions of the Prophet (pbuh), Maznah traced how these processes emerged alongside the rapid economic development that Malaysia underwent in the 1970s. Leaders and public intellectuals were the first to try to analyse how to adjust rapid modernization with these processes, which was followed up by attempts to explain to a broader public. As a result, debates on Islam's role began to spread to personal, public, and governance levels, and there were even calls to establish an 'Islamic State' as a political alternative. All this, Maznah argues, brings a controversial question back to the public arena: why, despite economic, scientific and technological progress, does culture go against the grain of modernization and in fact become a challenge to capitalist development?

### **Session III: 'America and Americanism in Asia'**

**Moderator: Lee Jong Wong, Professor, Faculty of Law, Rikkyo University**

**Nguyen Thi Hieu Thien** titled her paper 'Transition from War to Peace and from 'Socialist-Oriented' to 'Market-Oriented' Society: Experiences of a Vietnamese Intellectual'. Her initial goal was to rectify the distorted information and image of Vietnam as a socialist country and then to compare the values nurtured by socialist society, with those of market-oriented society. She suggested such comparisons may help many to learn from the past, in order to move forward.

Looking back at the Vietnam War, she noted that the spiritual strength and unity of the Vietnamese people was an important factor in explaining its victory over the materialistic but spiritually fragile United States military. With the collapse of USSR and the end of the Cold War, Vietnam's open-door policy ignited changes that prompted debates as to the extent to which a devoted and unified socialist-oriented Vietnamese Communist party should allow market-oriented practices to 'infiltrate' the society.

The eventual decision of the Party to allow opening in order to speed up the economy had led to drastic transformations in the country's traditional values. These changes include the loss of a sense of solidarity, the growing isolation of individuals from each other and the consequent impact on human relationships, the commercialization of education, and so on. As an educator, Thien felt there was less space for educators, as attitudes of children are also changing. Thien's commentary on these changes led her to cite Donald Richie who has suggested that the Japanese may be able to cope with their own changes by returning to their traditional frugal ways. Thien was in effect suggesting that the two countries can learn from each other as they confront globalization.

**Reiko Kinoshita's** presentation, 'War Memories and the History Issue in

Japanese Politics,' looked at the Smithsonian Institute's Enola Gay exhibition controversy over the description, interpretation, and display of the atomic bombing of Hiroshima and Nagasaki. Reiko first raised the question of how we should remember, or even forget, history. What is the collective memory of history and war? The Smithsonian incident was just one example of a conflict of interpretation between American and Japanese versions. This, however, is quite common across borders as shown by the ongoing disputes between China and Japan over the Rape of Nanjing, comfort women, Okinawa, Pearl Harbor, the Yasukuni Shrine issue, and official Japanese history textbooks. Addressing of these issues has been affected by policies of the Japanese State before and after the Cold War. The debate within Japan has taken a different turn after the collapse of ideology and the weakening of the ruling LDP. The new trend of identity politics has gained momentum in Japan, thereby complicating further how these historical issues are to be discussed and resolved.

It was not until the uprising and struggles in the 80s and 90s in China, the rise of feminist and other social movements, that some members of Japanese society were inspired to uncover past injustices of the State, and grievances of victims. Globalization and diffusion of information and knowledge via the Internet have also empowered this movement. However, the fact that these disputes continue and their resolution seem to be difficult shows only how separated and complicated the sentiments of the State and people are. Given these circumstances, Reiko tried to figure out what her role as an international female journalist in this debate should be.

### **Free Discussion: 'Whither Asia? In Search of a New Paradigm' Moderated by Vinod Raina**

To jump-start the discussions, Vinod proposed three topics for consideration:

- 1) Making sense of peace: Is peace absence of war? Are we making peace? Are people peaceful?
- 2) Heroism and Patriotism
- 3) What do we tell our children?

The discussion, with a question mark on the role and responsibilities of academics, led to exchanges on the education of children in school, home, and society. Within Japan, some participants warily noted a growing sense of hopelessness and lack of pride among children, based on a survey on high school students. They said that such sentiments reflect a lack of national vision on the part of adults, and their inability to impart any sense of national commitment that their children could reflect upon, and practice.

The discussions also looked at the growing importance of cross-border networks of public intellectuals who could play an important part in the facilitation of various interpretations of history, help conceptualize and provide alternatives, thereby generate adequate space for public thinking and debate. The discussants were unanimous in the view that a public intellectual is "one who is able to influence the public," rather than one who merely pontificates in public.

The retreat closed with the participants reiterating the need to constantly anticipate action in the public arena, and act accordingly.

### **Concluding Session: 'The Role of Public Intellectuals in a Changing Asia'**

**Moderator: Chiharu Takenaka, Professor, Faculty of International Studies, Meiji Gakuin University**

Professor Takenaka noted that the roles and functions of public intellectuals change and differ according to changes in political, historical, economic and religious contexts. Today, with democratization and the pervasiveness of open-market economic reforms, a paternalistic kind of public intellectuals cannot function anymore in regions like Asia. The following questions then arise: what kind of a role should intellectuals play in the current changing democratic society? What kind of a society are we aiming for? What kind of ideas do we have to make Asian societies, and even the World better? Can we come up with alternative ideas and commitments to go beyond national boundaries, other than multi-culturalism, right wing rhetoric, NGO networking, feminism, or environmentalism? Finally, what kind of media will convey these messages?

The discussion that followed reiterated public intellectuals' role to generate new ideas by analysing the past, the need for them to be involved in concrete activities aimed at the greater common good, seeking out new locations in society and among communities to open up discussion and debate, and the recognition of new social and resistance movements. In Asia, however, public intellectuals will also have to confront how to effectively communicate with each other and with the communities they are involved in. The problem of 'the English divide' was raised. Finally, concrete issues like how to organize a social movement, and foster alternative and unconventional lifestyles suited for the new generations were also raised.

### **Public Symposium: October 22**

#### **'Violence, Terror, & Peace: Problems of Identity in a Fluid World'**

The Fellows' symposium 'Violence, Terror, & Peace: Problems of Identity in a Fluid World' was held on the 22nd of October. The moderator Ishizuka Masahiko from the Foreign Press Center, initiated the program and invited the first speaker, Maznah Binti Mohamad.

On 'The Challenge of Islam in Southeast Asia: Origins and Prospects,' Maznah explored the roots of recent terrorism and instability in Southeast Asia by going back to the origin of a global political Islamic movement, and delineated its problems and solutions. In a climate of fear, investor confidence will be affected inviting the presence of the United States for security safeguards. Maznah expressed her concern that movements for democracy and human rights will be thwarted in the region. Following the nationalist phase of political Islam from the 16th century up until the 1950s, the transnational phase since the 70s characterizes the global political Islamic movement of today. It is based on

fundamentalism, cross-border common identity, and aims to set up an Islamic state within national borders and aspires to unite them later. However, why resort to violence to achieve these purposes? The concept of jihad is a basic model for the terrorists, as a defence against the perceived enemies of Islam and a fight against the internal and global repression of Islamic movements. Half of the Islamic society will practice moderate Islam and the other will become hardened and militant. Nevertheless, Islam should be distinguished from communism in seeking solutions. Unlike communism that was openly demonised by capitalist western powers, Islam is not just a system of belief but a deeply entrenched culture with long historical roots. The problem today is the sole emphasis on militaristic and coercive means by authoritarian governments. The challenge is whether violence can be overcome by peaceful means and whether democratic and human rights can be preserved when they are the first to be sacrificed.

Nguyen, Thi Hieu Thien described the history of 'Multicultural Literature in the United States' from the 60s, including descriptions of the Vietnam War by American writers. Thien suggested that the sensitivity and empathy of multicultural literature, and movements for democracy and minorities might be one of the solutions to the injustice and violence in society today. The 60s were a special period in history, when far reaching changes occurred in society. The old canon was confronted by a new liberal canon insisting on social equality amongst a plurality of class, race, and gender. In academic circles as well, the myth of white supremacy and Euro-centrism was overturned by progressive movements, to rewrite history and to give a place to marginalized authors. The publication of the Heath Anthology of American Literature was a tool to introduce a new notion of American culture, ushering in a major battlefield. Whereas the antithetical Norton Anthology remained the symbol of traditional power and ideology, the Heath Anthology provided a counterpoint by representing the rich diversity of American culture. Today, students in American universities are exposed to diverse literatures written by writers whose name may be 'unpronounceable at first.' Of course, another important aspect of this diversity is literature penned by Vietnam War veterans, reflecting an American society in which Vietnam continues to haunt.

Kinoshita Reiko presented her paper, 'Redefining the Role of Media: Challenges for the Freedom of Speech', in which she spoke about the role and behaviour of US Media in its depiction of terrorism, and raised questions about such journalism.

The 9/11 terrorist attack revealed challenges that the media was facing in multiple aspects. By describing it as a 'war' instead of 'crime', the media needs to be held responsible and accountable for its choice of vocabulary and emphasis, since the use of such misleading and careless language can escalate existing conflicts. The growing dominance of US media and the imbalance of coverage had resulted in a lack of stories about the terrorists, for example. It is apparent that an objective view and a sense of proportion and perspective to include the other side of the story has been completely ignored.

As an industry, deregulation of media ownership has triggered buyouts and consolidations. Whereas news in the past was regarded as a public service and news centres were tolerated as 'loss leaders' or 'cost centers' because of their prestige and credibility, the giant conglomerates have now turned them into 'profit centers', concentrating on satisfying shareholder interests. Hence, the trend is an increase in entertainment-driven soft news, violent crime, disasters and personal tragedies, to attract the audience. Due to the pressure to maximize profits and minimize costs, international news coverage is also on the decline.

Raising these unanswered questions, and dangers the US media poses today, Reiko suggested the need for the media to redefine its role and pointed to the significance of Asian perspectives.

After the coffee break, the symposium resumed with Hu Tao with his concerns regarding the intense conflicts hiding behind the contemporary trade regimes, and how we can deal with them peacefully, through his presentation titled, 'Trade War and Peace in a Globalizing World'.

Tao gave a basic review of the notion of trade from economic and social perspectives in a global and industrial context; and explained why trade wars are taking place. From an economic point of view, the problem of monopoly imposed new challenges on existing economy, making the protection of infant industries a major issue. From social considerations, protection of labour and employment are major issues. The political considerations involve acquiring votes and a dominance in international politics. Transcending these national issues are problems stemming from the current fluid world that is propelling economic, social, and political systems towards rapid change. Thus, identities of the economist, consumer, monopoly corporates, representatives of business sector, politicians, and public intellectuals are fluid altogether. Can we prevent trade wars and can there be peaceful trade at all? Tao concluded that there might be a solution by emphasizing the efficiency of economic structures and by using trade dispute settlement mechanisms as a judge, rather than as instruments for imposing trade sanctions.

The final speaker, Vinod Raina's presentation was titled, 'Violence by any Means; Identity Politics and Neo-Liberalism in South Asia'. South Asia, he indicated, has long been a spectre for violence. He examined 'peace' from a variety of perspectives. Violence is tangible but peace is not. What does peace look like? What does it mean? Is peace absence of violence? What constitutes peace? Why does violence exist when military action is not a solution to problems?

He used the metaphor of electric conduction to describe the fluid World and the resistances within it. The 'fluid world' is like electricity in a wire. Electricity 'runs' when the mobile electrons on the surface of the wire flow, but electrons at the core of the wire do not conduct electricity; they instead provide resistance. How is the 'fluid world' structured today? In the neo-liberal world, may be about 25 percent of the world population is 'fluid', global, on the move, i.e., benefiting from the system; but the remaining 75 percent are at the core – 'immobile' and adversely impacted. They form the resistance to the economic and social system, with violence always lingering nearby. They are not inherently violent, but are forced into it due to the violence of the fluid elites,

who derive their sustenance from the labour and suffering of the marginalized.

What are the responses to this fragile system? Identity politics, once a source of resistance to colonialism, is turning into hardened nationalism based on religion, ethnicity and other forms of identity. Terrorism is not inherent to Islam, which must be understood as a major cultural system with deep historical roots. Hope is to be seen in World movements fighting for equality, fraternity, and peace. The World Social Forum is proving to be an important platform where these movements are intersecting and renewing each other. We need to strengthen these processes.

After the Fellows' presentations, questions were collected from the floor and the Q & A session provided stimulating exchanges between the audience and the Fellows.

Questions for Maznah revealed that many of us hold one-sided and negative perceptions of Islam. Mainstream Islam needs to be distinguished from its recent extreme militaristic form. It is a plural religion and essentially contradictory to violence. Objective views of outsiders can help Muslims to wake up and start reasoning with the outside world. Maznah stressed that we need to understand Islam's deep historical background and diversity, and clear the mystification that surrounds it. Thien shared her experience of living both in a socialist and a market-oriented Vietnam. Her observations conveyed conflict of values toward the two systems and security/insecurity during war and peace times. She stressed that we should be fair and not prejudiced in judging which social system is more democratic or inhumane and contended that the West had a distorted image of socialist countries. Reiko received questions regarding media reform, its objectivity, regulations, and the role of the national government as a watchdog. She gave concrete suggestions to promote cross-border networking and interaction amongst journalists, and to introduce different views and new dimensions to conventional media institutions. Reacting to a question whether we can expect another Gandhi, Vinod stated the need for systemic changes rather than putting hope on a single figure to show us a way out. We should look at the main source of violence, which is heavily polarised economic, political and military power, and a deep feeling of injustice, and not demonise one identity, such as Islam. When neo-liberalism prevails and the secular nation is at stake, Vinod suggested the possibility of a 'softer' State, one that is tolerant to diversity, and not afflicted deeply by nationalism. Widespread disparity, and not just poverty is the problem. To break the violence inherent to monopolisation and centralisation, we need to think deeply about localized governance and production systems. Tao was asked about the likely scenario for China to reconcile politics and a capitalistic lifestyle. Tao argued that China embraces global values, market economy along with its political system, as it continues to progress. The image of China is distorted and the media, with presumptions like 'communism is bad', simplifies its political and economic logic.

Ishizuka Masahiko thanked the Fellows and audience for their wonderful

presentation, and discussions. One common agreement among us is that we live in a violent world with extreme affluence and poverty. Ishizuka suggested further sharing and serious intellectual and social solidarity with the Fellows on issues of Asia and beyond.

In her closing remark, Koide Izumi mentioned that this year's Fellows raised many questions and had extensive discussions during this fellowship program. They share common expectations for democracy and criticism towards various forms of violence, despite their diversity and differences. This assumption was the underlying theme of the symposium.

### **Study Visit: September 19**

#### **Matsui Yayori, Director of Asia-Japan Women's Resource Center**

Director **Matsui Yayori** explained about the history of women's movement, which started in Korea in the early 70's when young Korean women protested against sex tourism by Japanese men. It coincided with their human rights fight for democracy in Korea. Many women from the Philippines and Thailand were trafficked to Japan in the 80s as workers in the entertainment industry. In the 90s, "comfort women" in Korea and other countries began to accuse the Japanese government for its involvement during the War. Ms. Matsui, an activist even while working as a journalist for Asahi Shimbun, retired in 1995 and established the Asia-Japan Women's Resource Center (AJWRC) which focuses on issues related to migrant women in particular, and issues of development and women in general. They also publish quarterlies and organize study tours. The role of the Center is:

- 1) fact finding
- 2) reparation, compensation, or remedies to the survivors and advocating legislation
- 3) punishment to the perpetrators of sexual crimes during the war. A Women's International War Crimes Tribunal on Japan's Military Sexual Slavery was held in Tokyo in December 2000, due to the tireless efforts of Ms. Matsui. It exhorted the Japanese government to take responsibility for the past crimes, and to prosecute the accused responsible for sexual violence during the war. The Tribunal was centered around: a) respect for individual rights, b) gender justice, c) surpassing the state framework and advocating global solidarity, d) continued support and action.

Following Ms Matsui, one of the staff explained about a women's group in Okinawa established in '95, active in networking East Asia and US women's movement against militarism, including Korea and the Philippines, which has a similar situation because of the US military base there.

Questions from the Fellows revealed that many of the government or national women's organizations are conservative and the AJWRC faces opposition from right wing organizations as well. Fund raising is an especially a difficult task for private organizations such as AJWRC. Gender issues being mostly 'invisible', it is extremely difficult to find support.

Ms Matsui concluded that through transnational exchange of history, sharing experiences and building international links on memory and history, we might find a more objective assessment of the past.

*(A fortnight after this visit, Matsui Yayori cut short her trip to Afghanistan because of pain that was diagnosed as liver cancer by doctors in Tokyo. She spent the last months of her life completing many tasks related to the War Tribunal and a Museum, and died on Dec 27, 2002 at the age of 68; a tireless and inspirational human being.)*

## **Meeting with Noda Seiko, Member, House of Representatives October 21**

Noda Seiko kindly joined the Fellows for an informal meeting at the Shugiin Daiichi Kaikan, in spite of her busy schedule related to the 155th extraordinary session of the Diet. After briefly introducing her background, she touched upon some of the projects she is taking an initiative in, such as the child prostitution prohibition law, and the project on the formation and promotion of a universal society with equal rights for the healthy, and disabled people. But foremost is the project on alternative surnames for married couples. Under the law, Japan requires a married couple to register under one surname, and a majority of women are customarily forced to change their maiden name to that of their husband's. The traditional conservative female role is still supported by this law. Ms Noda is facing resistance from conservative forces from within the media and from Diet in her efforts to have this law changed. These never-ending gender issues are becoming more and more emotional and, illogical, she averred.

Asked about her dilemma as a third generation member of a political family, she clearly stated that, although she faced difficulties being a young female politician, being a member of the ruling LDP is practical if you want to accomplish something. She candidly gave specific data on her annual budget, funding and expenditures, including her election budget and costs.

Amidst an atmosphere where there is little credibility of politicians, how can we make the functioning of the democracy less corrupt? Ms Noda thinks democracy is beautiful, but we make mistakes and give wrong interpretations. She feels Japanese democracy is distorted and too dependent on the LDP. The right and capability to judge must be in the hands of the people, and the LDP needs to change its ideas and approaches.

## **Gifu-Nagoya Field trip: September 6 - 9**

The Fellows visited public facilities and NGO organizations relevant to the main theme of this trip, 'environment'. The first highlight was visiting the controversial **Nagara Estuary Dam**.

The Fellows visited **Aqua Plaza Nagara**, an information and education center located beside the barrage, where they were guided by **Mr. Yoshinari Kawai**, a local NGO activist from **Society Against the Nagara River**

**Estuary Dam Construction**, accompanied by Professors **Yoshiaki Kaoru**, **Mikihiro Moriyama**, and **David Potter** from **Nanzan University**. Mr Kawai gave an outline of the history of Estuary Dam construction. The plan was originally initiated forty years ago for the stated purpose of flood control and water utilization for heavy industry. At the time, Japan was reaching its economic peak. However, as demand for industrial water declined and other flood control measures were put into place, both the aims became redundant. Though the plan was once aborted, the Prefectural government and the Construction Ministry insisted on resuming construction by inventing a new reason - to prevent salt damage of rice fields, without any proof that salt water can be so harmful to the crop. In spite of disputes and opposition movements for decades, the Construction Ministry started its operation in 1995. Damage to sweetfish and other river creatures and plants was apparent, despite controversial environmental assessments in support of the government's construction plan. The residents quickly lost their river culture and lifestyle.

The Fellows later joined **Ms Megumi Omori**, a member of Nagashima Town Congress and the local residents group, all opposed to the dam. Four members of the group shared their personal experiences related to natural disasters in the past and their current state of life living near the river. Ms. Omori revealed that while it took 150 billion yen for the estuary dam's construction, the local government is now planning another water supply route to Yokkaichi City and Suzuka City located next to their town, at an estimated cost of 100 billion yen. To justify its deeds, the government argues that natural creatures can be found in the water just as before, that apparently salt damage on the rice fields has been contained, and water supply running short in industries and households can be augmented by the dam. Ms. Omori and the residents group are opposing these claims, and are demanding the opening of the estuary barrage so that the river may live again. Vinod shared the common experience of the anti-Narmada Dam movement in India. Though Ms. Omori is a Town Congress member, she stands alone in her opposition in the Congress. Later in the day, everyone enjoyed dinner on a fishing boat and watched a demonstration of cormorant fishing in the Nagara River.

The second day started with a meeting with another local NGO, **Gifu 2001 No Kai**. The concept of the group is described by keywords 'life' 'nature' 'existence' and 'future of children', which signify the diversities of their activities and interest. The group is funded by donations and membership fees from 250 members, and hosts lectures, concerts, and film-shows on current topics. They also distribute newsletters. Some of the members who joined the Fellows were specialists on biology, dam fighters, a lawyer, ecologist, medical doctor, high school teacher, and architect. Their latest event was an exhibit revealing materials and photo panels of germ warfare conducted in China by the Japanese Imperial army Unit 731 and other units during World War II. Some of the members of the group were involved in preparing for a lawsuit against the Japanese government. The court was held only ten days before in August of 2002, in which the facts were acknowledged but compensations dismissed. In autumn, the group plans to hold a photo exhibition, lecture, and concert on '30 years of Okinawa and Vietnam' commemorating 30

years since the recovery of Okinawa to Japan and the end of the Vietnam War. Other topics they worked on included reviewing public works, namely dam issues of Nagara Estuary Dam, Mecong Dam, and the recent Nagano Dam.

After lunch, the group headed for **Oak Village** located in Kiyomi Village, up in the mountain area of Gifu Prefecture. Founder and President, **Tadashi Inamoto** first set his location in Nagano Prefecture in 1972 where he built a small cottage house to pursue his philosophy to build a self-sufficient, self-sustainable community through farming and building their own houses. He moved on to Kiyomi Village in 1976, where he was fascinated by the clear water and treasure of high level, traditional industrial art. Since then he has nurtured and expanded Oak Village with his brother **Mr Hiroshi Inamoto**, now head of Nature School of the Forest. It is operated under three principles: to build 100-year-lasting furniture so that the forest can maintain a sustainable cycle; craftsmanship 'from a bowl to a house'; and providing 'an acorn for each child', an environmental education program to understand and appreciate the nature and environment. Guided by Mr Tadashi Inamoto, the Fellows toured the showroom and museum, which display crafts, from children's toys, tableware, furniture, audio player, to house architecture. Mr Tadashi Inamoto shared some of his personal background; his primary professional field was in nuclear physics, and he came to realize that energy is not sustainable. He started to think how he could help people, which led him to set up Oak Village. Mr Inamoto also introduced the concept of 'community forest', where a part of the forest area between the hamlet and the wilderness is groomed and utilised for food, water, and wood. It is unique Japanese culture based on co-existence with nature, by which Henry David Thoreau was influenced, and the renowned Japanese writer of the Meiji period Soseki Natsume had reverted to, after his philosophical and physical journey to the West.

The next stop, **Shirakawa-go** is an isolated village in the deep mountains, designated as a world heritage site with its gassho-style straw-thatched roofs and unique architecture, not found in any other part of Japan. **Akio Yamada**, a local civil servant, explained the traditional rules, system, and function of the community by which they maintain their lifestyle, including the essential task of involving every villager to thatch the roof.

A wrap-up meeting was held in **Nanzan University** on the last day, facilitated by **Professors Yoshiaki Kaoru**, School of Business Administration, David Potter of the Department of Policy Sciences, **Mikihiro Moriyama** of the Department of Asian Studies, and **Kiichi Noritake**, Head of the Office of the President. Each Fellow shared her/his views and comments about the trip. Maznah felt that the domestic civil group's experience is not linked with that of international counterparts. Through such networking, it could promote more debate and discussion on issues like sustainable development, particularly since it seems Japanese foreign aid is only exporting domestic problems for the recipient country to suffer in return. Although social development is complex and particular to a country, there are yet commonalities which can be shared for mutual benefit. Thien was impressed with the wisdom and flexibility of Japan

to respect and live in harmony with nature and preserve its heritages. In this sense, a strong community seemed an essential part of Japanese culture. Vinod had many questions from the visit - tension between academia and movement, conflict regarding the right to use natural resources, preservation and development, class disparity, balance between economy and culture, quest for equality in development, all of them being relevant to global society. Tao discerned that the disparity between the local and urban people in Japan was much less compared to that in China, and noted the strong consciousness regarding energy consumption in Japan. Giving an example from the US, Reiko emphasized the need for establishing independent think tanks in Japan to draw successful policies. In response, Professor Kaoru agreed that class struggles and different perceptions complicate the conflicts. Professor Potter explained the conventional structure and mentality of the Japanese state, government, corporations, and citizen, which incubated the issues that the Fellows witnessed. Professor Moriyama remarked that the group's perceptions were of a tourist nature, as the truth was veiled by a high degree of politeness! Professor Ohashi concluded that the NGOs and NPOs in Japan should interact in a creative way, domestically and internationally.

### **Hiroshima-Okayama-Kagawa Field Trip: October 12 to 15**

The Fellows visited Hiroshima, Okayama, and Kagawa Prefectures from October 12 to 15, with underlying theme of 'peace movement and education', 'human rights', 'gender', 'environmental security and citizen's rights'.

Arriving at Hiroshima, the group first visited **Hiroshima International Conference Center** where they met the former mayor of Hiroshima, **Takashi Hiraoka**, for a briefing on "Asia and Hiroshima" and discussion about the peace movement there. Mr Hiraoka explained his view that the 9/11 incident was a challenge to Hiroshima's peace philosophy and movement. The reaction to the challenge should not be retaliation, but should be based on Hiroshima's mission to stop the chain reaction of hatred and violence. The ultimate goal for international society should be to overcome poverty, illness, nuclear weapons, and other similar obstacles in order to establish a fair and equal society based on justice. Mr Hiraoka also mentioned opposition from the US and China against the certification of the A-Bomb Dome in Hiroshima as a world heritage site, reminding us that the 'anti-Hiroshima' sentiments in the United States, China, and other parts of Asia are still existent. For example, while the United States justifies the dropping of the A-bomb as necessary action to terminate the war, the Hiroshima peace movement is viewed by the Chinese as a means to absolve Japan of its war responsibilities. Regardless, inhuman use of nuclear weapons should not be justified as a retaliation for Japan's wrongdoings. As the then mayor of Hiroshima, Mr Hiraoka offered apologies to the Asian countries for the Japanese invasion in the peace declaration of 1991. He is taking initiatives to narrow the gap between people of Hiroshima and Asia, with citizens' exchange programs with e.g. Republic of Kazakhstan and Cambodia, who have both suffered from the consequences of nuclear testing or

tragic domestic dictatorship. According to the UN Trade Development Conference, held in June 2002, the worldwide figure of absolute poverty (those living on less than a dollar a day) is 307 million. This is a result of the vicious cycle of mass production, mass consumption, and disposal based on modern technology. Though science and technology revolutionized modern development, it has also produced negative results. Nuclear weapons are one such example. How do we choose to live in such circumstances? Hiroshima's challenge and mission is to share its experience and woes of its people with the people of Asia, in order to build a common ground for peace.

Reiko asked about the ties between Hiroshima and Japanese-Americans living in the US, as they have difficult times coming to terms with their identity and need support. Mr. Hiraoka responded that one should distinguish between a Japanese-American and Chinese or Vietnamese living in the US because they have different historical backgrounds. It is difficult to fill the gap of perception of the justification of the bombing, but Hiroshima has continuously tried to exchange views through exhibitions, lectures, and other forms of programs to nurture understanding between the two countries.

Tao commented he had always wanted to visit Hiroshima; the rules of international society should not be based on power but justice, fairness, richness, and peace. Use of the A-bomb is a tragedy for human beings and should not be an excuse to kill.

Mr Hiraoka agreed with Maznah's impression of Hiroshima peace movement as 'tame' and not successful to get its message out to Asia and the world. Leftists are making use of it for their own political campaigns, which makes citizens turn away from such activities. How can we convey our spirit? Hiroshima is trying through movies, theater, music, and exhibitions in and out of Japan. The Japanese government should put more effort in such activities.

Vinod asked where do people get the zest and energy for a peace movement and how are they convinced of non-violence, since their motives do not seem to come from 'resistance'? As a citizen of Hiroshima and former journalist, Mr Hiraoka could sympathize with the sentiments of the people and their peace movement, motivated by their agony and pain, as victims of such a tragedy.

Thien suggested that their anti-nuke/anti-war movements could be elevated much more with tie-ups with other peace movement groups in and out of Japan.

**Kazuhiko Takano**, Deputy Director of the **Hiroshima Peace Memorial Museum**, guided the Fellows through the exhibits with thorough explanations of their main displays showing damages to material and humans by radiation, heat rays, and the blast of the Bomb. The group was educated by the explanations, the overviews and guide of the city, historical and political background of the bombing, the current status of nuclear weapons, Hiroshima's peace activities and education, testimony of the survivors, and the models, films, and photo panels. The photos of the city taken only three hours after the bombing, diorama of the victims, replica of the A-bomb 'Little Boy', victim's shadow printed on the stone stairs of a bank, the story of Sadako Sasaki and her paper cranes, are shocking evidence of the devastation.

A more vivid encounter was the opportunity to meet an A-bomb survivor, now the Director of World Friendship Center, **Michiko Yamaoka**. It has been 24 years after her mother's death, since she started giving testimonies of her experience. She feels her mission is to devote herself to talk to children about the precious lives lost and the irrationality of war, on behalf of her mother and friends who were killed. Even after almost 60 years, Ms Yamaoka could remember vividly how, as a 15-year-old junior high school student, on her way to work at the telephone office just 500 meters away from the epicenter, she was blown away and trapped under the rubble, which actually saved her life. Ms Yamaoka miraculously survived but suffered heavy burns and wounds on her face, neck, and arms. Her mother and Ms. Yamaoka's life became extremely difficult with no jobs and discrimination towards the victims (hibakusha) and no proper health treatment. It was in 1952 that medical care was provided to her in the US, to undergo 27 reconstructive surgeries. Coming back to Japan with a brighter outlook on life, she started working in a kindergarten to support her life with her mother. While suffering from cancer and other health problems, she is determined to continue her rigorous activities throughout her life.

The discussion meeting with members of **The Women's Association of Hiroshima Prefecture** was held next morning on the theme 'Women's Agenda: In Pursuit of Gender Equity and Non-violent Community'. In 1990, the Association established The Hiroshima Women's University aiming to provide education for women on such topics as politics, economics, sociology, and gender - other than conventional topics as 'housekeeping' - to enable them to be involved in policymaking in their community. Nearly 600 women, housewives as well as working women graduated, building networks and becoming leaders of the community. Six of the members explained their own activities ranging from taking care of family disputes, counseling and international campaign activities on DV (Domestic Violence), international peace activities, women's career building, and education.

**Dr Eiichi Nakai**, Director of **Nagashima Aisei-en** gave a briefing on '**Nagashima Aisei-en in History of Leprosy**'. The national sanatorium was established in 1930 on Nagashima, an isolated island located in the Seto Inland Sea of southwest Japan, separated from the mainland with the beautiful sea, which has been finally linked with the construction of a bridge in 1988. With a capacity of 400, the facility initially hospitalized 85 people from all over the country. Discriminated against and abandoned by families and society, they were confined to physical labor that worsened their physical condition with deformity and paralysis. Some committed suicide, in pain and despair. The Leprosy Prevention Law formulated in 1907 kept the patients quarantined, even after 1956 when international medical experts declared leprosy was "rarely contagious" and called for an end to quarantine. It was not until 1996, when after a long battle to overturn the law, the Ministry of Health finally admitted its mistake in maintaining the law and abolished it. Nagashima Aisei-en is presently occupied by 510 residents, ranging from 50 to 96 years old, with an average age of 76. They live in designated areas within the island, according to each of their physical conditions. Asked about his personal motivation to devote his life there,

Dr Nakai explained that ever since he was a medical student in Kyoto, he aspired to accomplish what others would rather not. Having volunteered to go to India in 1966 for research and treatment on Hansen's disease, his outlook on life and human beings had been deeply affected by the experience, and he returned to Japan with a fixed determination to devote himself, regardless of opposition from his family. With accumulated years of experience, Dr Nakai hopes to take in Hansen's disease patients from abroad and those suffering with difficult diseases such as AIDS, in the coming future. The Fellows also observed its facilities, walked around the residential area and visited the hospital.

The next stop of the trip, **Teshima Island**, also located on the Seto Inland Sea, is a controversial place where illegal toxic industrial waste had been dumped for 15 years since 1975 after the Kagawa Prefecture had given permission to a waste processing company, triggering toxic industrial waste to be dumped from as far as Europe. The place is said to be the largest site for illegal dumping of industrial waste in Japan. Upon arriving on the island, the group visited **Teshima Center for International Exchange** where they were greeted by members of **Teshima Residents Conference for Waste Materials** and government officials from the **Kagawa Prefectural Government**, and **Toru Ishii**, who is a Prefectural assembly member and a core member of the residents group. Mr Ishii presented a briefing of the Teshima Incident in the context of historical, social, and economic development of Japan since the Meiji era, when a free market economy was introduced that boosted the expansion of production and consumerism. Reaching a peak in the 60s and 70s, Japan enjoyed its excessive economic prosperity while producing the worst industrial pollution, which is exactly when the illegal dumping started. Teshima residents finally settled the Environmental Dispute Coordination with Kagawa Prefecture in 2000. Treatment of the site is underway to prevent the polluted water from flowing out to sea, and the wastes are being excavated and moved to Naoshima Island next to Teshima, where a new furnace will melt the waste. However, this is not a final solution since the process will not completely dissolve the waste. Had the manufacturers and dischargers taken responsibility for its treatment at the original site of production, all the disputes could have been prevented. The group walked on the dump-filled ground, occupied with drums filled with toxic waste and labeled in other countries, while Mr Ishii explained the system in place to prevent polluted water from flowing out. During the question and answer session moderated by **Professor Togo Tsukahara**. Mr Ishii emphasized that the Teshima incident highlights the operations of unchecked industries and the markets over the past century in Japan and other countries. The case provides evidence that the present economic and social system needs to be reviewed and replaced with a new paradigm. Lively discussions with the other residents also revealed that the residents' goal to settle the dispute was solely to recover their beautiful island for the next generation, and not intended to make profit out of the waste processing procedures. Their decision not to accept compensation was motivated by this ideal. Along with the island-restructuring process, they are making the younger generation aware and involved in creating their own

community with a vision of Teshima as an 'Island of Learning'. Tao pointed out that deep-rooted economic and political issues must not be overlooked behind such an environmental catastrophe like the Teshima incident: Who is responsible? What is wrong with the political system? What should be reformed? As the closing note to the session, Koide Izumi expressed how deeply impressed we were to learn about the Teshima residents' way of confronting the issue in a fundamental way, their awareness and understanding of civilization and history, compassion for human beings, and devotion of the people. The visit certainly proved Teshima to be, 'an Island of Learning'.

On the last day, the group visited **Okayama University** for a wrap-up session where they were joined by Professor Tsukahara and **Professor Ayami Nakatani**, who acted as the moderator. Reflecting on the trip, the Fellows acknowledged that the meetings and experiences raised a number of issues to reflect upon, with many links to similar issues in each of their own countries. The Fellows shared many of these views. All agreed that this was an enriching experience, revealing different facets of Japan.

At the end of the trip, the fellows enjoyed an optional visit to the **Ohara Museum of Art** and strolled the streets of **Kurashiki**, an artistic town with a taste of the Meiji period.

**Resource Person Seminar 1, September 11**  
**by Michihiro Ko, General Director of Zen Ryo Kyo**  
**Presider: Dr. Hiroshi Yuasa, Sasagawa Memorial Health Foundation**  
**'History of Leprosy and Human Rights'**

Koide Izumi greeted the guests and explained that this seminar should also be an introductory session for the Fellows as they plan to visit a sanatorium on Nagashima Island during their second field trip in October.

The seminar began with introduction by **Dr Hiroshi Yuasa**, who as a medical doctor has been active in Japan and overseas on leprosy to contribute to resolving the accompanying human rights issue from a medical point of view. Dr Yuasa views that because leprosy represents a universal problem of human rights, it will contribute to wider interests and other situations if we find an answer to it. He explained that leprosy is similar to tuberculosis, but has different manifestations in its attack on the internal organs. The disease had been in existence for two to three thousand years until a Norwegian doctor Dr Hansen discovered the bacteria in 1876. It is known to be the first bacteria discovered that causes disease in human beings. Since leprosy bacteria lives only in human cells, no one succeeded in cultivating the bacteria, which delayed the development of a cure. After unsuccessful attempts, a miracle drug was discovered in the 50s with a relapse rate of only three to four percent. Since then, the WHO has been remarkably successful in eliminating the disease worldwide. Still, countries such as India, Brazil, Myanmar, and Mozambique remain affected, one leprosy patient per ten thousand people. Though medically a cure has been established, the problem lies in the social sphere of Japan where the draconian law, Leprosy Prevention Law was formulated in 1907 to keep the

patients quarantined. As mentioned, long after medical experts declared leprosy was rarely contagious and called for an end to quarantine in 1956, it was only in 1996 that the Law was abolished!

**Michihiro Ko**, former patient and an advocate against the violation of human rights of leprosy patients due to forcible quarantine, looked back at 50 years of his life, his experience of leprosy, and described how it had been intertwined with the Japanese policy. After developing the disease as a high school student, he had no choice and left voluntarily to be treated in the sanatorium under the Leprosy Prevention Law - a law which was said to have an 'entry' but no 'exit', or in other words, a forced isolation policy violating human rights and dignity. Fear of the disease raised discrimination and misunderstanding from the public, which also kept patients in isolation from their families. Lightly affected patients were even forced to work on daily laundry, food delivery, bathing, and cremation of the deceased, on a round-the-clock basis. Although he was recommended by the doctor to retire from the sanatorium, Mr Ko decided that his well-being and happiness lay with his suffering inmates, to devote his life in regaining the human dignity and happiness of the patients, and solving the problems in the sanatorium. One of his major activities had been to seek revision of the discriminatory Leprosy Prevention Law. (The uniqueness of the problem was that after years of segregation, the patients became so invisible to the society, that the awareness of the issue was gone, even from attorneys, lawyers, and experts of law. Now that 99% of the patients are recovered and that the disease has proved to be zero contagious, Mr Ko is working towards the elimination of the remaining sense of discrimination in society to leprosy patients.)

Responding to questions on how patients were confined, Mr Ko explained that the Law exhorted people to inform the authorities about suspected patients in their neighbourhood. The Law found support through the sentiments of people to segregate patients as symbols of 'shame' for the country, and to maintain the 'pure quality' of Japanese ethnicity. The Japanese government has now admitted to the illegal status of the Law, and agreed to compensate every inmate, and provide medical care, housing, clothing, and food. He stressed that the deep-rooted fundamental problem of worldwide violation of human rights is the common sense of discrimination against those who are different, in terms of ethnicity, gender, religion, and other categorizations. On the basis of intolerance and indifference, true democracy will never take root. Speaking out and sharing the history of leprosy with the public would contribute to acknowledging the basic existence of human beings.

A question was also raised for Dr Yuasa on the role of the scientific community. Japanese doctors and scientists had been silent until 1958 when a leprosy congress was held in Tokyo. There, scientists strongly called for the Law to be abolished and successfully gained acknowledgement and apologies from the health ministry. As a doctor, he still feels he has a role to play on the medical side of the disease.

**Resource Seminar 2, September 13**  
**by Prof. Shunya Yoshimi, University of Tokyo**  
**'Popular Culture and American Hegemony in Postwar Japan'**

Professor Yoshimi began by informing about his recent major research interest in Cultural Studies. Having its origin in the UK in the 70s and introduced to Hong Kong, Korea, Southeast Asia, and Australia in the early 90s, it gained popularity in Japan as well. Though the area of study has been around for twenty years, it is yet to establish its position within the institutional framework in Japanese universities.

Professor Yoshimi spoke on the relationship between popular culture and politics of the modern urbanization process. He contends that the relation to political power and the hidden desires of people influences people's mobility.

A gathering place also changes and is created in relation to urbanization politics, which affects the construction of culture. His question is: how do people build their identity in relation to the cultural power? He refers to the popular national entertainment, expositions, and track and fields school events. The study involves a broad range; from historical study of pop culture and politics, culture, history, people, to politics of power.

He also talked on 'war, media, and American hegemony in Asia', with reference to American hegemony in postwar Japan, Southeast Asia, Philippines, South Korea, China, and Taiwan. There six viewpoints concerned with this theme are:

- 1) John W. Dower's 'Embracing Defeat' and American Culture in Japan series, where two aspects of American influence on Japan and Asia can be seen, stemming from political science and the American culture. As a result of collaboration of the Japanese ruling class and US military to maintain occupation, cultural hegemony of the ruling class has continued since wartime.
- 2) Observing Americanism in pre/post-War Japan, we can trace it back to the late 20s, when cultural globalization began after WWI.
- 3) The American military bases during the occupation from 1945-1952 and their influence on post-war urban culture. Pop singers and American culture emerged from the bases and later spread throughout the country through TV. Desire for American culture was even stronger after the US exit from Japan. Roppongi, Harajuku, Ginza, where the US military was based, became gathering places for young people, negating harsh memories of occupation.
- 4) Stages of re-constructing the national subjectivity through the American gaze. Up until the 50s, Japan was exposed to direct influence from the US. From the 60s and beyond, indirect US influence remained and the Japanese proudly reconstructed its cultural identity with industrial technology and economical upsurge. The Tokyo Olympics in 1964 and expansion policy of the government also boosted the sentiment. The

advertising image in the 50s and 60s of Japanese technology and economy also played its part in reconstructing the national identity. All of this would not have become invaluable without the American gaze as its assessor.

- 5) From the 70s and beyond, the American gaze is internalized and turns from symbol to system. Tokyo Disneyland is a typical example of the American system to consume self-image and identity. In the 80s, Japanese enjoyed 'discovering' and 'mythologizing' their exoticness from the American gaze. With the end of Cold-war, neo-nationalism and identity politics is expressed aggressively in the 90s media, closing the relation of politics and culture.
- 6) The last question is how to deal with American cultural hegemony in Asia.

During discussion, Professor Yoshimi explained that compared with European elitist culture, American culture has attracted mass popularity because of its materialistic and easy lifestyle in contrast with the complex traditional Japanese culture. American culture was a symbol of wealth, commodities, convenience, richness, attraction of emancipation, free from traditional restrictions and system, and captured the heart of the mass in post-WWII Japan.

Widespread popularity of American culture in Japan is also linked with American foreign policy of the time. During the Korean War in the 50s, Japan was positioned as an ally of the US, as an example of an 'open' Asia, a model of a 'free country' in Asia. In the 60s, the identity of young student radicals and the middle and lower class people was formed with the influence of the American model. Domestically, a sentimental divide was formed between mainland Japan as an economic success model and Okinawa, Taiwan, as a military wall against communism. They showed mixed sentiments of anti-American, anti base, and anti Vietnam, but pro-American for the above-mentioned cultural reasons. Pro/anti sentiments had disappeared in the late 70s, and American culture was 'Japanized' (adopted and modified), implying the weakness of anti-Americanism.

**Resource Person Seminar 3, September 17  
by Professor Takayoshi Igarashi, Hosei University; Lawyer  
'Re-examining Public Work Projects in Japan'**

**Professor Igarashi** is a lawyer, active in city planning and a strong critic of wasted public works in Japan, termed, 'pollution by construction', which he believes is the most crucial and fundamental basis for understanding Japanese politics.

Public works in Japan has long been operated in an established system where once the plan is laid out, it never fails to be executed. A closely-tied nexus between bureaucrats, politicians, and the business sector has long supported this 'myth' of public works. The budget involved amounts to approximately 40

trillion yen per fiscal year, which is far greater than the total of France, Italy, US, and Germany for similar purposes. The Japanese annual budget is 80 trillion yen, of which 10 trillion is allocated for public works from the general account. Another 30 trillion comes from other pockets. The Government spends 10 out of the 40 trillion yen directly on bullet trains, airports, and roads; local government public works consume 20 trillion. The remaining 10 trillion is used to subsidize projects of the local government, and there are several principles laid down to distribute such money. First, decision-making by bureaucrats is believed to be a 'never overthrown myth', with no mistakes and alterations whatsoever once the plan is decided. The Nagara River Estuary Dam is a typical example. Then, there is the 'iron triangle', of bureaucrats providing information to politicians in return for employment in corporations after retirement, politicians giving contracts to constituency corporations for bribes and votes, and private corporations gaining profit out of the business. Academics and mass media also manipulate public opinion by making strong statements in favour of the plans. Initially, these public works were effective in building infrastructures, but have now become merely a temporary measure to boost the economy and secure employment, not necessarily for the advantage of the community. This is why local governments are dependent and unable to survive without construction works. Because the conventional system involves every aspect of Japanese society in this manner, Japanese politics can be clearly understood by whether you are for or against public works.

Since Mr Junichiro Koizumi succeeded as Prime Minister and Mr Tanaka as governor of Nagano prefecture, their top priority has been on reform of public works. The collapse of the above mentioned 'never overthrown myth' was due to the heavy debt of local and national governments, which has accumulated up to 700 trillion or even 1000 trillion yen, implying a 200% of GDP in debt. More than half of the amount is related to public works. Even government bonds have lowered in value to the same level as in Italy, Hungary, Greece, and Argentina. The last possible measures to dissolve debt are considered to be 'hyper inflation' or 'War'. Nagano prefecture, where roads and facilities were constructed for the Winter Olympics in 1998, will likely go bankrupt if its debt continues to accumulate. Mr Tanaka's 'no dam' announcement to stop the vicious circle of public works construction has raised a nationwide controversy. The big cities of Tokyo and Osaka also carry huge debts that may lead to the same scenario as in Nagano.

Another reason for the collapse of the 'myth' is the destruction of the mountains, rivers, and sea. Of the 109 major rivers in Japan, 108 rivers, except Kushiro River, have dams. Once the dams are completed, sand and sludge accumulate at high speed, filling up the dam and preventing its function. Soon, they do not prevent floods nor do they improve water usage. The sea and mountains have died away, and 90% of Japanese nature is lost. Because the politicians' murky involvement with public works has finally been uncovered, and some even imprisoned, Japanese politics is seriously tainted by scandals.

Public work plans are written in relation to a comprehensive national land development plan to build bridges, airports, road extensions, and the recent

main attraction is the relocation of capital functions from Tokyo. As a start to reform the mechanism of public works, Prime Minister Koizumi began by re-examining road construction. Furthermore, the overall public works system is targeted for reforms, including the long term development plan, tax revenue, and organizational structure, to stop the perpetual vicious cycle. The major obstacle for implementing reform is the confrontation between the LDP interests and Koizumi's policies. As a result, his policies weaken to a compromise. In the case of governor Tanaka, though he is strongly supported by the citizens, he is isolated in the assembly where the majority is pro-dam.

Whether or not reforms will succeed is likely to be very significant for Japan's future. One of the headaches of the reformer is the resistance from legislators, who cannot win the election without depending on public works. Also, the citizens are not always happy with the reform because they remember the happy days of economic prosperity and are filled with anxiety for supporting their lives in the economic recession. Employees in the construction business fear layoffs. To resolve the people's dilemma between reform and security, one solution is to have people decide by direct voting on public works. Japanese constitution and local laws need to be changed accordingly. People should also live without depending on public works, by creating a new industry and finding, for example, alternative power generation, providing rich welfare services for the community, and developing a unique local industry based on its history and traditions; in other words, to replace public works with 'civic works' in the region. Koizumi and Tanaka reforms depend on how well 'civic works' are carried out. Tanaka may be first to do that.

Professor Igarashi concluded that the future of Japan relies on the speed of reform by politicians to check the speed of public works.

Vinod raised a question whether Japanese economy will survive if public works are reduced. If public works are exported overseas as Japanese ODA, will it not be merely transferring the problem out of Japan, to other countries? Also, is there a need for major constitutional changes in order that local governments may make their own decisions? Professor Igarashi agreed that the national version of ODA is only transformed into an international version, where corporations go out to make contracts in other countries. We need to control this, but in reality, it is difficult to logically define relations between the economy and public works. Citizens' vote regarding nuclear power, dams, waste facilities, military bases, is negative. Two barriers exist that overturn people's wishes: a) The Assembly does not accept direct reference to people, and referendum to ordinances is rejected. b) The local government sees the result of referendum, if undertaken, as only a reference and not binding. The Constitution stipulates that the assembly decision is the only legal decision. Professor Igarashi's opinion is that the Constitution should be amended on these counts. But there are also complex issues surrounding the Japanese Constitution...

Maznah asked whether the results of referendum would change the political situation. The pattern of voting is confusing. Is there another force outside the assembly? Are voices heard through other channels? Professor Igarashi informed that 60% - 70% people are not affiliated to any political forces, and

their voting patterns are unpredictable. In ordinary elections, the results and patterns remain more or less the same. We may expect a new civil society to emerge. Maznah further asked whether militarization is being promoted as a means to counter the economic recession. Professor Igarashi explained that the Japanese Self Defense Force is a problem when viewed constitutionally. With a strong military association with the US, it is one of the biggest political issues, of how to question militarism. How Japan get involved with international conflicts, and the direction to dispatch SDF overseas is highly controversial. The government has made efforts to bridge the contradiction but it has been impossible. Economic recession can easily turn society in favour of militarism. On one hand, Koizumi's visit to the Yasukuni shrine is opposed by Asian countries, and on the other, emergency law enforcement is leading the country to militarism.

Thien inquired about the possibility of democracy. John Rock introduced indirect democracy for two reasons: 1) on the assumption that the elected have more insight than the voters, and 2) he believed that without a closed assembly, nothing can proceed. However, both the hypotheses seem flawed. Voters and the elected are of equal intellectual ability within the civil society, and the closed assembly has opened through the media and internet. The Constitution also states that sovereignty lies in the civil society. People must be able to stop a fanatic mood of dictatorship with direct democracy. The court of justice should also intervene by experimenting with various measures. In Japan, this experiment is being implemented and is likely to provide some results in the future. How mature the democracy is will determine the tendency to militarise.

Tao suggested that instead of public works, why not increase the budget on R & D on the IT industry and education industry? Is it possible to reduce tax or make the highway free? Professor Igarashi informed that IT and education have been discussed repeatedly since 1995 but not much has materialized. If the highway is toll free, 40 trillion yet debt will accumulate, but how do we repay it? The solution is either for people to shoulder the tax, or impose a toll.

Reiko asked about the future of academia and the media. Her idea is to form a neutral independent think tank of academia. For example, young Transportation Ministry officials are listed in websites discussing their hopes and plans for their future with the public. Such possibilities of civic works and officials working together in the future may be one hope for Japan. Professor Igarashi agreed there are hopes for the ministry's young generation, but doubts whether they can do it before reaching their forties. Independent think tanks can be a solution.

The session concluded with an understanding that the issue of public works projects in Japan involves essential problems regarding democracy, and not only economy.

**Resource Person Seminar 4, September 24  
by Muto Ichiyo, People's Plan Study Group  
'Militarization and People's Security in Asia'**

Muto gave an overall view of what has been happening in Asia after WWII and Japan after 1868 in terms of militarization and people's security. He stated the need for unity and convergence of people to share a common view of reality; i.e., if people are sincere about themselves, there is a force that puts them together. Emerging fears of militarization are emanating from economic depression, and the 'Bush Doctrine' declaring that US has the right of military action against their foes in favour of its national interests. The basic configuration of this century has already been created in the 90s.

In this period of 'Empire' and 'globalization', what do we need? We need strategy, to see beyond national frameworks, in a positive sense, approached from Asian and historical viewpoints.

In most Asian countries that gained independence after WWII, there was a process of national liberation, to regain an identity and to become 'Somebody'. They attempted social development through the acquisition of a nation state, and a national military to protect their borders, national culture, and national strength. Though there are differences in China, Indonesia, the Philippines, Korea, Thailand, Burma, India, and Pakistan, their histories show that whereas the role of the military was primarily to fight on behalf of the people, in reality it was used overwhelmingly against their own people, to support regimes that did not speak for the people. The militaries only exceptionally functioned against external enemies. These distinctions between the myths and realities need to be studied and demystified.

During the Cold war, realities were interpreted in a communist/anti-communist dichotomy. People were assumed to be potentially subversive to communism. The American military promoted this ideology for national security, but people in Asia lived in contradiction. In post-cold war, the anti-communist context is gone and the 'globalisation' that has taken over now seems like 'world capitalism'. The single dominant power, the US, is today creating the same realities as during the Cold War, only replaced by the context of globalism. After 9/11, the complex realities have been greatly simplified, where -by the US military dominance is seen as a solution for the basic problems of the world, and the rest of the world must kneel to the US. One of the responses in Japan is the controversial legislation on emergency measures, which violates the basic rights of the people. It seems like an uncontrollable situation.

Where is Japan now? Is militarism reviving? If so, what is its role? Muto stated that we should avoid simplistic arguments. He explained the twisted post-war Japanese statehood in relation to its contradictory formation under the built-in factor of US hegemony. As a result of the Japanese ruling group's decision to strategically go along with US policy in order to gain economic growth, the contradictory Military treaty and Peace Constitution generated three compatible principles in a single state: 1) free world principle, with the US-Japan security treaty and the US as a built-in state factor, 2) pacifist principle with the

Constitution written in 1947, 3) imperial heritage of Emperor Hirohito being well-preserved, incorporating issues on textbooks, etc. Under these principles, Japan worked closely with the US to rule Asia politically, economically, and militarily. The outcome was opportunism with three faces, which is back to back with the system of war: 1) facing Asia with peace nationalism, blind to what Imperial Japan had done to Asian neighbours, 2) pledging allegiance to the US, 3) formation of people's mentality and a leftist political culture. The uproar against the turbulence in the 60s with regard to the Vietnam War and the Chinese Cultural Revolution made the war mechanisms visible to the people. The US military based in Okinawa was also a part of the Vietnam war, and the people of Okinawa have a totally different view from mainland Japan towards war and the military. People's movements and the women's movement had great impact on peace and democracy. What happened after the Cold War? Pacifism supported by people was watered down by a process of economic growth and prosperity. In the 90s, the thrust was to become a full state with an ability to make war without hesitation, to take pride in our history, but with loyalty to the US; but how can we justify Pearl Harbour?

As stated earlier, Okinawa has a totally different view towards war and the military. Their experience can be described by their sense of betrayal by the Japanese military in the Battle of Okinawa during WWII, disillusionment about the Peace Constitution, and their anti-US base struggle. Pacifism has its roots in Okinawa. On this basis, we should overcome narrowness and various barriers that have been built in our thinking. In conclusion, Muto suggested we need to figure out ways to integrate state and nation with broader and shared perspectives for people's security in this era of 'global war on terrorism'. Perspectives from Okinawa and the new quality of women's movements may be key to a non-violent intervention.

Questions were raised about Article 9 of the Constitution and its contradiction with the Japanese Self Defense Force, which holds the second largest military budget worldwide next to the US. The discussion brought in issues related to the war; US intervention after Japanese defeat in WWII, the Constitution written by the US and jurisdictional judgment of its legitimacy, peace movement, democratisation brought by McArthur, and the iconized Emperor. Pearl Harbour was good propaganda to start the war. It marked the beginning of American hegemony. How do Japanese memorize the war? Young people have little memories, and textbooks do not have a good description. Some examples of the different angles are; sympathizing with the suffering of people of other nations, depicting the war as a pacific war between democracy and communism, and sympathetically trying to identify with the young soldiers who lost their lives. Muto was requested to give future predictions, and stated that we are heading towards a chaotic situation with no acceptable order and competition. There is no sustainable human society. Military is used to keep order, and the term 'stability' is a trap of the US; stating that in the name of stability, military presence is justified. Muto hopes that there is potential amongst the people and individuals to raise a voice against all this.

**Resource Person Seminar V, September 26**  
**Terawaki Ken, Director, Cultural Affairs Department, Commissioner**  
**for Cultural Affairs, Ministry of Education, Culture, Sports, Science**  
**and Technology (MEXT)**  
**'Educational Reform in Japan'**

Terawaki gave a clear description of the visions of educational reform in Japan from elementary to university level with perspectives from historical, economic, and social backgrounds, in a global framework.

He explained that one focal point of reform is conversion from a conventional 'knowledge accumulation' type of education to 'knowledge implementation' type of education. Quoting from the Constitution, he pointed out that after WWII, Japan denounced war and intended to achieve a cultural-oriented nation; 'culture' denoting not only artistic but broad values which are not linked with economic impacts on society. This original concept was forgotten during the Cold War period and Japan enjoyed dramatic economic growth, putting more priority on materialistic prosperity. Since the 80s, however, a national survey shows that there has been an increase of Japanese people who put more value on the importance of spiritual health, rather than material health. In the 21st century, as we face serious economic downturn and globalisation, Japanese educational reform is focusing again on its original concept in achieving cultural individuality and prosperity.

On the basis that human capabilities are measured by knowledge, spiritual strength, and physical capabilities, and that children grow in the school, home, and the community, educational reform expects more engagement and responsibility of the home and the community in nurturing children who are treasures of their community. As a consequence, schools have been made to adopt a 5-day week since April 2002, and have received positive feedback from children and adults that they have more time for communication with each other and contact with nature. Success of the new system also depends on the adult perception and attitude towards their own lifestyles.

Still, there are problems of large-scale dropouts, and children lacking in self-confidence. A world survey of high school students showed a high percentage of Japanese students lacking in pride. The problem here is the lack of understanding of individuals as to how to play their role in society, and their loss of interest and motivation in studies. By eliminating excessive uniformity in education and focusing on the individual personality, students may build confidence and motivation. Schools will provide integrative, cross-disciplinary, comprehensive study to make use of acquired knowledge and experience. Problem solving will be stressed in order to raise awareness and need of further knowledge, and encourage children to study. The reform aims to shape the foundation for children's education in the 21st century.

Not only in elementary education, but higher education and even teachers cannot be left out from this reform process. University reform will deal with bringing in a more student-oriented campus, abolishing uniform entrance examinations, and in 2004 national funded universities will be abolished and they

will be required to acquire funding based on evaluation.

Many questions and comments were raised in the following discussion.

Thien: Vietnam has the same issues where educators have no space for creative teaching. While in need of reform, the teachers and parents who are the implementers need to be oriented too.

Terawaki: There is a need to shape healthy public sentiment through open-policy and accountability in international perspectives. It is imperative that the public should be able to make their choice and decision.

Vinod: Is the nature of reform catered to the local community?

Terawaki: Yes, from nation to local municipal office to personal level, in both software and hardware.

Vinod: How is teacher-training done?

Terawaki: There is optimism that teachers will also eventually change with rise of public opinion.

Vinod: What about the juku system?

Terawaki: The Ministry is also responsible for juku. The role and benefits of juku are valuable for acting on behalf of the parent or community.

Reiko: How do we promote change of adults? Where is the pride of parents?

Terawaki: The lifelong learning program aims to provide opportunities for adult education.

Tao: Why is there pressure to enter universities in Japan?

Terawaki: Hierarchy of universities and fierce competition make it difficult to enter a prestigious one. The problem of universities is their lack of field of expertise and the fact that the name value of your alma mater is more important than what you study.

Maznah: Will the cost of reform be paid by the state or citizens?

Terawaki: There are two possible scenarios; the private sector will enter the market and drive up individual cost, which will also change the scholarship system. Another scenario would be more voluntary involvement from the community, which can be considered to be a 'social' cost rather than literally 'monetary' cost. This change in the concept of 'cost' would be key to change.

Vinod: How do you view the textbook controversy?

Terawaki: Negative interpretations are the cause of the controversy. The younger generation has potential to overcome barriers on common basic assumptions and start accepting history.

**Resource Person Seminar VI, October 1  
by Prof. Kosaku Yoshino, Associate Professor of Sociology, University  
of Tokyo  
'Globalisation as 'Englishisation': Asian Experiences'**

Professor Yoshino first defined the term 'Englishisation' or 'Englification' to describe "the process whereby English spreads", which is a fairly new word, used by linguists and scholars interested in the politics of English language. He focused on globalisation in higher education and the issue of English language

today, by comparing the Japanese and Malaysian situations. He also raised questions: How can Japanese universities, with poor command of English, compete with English speaking universities of other countries? What does it mean for non-Japanese students who come to Japan from abroad, to study in a monolingual country?

The debate on “English Imperialism” has long existed in Japanese society among the globalists, critics against domination of the English language, and cultural nationalists. He introduced some of the arguments of linguistic nationalists, who insisted that we should be liberated from the dominance of English, that is, unfair power games, call for the protection of the beautiful language, and preserve Japan’s linguistic sovereignty.

On the contrary, Professor Yoshino views Japanese Universities as failures in globalisation of higher education since English is not commonly used, and therefore cannot accommodate migration of students from other parts of the world. In contrast, Malaysia is successful in playing its role as a hub of higher education and international students, with twin programs with universities of the US, Britain, Australia, and New Zealand. Japan is left out of this networking of English-speaking universities. In reality, how can Japan cope in the global competitive market without English?

Professor Yoshino raised three questions for discussion: 1) Issue of linguistic imperialism, and the concept of ‘standard’ English in contrast to ‘Asian’ English, 2) Internationalization or localization of English, 3) The meaning of conducting business in English - does that mean we are no longer exploited by the power holder?

Maznah explained the situation in Malaysia where there is a divide between foreign and local private universities. Professor Yoshino’s interest in Malaysia lies in its close linkage with the Chinese, Muslim, and Indian civilizations within one national context. The fact that students from the Middle East are recruited to Malaysia under the slogan ‘Malaysia, truly Asia’ after 9/11, shows this trend.

Vinod questioned whether cultural preservation must always imply narrow nationalism. In India, they share no one language, and there is very little that could be called ‘Indian’ – language, food, dress, music and so on. How can you preserve linguistic diversity in a live form and exclude another language at the same time? Professor Yoshino tried to explain the relationship of the use of English and preservation of culture by giving an example of the Japanese culture, which is extremely difficult to generalize and define because of its regional, individual, and class differences. If you cannot define a unique Japanese culture, there is diversity enough not to define nationalism, which implies homogeneity. Speaking English does not change your identity, but there are people who believe so.

In China, Tao explained that people have strong motives to learn the English language, to have a different angle and exchange ideas. As they have a standard Chinese dialect, the Chinese feel they need to learn the common language to communicate with the world. Professor Yoshino pointed out an interesting distinction between Malaysia and Singapore where English is a community language, and Japan, China, and Korea, which try to imitate the British or American model.

Reiko stated that the uniqueness of English is that it absorbs different cultures, history, and ideas. Vinod raised another question, how does higher education play a role in getting a language integrated, in comparison with the role of, say, popular culture? He thinks rather than higher education, popular culture plays a bigger role in the assimilation of a language.

Thien thought that in cultural terms, acquiring a new language supplements knowledge and enables new interactions which lead to forming a hybrid culture. The influence also depends on the person's choice and consciousness towards learning.

Professor Yoshino also commented on the political and economic aspects of English language. The notion of 'Standard English' challenges autonomy of any other English language that leads to domination and subordination.

Vinod's question: Is the reluctance to open up to the English language in Japan based on cultural nationalism, on the perception that it would destroy Japanese culture, or for practical reasons where there are not many English teachers who are capable enough? According to Professor Yoshino, opposition based on political reasons is in a minority. The main obstacle to English education in Japan is lack of capabilities. Maznah also commented that Malaysia has a complex and deep-rooted situation of tension between globalization and nationalization, where English was banned by the state during the nationalization period in the 70s, and now the same government is promoting the language.

Thien pointed out that in Vietnam, there are many private English centers other than schools, where people can learn the language. Professor Yoshino informed that it is more or less the same in Japan, and the English education industries seem to be politically and globally linked with schools that do not teach practical English, for the prosperity of the industry.

Vinod shared the case in India, where the National Book Trust produces translations into 14 languages for all books that are awarded by the state as outstanding literature in each language. He also pointed out that economic control is shifting from nation-states to corporations, where they are dominating the global market. One symbolic example is that of the IT software industry, based on the English language. It is also producing a division of labor and promoting the hegemony of English language.

Tao proposed that from an economic point of view, if Japan could adjust its economic structure, reduce public works and increase new industry such as the education industry, there is big potential for Japan. If higher education is conducted in English, Japan can attract more students from other countries.

## **Resource Person Seminar VII, October 4, 2002**

**by Mushakoji Kinhide,**

**'Human Security and Informality: The Globalization, Commodification, and Criminalization of the Informal Communities'**

**Professor Mushakoji** first gave three reasons why he is interested in 'informal communities': 1) To begin with, regardless of the idea that nations are composed of the state and civil society, it is difficult to define "civil society" in Japan. As an

individual, there is also an identity gap within ourselves where we hold both formalities and informalities. 2) According to a report of the UN Conference in Durban last August, the NGO forum was said to be a failure because their behaviour was not in a diplomatic style, and the declaration by NGOs was too repetitive and emotional. However, it reveals that those who can speak the UN language are only a minority in civil society, and do not represent the true people who are oppressed and angry. 3) The 1995 Beijing conference, focusing on double discrimination combining gender and racial discrimination, revealed trafficking and sexual slavery accompanying sex industries in Japan. The industry was formally run by the Japanese state, but there are many other informal institutions that exploit human rights.

Professor Mushakoji has also been studying the issues in Europe and North America. A report from Germany states that the global political economy is now run by neo-liberalism, and describes that the State is reducing its contribution to civil society, and people are falling into informal civil society. In Canada, Steven Gill gives an analysis that the formal side of disciplinary neo-liberalism is not an idea but a discipline, and promotes the notion of freedom in a controlled form within the free market. There is surveillance and security in the capital market. The formal practice is called 'new-constitutionalism' which is controlled by the US through the IMF, World Bank, and WTO. The more the formal practice, the more informal people are getting involved in crime.

How did the formal and informal develop? The basic idea is that modern history is developing from community to civil society and we need to learn how to build civil society, peace, and democracy. However, there is the informal side within us that is undemocratic. Our economy should not be selfishly directed to rational behaviour. We have our own identities and culture. There is not only one global economy of formal capitalist, but there are networks based on communities and other networks e.g., criminal networks. The problem is the assumption that this is not good. Globalisation has its informal communal side, which can be called the anti-social and anti-systematic side. It is important to look at these aspects of reality closely.

In terms of human security, Professor Mushakoji referred to the Scandinavian countries where they solve problems among the countries through negotiations and not by military means. The Security Communities in the North denote only the civil society, but exclude the informal communities. Migrant insecurity is increasing in Japan, Europe, and North America. This is 'global fascism', where everyone is under observation and surveillance of the superpower, and human rights is restricted for the sake of human security, in a negative sense. In terms of the issue of 'multitude', civil society does not like the multitude, because it is not well organized. Terrorism is part of the multitude. It is important to develop a new theory that is based on the networking of formal and informal Security Communities. The concept of 'Common Security' which was used between the US and Soviet Union during the Cold War, can also be adopted for people of Tokyo and trafficked women in Shinjuku. We need to develop the 'common human security' between formal and informal security communities.

Professor Mushakoji gave four conclusions to his argument: 1) Global Fascism has to be opposed by an alliance of the citizens and the 'multitude'. He feels it is happening in situations such as the World Social Forum where the civil society, grassroots activists, and NGOs are working together. 2) The citizens must realize that the multitude sticks to its roots of identity. Professor Mushakoji pointed out that identity politics resorting to violence is bad, but in reality, we cannot become an idealistic 'world citizen', and need to recognize the multitude is composed of people with their own identities. 3) A global dialogue must involve the transformation of 'global states' with a clear political and economic agenda. He quoted an example from Antonio Gramsci, in which he stated the need to develop common projects between formal and informal communities based on networking of communities, not run by the global state or corporations.

This obviously led to a provocative and lively discussion:

Maznah questioned, how do you deal with multitudes that are more benign, and those that are oppressive and threatening, trying to enlarge their boundaries?

Mushakoji: To deal with the dangerous part of the multitude, a negative way is to force the multitude to be a part of the civil society. On the other hand, by looking at multitude as an overlapping phenomenon, we can try and figure out how to develop common securities between different multitudes, which may lead to dialogue. Another way may be to have dovish leaders in communities, with a non-violent approach, not to encourage the hawks. Gandhi's message was that your identity would be served best if you can have a broader understanding of humankind and have a dovish approach. The multitude should be activated in a non-violent way.

Vinod: Multitude does not imply anarchy, and has a degree of organization, though different from civil society. Shouldn't we try to integrate them into democratic systems?

Mushakoji: Globalization of the economy is breaking these systems in terms of locals and migrants.

Tao: The Chinese government issued a regulation on the mafia, but the underground economy is conducting money exchanges. As a result of regulation, the central bank is monopolized and people find it easier to exchange money with the underground organization. Therefore, the informal market is a product of the government. The "black banks" in southern China also fit in to the niche market for individuals to borrow money from, since the big banks do not lend money to small businesses. Tao quoted another example in Amsterdam, where prostitution and drug is legal. It may be good economically, but socially, it may not be good. What is your observation?

Mushakoji: Regarding Amsterdam, economically it is free but in the center there are the Dutch girls and in the periphery, Indonesian girls, who are illegal and cheaper. There is racial hierarchy here. Another example for the Chinese is their tradition of salt criminals. In terms of criminality, trafficking should not be liberalized, but in reality, they prevail - a complex situation. I am interested in different kinds of ownership in production. In China, a capitalist system is on the

coastal area, but the workers own the village system. There, production is owned not by the state but the community.

Tao: Reform of ownership will be a critical issue in China in the coming three or four years. Economy at the macro level seems good but on the micro level, it is not good because of the ownership system. There are big differences in the urban and rural areas. It is a difficult balance in such a big country.

Thien referred to media control and existence of the illegal black market in Vietnam. Since people are lured to the more attractive black market, the government and media need to adjust their system to meet demands of peasants and farmers and small business. Thien also referred to the oriental concept of yin-yang. Every aspect of society has 'yin' activities. Yin and yang are interacting and complementary.

Mushakoji: Western social science lacks yin-yang analysis. To understand the formal and informal, Germans are adopting this theory.

Thien: In literature, there are also the conventional and unconventional literature, oral literature, and anecdotes. For example, carnivals are an illegal part of life. In every field of human activity, there is the illegal and informal aspect. We should have respect for the informal and multitude.

Mushakoji: Art and graffiti, counter-culture creativity belongs to the multitude. In sophisticated civil society art, there is no spirit. Yin represents the multitude and yang represents the technocrats.

Vinod asked about governance and law. Liberal democracy is pushed presently because of the demonization of Islam. Islamic law is considered as an inhuman law. In India, there are community law systems. Indigenous groups have indigenous legal systems to resolve conflicts. Second question: Philanthropy is kindness to the society, but is it good? Is it legal or illegal?

Mushakoji: Robbers contribute to the society. The stability of Japanese politics is based on the LDP. It links multinational interests with local interest and local bosses.

Reiko: How can we persuade the public regarding the need for common human security? After 9/11, the Islamic community and the US community tried to dialogue, but there have been no positive outcomes. Instead, there is a feeling of fatigue amongst people. Where is the solution for dialogue and coexistence?

Mushakoji: We need to work on a different level, on a more legal and formal level. For example, there are open-minded reformers of Islam law. Dialogue between human rights and Islam. There are informal sides of Islam, such as the Islamic economics ethics. For example in Indonesia, Muslim and Christian women are demonstrating together through a sharing of feminist concerns. The role of women is transcending religion, common interests and ideal. Another example is of artistic manifestations such as music, that is shared among people transcending communities.

## Resource Person Seminar VIII, October 8, 2002

by Christopher Yohmei Blasdel, Shakuhachi Performer, Lecturer on Japanese Music; Advisor to Arts Program, The International House of Japan 'Traditional Performing Arts in Japan; Preservation, Transmission, & Performance'

**Blasdel** gave an overview of Japanese traditional performing arts by providing explanations about Gagaku, Shoumyou, Biwa, Noh, Koto, Shamisen, Shakuhachi, and folk song and dance, with audio references from a CD and his live performance on the Shakuhachi. At the beginning, he described Japanese traditional art as an integrated form with extensive influences over the ages from cultures of China, Korea, Southeast Asia, and India.

Gagaku, a banquet style orchestra performed and practiced in the Imperial household, was imported from China and Korea and established itself in the early half of the 9th century. The instruments used are relevant to those of China, India, and Vietnam. The court dance (Bugaku) which is accompanied by the gagaku ensemble, shows a formation of symmetrical style which later developed an asymmetrical formation. The songs can be described as synthesis of Shintoism and Buddhism.

Shoumyou, which is a chanting of the Buddhist text conducted in religious ceremonies, also came from China, Korea, and India, and transcribed to the Japanese context. This sutra chanting is believed to be the standard of Japanese vocal music which later developed into songs accompanied by the stringed instruments, shamisen and biwa. Because of its religious status, it is only recently that its artistic aspect has become recognized. The gagaku and shoumyou are the basis of Japanese traditional music.

The Biwa, a plucked lute, can also be traced to the Chinese pipa and Persian oud. It was originally used in gagaku and Buddhist chanting, and gradually used in secular forms. It is most famous for its use in the narrated performance of the Tales of the Heike, a story of the rise and fall of a Japanese aristocratic family. The purpose of narration was to let people know of the tragic historical stories, and also for the salvation of dead souls of the warriors who perished in fierce battle. The instrument and style of performance later developed several variations.

Noh theater was patronized by the Shogun in the thirteenth and fourteenth centuries. They had no preference for gagaku and patronized sarugaku street theater, which later developed into noh theater. It contains minimalistic movement, dance, singing, and literature, requiring not only the performers but also the audience to be trained in comprehending its contents. It is regarded as an expression of the aesthetics of middle age Japan, of Zen and minimalism; economic, formalized, dignified movements, highly artistic, with refined and explicit elements. Popular topics were on the Heike family and demon plays. The noh stage is a sacred space where the performers descend from the spiritual world to the real world. The orchestra consists of six to eight chorus members together with performers of the flute and drum. Its language is chanted in middle age Japanese in unit structures. The mask is condensed into simplicity and symbolized, yet encompassing rich expression.

Koto, a flat zither with thirteen strings, was originally used in gagaku, but became a popular home instrument in the 17th century, accompanied by singing.

The shamisen, a three-stringed lute, was imported via China and Okinawa in the Edo period. It is used in kabuki theater and bunraku puppet theater, and became popular in performing folk music and among geisha entertainment.

Shakuhachi, a five-holed bamboo end-blown flute, also came from China as part of the gagaku ensemble. It disappeared from gagaku in the 12th century but was later used in the secular and religious world by monks and poets. A basic shakuhachi repertoire is called the honkyoku, which is meditative and purely instrumental in Japanese music. Mr Blasdel gave an impressive demonstration on one traditional composition about a national bird, the crane.

Asked about himself, Mr Blasdel referred to his biography, 'A Shakuhachi Odyssey' in which he writes about his personal experience of studying, developing, and traveling in Japan since living here as a student in the seventies. He recalls his learning experience of shakuhachi and how it synthesized with the inner learning and changing of his own self. To play music, to be an artist, to make a difference in creativity, you need to enrich yourself through discipline and self-questioning, learning the formal aspect of art, and developing the contents. Shakuhachi, for him, is a tool for spiritual growth, and means of meditation. Improvisation with traditional and contemporary music elements is not a compromise, but one needs to know the classic technique and history to be able to do that. The ambience, or the traditional lifestyle with which traditional art was born is already lost, not to mention the restrictions of length of time that we are able to put on a medium such as the compact disk. The Ministry of Education mandated music education in junior high schools, to teach Japanese traditional instruments, which only endanger Japanese music by being popularised in a commercial form.

## **Resource Person Seminar IX, October 9, 2002**

**by Donald Richie,**

**'The Structure of Japanese Culture'**

**Richie** gave a provisional, rough blueprint of the structure of Japanese culture by indicating patterns and how they are portrayed, to offer ideas of how Japanese culture is put together. He observed that the main feature of the culture is modularisation. One useful example for understanding is represented by Tokyo city, which is an intricately structured city, that also serves as a template of interchangeable parts for every other place in Japan. Tokyo does not have a center, but is comprised of various centers and a collection of small cities, which have never integrated the way western cities did. These "nodes" are identical. It is made of modules or patterns that are represented by convenience stores, pachinko, hairdressing salon, shoe shop, etc., which are the same elements which constitute the city or town or village. In the traditional homes, the tatami (straw mattress), fusuma (Japanese cardboard door) and shoji (Japanese paper shade) are interchangeable construction parts for modularization. Similarly, the traditional costume kimono is another example.

Street fashions and language also retain their modular forms, but there is a desperation to try out new experiments, which become a fad. Another order of modular system, kata, is a breaking down into small units. For example, traditional sports and music are learned and memorized in kata. The assumption is that these modules proliferate. One of the ways to make a module is to reduce things into small and efficient parts. The miniaturization is represented by bonsai (miniature gardening), electronics, and transistor chips. For example, the Japanese garden, like Disneyland, tries to miniaturize nature into small space, and the Ikebana attempts to make flowers look more natural and authentic than nature. The idea of smallness culturally represents convenience, practicality, and civilization, but represents a strong national ethos. Impulse for miniature is culturally imperative. Modularizing also implies economic efficiency and standardization. Public taste regarding products is also standardized. Brand names are miniaturization of taste and easily accepted as standardized culture. Why does Japan use modularization? Mr. Richie analyses that it is purposely used for ease of governance, control, regularization, controlled harmony, and standardized guidance in various contexts. He concluded that the structure of Japanese culture creates a means of both disciplining and producing, creates a successful way of making and marketing, and efficient methods for developing and profiting, but at a great cost.

Mr. Richie then requested for feedback on his general thoughts, and the rest of the session was devoted on questions and discussion with the Fellows.

Maznah: From outside, Japanese culture looks well managed. Are there cross currents and counter currents of Japanese culture coming from younger generation?

Richie: Cannot see them coming. There was counter-culture during 1965 to 1969 with students, which the government successfully toned down. The Japanese psyche always have *honne* (real thoughts) and *tatemae* (social appearance), *giri ninjo* (duty or obligation; what you owe to somebody). There are two people in one person. Here, they have a social standard principle, and their individuality does not show, but the expense is spiritual.

Tao: Found similarities with Shanghai and Japan; garden and houses are small, small amount of food in restaurants, efficient and economic products, language is indirect and diplomatic. Different from Beijing.

Richie: Shanghai is exposed to the outside world. Beijing looks inside. The rulers of Japan would have been different if they were aware of the outside world. For example, the city of Fukuoka in western Japan looks more to Asia. Just like Shanghai, the Kyushu area (western Japan) is periphery from the center and historically was never subjected to central politics.

Vinod: Japan looks more connected to the US and unconnected with Asia. The modularization thinking is similar to the Descartes notion of reducing everything to binaries. Why is Japan closer on this western "reduceability"? In contrast, Asia, which Japan is a part of, is not so reductionist, and deals with the complex.

Richie: There is a third possibility that people may think differently, but feel the same. People are moulded by civilization, economics, and politics.

Vinod: The diversities, plurality, creation of complexities accumulate and

dissolve. Isn't there creativity, diversity and plurality in Japanese culture?

Richie: The invisible wall on which the tree of Japanese culture grows is created by its history, agenda of political party in power, and control power. There is the unofficial side and official side of Japan. The real Japan was shown with outlets in the 60s, when Japan experienced outbreaks of youth fashion and culture.

Vinod: 'Rashomon' depicted there is nothing like a truth or fact. The plurality of viewing the fact is complex and cannot be reduced. It depicted Japan's philosophy. What you said seems contradictory.

Richie: Think of the maverick – Kurosawa - he doesn't represent Japan, but himself. Kurosawa wanted to say there is no one reality. We each perceive reality in different ways. The maverick doesn't reduce himself.

Mohamad Haji Salleh: I come from a country with poverty and political strife. Malaysia is experimenting on the social system. It may come up with good results. Japan seems successful but needs to improve on individuality.

Richie: Bureaucrats trying to protect their turfs. Few people who want to protect their common wheel!

Ann: In 'Japanese homogeneity', what do you see as demarcations of class and sexuality?

Richie: Changing rapidly with economic erosion. Class is about money. Demarcations of class is not being addressed but gender is heavily questioned, also especially in terms of sexual freedom. Now you see erosion of traditional values and dynamic social change, and eruption of new culture and values.

Reiko: What do Americans expect from Ozu films? They seem to be enjoying the kata education system.

Richie: Americans admire a land of order because they are badly trained and live in a land of individuals. They need royalty. Too much freedom does not work. Ozu films are popular because they have many rules with camera and narrative. Ozu teaches us to be creative within these boundaries and shows us a different kind of freedom by giving other options. Americans feel even nostalgic for the values.

Vinod agreed with Mr Richie's observation that affluence seems to have become a disease in Japan and his wish to see more frugality and discovering the earth, could be a solution to bring back some hope to the present social situation. Another question: In spite of the modularity and kata in Japanese society, you were strongly influenced by Mr Suzuki who had just the opposite values, and have since lived here. It seems contradictory?

Richie: True, but I don't see it as a conflict. People are made of different elements. In Japan, I find ways to satisfy my needs for order and anarchy. I found a country where both ends could be entertained. I could be a whole entity in this country where as I could not be so in America. There are other countries but only by being an outsider. If I were Japanese, I would not live here. I live here because of my difference and freedom.

Maznah: It sounds a paradox, but modularization can lead to individualization. Exceptions can be parts of a whole complexity of a culture. I like appreciation of complexities of cultures rather than reducing it.

Richie: We're talking about variables and balance of back and forth. The problem is that we do not have a counterpoint of real Japan.

Thien: I am interested in the concept of Ma.

Richie: It is an aesthetic term used by aestheticians to identify the indefinable. Ma is the way space is used. Emptiness has weight. Nothingness is not empty. It has its positive qualities. A room where what is not there has the same weight as one with what is there. In the West, there is the concept of negative space. Ma is not used. The concept of Ma indicates that nothingness has substance, which makes it not negative, but positive. Difficult to comprehend. Many such terms, for example, shibui, wabi sabi, hade, jimi... Concepts of values which cannot be discussed. Ancient Greek had similar terms.

Vinod: In India, the notion of emptiness is full of meaning. What is absent is powerful.

Richie: One reason Ozu movies are loved is because he refuses to be pragmatic about existence. He will leave things out by stopping narratives or the picture, and make the audience reflect on the absence.

Vinod: Silence in Indian music. It gives a different meaning.

Thien: What is your notion of smell, color and sound? (quoting from an interview of Mr Richie)

Richie: Human beings make clutter and clean them up. For example, it must be an extension of one's property for them to take care of. If something belongs to everybody, it belongs to nobody. This seems extreme and strong in Japan.

### **Resource Person Seminar X, October 10, 2002**

**by Professor Ryosei Kokubun, Director of Center for Area Studies,  
Professor of Political Science Department, Keio University  
'China's WTO Entry and Sino-Japanese Relations'**

The presentation by Professor Kokubun focused on 1) the assessment of Chinese entry into WTO, and 2) perspective of Sino-Japanese relations on the 30th anniversary year of diplomatic normalization. He quoted from an interesting opinion poll conducted in major cities of Asian nations in the year 2000 by one of the largest public relations companies in Japan. Asked about the impression of 'globalization', the Chinese and Japanese results were two extremes. Japanese show pessimism on the surface but their action is often optimistic. The Chinese are optimistic but their reaction is extremely realistic and pessimistic. The difference derives from their historical and social backgrounds.

Since the Meiji restoration, Japan has worked on economic modernization for more than 130 years. The system has worked by distributing wealth and most people are considered middle class. However, it brought serious stagnation in the system while unnecessary regulation escalated and political corruption spread and regenerated. Due to the system's hard foundation, it is difficult to carry out reform. Meanwhile, it has only been some twenty years since the introduction of open-door policy in China. The foundation of its economy and society is not yet certified. Its economic base is still fragile. That is why China is

susceptible to globalization and considers it as a great challenge and opportunity. With such differences in the two countries, it is necessary to make adjustments in building a relationship.

In China, globalization has been a topic for discussion in the context of being admitted to WTO. China must adjust the economic domestic system to meet the requirements of the international market economy, to change into a capitalistic economic system. It persisted for accession to WTO in order to make fundamental changes, because it was too dependent on foreign capital. 40% of GDP is dependent on trade, of which 50% is exports by foreign corporations. In terms of national tax revenue, 20% of tax revenue comes from foreign companies. These facts show how Chinese economy had to adapt to foreign pressure and competition, whereas a thick wall protects Japan.

These days, Japanese are attracted to make investments in China. Corporations and manufacturers from Japan and Southeast Asia are moving to China. In the past, there were several 'China booms' in Japan. In 1972, after diplomatic normalization of China-Japan relationship, China was in the midst of the Cultural Revolution. In 1978, after signing the Peace and Friendship Treaty and the official long-term agreement, Japan decided to export advanced technology to China, and China decided to export oil to Japan. China started its economic modernization process. Japan started to establish business in China. However in 1981 after business agreements were cancelled, the boom was gone. During 1984-85, China made rapid progress in economic reform where coastal cities were opened up for foreign business. Durable consumer goods were imported to China and consumers started buying Japanese goods. The mood was again disturbed by the visit to Yasukuni Shrine by Prime Minister Nakasone which fuelled Chinese anger. In 1992, Deng Xiaoping made the declaration of a socialist market economy and opened the country. Japanese and foreign corporations rushed into the market, resulting in annual growth rate of over 10 percent. In the late 90s, the Asian financial crisis and other problems influenced the economy. Economic stagnation accelerated and bad loans accumulated. The fifth boom started in 2001, not because of great expectations of entering the market, but because of the Japanese recession forcing companies to move to China.

Behind the boom, there is a deep-rooted China economic threat theory in Japan and uneasiness that cheap Chinese goods will blow away Japanese goods from the market. It is said that the move of the Japanese corporations is related to China's entry into WTO, but this statement should be studied carefully. Rather, it is related to Japanese recession. Direct investment by Japanese manufacturing companies has been increasing while it has decreased with other foreign countries. Japan, Korea, Taiwan manufacturers are offering employment and stabilization of Chinese economy and accelerating transfer of technology. As a result, Japan is facing hollowing out of industries from the country.

How should we understand the current state of Sino-Japan relations? There are no major conflicts, but the biggest problem is the image and people's feelings toward one another. As can be seen from the past, it is easily fluctuated by political strategies and events between the countries. Noticeably, the 1972

framework changed the international structure and system. Generation change and Japanese domestic policies also contributed to building a new relationship. A similar situation can be seen in China and Taiwan. With political regime changes, from Mao to Deng to Jiang Zeming, Chinese society is changing.

Within the new framework, what should we do towards rebuilding the China/Japan relationship? 1) Search for ways to develop cooperative relations. Because economic relations are interdependent and strong, we can monitor the relationship. However, we need to deal with issues in a logical manner, lest conflicts occur with slight emotional divergence. 2) We need to perceive the China/Japan relationship within the framework of East Asia. Relatedly, free trade agreements are also an important issue and necessary in the region, namely ASEAN plus three.

Tao argued: It seems the China/Japan relationship is still based on Cold War perceptions. Is China a threat, a potential enemy in economic and environmental terms? The US, which defined China as a potential enemy, needs potential enemies for military purposes and business. China is joining the international community. What comes after joining WTO? It can be OECD. Cold War thinking should be changed.

Thien: For Vietnamese and other small nations, it is true that China is an unconscious threat. However, we need to be aware that there are biased views regarding national interests.

Kokubun: I have never talked about the China threat. I am talking about the rising China. We are watching carefully how China behaves. It should be transparent which will help reduce the unconscious fear towards China.

Vinod: The results of the Friendship survey, and the fact that when there is minimal interaction there is a good mutual impression, is interesting. It is an important question. The perception that as we move towards liberalization and an open world, we will be friendlier, is in question. We are moving towards a more self-exploited, self-interested world order. There is an inherent contradiction of terms. Increased business interaction is also an increase in threat perceptions. Therefore, opening up economically does not necessarily mean a better world order. Can economic open-door policy be matched by a political system that can keep this distress down? The biggest problem with China in this context is a slightly non-transparent political system.

Maznah: Can ASEAN be a solution? It's creating a block.

Kokubun: Relations between ASEAN and China, Korea is sensitive and competitive. ASEAN and China have a gentleman's agreement.

Reiko: What is the remedy to understand the real China?

Kokubun: Approach from the reality, history and culture.

Kokubun: In case of China, the challenge is lack of democracy. How the leaders are elected will be the key point. One good sign is they are raising good international people. Japan is sustained by its system.

## Resource Person Seminar XI, October 17, 2002

by Funabashi Yoichi,

Chief Diplomatic Correspondent & Columnist of The Asahi Shimbun;

Professor Takeda Isami, Dokkyo University as observer

### 'Japan's Post-War History'

Followed by a brief introduction from Professor Takeda, Dr. Funabashi gave a concise description of more than 50 years of '**Japan's Post-War History**', with the underlying question as to the role its partners should play in policy-making.

After World War II, the United States and Japan played a 'good winner' and 'good loser' role, respectively, in which Gen McArthur imposed an occupation policy to democratize Japan, lasting until 1952. However in the 60s, the signing of the US-Japan Peace Treaty fueled sentiments against the US and Japanese government. People's sense of ownership for democracy was challenged and nationalistic sentiments against US were suppressed by McArthur and Prime Minister Yoshida, which finally exploded. Economically, Japan enjoyed its golden 60s with a GDP growth rate of more than 10%. During the 60-70s the middle class formed the solid basis of society. Events such as the Tokyo Olympics in 1964 and joining the OECD and G7 has turned Japan from a 'good loser' to a 'good builder'. With economic upliftment, the ruling party was able to absorb Japan's 'surging nationalism'.

Two die-hard issues in Japanese politics still remain. One is the Hiroshima and Nagasaki issue with disputes over the legacy of nuclear weapons. Japan and US have not come to terms with this sensitive issue, both holding different views. Another unsettling issue is the presence of an American base in Okinawa. Citizens' movements, such as the women's human rights movement, environmental movements, and local grassroots activists, have opposed the continued operation of the base. They are becoming major players of the nationalist and protest movements.

From another perspective, we could ask the question: is Japan a 'model country'? Does it have a vision to explore beyond catching up with economic growth; such as becoming a major player for human rights, environmental ethics, or a cultural epicenter for a new civilization? It has no national consensus, identity, nor leadership. People have become ambivalent to the role of the government over the years. The occupation days and the following years have been a collusion between the ruling class and occupation forces, with no true democracy. The epitaph, 'Politicians reign, bureaucrats rule' dominated the war years and remains cemented since occupation.

The Cold War and Gulf War experience was traumatic. Japanese aid to these conflicts was not appreciated. It challenged Japan's economic success and proved that economic power is not compatible with geo-political power. Japan was too clumsy to adjust to new security dynamics.

It was in the year 1995 that people realized the ineffectiveness and incapability of the central and local governments in handling the earthquake disaster and Aum Shinrikyo attacks. It revealed how irrelevant the Japanese

government was in ensuring human security. The following year, it was revealed that the Ministry of Welfare had allowed the use of unheated blood plasma, which resulted in transmitting HIV disease to 20,000 people. Fifty years after WWII, the credibility of public services was shattered causing deep mistrust of the government. Internationally, Japan was the target of serious accusations from Asian countries over historical issues, strongly suggesting that the past will not easily fade out. Issues like the comfort women, Japanese official textbooks, POWs, Yasukuni Shrine and so on, are a source of continued unease in post-war Japan.

Finally, Dr Funabashi attempted to grade Japanese post war history. In his view, Japan, as 'Good loser' merits A minus, 'Good builder', A, 'Good citizen', B plus, 'Good neighbor', B minus.

The question and answer session was as profound as the presentation itself. Questioned about the reason for Japan's reluctance to take on an international role in Asia, Dr Funabashi gave explanations from several perspectives including complex history issues and their constraints on diplomatic policies, domestic bureaucratic system, Japan - US alliance system, reluctance of Asian countries to accept Japanese leadership, and Japan's inability to follow through an alignment. Regarding the future of the Japan-US relationship, he predicted that 'checkbook diplomacy' could not be afforded anymore. Japan's economic peak has already passed. Rather, it would be most affected by the underlying issue of the Korean peninsula; specifically North Korea, and the US-China relationship. The Okinawa issue, however, will still remain as the focal point. For Japan, China is unlikely to become a direct fractious point. It is up to the political leadership and their decision of how to realign and revitalize the relationship with China. Professor Takeda added that we should also carefully follow the effect of Free Trade Agreements between Japan and ASEAN countries. Asked whether Japan had strong oppositional tendencies within, that might destabilize the democratic, peaceful, and economically equal society, Dr Funabashi explained that Japan is basically a homogenous society with no serious dividing lines, although it is likely to become more multi-ethnic. Citing from Dr Funabashi's article in which he alerts about US unilateralism, would the Japanese society support his view when actually unilateral action might bring economic benefit to Japan? To this, he replied that the Japanese society stood in a vulnerable state, with no independent military force to protect the metropolitan cities. Japan would rather see a more multilaterally assured society. If the US is constantly targeted by terrorists or other forces, it would impose risks on allied countries as well. Imposing military power would only upset the delicate balance, which has been established with neighboring countries. To keep the balance, we must develop Asian regionalism by stabilizing Southeast Asia and Central Asia, having India and China more involved, and search for global civilian power. On the debate of revising the Japanese Constitution and handling the emerging fervor for nationalism, Dr Funabashi didn't see the issue as politically developed, revolving around the 'peace issue' between the Socialist party and Liberal Democratic Party. Lastly, on how we can revitalize multilateralism in the world order and challenge unilateralism, he saw ASEAN plus 3 at the core of this, rather than Japan.

**Core Seminar 1, September 18**  
**by Prof. Fujiwara, Kiichi, University of Tokyo**  
*'Heiwa-shugi; The Life and Times of Pacifist Intellectuals in Japan'*

**Professor Fujiwara** gave a thorough explanation of Intellectuals in Japan in a changing historical and social context before and after the Meiji restoration period, after World War II, up to the present.

Until Meiji era, the criteria of a Chishikijin, or Intellectual in Japan included his capability to read Chinese text, and the long tradition lived on until the 1960s. With the Meiji restoration, westernisation became another key factor. According to Professor Fujiwara, Intellectuals are not professional scholars, politician, nor activists. 'Intellectuals' and 'Activists' should also be clearly distinguished. 'Intellectuals' can be defined as those putting value to meaningfulness and usefulness, doing nothing but being absorbed in thinking and observation. Then who are the Intellectuals? For example in China, they are often those who have trailed out from the mainstream power, who failed national examinations and became poets, or those who were not born as elder sons in Russia. In Japan, the ex-samurais who were ousted from government offices became educators and journalists, and social advocates calling for action against injustice. To this day, the term Chishikijin has a leftist implication. In short, the Intellectual's role is to find meaning of spirit of the times and lives of people.

In the post WWII 'enlightening period', there was a sudden outburst of people talking, and writing in journals. What were their accomplishments in terms of historical context? How did their day begin and how did it end? What did war mean to intellectuals? First of all, it meant a demise of any liberal argument. The Japanese Communist Party, which was an anarchy of social voices and the only party that could confront militarism, was shut off after 1937. With a Stalinist discipline, the party was repressive towards supporters of social and independent voices. They also played their part of a secular religion among intellectuals in the 30s, as the only political institution that could confront the government. After the War, there were those who supported the party but those who criticized it were interested in regaining their voices, and rather than argue about war crimes, their focal point was to argue against hierarchy and hegemony of the party authority. Their first debate after the War was the 'politics and literature debate', which stood against the Stalinist discipline imposed on independent writers. The decline of party control of intellectuals opened a liberal space for a new group of intellectuals in Japan. This was also the beginning of a surge of real socialism that is neither Chinese nor Russian. Not adhering to party leadership, they started to look for 'real' communism. This is a very important stream of thought in post-war Japan. Another group can be loosely called the 'pacifist people'. For them, an outbreak of 'peace' and 'democracy' became so important until it became meaningless. This trend has its significant origin in the Japanese psyche. During the War, the State and people were united under the Emperor symbol. After the war, the State lost credibility of political power, breaking its relationship with society. Civic nationalism emerged in return to put together 'We', which implies 'the society', against the

'State', 'Peace' and 'Democracy' were popular symbols that were respected at the social 'we' level but neglected at the political level. In this context, the role of intellectuals was to make sure that the power holders were not neglecting these symbols, in order to fight against authority. This liberal project was actually a revival of early 1920s, during the movement of 'Taisho Democracy', when there was open space in civil society to speak about various ideas. However, the new generation who grew up in the 1940s held strong resentment toward these elitist intellectuals who did nothing against the government but repeat the arguments of the 20s. As a means to reclaim independent thinking, therefore, the immediate enemies of intellectuals were the communist party and the emperor. Another implication of the War was its effect on Japan's relationship with the US. Westernized liberals in Japan adored Germany, England, France, but the US was only popular in terms of pop culture, and not for intellectuals. However, pro-American liberals allied with the US to politically survive, and the US also needed capable administrators in the region to stand against North Korea and China. The liberals allied with social democrats and communists to fight against the US. This was the origin of the post-war pacifist movement in Japan. On the other hand, the constitution could not have been made without the US. This is one of the major basic traumas of post-war Japan. What is more ironic is that when the US became interested in industrialized Japan, intellectuals defended the country based on principles of the Constitution. The fact that this symbol of western liberal ideas was used against the US is a paradoxical tragedy for Japan and the US.

These post-war pacifist intellectuals had poor propaganda in terms of writing. They wrote in the first person singular 'I', caring less about democracy or nationalist appeal. Rather than talking for the nation, they tried to reclaim 'me' from the nation. In other words, the period when Japanese pacifism became plastic was a period when no strong political advocacy was present. The mid 50s was a transition period when liberal writing turned into political propaganda. There were arguments and recurrence of iconized leading figures.

In conclusion, Professor Fujiwara stated that Public Intellectuals were a 'product' of both talent and times.

The Fellows further shared their opinions about locating public intellectuals in the context of art, culture, history, society, time, profession, and country; for example, in the context of Asia, Japan, US, war, peace, Americanism, colonialism, gender, environment, and being on the right, left, or being a politician. They agreed that the role of intellectuals is to function as dissenters, providing alternatives to the needs of civil society. In other words, to find what is 'out there', having faith in 'seeing the times', and 'make it going'.

**Core Seminar II, September 25**

**by Dr Sakamoto Yoshikazu, Professor Emeritus, University of Tokyo  
'Transnational Civil Society in the Age of Globalization'**

**Dr Sakamoto Yoshikazu** first spelled out some of the intrinsic contradictions of today's extraordinary acceleration of globalization. The main engines of globalization are the marketization of economy and the global advancement of science and technology, especially dominated by the power of the US, leading to diminution of other countries. Contemporary world order can be outlined in four dimensions; 1) the unipolar state system, 2) the market, 3) civil society, and 4) international organization including regional organizations. The traditional sovereign state system that persisted for the past four centuries is confronting these new four dimensions.

*(Full text of Prof. Sakamoto's presentation included in this volume pg 132)*

# PAINS OF A JOURNEY

by Nguyen, Thi Hieu Thien

*Dear friend, I'm telling you a fairy tale.*

## HOPE

To be transferred from Narita Airport to the International-House<sup>1</sup> was like landing on a new planet. The thing that impressed me most right at the moment of "landing" was the wonderful peacefulness of the place. I had a walk in the I-House's old garden (the International-House boasts a beautiful traditional Japanese garden) and its solitude brought me centuries back to a remote ancient era. Suffocated by dusty and smoky Hochiminh City's streets I hoped to escape to an island of peace.

## LOST

My hope did not last long. On the following day, leaving the I-House for a walk around Roppongi, I was astonished to find its striking resemblance to Hochiminh City's streets. I could not believe my eyes! There were advertisements everywhere. Red, purple, orange, yellow, green, blue, black or white. Large or small, running horizontally or vertically, flashing or not flashing, emitting sounds or not emitting sounds, they all joined the ever-lasting struggle for survival common to every being on this earth. And people! There were so many people. Men and women looked important in business suits, all hurriedly heading somewhere. And motor vehicles! There were cars in front of you, behind you, on your right, on your left, and above your head. All that noise, that bustling, that rush.... How powerful the whole flow was. Can anyone stop it? Stop it just for a moment, just symbolically, to let think of whither humanity? Hardly. But that is what we, the fellows of the ALFP 2002<sup>2</sup>, were supposed to do. I started to doubt the relevance of my being there where I was, lost in the powerful flow of rushing people and machines. I felt pretty weak and lonesome.

## HOTELED

We, the fellows of the ALFP 2002, stayed in the I-House. Staying in a hotel is never a blessing to me but never did I dread it as much as I did the first days of my staying there in the I-House hotel. Living in a hotel you should behave *accordingly*. You should not make noise, you should not mess things up, you should not disturb the others, you should not stay out too late, and so on. A hotel is a place of highly concentrated politeness. Yet a Vietnamese can barely survive a day without company. He/she loves talking, laughing loudly, smiling broadly and frequently (often for no definite reasons), exchanging eye contact (with whoever appearing in sight) and, hence, can be a pretty messy animal (to borrow an expression by Donald Richie<sup>3</sup>). In short, to me, a Vietnamese, warm

and informal company is the air to breathe in. Therefore, I did not have to wait very long to find all those little habits of mine tending to be at odds rather often with the neatness and tidiness of the hotel for, in this regard, it was an exemplary one. In brief, during the first days of living in the I-House I was gasping for air like a fish cast on dry land.

## UNVOICED

My instinct for survival urged me to make a few attempts to break out of that blockade in quest for company. At the fellows' meeting before the first workshop I blurted out (producing a smile of apology lest my words might sound silly), "Let's select a leader for our group. I'd like to suggest Reiko as a candidate." The fellows did not smile at me back and one of them looked sternly at me as a teacher at his little pupil and said, "I think we've already got the secretariat to be the leader." I withered.

Silly as my suggestion may sound to somebody I had profound reasons for it. For ten years I worked as a teacher of Russian and was in charge of the groups of student candidates to the USSR I was teaching Russian to. There will be no other time like that in my life. It was filled with so much holy joy. Consecrating the whole of my youthful energy to teaching, I was awarded unbelievable love and worship. The being true friends and working together as a team did produce wonderfully edifying effects on us both, me and them. Those unforgettable days have sown in me strong faith in the value of education and the sacred mission of the teacher.

I wanted to explain to the fellows my conviction. I wanted to say that the success of the program depends very much on interaction among the fellows, that is on whether we can join efforts or not. I strongly believed that only through working as a team, would we be able to learn a lot from each other and fulfill our part: to bring common experience and knowledge gained together to the others. But, being discouraged by the rejection, I decided to keep silent. In Confucian Asia the hierarchy "Emperor-Teacher-Father" sanctified the teacher's position in society but nowadays in Japan (and Vietnam, as well) teachers should be the last ones to be listened to.

Then, again, the question of my relevance reappeared. If I can not bring to this program something distilled from the whole teaching experience so crucial to my life, am I relevant to it and vice versa?

## DECONTEXTUALIZED

At the first workshop it became clear to everyone that there are no public intellectuals in Vietnam and China. Because the political systems in these two countries are totalitarian. *Totalitarianism*. That was the first time I encountered this word. And it sounded so ugly and so threatening. Not much better than the

term *terrorism*, which has for some reason become so fashionable lately, I thought.

We spent hours discussing the notion *public intellectual* and ended in a deadlock unable to answer either of the two thorny questions: 1. Who is the public intellectual? 2. What roles should public intellectuals play in modern world? Then, suddenly, a naughty question came to my mind. What would happen if all these discussions were carried out in, let's say, Vietnamese, Japanese, Chinese or Malay? An attractive idea! In these languages the terms *public intellectual*, *democracy* and *totalitarianism*, apparently "Made in West" products, I hoped, may acquire new cultural meanings.

Can one say, for example, the concept *democracy* has been existing in the West longer than it has in the East? The concept *NHAN* (roughly "human", "for human"), one of Confucius's key notions, is the core of his thought. But nowadays in the West (and the East, also) Confucius is known to many as an advocate of anti-democratic feudal ideology. And hardly does anyone of Western scholars know about Nguyen Trai, a great Vietnamese politician and philosopher, who has developed the Chinese Confucian concept *NHAN* to form a Vietnamese notion *NHAN*, developing further Confucius's thought. In a Vietnamese culture a ruler or leader is said to have *NHAN* if he/she has an ear for his/her people's words and their welfare is his/ her primary concern.

*TAM* is another notion that could shed light upon the understanding of the concept *public intellectual*. *TAM* means literally *heart*<sup>b</sup>. In Chinese and Vietnamese cultures, where Confucianism is blended with Buddhism, this word has been developed to form a whole notion central to understanding human's internal world<sup>a</sup>. An intellectual who is said to have *TAM* is the one whose heart and soul, in short *TAM*, is oriented toward common human welfare and humanistic ideals. He/she is the one who has great love for his/her human fellows<sup>a</sup>. *TAM* and *TRI* (*mind*) are interrelated. If one's *TAM* is *sang* (*lit* or *guided by a light*) then his/her *TRI* should be *sang*, too<sup>c</sup>. So, I believed the concepts *NHAN* and *TAM* should be used to gain another approach to the understanding of the concept *public intellectual* discussed so far purely in terms of *mind* rather than *heart*, not to say *TAM*.

Obviously, the same concept may vary from time to time and from culture to culture. Then, is it wise to simply apply the Western concepts *democracy*, *public intellectual* and *totalitarianism* to particular contexts of Asian cultures without thinking about how the former would interact with the latter? Should he/she take into consideration the cultural elements that are sure to condition the application of these Western terms to the new environments? This is not easy for one to lift him/herself up the ground on which he/she is standing by grasping his/her own hair. Would we be able to lift ourselves up standing on the ground of a Western discourse which is still basically Euro-centered and American-centered?

Labor and language are the two essential elements in the process of converting chimpanzee into human, says Engel. It seems without language man can not delve into secrets of this world. But Buddha has warned us of the danger of language: it may be turned into an obstacle to perceiving truth. I did not start reasoning with counter-arguments, however, keeping to myself the fear that excessive rationalizing would enslave us to what we believe to be the milieu for our thought. I might attempt another approach, I thought.

## CHOKED

We had a field trip to Gifu and Nagoya. That was the first time I had a chance to see Japan's countryside. The wonderful landscape reminded me of Vietnam's countryside: I saw many mountains and rivers. The mountains were all covered in green forests. The water in the rivers was crystal clear and the rivers themselves looked graceful and peaceful. Like Vietnam, Japan is said to be a country of river.

We visited Nagara River Estuary Dam and the Society Against the Nagara River Estuary Dam Construction. There, we met with gray-haired men and women who have been fighting against the construction of the Dam since their hair was still all black. Yet not much change has occurred since then. Later, from a resource seminar, titled *Re-examining Public Works Projects in Japan*, we learned that to Japanese politicians and bureaucrats public works are an exceptionally good channel for Big Dollar to flow into their secret pockets. For decades, a triangle of power "politicians - bureaucrats - corporations" has been cemented to keep unshakable its umbrella of protection over thousands of dams built in Japan in the name of the Japanese people's well being. No matter how much local people, environmentalists and social activists may outcry, these dams remain intact. On leaving the Nagara River I looked again at the dam. It loomed large and imposing at the horizon. Poor Nagara River! She looked so gentle and graceful. Too fragile under that threatening giant block of concrete.

In Asian cultures mountains and rivers are sacred sources of life. The mountain is yan – the masculine, the Father; and the river is yin – the feminine, the Mother. For millions of years, the River has been Mother to Man. The Nile gave birth to ancient Egypt and Ganga nurtured India in very much the same way as the Hong River Delta was the first cradle to Vietnamese culture. Vinod, in his paper *Why People Oppose Dams*<sup>4</sup>, gives a startling figure. The world's rivers are now choked by more than 40,000 large dams, an incredible number of them having been built since 1950. How has it come that the child has learned to exploit his mother in such a way?

The Nam Bo Delta, the largest rice basket in Vietnam, is watered and fertilized by nine branches of the Mekong River and for this reason the Mekong River in Vietnam<sup>5</sup> receives a beautiful name: *Cuu Long* (Nine Dragons). However, it has been recently decided that one of the river's branches should be blocked by a dam as a huge tourist and commercial center is to be built in that place. So, the *Cuu Long* River is probably going to be renamed as *Bat Long* (Eight Dragons). In

Vietnamese culture, 9 is a sacred number – the symbol of maturity and perfection. What new connotations may the number 8 have now? *Flaw and immaturity?* I recalled a remark by a friend of mine who has traveled extensively around the world, "Black, white or yellow - people are the same everywhere." Japan and Vietnam share striking similarities. I thought and did not know whether to feel happy or sad about it.

## BEFRIENDED

A few days after I came to Tokyo a group of journalists from ASEAN countries arrived bringing the kind of noise I was starving for. I thrived in the warm company with those young boys and girls like a Vietnamese idiom goes, "fish is brought back to the water". Through them I learned about some more painful truths. For instance, I learned about Roppongi's nightlife. Roppongi is a famous residential and commercial area in Tokyo. The story of its becoming as it is nowadays can not be told without the story of American troops occupying Japan during the post-war time. Americans brought prosperity to this area through different ways, one among them being the development of prostitution -- a tradition to be continued up to these days.

The journalists showed me heaps of small ads they found stuck to lampposts along Roppongi Street. In those ads (with photos attached), females of a variety of occupation, ranging from housewives (not necessarily widows) to university students, offered sex with price varying according the kind of sexual pleasures available. Basically, prostitution is not something exotic. In Saigon during American occupation brothels mushroomed fabulously, too. Yet the way sex is advertised in Roppongi was really special.

Needless to say, as soon as they arrived, the journalists became unpopular in the hotel because of the noise they made talking, eating, laughing, and running. This reminded me of my first days in the USSR as a student. In a class in Russian language, my Russian tutor explained to us, the foreign students, the Russian word *mugik*. Before the October Revolution this word was used to refer to ingenious Russian peasants who loved doing everything with loud noise: eating, talking, walking, snoring and the like. The word is now used as a derogatory expression for those Russians who fail to acquire gentle manners to look Western ladies or gentlemen. Then the tutor turned to me and said, "You may learn something from this, my darling. Your steps are making awful noise for you always drag them on the floor." I should confess that the remark produced a miraculous effect on my appearance in general and my manners in particular; just like the way the Fairy Lady's stick did on Cinderella. I was desperately determined to stop dragging my boots. Most importantly, I learned to be a perfect Western lady. Unfortunately, however, the self-training has left an awful scar on my poor unconscious: I have developed a deep fear of polite places. In vain should I try, I do miss those weird habits of mine. And I miss them so much that nowadays, whenever I have to keep an eye on my manners for too long, I begin to feel sick. And I did fall sick around

the time the journalists were to be gone. My consolation then was Mazna's spending hours listening patiently to me talking nonsense.

## **FORSAKEN**

Unlike Japan or any other Western country, Vietnam is a country of peasants: nearly 80% of the population is engaged in agriculture. So, being a Vietnamese, I have inclinations close to those typical of peasants rather than intellectuals. I prefer communicating through informal chats to highly formal and highly academic exchange of thought in the form of scholarly meetings, seminars, workshops, symposiums or the like. Nevertheless, preparing for important talks with Japanese and international intellectuals all of whom are incredibly erudite, I had no choice but to read like mad articles, papers, essays, book chapters and books. Sick and exhausted I found my flow of thought choked like a dammed river. To worsen my sickness my dreams were haunted by two formal talks I was to present in front of large and diverse audiences.

It is a shame to confess my command of English was the lowest among the fellows. Not only because my English was bad at the basic levels such as pronunciation, grammar, vocabulary etc. but also because, I soon discovered, I was ignorant of many key concepts, notions, terms, styles, discourses etc. used everyday in the Western world by intellectuals and non-intellectuals. To find consolation and to feel less marginalized I told myself that one of my ALFP colleagues, who came from a totalitarian society like me, might be facing the same difficulty of culture shock. Unluckily, he possessed the kind of confidence and optimism that none of us could compete with. In other words, I had no choice but to accept the fact that I, alone, was lagging utterly behind.

Another torturing horror was the search for a topic that sounded serious, informative, scholarly but still able to keep the audience all awake throughout the talk (otherwise, what sense may it have?). What would I be talking about? Mazna would probably be talking about Islam -- a topic that suddenly became incredibly thrilling after 9/11. Hu Tao would be talking about rising China's "American Dream", the kind of talk which is sure to be breathtaking to everyone today. Vinod is a wizard who always knows what to say to scare his audience most. Since Reiko is a person of and by the Media exercising power over people's mind is the air she breathes in. What about my usual topics -- literature and education? How can they intrigue any keen interests in modern audience? I thought with much self-consciousness.

## **SHARED**

To my rescue came Vinod. He said the thing he and, he believed, everyone would like to listen to from me is the Vietnam War. I was moved by his kind words. Vinod is the type of intellectual with bright TAM -- I learned about that pretty

soon after my unfortunate suggestion about selecting a leader was dismissed. He reminded me of an American friend of mine: Gary Okihiro<sup>6</sup>. At the international conference *American Studies Today* held in Hanoi on 12<sup>nd</sup>-13<sup>th</sup> of October, 1998, the first conference at which Vietnamese and American scholars working in the fields of social sciences and humanities met, he started his paper on the 1960s movements against the Vietnam War in the United States with the following words: *Vietnam is central to my life*.

He is not the only American scholar to whom Vietnam has such significance. The War of Resistance Against American Imperialism by Vietnamese people has produced a *Vietnam War generation* to whose life orientation Vietnam is central. Vinod Raina and Gary Okihiro are remarkable representatives of this generation that I have had a chance to meet. Similarly, the War is central to my life orientation and that of many other Vietnamese of my generation, who were in their prime in the 1960s and 1970s. To us that was a romantic time -- a feeling that generations succeeding ours may find hard to understand.

I felt encouraged and inspired by Vinod's understanding and sharing when we, he and I, spent hours discussing how to approach the topic I had chosen: *Transition from War to Peace -- Experiences of a Vietnamese Intellectual*. The thing that struck me most was that we had so much in common in terms of value-orientation. So I decided finally to take value as the key concept which the whole talk of mine would revolve around. The Vietnam War! What topic on earth could I love more? Yet, I recalled, when I started my study on *Vietnam War Literature in the United States* some of my Vietnamese colleagues were surprised, "Are American still writing about it?" Is the Vietnam War still relevant here when even in Vietnam, to someone, it has fallen into oblivion?

## TATESHINA

Tateshina is the name of a beautiful place. It was in the mountain, far away from the flashy and dusty Tokyo. We went there for weekend retreat. A Japanese colleague explained to me that although outwardly Japan looks oriented toward the materialistic West, inwardly love for Zen has not died yet in their hearts. Therefore, *retreat* can perhaps be understood as a modern version of meditation. As September was approaching the end, the air in Tateshina was cooling, fragrantly damp and youthfully fresh. The sky had a moody gray hue. The leaves on the trees had all turned red or yellow. I wondered if Tateshina was an ideal place for retreat or for love. Being in front of such a beauty one would feel inclined to think of the latter.

We had a wonderful dinner with tables covered with dishes reminding me of Japanese autumn forests. The ALFP 2002 fellows and secretariat were joined by invited guests, who were mainly Japanese, Korean and American academics, scientists and social activists. During the dinner, a young man came over to me and introduced himself as a Korean research fellow and social activist working

for Japan International Volunteer Center. Then he started asking me about the Vietnam War, learning that I was from Vietnam. I was moved by his kind words and shared his feelings. We, Vietnamese, had a long and horribly devastating war but our nation was united in the end. They, Koreans, had a war, too; and bloody, horrible and devastating. Yet, their country remains divided. And those American military bases in Korea! Could any Korean think about them without pain and shame? Kim Kyung-Mook -- I later learned about his name -- told me he valued patriotism but did not like nationalism and then asked me how to distinguish between *patriotism* and *nationalism*. I could not at once appreciate the depth of his concern but did feel the significance of the question he raised. To him, and not to him only.

## LIT

When I was thinking about how to develop the talk at Tateshina the words of Ronald Richie's echoed in my mind, "Japan is not relevant if relevance consists of making wads of money and calling that life ... To be Japanese is to be poor. To be decently poor. Japanese, traditionally, did not have anything beside mud so they made the best pottery going. They did not have any furniture because they were so poor so they developed the whole science of space called "ma" to account for emptiness. This is what the world needs from Japan. The country has shown how much can be made of little. The materialistic philistine world can learn something from Japan...."<sup>7</sup>. These words reminded me of my own country that has shown the world "how much can be made of little," too. Entering the War of Resistance Against American Imperialism<sup>8</sup>, Vietnam was very poor, like Japan before the "bubble economy"<sup>9</sup> period. How could such a poor country fight with the United States, one of the world's economic and military superpowers? Logically, the war should belong to the mighty, not to the weak. How could Vietnam win the war? The answer lies in the concept *strength*. In the materialistic world of today the word *strength* tends to evoke the images of dollars and guns. However, this is only one side of the problem. The other side often seems to be hidden from sight. This is spiritual strength. The war mobilized all the hidden strength potential in every human being in Vietnam that fought for their country. And we, Vietnamese people, were inspired by the noble fight so strongly that each of us was raised spiritually to a level closer to that of saints and gods. At that level one is capable of doing things normally beyond human capacity. Today, like Japan at the beginning of the bubble economy period, Vietnam has become significantly wealthier over a decade of market economy. And like Japan, I believe, it is time for Vietnam to look back to where it was and reflect over the hidden strength which was so miraculously mobilized at some time in the past. To reflect over the values of that struggle. And to learn its lessons.

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It was like a dream. I mean, these days when I recall the morning I presented my talk about the Vietnam War and my teaching experience -- about their values --

at Tateshina Forum it appears like a dream to me. A dream full of light.

When I finished my talk Reiko looked at me and I saw so much light in her eyes and in her smile. I looked around and saw I was submerged in light. Dazzling light. I did not know where it came from. Then, suddenly, it dawned on me that it was from us. All of us. I have found it! I thought and a rush of holy joy filled my heart. At last, I have found what I have been painfully seeking for.

I was brought 20 years back in time. Yes, over 20 years ago, when I was teaching Russian to student candidates to the Soviet Union's universities, I used to have classes when I found myself covered in light like I was in that morning in Tateshina. After the collapse of the Soviet Union I happened a couple of times to have dark agonizing days. Still, those happy hours kept shedding their light on me to dissolve even the worst darkness, out of which I already lost hope to break away.

## HOME

After Tateshina days flew very fast. To bring my journey to a happy ending as it usually happens in a fairy tale. I have found home in Japan. There I have loved and been loved back. There I have found what I have been searching for. Through turbulence. How can it be obtained otherwise? Also, it, the journey, has opened in front of me new roads. I will embark on them with more faith in my TAM (roughly *my heart*).

May light from Tateshina and from those days follow me.

## H. T.

### Notes

1. International House of Japan is a non-governmental organization in Japan founded for the promotion of cooperation, mutual contact and understanding between intellectuals and people of Japan and other nations in the world.
2. Asian Leadership Fellow Program, created jointly by the International House of Japan and the Japan Foundation Asia Center in 1966, aims promoting mutual understanding and cooperation, the creation of a close personal networks among the "public intellectuals" who:
  - understand and have deep faith in the values of democracy and equality
  - are committed to create a public sphere of intellectual discussions by interacting with people, and to empower civil society
  - can articulate critical voices/discourse against the status quo and take action to propose alternative solutions and meaningfully intervene in public life and culture
  - are able to utilize their professions beyond their disciplinary boundaries and to motivate people for the common public good

The fellows of the ALFP 2002 are Hugo Tao (China), Vinod Raina (India), Maznah Binti Mohamad (Malaysia), Nguyen Thi Hieu Thien (Vietnam), Reiko Kinoshita (Japan).

3. The expression is borrowed from *Films, Zen, Japan*, an interview of Donald Richie, regarded as the leading Western authority on Japanese film, carried out by the Japan Times of September, 1st, 2002. Answering the question, "What are the impressions - in terms of smell, colour, sound - that you miss from the Japan of 1947?", he answered, " ... clutter. Tokyo now has the cleanest streets of any city in the world. The genetal, glorious, natural waste of clutter -- visually, I miss it very much because it was so human. Humans are really messy animals. "
4. This paper is published in *Inter-Asia Cultural studies*, Vol. 1, No 1, 2000; Routledge.
5. The part of the Mekong River that flows in Vietnam is called the Cuu Long River.
6. He is the current Director of the Center for Race and Ethnicity, Columbia University, the USA.
7. See *Films, Zen, Japan* in Japan Times of September, 1st 2002.
8. The war between Vietnam and the United States is called "Vietnam War" in the Western countries but Vietnamese people call it "War of Resistance Against American Imperialism."
9. This expression is borrowed from *Films, Zen, Japan*.

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# Redefining the Role of the Media: Challenges for the Freedom of Speech.

by Reiko Kinoshita

Let me begin by telling you about my personal experience of September 11<sup>th</sup>, 2001. By coincidence, I happened to be in Washington on that day. In the immediate wake of the Pentagon incident, I heard that the Red Cross were urgently calling for blood donations, and like many others decided to do my part. I arrived at the Washington DC blood donation center to find long lines of people, perhaps two or three hundred, all waiting to give blood.

By a further chance, I bumped into a limousine driver I knew. He was an Arab-American, and at pains to express how bad he was feeling about the attacks as a Muslim. These emotions had prompted him to come to the donor center and give blood.

As we waited, he described to me how Islamic society also suffers. Just behind us was seated a federal government worker who, overhearing our conversation, felt obliged to tell him how impressed she was by his words. She actually seemed almost moved to tears, and emotionally asserted that she must make an effort to better understand the Islamic community.

As a gesture of solidarity, she stretched out her hand to him to shake hands, but he could not take it. All three of us were stunned. He apologized, explaining that he was not permitted under his religion to make physical contact with a woman other than his own family members.

This incident dramatically confirmed for me how, despite people's efforts to show understanding in a multi-religious society, barriers still exist. That is very hard to digest. Most of America shakes hands as a matter of course, however what for most Americans is a straightforward act was utterly incompatible with the driver's beliefs. Despite a shared motivation (wanting to express solidarity at that critical time) the driver and the government worker could not find a shared cultural medium within which to do so. The chance encounter illustrated, in other words, how the desire to unite under the same flag can be obstructed by religious differences.

Immediately after 9-11, the headlines started to ring with words of war, and I began to feel uneasy. Was not what occurred on 9-11 a terrorist attack, I wondered, and therefore a criminal matter as opposed to an act of war? Once the linguistic framework of war is brought into play, however, people generally fall into line.

The message that 9-11 and Pearl Harbor were essentially the same was being broadcast over the airwaves as a matter of course, and the surprise attacks were even labeled "a second Pearl Harbor". The assumption behind this was obviously that surprise attacks and terrorism are one and the same thing. I started to feel very uncomfortable. Since the media is not just a world unto itself, but can have powerful influences on society, it has a responsibility to pay much closer consideration to its choice of vocabulary. As British propaganda

posters put it in the Second World War, "Careless talk costs lives" -- or at the very least, can risk escalating conflicts unnecessarily.

US-centered discourses increasingly dominate our globalized world, owing to the extended reach of the US media. September 11<sup>th</sup> has made this all the more obvious. It goes without saying that I feel unreserved sympathy for the casualties of 9-11. However, at the same time it seems to me that the media's response has lacked all sense of proportion and broader perspective. Perhaps we need reminding that of the number of casualties in Kashmir, Algeria, or East Timor are far in excess of the albeit awful toll taken on 9-11. In contrast to the apparently never-ending story telling surrounding that one American day last year, however, we never hear heroic deeds from these "far-flung" places. It seems that the American media is given to valuing "American life" more highly than other forms, and has lost all sense of balance.

What is more, we have heard innumerable human documents revolving around the victims of September 11<sup>th</sup>, but where are the terrorists stories being told? We are not sufficiently well informed about their personalities, their histories or their motivations. The US media needs to dwell on these aspects more deeply in order to present a fuller picture. In showing us only one side of the coin, it has failed its obligations to objectivity. Although more has emerged in recent months concerning the terrorists' own tales, analysis of the reasons why they felt that they had to turn to terror has still been left largely to Mr Matsumoto and his team at the Asahi Shimbun Newspaper in Tokyo, in their book 'Terorisuto no gunzou' ('A Portrait of Terrorists', printed by Soshisha).

It seems fair to say, therefore, that the US media, fixated by the images of what occurred a year ago, has not focussed sufficiently on concrete analysis of the destabilizing effects. Important questions have been left unaddressed. How far is it true, for example, that American politics has significantly changed since the events of 9-11? We know President Bush's reaction, but what of a more fundamental analysis? There has, similarly, been talk of World War III, but where is the analysis or proof? Without an intellectual engagement with the issues behind the issues, we are left with just opinions -- and potentially very dangerous opinions at that. The way to unravel terrorism is through a non-military, non-reactive response. Culturing such an environment is a life-or-death challenge for journalists.

Terrorism's wide-ranging impact on society, politics and economics seems likely to find a further tragic illustration in Bali. The effects of the Bali bombing may be extremely widespread. It seems likely that foreign tourists will associate Bali with the bombing, and that the tourist trade will be hit hard as a result. This has potentially very worrying implications for the entire Indonesian community. The whole of Indonesia has depended on the income derived from visitors to Bali, which has been a symbolic cash dispenser providing 50% of the tourist income in the Indonesian economy.

Pressures let loose in the wake of the Asian financial crisis led to the downfall of Suharto. A collapse in the Bali economy could similarly enflame ethnic conflict in this fractured country. Could it be possible that the overwhelmingly Hindu island of Bali might now be persuaded to seek separation

from the larger Muslim-dominated entity that is Indonesia? One attack, in other words, has threatened to alter a whole country in its social, economic and political aspects. Furthermore, we cannot expect that the effects will be limited to just Indonesia: the side effects could impact on every one of us in Asia.

Whereas I felt a hot anger about 9-11, I was filled with a kind of cold anger as it became obvious how the five Japanese kidnapping victims who have returned to Japan had been deprived of their mental freedom -- mentally damaged, indeed. It was obvious that this was itself a crime of state terrorism. On the one hand, President Bush's opinion regarding regime change is clearly over-simplistic -- it is after all not as simple as changing a hat or changing clothes. Although Bush is not normally overly concerned about more subtle considerations, there is clearly a complex political and social history underlying today's North Korea. Watching the five abductees on television, however, I agreed that the regime has to change.

All I have are questions, with few answers. What is the real meaning of the anti-terror war? Can it actually be waged successfully? What is the best approach toward solving the problem of international terrorism?

# IN AND OUT OF JAPAN: PUBLIC INTELLECTUALISM AND MAKING SENSE OF IDENTITY POLITICS, GLOBAL STRIFE AND INJUSTICE

by Maznah Mohamad

## Prologue

I imagine that most ALFP fellows who came before me would be lamenting the same way as I do -- that this is a really tricky final report to produce. After such a memorable and unique two-month stint what sort of report would do justice to the aims of the programme, to the efforts of the people behind the project and to the integrity of one's own personal development out of this experience? The guidelines supplied were wonderfully flexible; we were told that we could either submit a report that presents the findings of the "collaborative" research among us fellows, or, it could also be on any aspect of one's own experience in Japan. Needless to say such openness of requirement was the source of this difficulty in writing. How do I combine in this one report my expression of thanks, my proof of attentiveness towards the richness of the seminars given, my evidence of a learning-curve responsive to the stimuli of stirring field visits and my honest thoughts on how we fellows maintain a cautious but healthy respect for our mutual attempt at enlarging one another's personal horizons? And all at the same time making sure that the report is worth reading about and even gripping in its coherence of ideas, prose and substance?

It is a tall order. I can only try my best, if not my worst at producing this difficult paper. My account is a hotchpotch of thoughts and musings, and will not pretend to lay down problems and answers but will nevertheless attempt to frame a set of pertinent questions. It will try to deconstruct the concept of the Public Intellectual, probing questions such as -- is there any such entity, or category of people, and if so how does it make sense of identity politics, global strife and injustice? Can Japan, via the ALFP serve as a cultural template, or a base for the flow of knotty, subversive and hopefully all at once, fresh ideas to stream in and out of its political walls?

To simplify my task I have arranged this report into three parts, at first glance chronologically, although substantially, the themes may criss-cross and diverge from one another. This paper should thus be seen as a collage of my thoughts on public intellectualism, identity politics, global strife and injustice; thoughts interwoven while I move in and out of Japan. Really, this report should be read as three separate papers.

## Outside Japan:

*My Thoughts on The Unbearable Heaviness of Being a Public Intellectual in Malaysia*

As I prepared to leave for Japan in the month of August, 2002 I reflected on the meaning of the public intellectual by describing my own experience as a scholar and social activist. However, I first made the point that many thoughts on the engaged intellectual have already been traversed by various scholars such as Antonio Gramsci (1971), Paolo Freire (1974), Noam Chomsky (1989) and Edward Said (1994). They all tried to address the problem and meaning of the intellectual in their own way, but they were driven by a common intent -- to overturn a world increasingly shaped by concentrated power. Having said that I am not sure that I myself can categorically be called a public intellectual. Such a distinction can surely only be conferred by the knowing public and not something that is self-assumed.

Back in the late 1970s when I returned from my university education abroad, everything in Malaysia was either about to be changed or was in need of change. That was the mood that scholars of my generation found themselves caught in. The academic tradition was new in the country. Only a few state universities were being built and as academicians in such fresh settings, we were proud to be given the opportunity to shape young minds.

At the same time the state was strengthening itself. The modern nation-state was about to be overwhelmed with new notions of identity. Nationalism was not as unproblematic as most people had thought it to be. The simplicity of it all ended after people finished agreeing that the land must be rid of outsiders. Beyond that everything had to be fought for, and against one another – from language, to education, to who should live where, to what jobs which people should have, and when. People in the new post-colonial entity were either forced to, or wanted to live differently from before. They had to construct new meanings and ideas about their existence. Malays, Chinese, Indians and other indigenous communities found that they had to invent a formula for ‘national unity’, where as under colonial patronage they had existed relatively peacefully, in separate parallel worlds, albeit in an unequal way. In Malaysia, one aspect of this post-colonial rebuilding culminated in a rude, sharp shock in the form of the 1969 racial clashes. Although much questioning remains about the real motive, extent and spread of the conflict, the episode provided a defining moment for those who succeeded in seizing the power to affect change. The nationalists ultimately accepted the new terms of nationhood with the New Economic Policy (NEP) in place to structurally favour the advancement of the indigenous population. For some left-leaning intellectuals the NEP at least spelled out some recognizable goals of equity notwithstanding its racial nature. The switch of the schooling system to the national language was also accepted because people felt that the prerequisite of unity might lie in the use of a common language, a common curriculum and a centralized bureaucracy. The affirmative-action thrust of the NEP was ultimately accepted as the price for stability and national cohesion. The other price was the emasculation of democracy. Throughout the 1970s when the NEP was being put in place, numerous legislations to curb civil freedoms were passed. For many this was not even a heavy price to pay.

As scholars we were prepared to play a leading and strategic role in challenging the above process. We wanted to be the voice of critique and conscience for the system, we wanted to provide the checks and balances in society, we wanted to build new consciousness about class, gender and ethnicity. We wanted to build a more just society, with equality and welfare as the prime goals. We were wary of capitalism, aggressively seeking its prey at every turn of our lives. We denounced wily politicians and fawning bureaucrats.

In coming to terms with the above, a variety of choices existed for us. We could take the conventional road of academic scholarship and be content with pontificating sophisticated but obscure theories and debates within the cloistered world of teaching, research and publication. Or we could create two worlds for ourselves. There was to be one world where standards of academic merit would be exercised. The other would be the world of social activism. We felt we could draw clear boundaries between the two and didn't need to sacrifice our professional integrity in favour of partisan engagement. Of course this was not easy.

The other solution was to try to reconcile the two worlds, and in the process extract the mutual advantage of academia and activism, and enhance our personal stature within both the realms. However, there was danger that the conflation of popular inquiry with scholarship could be detrimental to both..

Still, the intellectual in the Third World somehow feels that s/he has to play a double role, as an activist and an academician. There is always a real or imagined perception that the social and intellectual capital in a developing society is hopelessly deficient. Hence the persistence of the push and pull factors for critical intellectuals to be involved in social activism. Changes in these societies are occurring so fast that the ones who reflect upon the repercussions of such changes will inevitably find themselves intertwined within its praxis. One sector of the intellectual class will readily yield to their cooptation by the state and function as the legitimizers of national policies. The other group will find themselves on the adversarial side of the state and mainstream scholars. They provide the other discourse and find themselves building new discursive outlets through which alternative consciousness, agendas and perspectives can be pragmatically applied. These scholars, rightfully called the public intellectuals, are the ones who would inevitably be drawn to civic organizations, like feminist, human rights, democratic, non-mainstream and radical religious movements.

But of late, with the entrenchment of neo-liberal economic agenda through privatisation and liberalization, the expansion of university education has been phenomenal in the country, accompanied however, by a drop in standards and quality of education. With more faith instilled in the fundamentalism of the free-market, social activism of the left has since been on the wane. Idealism of any persuasion has made way for crude economic pragmatism. In 1995, Malaysians voted overwhelmingly for their government (even with its extensive record of corruption and bad governance) to continue in power, signalling the

pointlessness of dissent. The credibility of the government was so assured in the wake of spectacular economic success in the 1980s and 1990s that buoyancy about 'the end of history' or the end of class politics became infectious. Public intellectuals worried about their source of support. With the economic boom and the growth of the new middle-class, empowerment through the sovereignty of consumerist rights was much easier to achieve than through civic engagement. There were simply more things to do for most people than to be involved in politics or to fight against an enemy which had by then become rather vague. The logic of this new system goes this way. While unscrupulous developers may have usurped the land-based lifeline of squatter communities they also compensated them with low-cost abode in high-rises with property titles to their names. While government may be corrupt, it was also creating more jobs for the erstwhile poor. While democracy was being battered, people were still granted the technical right of 'voting-out' the government, if they so desired, every four or five years.

As the authoritarian-developmental state basked in its 'performance-legitimacy' the role of university intellectuals gradually became limited to becoming agents for producing employable human resource. Many intellectuals within civic organizations and NGOs, despite carrying an inherent mission to check and balance state excesses and oversights, also began to craft their roles around acceptable conduct that could fit well into the rhetorical goals of nation-building, national unity and other agendas propounded by the national leadership. My unkind view is that Malaysia is either still a long way in establishing its sound intellectual, democratic and good governance tradition or that it has even degenerated from its heyday of a once nascent democratic revolution. The contribution of public intellectuals in this country is either ambiguous in nature or shunned as a voice on the fringe. Amidst rising middle-class affluence, political and social reforms are the elusive goals of an increasingly demoralized civil society.

### **The Limit of the Intellectual**

Coming back to the topic of a changing Asia of the last three decades, I observe that in this region the role of the intellectual is seldom debated. It is ambivalently accredited, and it is implicitly recognized as a necessary but not the most valuable form of human capital in a market-driven economy. In many states, not just the authoritarian ones, intellectuals are easily enticed to endorse populist national ideologies and provide the unity to ideas that further entrench the concentration of power, involving the nexus of state, bureaucracy and corporation. However, there are also others who resist this domination. But they have to do so at the margins of public space, that is beyond the grasp of state cooptation, and sometimes have to pay a heavy price for such exclusion. They risk their voices remaining unheard, and if they do succeed in overcoming control to permeate popular consciousness, they risk being violently shut out. Within our remembered and lived history what has been gained out of a

collective critical consciousness of the public intellectual? It's true that great social movements of Asia, beginning with anti-colonialism to economic development have depended on critical intellectuals to power their realisation. But the struggle to establish genuine democracies and truly sustainable national economies have also seen critical intellectuals falling by the wayside, unable to affect the tide of consensus or 'necessary illusions' as Noam Chomsky calls them, which sustains a public mood that shuns any confrontation with hegemonic power and domination. Either people are tacitly grateful for the system they inhabit, or they have ceased to find it worthwhile to oppose a potent but undefined enemy, or even, they would rather be part of the systemic ensemble that wins and profits from the perpetuation of unjust orders rather than be partisan to anything that upsets it. Which is why the role of the public intellectual is getting harder to fulfil.

Intellectuals provide an alternative imagination, but this may be dismissed as contemplative indulgence. Intellectuals may carry their conviction for justice based on compassion and moral faith, but this may be dismissed as naive romanticism. Intellectuals may engage in reflexive action, but this may be dismissed as destructive activism, a distraction from national interests. A rendition of failed encounters against the hegemony can go on endlessly. There is nevertheless the presence of will. We are confronted with a long list of global ills and shortcomings. A few examples below show that we need more than just intellect to take on every problem by its bullhorns. We need an enormous will to overcome enormous global woes such as:

- The worsening disparity between the richest nations and the poorest nations.
- The extreme conditions of deprivation from basic needs experienced by a large section of humanity.
- The existence of slavery everywhere in new guises—especially the condition of waged labour with no power nor rights nor even a sense of organization.
- The extensive ecological damage that is making way for more and more wealth-creating activities.
- The rise of non-rational challenges waged against a western-centric, secular and liberal order in the form of struggles for the rights of distinct and religious cultures, rather than merely rights of minority cultures.
- The shrinking room for values that fall outside the sphere of market-rational choices—concern for equity and equality giving way to prerogatives for efficiency and productivity.
- The increasing elusiveness of democracy and human rights as goals of the modern nation-state.
- The persistence of unabated death from disease, war, terror and destruction in almost every corner of the world.

That is not to say that only through the emergence of the critical intellectual, armed with an iron will, can we change and improve these conditions. But

without the critical input of the engaged intellectual through her eloquence and action, the malevolence that lurks behind the global process cannot even begin to be unravelled. Hence the role of the public intellectual must continue to be conceptualised and actualised, if a grim global reality is to be confronted and ultimately overturned.

### **Inside Japan:**

#### *A Haven of Tranquility, A Promise of Intellectual Lucidity*

Having written the stream of sketchy ideas and providing my own raw take on the meaning of the Public Intellectual, I journeyed to Tokyo on 1 September 2002. I landed to a balmy late summer weather. The humidity still hung in the atmosphere but the air was refreshing and the sun was gloriously blazing. Funnily, and happily I even felt a sudden sense of being carefree and liberated (after the mad rush of preparing for the trip, and dragged before this by the feeling of apprehension over the worth of the programme). But from day one, the two-month stint was not only extremely stimulating, it might even have been one of the best times of my life, given the sense of tranquility, and the lucidity in thoughts and movements that I experienced.

But technically I cannot decide whether the ALFP was akin to a lavish all-expense-paid intellectual study tour or an enriching, even if “forced”, collaborative research encounter among five disparate individuals. It was both actually, and I am thankful to the sponsors for enabling me to indulge in such an exceptional sojourn. It's the luxury of space, time and abandon that affords one to make sense of one's own intellectual journey (replete with its incessant crossroads and dead-ends) -- especially when given the opportunity to confront with that of others. In that way, the two-month period was indeed an intellectual discovery of many sorts for me. On the surface it was about absorbing information and insights about Japan, India, Vietnam and China, laced with the perennial discourse on identity, power, historicism and purpose. But beneath this, it was also about differentiating the nuances, ambivalences and discomforts in national experiences. It was about how best, and how worst to move forward or not at all --- with a hurried, stumbling pace catching up with what's in front, or with a slow, guarded shuffle fearful of leaving anything, something behind, or with a cold, impassioned forward strut, looking neither left nor right? But as we all discover, so much of the national experience is about moving forward that even the issue of memory and past haunting must be framed within the logic of its currency for the future.

On reflecting the two-month experience I start by trying to make sense of our three sets of activities. The first activity was the series of seminars given by scholars based in Japan, on various aspects of Japan's contemporary development. The second was our series of field trips during which we met with socially-engaged members of local communities. The third was the series of

informal and personal encounters and conversations we had with fellow members and staff of the ALFP secretariat. All three activities must be judged as having equal worth in shaping our impressions of Japan as well as enriching our own intellectual perspective in our fields of study and activism. The seminars on Japan were highly informative as well as stimulating. As a scholar and teacher in development studies I naturally found the seminars most beneficial in enlarging my scope of knowledge about another country in Asia. I discovered that Japan's post-war experience is still a minefield of untapped national outpourings and sentiments.<sup>2</sup> The field trips were a sobering eye-opener as we got to know of the less advertised 'underside' of Japan. It was one of the most valuable experiences that the fellowship has afforded me. In knowing the struggles of communities undergoing the travails and excesses of development we got to know the much richer and in many ways the stronger (not of the technological powerhouse) face of Japan. Our personal meetings and conversations also allowed us to bounce off our own particularistic experience with that of Japan's.

In Japan we met with many organic as well as public intellectuals who are specialists, who provided depth, meaning and credibility to social movements. They use their specialist knowledge in a way that allows for it to be translated into generalist concerns. The issue that pervaded global concerns while we were in Japan revolved around the subject of violence, terror and peace. The U.S and the United Nations were in the throes of debating and deciding on possible military action in Iraq. There have been views expressed in our seminars that resurgent nationalism and the economic downturn in Japan may augur for the opportunistic revision of Japan's 'Peace Constitution' and lead it down the slippery slope of re-militarization. In Kashmir, the state election held in September went on albeit the almost daily incidents of killings. And all of this was happening amidst the never-ending use of violence and counter-violence between the Palestinian freedom fighters and the Israeli state. On October 12<sup>th</sup> the world was rocked by the Bali Bombing incident. This was followed soon after by the hostage-taking incident in a Moscow theatre staged by Chechen rebels. This list of terror, *ad nauseum* and *ad infinitum* seems to mock us that the precursor to peace can only be violence. The tools of conflict-resolution in the form of diplomacy, democracy and decency all seemed to have broken down.

But Japan, throughout our two-month stay, appeared as an oasis of calm, order and almost perfect political-neutrality in the midst of global military alignments and re-alignments that were being worked out by the major powers in the world. However, this does not mean that the Japanese were unconcerned about events and issues around them, even if the issues that touch Japanese people the most are the ones affecting the future of their local economy, environment, education, and political and cultural purpose. For the record I would like to thank all the esteemed speakers of the seminars for giving me a valuable and insightful introduction to the many facets of Japan. And what I got was the image of a Japan that is very proud of its ability to ride the horrors and mistakes of the past, complacent in its present state of economic "comatose" and extremely

ambivalent of its role in the future. The field trips were the most memorable because of the opportunity to meet with a variety of people who were either the practitioners of development or themselves victims of it. I learned a lot about how social activism was practiced within the context of Japanese politics and cultural sensibilities. There is still a healthy though patchy search for the true meaning of pacifism, liberalism and freedom within the Japanese psyche, as described from an outsider's point of view.<sup>3</sup> Our informal gatherings and conversations with one another (fellows and staff of I-House and the Japan Foundation) were also most inspiring, both in an intellectual sense and in a human way. It was possible to connect and empathize with one another's cultural and political dilemmas.

If I may go back to theme of the fellowship programme, "The Roles of the Public Intellectual", I would like to say that the theme is as trite, as it is murky, as it is intriguing, all at the same time. But inherent in each concept, from 'roles' to 'changing Asia' and 'public intellectual' is the idea of 'moving out' and 'stepping ahead'. Needless to say, to have to think in those terms is somewhat of a personal burden. I think that all of us felt we were already involved in making our own especial, even if unnoticed, intellectual contribution to the well-being of our bounded nation, if not to the global, borderless community. Hence, I think we did not spend much of the two months mulling over this theme. However, I am quite sure that we were all touched by it in different ways. For me, I felt the obligation to sort out the difference between the straightforward meaning of the scholar-intelligentsia or the functional intellectual in service of the hegemonic state from that of the autonomous, critical, and reflective intellectual that is nurtured by the tradition of social activism. I am quite sure that it is through the cultivation of the latter, even if only conceptually rather than realistically, that this programme can be distinguished from all other similar fellowships in its uniqueness. Hence, I am grateful to have been a beneficiary of such a special endeavour, so meticulously organized and sponsored by the International Centre of Japan and the Japan Foundation.

### *Rethinking the Public Intellectual*

Why was the theme of the public intellectual chosen as the recurrent theme of the ALFP project? By looking at the previous years' reports, the issues of globalization, alternatives, local strategies and emancipation were tagged on as related concerns. I think that underneath this concern is the fact that people all over the world are looking for something new to replace or deal with the discomfort of contemporary developments. One of the reasons for this is the pervasiveness of capitalism as a globalizing and homogenizing force. We are also confronted by a situation wherein the state has become beholden to the market and assuming more and more of a corporatist function. The state used to be a site where citizens could hope to mount their challenge against the private interests of the dominant class. Today we have civil societies in many places unable to affect the tide of change in their favour.

Why the necessity to deconstruct, dissect, even decry the concept of the public intellectual then? I can only conjecture that first of all most people are in the dark as to where the impetus for social change will henceforth spring from. There are no large-scale social movements taking over the stage since the demise of the Left after the end of the Cold War. At the same time this vacuum of counter-hegemony is being filled by the rise of various non-rational movements, galvanizing around ethnic and religious identities. Secondly, there is the convergence and conflation of the market and the state. Civil society is ineffective in influencing the state, and worst in affecting the market. But market forces are also often undefined and ambiguous, making them even harder to deal with. So where are the social movements and their public intellectuals behind all of these emergent trends?

Grouping public intellectuals into two categories helps in clarifying the issue. The first group is what we might call the functional intellectual and the second is the category of critical and oppositional public intellectual.<sup>4</sup> On the first, the role of the functional public intellectual is mainly to legitimate the role of the state. These intellectuals may comprise academic scholars and scientific specialists. They maintain a façade of being apolitical, but in actual fact are the apologists, publicists and propagandists of government and market-favourable policies. The kind of civil society they cultivate would be a consensual one, devoted to 'problem-solving' within a circumscribed political framework. On the other hand, critical public intellectuals can be distinguished by their attempt at disseminating ideas that are counter-hegemonic, the ones that go against the grain and ultimately threatening to the *status quo*. They see themselves as representing the masses, interpreting popular demands into credible social needs and as a force capable of de-legitimizing the power of the dominant classes.

However, this ideal dichotomy or existence of points and counterpoints in the dynamics of social transformation is even usurped by current closing in of the public space. The public space whereby public intellectuals can even hope to assert their public authority is being narrowed. The media is either fettered by state powers or even if it exists in a democracy, it is getting increasingly concentrated in the hands of only a few, powerful owners. The other public space, the academy is also being transformed to restrict the voices of the critical public intellectual. As more and more public institutions such as universities are being put under centralized control or being privatized, the traditional intelligentsia will have little incentive in assuming its role as a critical public intellectual. What we are seeing instead, out of the above conditions of hegemony is the proliferation of more and more functional intellectuals in society. As the media evolves by the day to become a most powerful manufacturer of public tastes and opinions it needs to be propped up by pundits and intellectuals who bandy about crisp analysis and uncomplicated answers to thorny social problems. These are the intellectuals who give credence to a presupposed governmental or ruling clique's position. If the subject of national politics and global politics is to be avoided they can always provide the basis of

discernment for lifestyle choices. In Malaysia for example, as middle-class affluence and mass consumer power spreads, the media has become the great outlet and guide for the “good life” ideologues and followers. They include the medley of cultural critics, film reviewers and feel-good gurus. On an insidious side, intellectual debates involving critical public policies will also have their agenda set by the media. Any oppositional voice or voices that fall outside of the agenda are considered partisan in a sense of being in league with an oppositional party line, and hence subjective and illegitimate. In the end the Public Intellectual can no longer function in a milieu where there is a decline of public intellectual life and space. Speaking from perhaps an elitist or vanguard point of view I believe that the urgent need in responding to the above closures would be to restore the vibrancy of the public intellectual space first even before any pool of new public intellectuals can ever be hoped to be created. Unfortunately, speaking as a Malaysian, I feel that this much-needed space for the Public Intellectual has become scarce, deserted by the intelligentsia and feared by the masses due to the spreading tentacles of coercive politics.

### **Leaving Japan:**

#### *Reflecting on the Challenge of Islam in Southeast Asia*

Towards the end of October I began on another reflection. An issue most pertinent to my field of study and closest to my personal life is the issue of Islam. The theme of the symposium was decided by the fellows after much debate and deliberations. The selection of the theme was prescient. On October 12, ten days before the symposium, the bombings in Bali occurred. This simply drove home the point that the theme of the symposium which we decided upon, exactly a month earlier could not be more apt, unfortunate though the circumstance might be. I had already titled my talk, “Reflections on the Challenge of Islam in Southeast Asia” and used the Public Symposium as an opportunity to share my diagnosis of the root of political Islam in Southeast Asia with the audience. Below is the text of my presentation at the Public Symposium:

#### *Introduction to the Talk*

*The October 12<sup>th</sup> bombing incident which killed some 200 people in Bali as well as the smaller ones which occurred in Zamboanga and Manila a few days later have shed a pall of gloom over the region. People were jolted into realizing that terrorism had actually arrived at their doorstep. Last year's September 11 was still considered a faraway event since at the back of people's minds the target of the terrorists would be the West, rather than the Rest. People often forget that with globalization the presence of the East and the West can be anywhere and everywhere all at the same time. Hence, while the bombing may have occurred in the East last week the targets, it seemed were the West. The other irony is that while the perpetrators of September 11 were from the East, they resided in the West, were schooled in the West and hatched their plots in the West. Perhaps people's fears are not exaggerated when they find themselves vulnerable to violence and terror no matter where they are, who they are and even what they*

stand for (even if they stood for the cause of the perpetrators). Such is the peril of living in a fractured world that is at the same time magnificently fluid and porous.

### Regional Security Arrangement and US Presence

This climate of fear and uncertainty is providing the seeds for instability in Southeast Asia. And what is worrying about this is that it will have a direct repercussion upon the economy. It follows that what really worries Southeast Asian governments is the possibility of declining investor confidence. Already with the economic crisis of 1997, investments have been on the decrease in the region. This worry about the state of the economy will further invite another development, and that is changes to the future security arrangements of the region. Already in the Philippines, U.S. military presence has returned under the pretext of training the Philippine military to fight against the Abu Sayyaf rebels. Earlier during the year, the American government had already succeeded in getting Southeast Asian governments to agree to an anti-terror pact spelling out cooperation in the areas of information and intelligence sharing. There has also been tacit, if not open pressure to get governments to enact tougher, and by nature, more draconian legislations to deal with the issue of their homegrown militants. It was only about ten years ago the U.S dismantled its military bases in the Philippines and withdrew from the region, as soon as the Cold War ended and the Indo-China Peace settlement was achieved. Presently, there is much anticipation and speculation that the regional security arrangement will once again see active military influence if not intrusion of the U.S. into the region.

### Democracy and Human Rights Jeopardized

Yet another development that is worrying is that all of these measures to prevent terrorism will in all reality hamper, thwart and jeopardize the movement for democracy and human rights in the region. The case of Indonesia is worth noting in this respect. Soon after the fall of Suharto, Indonesian civil society was hopeful that they could finally work at establishing the rule of law, democracy and human rights in the country. Malaysian and Singaporean civil society was also embarking on an active campaign to repeal their four-decade old repressive law, the Internal Security Act (ISA) but since September 11 this campaign is falling more and more on deaf ears. A law like the ISA is euphemistically referred to as a preventive law. But preventive in actual practice implies detaining anyone, suspected of going against national interests, indefinitely; without access to legal counsel, often incommunicado, without charges and without trial. Just a few days ago Indonesia was forced to enact a similar legislation. All these laws are open to abuse and have been used so to arrest all kinds of dissidents, even the legitimate ones who operate within the bounds of the constitution.

### Source and Origins

Since the source of these new developments is linked to the rise of political and radical Islam it is thus important to understand the origin of this new movement or 'threat' as some factions would like to see it. For me, on reflecting upon this phenomenon it is important to

make a distinction in the two phases of the evolution of political Islam. The first phase in which a politicized or distinctive Islam emerged is what I would call its parochial-nationalist phase. The second phase is the phase of transnational and globalized Islam.

### Nationalist-Parochial Phase

This phase is characterized by Islamic communities fighting to retain their autonomy and colonization against foreign powers. The cases of Aceh and Mindanao are its examples. The Moros of Mindanao had struggled against Spanish rule since the 16<sup>th</sup> century and they continue till today to resist what they see as the domination of the Christian north against them. Similarly, the Achenese in Sumatra also have a long history of fighting against the Dutch colonizers and were in fact successful in remaining an autonomous region while the rest of Indonesia succumbed to Dutch colonization. Hence, when the independent Republic of Indonesia was conceived, Achehnese resisted the move to include their autonomous region as part of the newly created nation-state.

Islam during this nationalist phase also rallied a sector of the indigenous population that was marginalized by the colonial ruling elite. In Malaysia, rural Malays and those who were educated in the Middle-East saw themselves as another class opposed to those who were favoured by the colonialists and had their education in English schools and were educated in the West. Those who were not part of the ruling and colonial circle found themselves gravitating to Islamic movements. In many Muslim societies the earliest mobilization of people against colonialism was led by Islamic scholars and clerics.

During this nationalist-parochial phase there was little contact among Muslims from different regions in the world. The form of Islam that was practiced had a very local character. In fact there was a lot of infusion of local customary traditions into Islam, as well as those found within Hinduism and Buddhism. So at this period Islam was distinct from one region to the other, and from one continent to the other.

### Transnational-Global Phase

It was much later that the second phase evolved and this is what I would call the transnational or global phase of Islam. This began from around the 1970s and continues to the present time. The developments precipitating this phase of Islam were many.

First, it is tied to the politics of the Cold War itself. During this period the greater enemy that was pitted against the so-called Free World was Communism. The ideological propaganda waged during this time was to use all kinds of cultural systems to demonize communism. Islam was conveniently employed to oppose communism, projected as being atheistic, anti-god and anti-religion. The 1965 massacre in Indonesia, wherein an estimated one to two million members and sympathizers of the Communist Party of Indonesia (PKI) were eliminated was not only waged by the military but also by the members of the Islamic mass movement the Nadhlatul Ulama (NU) (Zurbuchen, 2002; 572). When the CIA used this familiar strategy in Afghanistan to fight the Soviets it was very successful. Not only that, it succeeded in building an

*international network and brotherhood of Islamic fighters. Muslims from all over the world were recruited by the CIA to be trained in Afghanistan and to fight alongside the Afghans against the Soviets. When these fighters returned to their individual countries they were fired up and set up their own movements.*

*The second development which fed into the resurgence movement was the oil boom in the Gulf states and Saudi Arabia. The wealth which was created overnight in these states allowed some of the money to be channeled to other Muslim countries around the world. It so happened that the Gulf states and Saudi Arabia were also practicing the most conservative and fundamentalist Islam. So with the money they also exported this particular tradition of Islam. One cannot underestimate the power of such overflowing funds in contributing to the resurgence of fundamentalist, or to be more precise, the literalist Islam. The authentic model of Islam which the leaders preached was one based on the 7<sup>th</sup> century model of Islam, the period during which Prophet Muhammad lived. This was the period when the Prophet established his first city-state in Medina. Literalist Islam essentially meant following the words (revelations) of the Quran as closely as possible and to emulate the ways and traditions of the Prophet (Sunnah) as closely as possible too.*

*The third important development which further provided impetus to this resurgence was the Iranian revolution in the late 1970s. When the Islamic clerics were successful in overthrowing the secular regime of the Shah and established the first Islamic State by popular revolution in the world it had the effect of radicalizing many Islamic movements, especially the ones led by youths.*

*Yet another reason which led to the 'overnight' revivalism of fundamentalist Islam was the question of identity itself. Islam had become a new basis for reinventing or strengthening ethnic identities. In Malaysia the identity of Malay quickly became indivisible from Islam as the resurgence picked up momentum. In Malaysia, a sense of economic inferiority experienced by Malays living in the midst of other more successful communities forced many to adopt a more universalized identity which was considered to be more powerful. In Malaysia, because of the multi-ethnic structure of society, Malays who are the indigenous community experienced a new sense of empowerment when they took on a clearly-defined Islamic identity. Islam was considered more global and universal. Old Islamic practices that had been meshed with local customs and other religions were abandoned for this so-called more pristine authentic Islam.*

*This second, transnational phase of Islam leads to its present dominant character, viz.,*

- *Fundamentalist-literalist*
- *Islamic movements have widespread networking and cross-border contacts*
- *Aim of these movements would be to work at setting up an Islamic state within the national borders first.*
- *Eventually to realize the institution of the Islamic Caliphate that would govern the international Islamic community or Ummah.*

## Violence

*Now I come to the question of violence. Is violence then the necessary method in achieving all of the above aims? I argue strongly that violence is not an inherent value in Islam but it may be used as an instrumental value when the believers feel that they are being threatened. The perception is that violence will be used to defend Islam against its perceived enemies, especially those that are perceived to hinder and obstruct Islam.*

*As far as the concept of Jihad or holy war is concerned some of the radical Islamic group may have wanted to emulate the prophet. In the 7<sup>th</sup> century the Prophet was persecuted in Mecca when he started to preach Islam (Doran, 2002; 177-190). He escaped to another city called Medina and successfully set up a model city-state using Islamic principles of governance. Subsequently when he had built his own independent power base he waged war against the unbelievers in Mecca and successfully converted the population to Islam.*

*I am not trying to make any assertions here or to try to explain the motives of the terrorists but the obsession to emulate the ways of the Prophet may have driven some to invoke violence justified by the concept of jihad. But as far as my personal experience in Malaysia goes, I haven't seen the necessity of Islamic groups to use force or violence to carry out their mission of deepening and spreading Islam. They have actually been very successful at Islamizing society or influencing more people into their fold through the tactics of cultural coercion, intimidation and invocation of divine-sanctioned authority.*

*Tactically, the use of violence by some Islamic groups would only serve to discredit fundamentalist Islam. The end result would be of two kinds. First, one-half of professed Muslims today will veer towards more moderation and become less dogmatic in their beliefs. However, the other half will feel even more threatened due to the increase of negative propaganda against Islam today. Furthermore, the Palestinian-Israeli violence has not abated and the threatened military action against Iraq by the US will likely come into effect – all these will potentially drive the other-half of the Islamic believers to become more hardened and militant.*

## Solution and Prospects

*It is dangerous to apply the Cold War model to frame the analysis and solution to the threat of terrorism associated with extremist Islam. It was easier to demonize Communism because it was essentially a modern ideological movement focused upon relations based on production and economic structures. Although it may be considered a sacred doctrine among its many followers its essence is devoid of the 'sacred'. With Islam it is different. Islam is not just an ideological system born in this century, but it is also a deeply entrenched culture with roots that go very far back in history.*

*The challenge in creating an Islam that would co-exist, even integrate peacefully with modern realities is to distinguish the repressive, literalist Islam from its compassionate,*

*tolerant and liberating variant. It is definitely not easy today given that there is this thin line between an Islam that is pristine and one that is extremist, just as well as there is this thin line between an Islam that is liberal and an Islam that is considered too open-ended. The problem is that the only solution that is being used today is of the coercive, militaristic and repressive. In this way, there could be success in obliterating the messenger but not the message. No apparent and concerted ideological programme or cultural instrument is being used today to undo the source and origins of political Islam which I described earlier.*

*What we are witnessing is that democracy and human rights are being sacrificed, as more and more ineffectual governments try to enact draconian legislations and measures to legitimize their own politically unstable positions. This is victory for the extremists because they are succeeding in chipping away the very foundations of the democratic, and secular order. The challenge is, can violence, in both its palpable and culturally insidious form be overcome by peaceful means? And finally, can we promote democracy and human rights relentlessly when these are the very institutions that will be the easiest and the first to be sacrificed in our desperation to protect ourselves against fear?*

## **Celebrating the Positive**

As a follow-up to the above questions which formed the closing lines of my speech at the Public Symposium I would also like to ask if there is any role for the public intellectual to play in mitigating humanity's slide down the slippery slope of mass destruction? I believe that issues explicated in my presentation above will dominate current concerns of activists and academics. But we must at the same time be wary about this outlook. The global focus has been too narrowly framed to view the misdeeds of evildoers as simply emanating from a system of beliefs involving religion and culture. This narrowness of perspective and prejudice can serve as a trap – to close off minds and the development of thinking about the various sources of injustices and inequality in the world. Here I would like to reiterate my earlier points that the list of global woes is an extensive one. It ranges from pervasive and worsening poverty among a large section of humanity to pervasive and worsening state of disparity between the richest nations and the poorest nations. An unequal world order could well be the greatest source of our problems today. But how many people dare to upset the current orthodoxy about the urgency of allowing a few benevolent superpowers to deploy their extraordinary military prowess to supposedly restore safety, security and stability for all of humanity?

But I must also affirm that the role of the public intellectual is not only to expose the gloom and doom that has befallen the world, it is also to make known the other, brighter side of human existence. Just as it is important for intellectuals to unravel misdeeds it is also crucial that they help in highlighting the interstices and spaces within which society has found hope and sustenance. The optimism shared by a cross-national civil society in being able to network and organize on a global level is something that should be celebrated. The

ingenuity of resistance movements to appropriate tools such as the Internet for their own advantage is also something to cheer about. It is also a comforting thought to know that the will of belligerent national governments is never necessarily the will of their people. One other hope for those harmed by the unequal global order today is the fact that the strength of such an order, built on the backs of finance capital and corporate greed has shown its numerous cracks, here and there, no matter how resilient it is made out to be. Of course the contest is still one-sided and hegemony is not easy to smash but it helps to know that through a strong global civil society and communication avenues like the Internet, intellectual exchange programmes and international people's fora, there is still room for dissent and addressing disquiet over the insufferable state of things and beings. This is the space that is in need of defence by the public intellectual who must depend on it all at the time to articulate, write, propound and act on behalf of the other half of humanity-- the embattled half, the dispossessed half and the un-mesmerized half.

Despite the pessimistic diagnosis of a deteriorating state of identity politics, global strife and injustice, I would like to end this rambling piece of "intellectual ranting and raving" by believing that the future holds many possibilities, and I look forward towards making this world a more equitable, if not enjoyably bearable place to be. Every little attempt, the ALFP included, must have left something of a legacy for all of us to work upon towards achieving this end.

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<sup>1</sup>The first part, titled "Outside Japan" is an extract of my notes, "The Roles of Public Intellectuals in Changing Asia" submitted in late August to the International House of Japan before I left for the two-month stint. The second part "Inside Japan" is the real "meat" of this report, in the sense that it captures my own cogitation of ideas during the ALFP period. Thematically it is partly a rethinking of the concept of the Public Intellectual and partly a stream of ruminations of the actual two-month experience. Finally, the third part, titled, "Leaving Japan" contains a write-up of my presentation for the Public Symposium, "Violence, Terror and Peace: Problems of Identity in a Fluid World" held on October 22, 2002 at the I-House.

<sup>2</sup>After visiting Hiroshima and listening to the accounts of one of the survivors (hibakusha) I sense that Japan still straddles a dual identity of between wanting to have everything out in the open and approaching history (and memory) with great caution still. Lisa Yoneyama's idea of "innocence" strikes me as appropriate in capturing this syndrome. She asserts that, "the memories of Hiroshima's destruction, secured within the global narrative of the universal history of humanity, has thus sustained, at least in the dominant historical discourse, a national victimology and phantasm of innocence throughout most of the postwar years." (Yoneyama, 1999; 13).

<sup>3</sup>One of the more fascinating figures in propounding liberalism in Japan was Masao Maruyama. In a way he was describing an "Asian" malaise of having to function within a "closed" worldview which is also at the same time manipulated by official ideology. Even if Japan were to function within a democratic structure weaknesses of such a nature would still be, "... an invitation to abuse by an unscrupulous authority...". (Kersten, 1996; 125).

<sup>4</sup>I would like to borrow the two terms from David Kellner who distinguishes, "...functional intellectuals who serve to reproduce and legitimate the values of existing societies" from, "...critical-oppositional intellectuals who oppose the existing order. To quote him further, "...oppositional intellectuals voice their criticisms in the name of existing values which they claim are being violated (i.e. truth, rights, rule by law, justice, etc.) and sometimes in the name of values or ideas which are said to be higher potentialities of the existing order (i.e. participatory democracy, socialism, genuine equality for women and blacks, ecological restoration, etc.). Functional intellectuals were earlier the classical ideologues, whereas today they tend to be functionaries of parties or interest groups, or mere technicians who devise more efficient means to

*obtain certain ends, or who apply their skills to increase technical knowledge in various specialized domains (medicine, physics, history, etc.) without questioning the ends, goals, or values that they are serving, or the social utility or disutility of their activities. Functional intellectuals are thus servants of existing societies who are specialists in legitimation and technical knowledge, while oppositional intellectuals are critics who struggle to create a better society.” (Kellner, 1997)*

# ENVIRONMENTAL AND TRADE IMPLICATIONS OF CHINA'S WTO ACCESSION -- A PRELIMINARY ANALYSIS

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## 1. Introduction

### 1.1 Summary of impacts of China WTO accession on the economy structure

China has become a member of WTO in Doha Ministerial conference in 2001. China's accession to the WTO will have great influence on China's foreign trade in terms of volume and structure. Under the agreement between China and the United States, China's policy will have the following changes after it becomes a WTO member: average tariff reduction for agricultural products from 22.1% to 17%; average industrial tariffs on U.S. products will fall from 24.6% in 1997 to 9.4% by 2005; elimination of all export subsidies; further opening of the market for agricultural products; implementation of a "tariff-rate quota" system for wheat, maize, rice and cotton; phase-out state control over trade in soybean oil; increasing textile exports; opening of the retail market and service sectors including legal, accounting and medical services; 100% foreign ownership for hotels; opening of tourism and the video and audio product markets; and importing more foreign films, at least 20 each year to double the present number. The auto industry will be expanded, reducing car tariffs each year from the present 80-100% to 25% by the year 2006 and allowing loans for car purchasing. The telecommunication industry will also be open, allowing foreign investors to own 49% of shares in communication services and increasing to 50% after two years. Foreign investors are allowed to invest in the Internet market and banking business will also be open, allowing foreign banks to handle Chinese currency for Chinese companies two years after China's accession to the WTO. The banking sector will be completely open after five years of being a WTO member and sectors such as brokerage, security, bond and insurance will also be open.

According to the quantitative estimates by a CGE model by Li Shantong of the Development Research Centre of the State Council<sup>1</sup>, when China fully fulfills its WTO commitments by 2005, its GDP will have increased to 195.5 billion yuan RMB (1995 price, in contrast to non-accession), which equals US\$ 23.55 billion. These would account for approximately 1.5 per cent and 1.2 per cent of China's GDP that year (China's Tenth Five-Year Plan estimates that China's GDP growth rate in the 2001-2005 period will be 7%). The income increase of the WTO membership is mainly due to high efficiency resulting from

global resource re-allocation according to comparative advantage. This means China will participate in the division of labour internationally and share efficiency benefits of the integration into the world economy. For sectors that are capital intensive and under high protection of the state, such as auto, equipment and instruments, as well as cotton, wheat and those under high protection by agricultural departments, their output value will decrease greatly. However, sectors that are labour-intensive, like textile and clothing, will be the beneficiaries. The world exporting market for labour-intensive products and the importing market for primary agriculture commodities would be greatly affected. The share of China's clothing exports in the international market would meanwhile increase by 10 per cent and the import of land intensive agricultural commodities would also greatly increase. In the year 2010, China will probably become the most important agro-product importing country after Japan. In general, the tertiary industry in China will develop greatly after China's WTO accession. The proportion of the secondary industry in the economic structure would further grow, while the primary sector would shrink. According to the calculation by Huang Jikun of the Chinese Academy of Agricultural Science, grain production within the agricultural structure would decrease substantially while livestock production increasing greatly.<sup>2</sup>

## **2. Potential Environmental Impacts of China's WTO Accession**

After China joins the WTO, the opening of the market and changes in the trade structure and volume will lead to tremendous changes in China's economic structure. Changes in the economic structure will have great potential environmental impacts in China. These include impacts on industrial pollution, the state of the ecological environment environmental management and environmental industries. This section discusses these possible impacts.

### **2.1 Impacts on pollution in industrial sectors**

With WTO membership, China is likely to substantially increase its exports. This may lead to rapid production expansion in certain sectors, which would undoubtedly add new pressures to the environment. However, one of the most important changes in China's WTO accession will be China's participation in global re-allocation of productivity elements such as land, labour, capital and natural resources. It will help China restructure its overall economic configuration. If this takes place properly, the pollution elasticity of per unit of change will be presumably higher than the pollution elasticity of the volume change. With overall changes in the industrial structure, the pollution level would probably decrease gradually over a long-term period compared to non-accession. This is because environmental pressure would likely stick to the following trend: low value-added and labour-intensive industries which usually perform poorly in financial and environmental terms will, along with the investment direction, be transferred from developed countries in Europe, the United States and Japan to China, and then from eastern China to central and

western China, and from China to other even poorer regions like Indochina countries, Africa etc. Industrial restructuring induced by trade expansion will be conducive to tackling industrial pollution at its sources and also to addressing non-point source pollution problems of chemical fertilizers and pesticides in the agriculture sector, if proper policies are put in place.

After China accesses to the WTO, productivity elements such as land, labour, capital and natural resources will be re-allocated internationally, which may help China reorganize its industrial structure. A general perception based on qualitative analysis could be:

- Labour-intensive industries such as manufacturing, livestock and handcraft would further expand;
- Intelligence/intellectuality-intensive and knowledge-intensive industries including information, telecommunication, consulting, community services, education and culture, etc. would grow further;
- Land-intensive industries such as plantation, grain production and traditional husbandry would decrease;
- Capital-intensive industries would largely increase, including banking, security, insurance, brokerage, tourism, real estate, education and culture;
- Pollution-intensive industries will vary from the east to the west of China. Generally speaking, environmental pressure would increase in central and western regions but decrease in eastern regions.

Quantitative estimates by the CGE model of the Development Research Centre of the State Council predict that the proportion of the tertiary industry in the national economy structure would greatly increase in the future while the proportion of the primary and secondary industries including traditional manufacturing, processing, grain production and husbandry would substantially shrink.

With the increase in the proportion of the tertiary industry and the decrease in the proportion of the primary and secondary industries after China joins the WTO, the overall pollution in China will most likely drop gradually in comparison with the baseline pollution level before China becomes a WTO member. WTO accession will be an historic opportunity for China to restructure its economic structure.

International experiences have proved that rational economic restructuring would help eliminate industrial pollution emissions at their source as well as non-point source pollution caused by the use of fertilizers and pesticides. It is a far more effective measure than direct pollution control. Japan underwent economic restructuring in the 1970s; it transferred its low value-added and labour-intensive polluting industries to other southeast Asian countries while developing its electronic industry at home. In doing this, it gained both economic growth and environmental benefits. Restructuring is also one of the measures now highly recommended by the World Bank in addressing environmental problems.

The Chinese government can take the opportunity of WTO accession to restructure its economic and industrial structures rationally, eliminating old industries that have low efficiency, high pollution and high energy consumption

and replacing them with high technologies, high efficiency, low pollution and low energy consumption. Enterprises that intend to expand and develop in the international market will have to undertake technology innovation on one hand and on the other hand undergo systematic reform, establish a modern industrial system, strengthen their development forces and establish incentive or disincentive mechanisms. They will also have to learn advanced and modern management experience from abroad.

Rational restructuring can help eliminate industrial pollution emissions at their sources. In a long-term period, overall environmental pollution will be reduced and environmental quality improved. This is a more effective way to control pollution than the end-of-pipeline control used in the past and even cleaner production practiced at present.

It should be also noted that although restructuring through trade liberalization is likely to reduce pollution per unit of output, there is a concurrent risk of increased output volumes negating the gains per unit. To prevent this from happening, appropriate policy measures are needed. Most developed countries have found it necessary to utilize multiple standards to deal with environmental problems created by economic growth; these include emissions standards, environmental quality standards, product and process standards, use standards and disposal standards. China also needs to adopt such a structure to control scale effects of pollution after WTO accession.

## **2.2 Impacts on the state of the environment**

After China's WTO accession, if appropriate policy measures are taken to facilitate rational industrial restructuring and effectively address environmental problems, the volume of wastewater discharges to the environment will probably be reduced due to more and better treatment being enforced. Although environmental pressure on air quality will also be reduced in general, air quality in urban areas will likely worsen. There is a possibility that the import and export of wastes will grow and the trend in ecosystem degradation probably slow down and even be reversed.

### **2.2.1 Water**

Wastewater discharges in different sectors will vary along with the changes in industrial structure after China's WTO accession. The preliminary qualitative estimate of overall impacts on water is that total contaminated water into the environment would slightly decrease. This would mainly because pollution caused by non-point source from grain production accounting for a fairly large proportion of the total contaminated water into the environment. Take Taihu Lake as an example, 40% of wastewater containing nitrogen and phosphorus come from agriculture production.

As the partial equilibrium modelling by Chinese Academy of Agricultural Science predicts, although China's accession to the WTO will have adverse

impacts on China's agricultural production (Huang, 1999), the export of livestock products is likely to expand. The textile industry will see tremendous development. Other traditional industries such as iron and steel are likely to slow down. Both the tertiary industry and residential water consumption will grow. How the water environment will be affected depends on the following sectors:

- *The grain production sector:* this sector will see reduction in use of chemical fertilizers and pesticides and therefore a reduction of non-point source pollution (presumably, substantial domestic production of rice, wheat, maize and bean, etc. will be replaced by foreign exports due to price disadvantages);
- *The livestock industry:* there is likely to be an increase of point-source pollution in this sector with increase of livestock manure;
- *The textile industry:* this sector will see an increase of wastewater discharges;
- *The iron and steel industry:* there will be a decrease of wastewater discharges as this sector is likely to slow down; and
- *The tertiary industry and residential consumption:* there will be an increase in wastewater discharges from the tertiary industry and residential consumption.

### 2.2.2 Air

After accessing to the WTO, China is likely to increase the import of clean energy such as petroleum and natural gas, which would enlarge the proportion of such clean energy and reduce the proportion of coal in China's energy structure. Therefore, environmental pressure resulting from energy consumption on air quality is likely to reduce.

However, the situation in urban areas could be quite different. Given the tariff reduction for automobiles, the import of cars will greatly increase as a result of price reduction. Therefore, the automobile purchasing rate by consumers in urban areas is likely to increase at an estimated rate of 5 per cent to 10 per cent annually. Meanwhile, existing old cars will continue to emit presumably much more air pollutants than newer cars. Moreover, there are other major sources that are likely to cause urban air pollution including domestic heating and industrial emission from existing sources. Compared to the baseline level before WTO accession, the increase of car consumption will bring greater pressure to urban air. Without taking adequate measures to enhance pollution control, particularly pollution caused by the increase of automobiles in urban areas, serious air pollution is likely to take place.

### 2.2.3 Solid wastes

Given the probable shrinking of the secondary industry and the growth in the tertiary industry after China becomes a WTO member, industrial solid wastes are likely to decrease with appropriate control measures. However, municipal wastes are likely to increase with urban expansion.

Meanwhile, with the increase of trade volumes and opportunities, there is a

possibility of increasing the import of wastes from developed countries if no adequate controls are in place. There is also the likelihood that wastes would be exported from China to poorer countries.

#### **2.2.4 Impacts on ecosystem**

Since 1996, China has paid as much attention to ecological conservation as to pollution control. Nevertheless, ecological conservation and reconstruction projects are very difficult to carry through because of China's self-sufficient agricultural policy.

After accession to the WTO, China could greatly increase its import of timber and timber products to protect its forest resources, and to use both international and domestic markets to maintain food security for its 1.2 billion people. With WTO membership, average tariffs for agricultural products will be reduced from 31.5% to 14.5-15% within five years and a tariff-rate quota system will be applied for products such as wheat, rice and cotton, the import of these products (mainly land-intensive products) will greatly increase as they lose competitive advantages. Labour-intensive products like fruit, vegetables and livestock products could be developed faster given the comparative advantages of such products.

From the environmental protection perspective, the increased import of land intensive agricultural products such as grain means reduction of land utilization, reduction of chemical fertilizers and pesticides use, reduction of agriculture plastic film pollution and reduction of straw pollution caused by agricultural production. In this sense, after China's WTO accession, more agricultural products will rely on the international market. It will be conducive to addressing agricultural non-point source pollution, which is a daunting task at present. It could also make it possible to carry out reforestation and afforestation projects in remote and mountainous areas. This would apparently help China greatly reduce environmental pressure in rural areas and fundamentally halt the trend of ecological degradation resulting from economic development. Meanwhile, appropriately guided use of foreign investment would help carry out ecological reconstruction projects, if the Chinese government formulates appropriate incentive policies to encourage the investments.

At the same time, China's trade establishment should be cautious not to adopt trade policies that encourage exporting of products having detrimental environmental impacts simply for the purpose of keeping trade balance between import and export after China becomes a WTO member. Exporting of such products will cause significant environmental impact. For example, excessive expansion of tin exports is likely to result in serious environmental problems in the tin mining process, unless sufficient investment is put in environmental protection, which will permit increased production with lower pollution.

#### **2.3 Impacts on environmental management**

From the perspective of environmental management, China's accession to the

WTO will provide China with good opportunities to improve its environmental management and make China's environmental management system and standards gradually conform with those of the international levels.

First, the complete market opening would make China's environmental management authorities face many new issues. To better manage its environmental regime, the authorities need to learn from the advanced experiences from abroad, standardizing its management system and making it gradually conform to the internationally practiced system.

Second, China's environmental management standards need to be revised in order to meet the requirements of the importing countries. The WTO encourages free trade while at the same time allowing governments to take appropriate measures to protect human health, animal and plant health, natural resources and the environment. Therefore, environmental measures are sometimes used as a non-tariff barrier. With WTO membership, China will have to re-consider its environmental standards and make efforts to coordinate with developed countries to reduce transaction costs for its exports.

Third, trading under the WTO rules requires a market-oriented system, and the separation of enterprises from the government is inevitable. Such a separation makes it easier for the government to regulate enterprises in terms of environmental management without considering too many social, economic and political issues.

## **2.4 Impacts on the environmental industry**

After China's WTO accession, the environmental industry in China as a whole will develop rapidly, not only in scale but also in terms of the technology level; it will become a sector with a substantial scale. Presently, China continues to increase investment in environmental protection, and the market for the environmental industry is prospectively promising. After China becomes a WTO member, more and more foreign environmental companies are likely to enter China's market. Given fewer barriers for foreign investors to invest in China, foreign companies, with their advantages in capital, management skills, technology and human resources, can establish joint ventures and wholly foreign-owned enterprises and even form entities by ways of acquisition or recombination of China's environmental enterprises, according to the rule of the market economy. This means major upgrading of this industry not only in scale but also in terms of the technology level, if proper policy measures are taken.

However, China's environmental industry, which is now mainly comprised of TVEs, would not be able to compete with foreign companies in terms of technology, management and scale. This would substantially affect China's environmental industry and "force" it to increase its competitiveness. Without appropriate adjustment, China's environmental enterprises are likely to go bankrupt and come under the control of international capitals. Facing such a great challenge, China's national environmental industry needs to be reformed or it would go bankrupt.

Under WTO General Agreement on Trade in Services, the environmental

services sector is one of the sectors encouraged to liberalize. In facilitating China's WTO accession negotiations, the Ministry of Foreign Trade and Economic Cooperation worked out a schedule of specific commitments for liberalizing trade in environmental services in China in 1995. After China's accession to the WTO, this sector will be gradually opened. Importing foreign advanced environmental management skills, coupled with their advanced technology, will help China meet its environmental protection needs and promote sustainable development. On the other hand, opening this sector to foreign environmental service suppliers may impede the development of the newly developed domestic environmental services sector. The challenge for China will be how to maximize the benefits of liberalizing this sector, while at the same time providing necessary protection to the development of its own sector. It is important for China to meet such a challenge under the WTO rules and obligations.

### **3. Environment-related Trade Implications and Other Trade-related Environmental Implications**

In addition to domestic environmental impacts, China's WTO accession would also have some environment-related trade implications and other trade-related environmental implications. These include the impact of green consumer challenges in the international market on Chinese exports, environmental challenges of increased foreign investment inflows and the impact of increased imports of resource-based products on the global environment. WTO membership will also require China to adjust its trade and environment policies to ensure consistency with rules of the world trading system in support of environmental protection and sustainable development.

#### **3.1 Impacts of green consumerism in the international market on Chinese exports**

WTO membership will provide China with tremendous opportunities to expand exports, as China will enjoy stable multilateral preferential trade policies under a rule-based system and its trading partners will have to reduce arbitrary tariff-rates and measures imposed on China's exports. As mentioned earlier, China's WTO membership will mostly benefit China's labour-intensive products like textiles, toys, leathers and other light industry products. Taking the textile and garment industries as an example, their products are expected to benefit considerably from WTO membership. At present, about 25 per cent of Chinese textile exports, worth \$US10 billion value, are under the restriction of quotas imposed by European countries and the United States. With WTO membership, China will greatly benefit from the Uruguay Round Agreement on Textiles and Clothing. China's textile exports are expected to grow substantially by 2005<sup>3</sup>, while garment exports will double. The toy industry is another sector that will benefit from WTO membership.

In the agriculture sector, although exports of Chinese primary products such

as wheat, corn, rice, edible oil, cotton and sugar are likely to shrink (due to price disadvantages), fruits, vegetable and husbandry products are likely to obtain competitive advantages in the international market.

However, there will be some potential environmental challenges for these Chinese exports in the international market. The current international market is changing rapidly in response to consumer's preference for environmentally friendly products, and stringent environmental regulations in other countries. There is an increasing public perception in developed countries that trade liberalization needs to consider environmental and other social values. Chinese exports are likely to encounter green challenges due to more stringent environmental regulations and other voluntary environmental measures in response to green consumers' choice in these countries. Textiles, toys, and food products are most likely to encounter environmental measures in foreign countries.

Studies undertaken by the Working Group on Trade and Environment of the China Council for International Cooperation on Environment and Development on impacts of environmental standards and other voluntary environmental measures in other countries clearly indicate that measures taken by other countries for the purpose of the environment, health and plant and animal protection will cause impacts on China's exports, such as the German ban of 108 Azo dye stuff and the ban imposed by the U.S., Canada and EU on untreated wooden packaging materials.<sup>4</sup>

An APEC study indicates that environmental regulations and standards in the U.S., Japan and European countries have mainly impacted 24 categories of products in APEC developing countries among 10 surveyed environmental measures. Of the 24 categories of products surveyed, 21 are affected by environmental measures.<sup>5</sup> Environmental measures range from provisions of multilateral environmental agreements, national laws and regulations and environmental standards and requirements, to voluntary environmental measures such as ecolabelling and ISO14000 environmental management system standards. These measures are sometimes referred to as "green barriers." Strictly speaking, only those measures that are used under the green cloak but for the purpose for trade protection are called "green barriers" in a real sense. Nevertheless, some commentators refer all environmental measures as "green barriers."

Although these "green" measures caused some difficulties for Chinese enterprises, they also brought about opportunities. They prompted the industry to seek alternatives and undertake technology innovation. As a result, they promoted the integration of environmental considerations into industrial restructuring and strengthening the environmental management systems of exporting firms. These efforts eventually brought competitive advantages to Chinese exporting firms.

The most recent trend is developing countries tightening their environmental regulations. Trade conflicts could arise from environmental measures taken by a developing country as well. Recently, the European Union requested consultation with Chile, within the WTO, concerning Chile's ban on access to its ports for foreign fishing vessels catching swordfish inside and outside the 200-mile coastal economic zone of Chile. Chile has tightened its

domestic rules regarding the capture of swordfish because the species is now threatened. This could be a precedent-setting trade and environmental conflict triggered by environmental measures from a developing country, if it goes to the WTO dispute settlement.

To compete successfully and ensure the expected greater access of Chinese exports to the international market after China joins the WTO, Chinese exporting enterprises need to be aware of the green consumerism trend and the rapid change in international markets in response to environment protection. It is not economically beneficial to rally against the prevailing winds of consumer preference. The government of China needs to strengthen and adjust its domestic environmental regulations and standards, help exporting enterprises obtain necessary information on changes and overcome “green barriers” adopted in foreign countries to meet the environmental challenge in international markets. Enterprises need to strengthen their environmental management, practice cleaner production, and make these efforts known by obtaining ecolabels or ISO 14000 certification.

### 3.2 Implications of Foreign Investment for Environment and Sustainable Development

Since the economic reform in late 1970s until July 2000 there have been more than 350,000 foreign-invested enterprises established in China with a contractual investment totalling US\$ 641.7 billion and an actual investment of over US\$ 327.7 billion. According to a newly released World Development Report by the World Bank, China has attracted 6% of the world foreign direct investment (FDI), and has become the largest recipient of FDI among developing countries<sup>6</sup> since 1993. Foreign investment now accounts for more than 20 percent of the fixed assets of the entire nation.

**Table 1 FDI Ranking for Developing Countries**

Country	Percentage of total FDI (%)	Rank
China	6	1
Brazil	4	2
Mexico	3	3
Singapore	2	4
Indonesia	2	5
Malaysia	1	6
Saudi Arabia	1	7
Argentina	1	8
Other developing countries	10	
Industrial countries	70	

Source: *Entering the 21st Century: World Development Report 1999/2000*, World Bank

Most of FDI comes from Hong Kong, Taiwan and Macao, Japan, the U.S. and EU as well as Singapore. Most FDI inflows to the industry sector, particularly manufacturing, and to eastern coastal areas such as Guangdong, Fujian, Jiangsu and large Chinese cities such as Beijing and Shanghai. These regions attracting most foreign investment have been very successful in its development. FDI has played a very important role in China's fast-growing economy over the past two decades. In 1999, the growth rate of the industrial output of foreign-invested enterprises was higher than the national average. Their tax revenues increased by 33.78 per cent, 16% of the total tax revenues of the national industrial and commerce tax revenues. The import and export value of these enterprises reached US\$ 174.5 billion, accounting for 48.38 per cent of the nation's total.<sup>7</sup>

China's WTO membership would further boost FDI inflows. Elimination of restrictive measures, access to more sectors, and lifts of tariff would all contribute to bring more foreign capital to China. The rule-based environment would also boost foreign investors' confidence and trust in investing in China. It is estimated that FDI inflows will increase from US\$ 45.6 billion in 1998 to US\$ 70 billion by 2003.

As mentioned above, the CGE model prediction by the Development Research Centre of the State Council indicates that after China joins the WTO the general development trend will be: the primary and secondary industries will generally shrink while the tertiary industry is likely to greatly increase. More specifically, land-intensive sectors such as plantation, grain production and traditional husbandry will decrease, while labour-intensive sectors (such as textile, toy and handcraft, etc), capital-intensive service industries (such as banking, security, insurance, brokerage, tourism, real estate, etc.) and intelligency-/intellectually-intensive and knowledge-intensive industries (including information, telecommunication, consulting, community services, education and culture) would largely increase.

Accordingly, the investment direction will most likely follow this trend. The increase of the tertiary industry and the decrease of the primary and the second industries will be conducive to China's industrial restructuring and help address environmental problems and promote sustainable development. Nevertheless, it is still important to integrate environment and sustainable concerns in guiding FDI inflows to China. Because investment is the most important force in fostering more sustainable forms of production, the introduction of foreign capital, advanced technology and management expertise will give impetus to technical innovation and structure adjustment in Chinese enterprises. However, these benefits associated with investment do not accrue automatically and need adequate policy guidance. Investment today will largely decide the future economic structure of the country in the long run.

There are lessons that can be drawn from China's own experience in utilizing foreign investment in the past. Foreign investment has made obvious

contributions to China's rapid economic growth. Many foreign-invested firms, particularly large multinationals, are more environmentally responsible. They introduced advanced technology and pollution control facilities and practice advanced environmental management systems in their operation. However, in some cases, environmental and national long-term goals of sustainable development have been compromised for short-term economic profits. Studies done by the University of International Business and Economics pointed out that some small and medium sized foreign-funded firms have moved to China's southern provinces to take advantage of lower environmental standards and lax enforcement.<sup>8</sup> Certain foreign-invested enterprises are engaged in pollution-intensive industrial activities. There is a race among different regions to attract foreign investment, sometimes at the cost of environment and long-term development.

The Chinese government has begun to attach importance to integrating environmental concerns into its investment policy. In its guiding industry priorities for foreign investment implemented in 1998, foreign investment is encouraged in sectors and projects that are energy efficient and environmental friendly; and discouraged or prohibited in projects that may cause environmental pollution. Most recently, measures have been taken to encourage foreign investors to undertake R&D and establish R&D centres, including environmental technology R&D. Those who do so will be exempted from import tariff and other import fees for equipment and technology needed for R&D. Those who invest in encouraged projects and technology will be exempted from certain business and other taxes. In response to China's new development emphasis in the western provinces, various measure have been taken to attract foreign investment. Those who invest in projects that are encouraged will be exempted from import tariffs and procedure fees. More sectors are open for investment, and requirements for investment and the approval procedures for encouraged projects have been relaxed.

When it becomes a member of the World Trade Organization, China needs to continue to adjust its national investment policies to include environmental and sustainable development concerns in its investment policy-making process. China must ensure that new investments do not lead to environmental deterioration but rather support its goals of environmental protection and long-term sustainable development and ensure that short-term economic interests do not compromise long-term sustainability. In this regard, there are two aspects that need attention. First, to provide detailed guidance for investment projects and technology and to enhance the ability to identify the technology desirable for supporting China's environmental and sustainable development goals. Second, to strengthen environmental management of foreign investment such as encouraging foreign investors to implement higher environmental standards, develop environmentally friendly products and practice cleaner production, etc.

### 3.3 Impacts of increased imports of resource-based products

After accession to the WTO, China is likely to substantially increase imports of resource-based products for various reasons. These include grain products, forest products, oil and natural gas.

China's annual timber consumption reaches 150 million cubic meters, which exceeds the world total annual timber trade volume. The demand for timber products in the future will continue to grow in a rapid growing economy. Ironically, the country's forest resource base has been very fragile. Deforestation over the past few decades for economic development has caused devastating consequences. Floods in 1998 demonstrated the serious consequences of deforestation and China's fragile ecological environment. In order to reverse the deterioration of the ecological environment, the Chinese government has decided to ban logging in the upper and middle ranges of the country's two major rivers and initiate programs for afforestation and restoration of claimed land for grain production. Under these circumstances, China expects to increase timber imports and reduce exports. Statistics shows that China's timber imports rose sharply in 1999 since the logging ban was imposed. In the first half of 1999, China imported 10 million cubic meter of timber, more than doubled the 4.8 million cubic meters imported in 1998.

China's WTO accession will likely foster China's timber imports. Tariff rates for imports of processed forest products could be further reduced and non-tariff measures such as trading rights can be phased out. Increased imports of forest products would benefit the country greatly, helping to address the domestic timber shortage and support domestic forest conservation efforts.

In the agriculture sector, marked reduction of tariff and elimination of quota could likely lead to increased imports of agricultural products such as wheat, corn, rice, cotton, oil and sugar. From the environment and sustainable development perspective, it would be conducive to the country's land conservation leading to less land exploitation, less application of fertilizers and pesticides, and reduction of non-point source pollution.

In the energy sectors, increased imports of natural gas could help ease its heavy dependency on coal and increased imports of petroleum products may help ease oil exploitation. The importation of other natural mineral resources could prevent environmental impacts associated with mining.

Although these changes in trade in the forest, agricultural and energy sectors would be environmentally beneficial to China in terms of land conservation, forest conservation and promoting the use of clean energy; China's likely increased imports of natural resource-based products may raise issues of environmental impacts on the global environment. China would be soon in the situation where it plays a role in deforestation in tropical countries and in

unsustainable exploitation of natural resources in other poor exporting countries. China needs to pay attention to the environmental challenges in resource exploration beyond its border and become a responsible natural resources consumer in the international market. The government could take necessary measures to encourage the sustainable form of production and discourage the unsustainable form of production in exporting countries. These measures may include the requirement of the Forest Stewardship label to encourage sustainable forest management systems and environmental impact assessment on projects that Chinese firms invest in, etc.

### **3.4 Implications for trade and environmental policies**

After China becomes a member of the WTO, it will have to strictly follow the rules of the multilateral trading system. Some current trade related economic laws and regulations in China are not quite consistent with rules of the multilateral system and need to be adjusted.

From an environment and sustainable development perspective, WTO membership also requires necessary changes in environment-related trade policies and trade-related environmental policies. Integrated policies and measures are needed to ensure mutual support of trade development and environmental protection and to promote long-term sustainable development. The overall effect of China's WTO accession will be to place increased demands on the quality and technical appropriateness of China's environmental management system.

China needs to make efforts in integrating environmental concerns in national investment, import and export policies for goods and services, and strengthening its environmental legislation and enforcement. In addition, attention should also be paid to the following aspects:

#### ***Technical barriers to trade and sanitary/phytosanitary measures***

The WTO aims to promote free and fair trade. But it also allows its Member States to maintain their sovereign rights to protect human health, plant and animal health, natural resources and the environment as exceptions to its general rules. There are two binding WTO agreements that intend to limit abusive uses of standards for protection purposes. They are the WTO Agreement on the Application of Sanitary and Phytosanitary measures (the SPS Agreement) and the WTO Agreement on Technical Barriers to Trade (the TBT Agreement). The SPS Agreement covers the use of sanitary and phytosanitary measures that ensure food safety and animal and plant health. The TBT Agreement governs all mandatory technical regulations and standards as well as voluntary standards for products. TBT standards may involve product content, packaging and labelling measures. Although WTO member states are allowed to maintain sovereign rights of governments to provide the level of protection of

human health, plant and animal health, natural resources and the environment, as they deem appropriate, the basic aim of these two agreements is to ensure that such measures are not distorting trade. These two agreements regulate the use of protection measures.

The TBT and SPS issues China may face are twofold. On one hand, China's likely increase in imports of timber and food products may pose challenges to China's sanitary and phytosanitary regulatory regime. The increased imports of these products will likely increase the chances of bringing invasive species to China. Currently, China's sanitary and phytosanitary measures are generally lax and the risk of bringing in invasive species doesn't seem to receive adequate attention. In order to protect human health, plant and animal protection and ecological environment conservation, China needs to strengthen its sanitary and phytosanitary regulatory regime to provide adequate protection of human health, plant and animal health, natural resources and the environment.

On the other hand, with greater access to the international market, Chinese products may also encounter more stringent TBT and SPS measures, and other "green barriers." China needs to carefully undertake studies on TBT and SPS measures and other "green barriers" in foreign countries, and formulate its counter measures so as to minimize barriers to trade and maximize its exports of goods and services.

### ***Upgrading environmental regulations and standards***

After China becomes a WTO member, China's environmental regulations and standards will have to gradually conform with international ones. These may include environmental standards for products, environmental management standards and environmental quality standards. While allowing Member States to take necessary measures to protect human health, plant and animal health, the environment and natural resources, the WTO rules also impose some restrictions on protection measures to ensure that measures taken by governments are not misused for protectionist purposes and do not result in unnecessary barriers to international trade. The WTO rules require standard setting bodies of governments to follow certain rules. On the other hand, both the SPS and TBT Agreements encourage Member States to use international standards. They also encourage standards harmonization and mutual recognition.

This implies that WTO membership requires China to upgrade its environmental regulations and standards by incorporating international standards as well as regulations and standards in other countries. Strengthening environmental regulations and upgrading its environmental standards will promote environmental management in the country, encourage efficient production practices while raising the competitiveness of Chinese firms in the international market.

## ***Transparency of trade and environmental policies and regulations***

Another important policy implication is the issue of transparency. Transparency is one of the most important principles of the WTO. It requires member governments to follow a transparent procedure in the rule-making process and make any rules related to trade easily accessible. WTO membership requires China to publish domestic laws and regulations that may affect international trade, including measures governing import, export, sale of goods and technical regulation, as well as sanitary, etc. These requirements also apply to environmental regulations and standards.

This means that China needs to establish a transparent registration and publication system for governmental regulations that may affect international trade ensuring the compliance of the WTO publication requirements. Trade related environmental regulations and measures as well as environment-related trade regulation and measures will become one of the important components of the system.

### **4. WTO and China: a perspective of trade and environment**

China's entry into the WTO will not only allow China to enjoy stable multilateral preferential trade policies of its trade partners and expand its exports, China will also enjoy a full membership in exercising its power to influence this organization and present its views. In addition, China will be able to participate in the rule-making process of the world trading system. It will also participate in a new round of trade negotiations, if there are any, and influence the rule-making process of the trading system. China will be also able to participate in the continuing negotiations on the "build-in agenda" and on issues concerning the implementation of existing commitments.

It will also allow China to use the WTO dispute settlement system to resolve any dispute it may have with other trading partners. From an environment and sustainable development viewpoint, China will be able to use the dispute settlement system to resolve trade and environment-related disputes and play a role in the trade and environment debate.

#### **4.1 Use of the WTO Dispute Settlement System**

Over the past few years, there were a number of trade conflicts between China and other countries related to environmental measures. Non-WTO membership prevented China from bringing its disputes to the WTO dispute settlement system. China's WTO membership will provide China with a channel for bringing its trade conflicts with other trading partners to the WTO for a fair settlement. To resort to the WTO dispute settlement mechanism could safeguard its trade and environment interests.

Studies undertaken by the Working Group on Trade and Environment of the CCICED found that although environmental measures taken by foreign governments are sometimes legitimate, the procedures used to adopt the measures are inconsistent with WTO rules. Take for example the azo ban in Germany or the packaging requirements by the U.S. and Canada. Although the measures themselves are legitimate in protecting human health and forests, these measures did not pay proper attention to the impact on China's trade and are not consistent with the procedure requirements like consultation and transparency.<sup>9</sup>

WTO membership will allow China to bring these disputes to the WTO dispute settlement system for a fair settlement.

#### **4.2 The role of China in the trade and environmental debate in the WTO**

WTO membership will allow China to participate in a new round of trade negotiations, if there are any, and in making international trading rules. With its size of economy, its dimensions of trade, its status as the principal recipient of investment among developing countries, China is likely to become one of the most important key players in the WTO regime, and in discussions on all the important issues. Developed countries and developing countries are greatly divided in the debate about trade, environment and development. Developing countries reject any inclusion of environmental or labour issues and call for full implementation of the Uruguay Round Agreements, while a growing number of developed countries in Europe and North America call for strong environmental measures and support environmental review of trade agreements.

China, as the world's largest developing country, shares the concerns of the developing countries. On the other hand, it also recognizes the importance of environmental protection and sustainable development. It is crucial that China develops a forward-looking position and plays a major role in discussions on the issue of trade, environment and sustainable development.

#### **5. Preliminary Conclusions and Recommendations**

Generally speaking, WTO membership will have long-term historic impacts on China's environmental quality, environmental management and environmental industry at large. It will become a major milestone in China's environmental history. Some of these impacts are short-term direct impacts, while most of others are long-term and indirect. It is not only a historic opportunity to redistribute its industrial structure, but it also adds more pressure on the environment in some aspects. It challenges the environmental industry and raises new requirements for environmental management.

Environmental impacts of China's WTO accession can be summarized as follows:

- With fundamental changes in industrial structure, the overall pollution level will gradually reduce year after year compared to pre- WTO accession, if proper

policy measures are taken. There is a likely tendency in terms of environmental pressure: low value-added and labour-intensive industries which usually perform poorly in environmental terms transferred from advanced countries in Europe, the United States and Japan to China, and then from east to central and west regions, and from China to poorer countries (such as India, Africa, etc.). Industrial restructuring is conducive to addressing industrial pollution emission at its source, and non-point source pollution caused by chemical fertilizer and pesticide from agriculture.

- The quantity of wastewater discharges in China will probably be reduced with appropriate measures. Although environmental pressure on air will be lessened in general, air quality in urban areas will probably worsen. Industrial solid wastes will be cut down, but municipal wastes would likely increase. There is a probability that the import and export of wastes would increase. The trend in ecological degradation would be reversed.
- China's WTO accession may bring excellent opportunities for China to improve its environmental management and to gradually upgrade its environmental management system and environmental standards to be more consistent with international practice.
- China's environmental industry will develop rapidly, not only in scale but also in terms of the technology level, and it may form an industry in substantial scale. WTO membership may also greatly affect China's environmental industry, which is mainly made up from township and village enterprises. This sector will be facing great challenges and needs to be reformed or else go bankrupt.

In addition to domestic environmental impacts, China's WTO membership will also have some environment-related trade implications and other trade-related environmental implications. These include:

- Chinese exports that may have great competitive advantages, such as textiles, toys and leather, are most likely to encounter green consumer challenges in the international market. Efforts need to be made to address these environmental challenges;
- China's WTO membership will attract more foreign direct investment to China. New investments need to be guided and rationally used in support of China's long-term national goals of environment and sustainable development;
- With WTO membership, China is likely to substantially increase imports of natural resource-based products. China needs to pay attention to environmental challenges in natural resources exporting countries and avoid playing a role in deforestation and unsustainable exploitation of natural resource in these countries;
- China's WTO membership requires adjusting its relevant trade and environmental policies, including integrating environmental concerns into national investment, import and export policies. It would also require China to establish a sound regulatory system for protection of human health, plant and animal health, natural resources and the environment. Efforts should also be made to upgrade its environmental laws and regulations in lines with those in other countries, and to make its laws and regulations transparent; and
- China would be able to use the WTO dispute settlement mechanism to

protect its trade and environmental interests and play an active role in the trade and environmental debate in the WTO.

WTO membership will bring China opportunities as well as challenges; it will have positive and negative impacts on China's environment. Therefore, the Chinese government needs to pay sufficient attention to trade and environmental implications of China's WTO accession. In order to make good use of the opportunities of WTO membership and minimize adverse impacts on China's trade and the environment and to maximize its trade opportunities, the following preliminary recommendations are put forward for relevant departments to consider as actions to be taken to address trade and environmental issues of China's WTO accession:

1. There is a need to undertake a more thorough assessment on environmental impacts of the WTO agreements in China in order to be clear about the actual impacts of China's WTO accession on the environment and environmental related trade implications. Adequate policies and measures to address these issues must be formulated

2. There is a need to set up an integrated program to address environmental challenges brought about by China's accession to the WTO. The opportunity of China's WTO accession to address environmental problems through the structure adjustment must be taken in hand. A detailed plan needs to be formulated that integrates eco-environment protection into economic system as soon as possible to take part in economic actions and minimize negative environmental impacts. Efforts should be made to strengthen its environmental legislation, enforcement and management

3. There is a strong need to integrate environmental concerns in relevant trade policies to address environmental challenges both at home and abroad. These include adjusting China's national investment policies, import and export policies for goods and services to strengthen its sanitary and phytosanitary measures and other technical standards and regulations and to establish a transparent publication system for trade laws and regulations. This also requires close cooperation among relevant departments responsible for trade, environmental, technical standards and others. It is desirable to establish an advisory committee, under the auspice of MOFTEC, comprised of representatives from all relevant departments. This committee should meet regularly to advise on appropriate policies for China to address issues related to trade and environment. There is also a need to study "green" measures in foreign countries, to help enterprises meet the green challenge in international markets.

4. There is also a need for China to develop a forwarding and positive position and play an active role in the trade and environment debate in the WTO. China may wish to bring relevant governmental officials and academic professionals together to develop a set of principles to help address trade and environmental issues.

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<sup>3</sup>*According to a commentary by Ni Yueju in China Economic Review of June 2000, Chinese textile exports would increase by 63.8 percent by 2005.*

<sup>4</sup>*Policy Research Centre for Environment and Economy, Impact of environmental standards/requirements in EU countries on China's textile industry, a report submitted by the WGTE to CCICED in October 1999; Chinese Academy of International Trade and Economic Cooperation. Improving outer packaging of export goods for sustainable growth of China's foreign trade, a report submitted by the WGTE to CCICED in October 2000.*

<sup>5</sup>*APEC Economic committee, Survey on trade-related environmental measures and environment-related trade measures in APEC, p64-65, 1998.*

<sup>6</sup>*World Bank, Entering the 21st Century: World Development Report 1999/2000.*

<sup>7</sup>*The role of foreign direct investment in China's economic development, China Economic News (www.cei.gov.cn) September 8, 2000.*

<sup>8</sup>*University of International Business and Economics (UIBE), Pollution Heavens and ODS control in China, a report submitted to CCICED by the WGTE in 1998; UIBE, International investment rules and sustainable development: China's perspective, a report submitted to CCICED by the WGTE in 1999.*

<sup>9</sup>*See Note 4.*

# THE PUBLIC INTELLECTUAL

*FROM ACADEMIA TO GRASSROOTS*

by Vinod Raina

Having 'Embraced Defeat' (title of John Dower's fascinating book) in the Second World War, Japan is often accused of being a surrogate of the US, mostly mimicking and echoing the US sentiment and interest in world politics. The presence of US bases in Okinawa, the somewhat unabashed aping of the US pop and media culture and the fierce technological and economic competitiveness between the two nations are visible manifestations for such accusations.

Personal encounters often deviate from such broad generalities. That in many ways was my experience on landing at Tokyo on August 31, 2002. Nearly a year back, on that infamous day of September 11, 2001, I was in the United States on a lecture tour. With my South Asian appearance, compounded by a beard, I was mostly a 'Bad Fellow' on the roads and airports of the US, provoking instant suspicion, body searches and disapproving glances. The final exit from that nation was quite a relief. But beginning September 2, 2002, the opening day of the Asian Fellowship Leadership Program (AFLP) in Tokyo, it was so different and refreshing to be treated as a 'Good Fellow' in Japan, even though my appearance remained unchanged and the echoes of the debatable War on Terrorism were reverberating with vigour throughout Japan. Obviously, the difference was not due to any major transformation in the relations between the Governments of US and Japan on the question of terrorism, but clearly due to the difference in the public perception of ordinary people of the two countries; which refreshingly points out to the fact that even though Japan belongs to the G8 block, it remains in many ways an Asian country, and not just geographically. The complexity involved in such a perception would of course require a separate treatment.

Quite apart from the fact that one did not feel like an alien walking on the streets and hurrying through Tokyo trains, that five people drawn from countries like China (Hu Tao), Vietnam (Nguyen Thien), Malaysia (Maznah Mohamad), India (Vinod Raina) and Japan (Reiko Kinoshita) would be spending over two months together exploring the nuances of the "Role of Public Intellectuals in a changing Asia" sounded just the kind of tonic a field-worker like me would have wished for. It was also gratifying on two counts. One, that it was an Asian initiative for Asians, jointly promoted and implemented by the Japan Foundation and the International House of Japan and not by some Western consortium, and the second, that even though I no longer worked at a University, that did not go against I being selected to be part of such a group. The latter would seem important, since people fitting these credentials would normally be sought from academic institutions. Without stating it precisely, the ALFP program has therefore made a very important statement through its

choice of Fellows, that the site of Public Intellectuals is wider than the customary University. But how wide could it be – could it be a pro-establishment researcher, bureaucrat or academic, a baseball or football player, a social activist, are questions we were destined to grapple with for the two months, obviously with a great deal of heat and passion.

### Who is a Public Intellectual?

Far from defining a public intellectual, getting even a sense of who is a public intellectual is obviously a very elusive proposition. I doubt that the ALFP faculty was aware that the issue had become a topic of intense discussion in the preceding year through the publication of a very 'authoritative' book on public intellectuals in the US by the conservative judge, Richard Posner, that prompted them to make this as the theme for ALFP2002.

Much controversy has been generated by the "Top 100 Public Intellectuals" list he created based upon these individuals' number of media mentions, Web search engine hits, and scholarly citations. Posner is quick to point out that "'prominent' is not a synonym for 'best,' or even for 'good.'" He also employs complicated tables filled with coefficients, constants, and t-statistics to demonstrate the deterioration of the public intellectual sphere.

Once the data and magic formulas have been inserted, Posner pulls the lever to reveal a top 100 list crowned by Henry Kissinger. Kurt Vonnegut edges out Milton Friedman 21 to 34, and Toni Morrison handily tops Jean-Paul Sartre 12 to 69. Posner ranks himself in at number 75, a bit ahead of W.E.B Du Bois at 83. Since the list is founded upon media mentions, his own presence is not surprising, as he has published 33 books and hundreds of articles and lectures at the University of Chicago, all while serving on the U.S. Seventh Circuit Court of Appeals.

A review of this provocative book by Denis Dutton, would seem to match the passion of our group discussions during ALFP2002 very well, and help explore the question – who is a public intellectual?

Writes Dutton, "It's not often that a book by a public intellectual has received as much media attention—mostly vilification and scorn—as Richard A. Posner's *Public Intellectuals: A Study of Decline* (Harvard University Press). Three reasons for this stand out. First, there's the sheer audacity of including a list of the top hundred public intellectuals, drawn from a larger list of 546 names. This invites endless dispute over how the list was generated, who is on it, who is left off, where each one stands, and why. Second, there is the fact that Posner has managed in the book to offend half of the public intellectuals you'd expect to be called on to review it—almost as though he made a list of potential reviewers and worked in a swipe at each. Finally, he has tapped into the deep antipathy humanist intellectuals have to seeing a beloved topic treated quantitatively, with

statistics and applications of social and economic theory, replete with graphs and algebraic formulae. And after all, what topic is more beloved by the intellectuals than they themselves? That Posner would actually treat such important people as a demographic type, sorting them in terms of race, age, field, politics, sex—why, he even asks why so many are Jews. It's outrageous . . . and delicious."

Echoing Russell Jacoby's argument in *The Last Intellectuals*, which appeared in 1987 and lamented "the eclipse of public intellectuals," Posner places much of the blame on the mania for specialization that's become de rigueur throughout the modern university in recent decades. The idea of an intellectual, Posner says, should not be identified merely with having highbrow, cultivated tastes, being especially creative, or having high intelligence. All of these things are possible without being an intellectual, which Posner thinks ought to denote the application of the mind to "*political* matters in the broadest sense of that word, a sense that includes cultural matters when they are viewed under the aspect of ideology, ethics, or politics (which may all be the same thing)." There is therefore a vague redundancy in the term "public intellectual," since the placing of ideas in a larger public context, acting as social critic, is what the intellectual most essentially does. In our age of vast communication media, it is also done conspicuously *in public*, through op-eds, public radio interviews, and on TV clips with the regulation public-intellectual bookcase as a backdrop. This concern with larger moral issues means that for the Posner paradigm individuals would therefore include the likes of John Dewey, Bertrand Russell, Hannah Arendt, Arthur Koestler, Edmund Wilson, Susan Sontag, and most powerfully in Posner's mind, George Orwell: people who write about literature, art, science, and so forth from a broadly political or ideological perspective. For example, when Allan Bloom writes about rock and roll, he is not doing so as a music critic but as a philosopher who sees it as a symptom and source of social degradation. That's public intellectual work (and rather bad work in this particular case, Posner believes). That it is done *for* a broader public is also a crux for Posner, who leaves John Rawls off his list, because as influential as Rawls is as a philosopher, he does not address a larger public in the way that Richard Rorty and Martha Nussbaum do.

The decline referred to in Posner's title is a decline in the actual worth of public intellectuals' work, not in their media celebrity, which has grown roughly inversely to the value of what they do. This invidious situation has followed, in Posner's view, the proliferation of academics in the ranks of public intellectuals. From the nineteenth century, with such names as Thoreau, J.S. Mill, Herbert Spencer, Matthew Arnold, and Tocqueville, to well into the twentieth, with the likes of Max Eastman, Edmund Wilson, H.G. Wells, and Dwight Macdonald, the great tradition of public intellectuals had its life outside of universities. Although there remain nonacademic public intellectuals today—Susan Sontag, Roger Kimball, Tom Wolfe, Gore Vidal—they are a severely diminished species. Universities, which have expanded so enormously in the twentieth century, offer

“to anyone who wants to embark on a career as a public intellectual” the requirements for the job: “leisure, credentials, and financial security.” For academics who otherwise keep their noses to the scholarly grindstone, and even for those who don’t, there is but small cost for entering into the market as a public intellectual, small cost for doing bad work there, and small cost for withdrawing from the market. The media for their part have column space and air time to fill, and they are all too willing to give a platform to public intellectuals to pontificate, predict, warn, scold, handwring, entertain, and occasionally inform their audience.

Posner’s discussion is wide-ranging and digressive, animated by a skepticism that never quite falls into cynicism: dour amusement is more his style than bitter condemnation (besides, since Posner is himself the preeminent public intellectual in the American judiciary, he can ill-afford to dismiss everyone else who is doing what he does). The public intellectual is selling *credence good*, ideas and arguments that solicit agreement, and therefore demand some kind of authority in order to be accepted. This authority is attained through having academic credentials indicating a high degree of specialized knowledge: being an academic expert in astrophysics, aboriginal peoples of Tierra del Fuego, copyright law, or Latin poets. Since this is accompanied by being “professor” so-and-so at a university, and since the specialty is beyond the grasp of the lay audience, it helps to have one or two further warrants: celebrity and commitment. Celebrity is understood here as an intrinsic value: being familiar face on the television screen or regular name on the op-ed page is a value in its own right. Commitment is perhaps more substantial, and can contribute to both celebrity and authority: it means that the public intellectual has stood behind a cause or position in a way that requires a sacrifice or risk of some kind. Posner mentions eco-catastrophist Paul Ehrlich’s decision to be sterilized after fathering a single child, therefore putting the fight against overpopulation, as he then saw it (about 1970), into his personal life. This commitment seems at least a real, if not major, sacrifice (many people choose anyway to have one child, or none at all, without worrying about world population). On the other hand, Posner treats as fatuous the well-known photograph of Edward Said throwing a stone, risk free, at Israeli soldiers, who were not responding. As risk-takers, public intellectuals like Ehrlich and Said, Posner remarks, “are our Havels and Solzhenitsyns, writ small.”

Commitment and sacrifice are issues Posner alludes to more than once in *Public Intellectuals*: for the individuals who partake in public-intellectual work in the media today, the performances have the quality of a risk-free lark. The self-image of many an academic is of a brave battler who “speaks truth to power.” In fact, far from being marginalized outsiders academics are, in Russell Jacoby’s phrase, “consummate insiders.” They are the very ones with the power—and the security of having well-paid jobs from which they can be fired only with the greatest difficulty. Yet they often flatter themselves that they are lonely Socrates-types, independent seekers of truth, living at the edge. An American example

Posner gives is that of Cornel West, who in self-pity calls himself “isolated,” caught between “an insolent American society and an insouciant black community.” Of course, Posner remarks, it doesn’t help his recognition in the black community that this wealthy Ivy-League professor seems more at home talking about Hegel, Gramsci, Lyotard, and Jameson than formulating practical social policy (Posner’s book predates West’s recent rap CD). In any event, most academic intellectuals take no risks whatsoever in expressing conventional left-leaning (or politically correct) views in the public arena, which is undoubtedly part of the reason their pronouncements are not regarded with much seriousness by the public.

There is another point Posner makes in connection with public indifference to public intellectuals. The image of the independent outsider calls on the academic to display overt *originality*—academics are expected to avoid spouting “conventional wisdom.” At the same time, the media find more entertainment value in talking heads that express unusual or jarring ideas of any stripe. The result of these two factors is to drive the opinions of public intellectuals to extremes, or at least to present mostly the extremes, in order to up the drama of public debate. Posner observes: “Because there is no correlation between the originality and the political and social utility of an idea, the academic emphasis on originality, and the superior marketability of extreme positions in the market for public-intellectual work, are frequently at war with the accuracy, utility, and practicality of the academic public intellectual’s predictions and recommendations.” After all, the best sense that might be expressed on a public issue might well turn out to be boring, and boring is not what the media want.

This is not a dumbing down that can be laid at the feet the media. As Popper and Kuhn understood, bold, risky hypotheses are, infotainment demands aside, at the heart of great advances in the sciences and scholarship generally. Posner points out, however, that bold and risky propositions are not something that usually have much merit in the realm of the social and political. In fact, it’s the more frequently the reverse: the best public-intellectual work in the past “has consisted in seeing through the big new economic and political nostrums. Typical academics, on the other hand, are not oriented toward political reality: “They tend to be unworldly. They are, most of them anyway, the people who have never left school. Their milieu is postadolescent.” They often work alone, without developing the social skills and sensibilities that would give them political insight. Here is how Posner summarizes the academic public intellectual:

“A proclivity for taking extreme positions, a taste for universals and abstraction, a desire for moral purity, a lack of worldliness, and intellectual arrogance work together to induce in many academic public intellectuals selective empathy, a selective sense of justice, insensitivity to context, a lack of perspective, a denigration of predecessors as lacking moral insight, an impatience with prudence and sobriety, a lack of realism, and excessive self-confidence. The “on the one hand, on the other hand” approach to

politically or ideologically charged issues—the kind of approach that can understand slavery in its historical context, that sees the bad along with the good abolitionists, that seeks a functional explanation to (for us) bizarre practices such as clitoridectomy and infibulation, that acknowledges that Nazis were fervent environmentalists and public-health fanatics, and that Bill Clinton was the consolidator of the Reagan Revolution—this approach is uncongenial to the academic temperament. The typical academic is a Platonist, not an Aristotelian.”

## Functional and Critical Intellectuals

An area of intense debate during our ALFP2002 discussions was the distinction between intellectuals in countries with multi party democracy, uncontrolled press and constitutional guarantee for freedom of expression, with those in socialist countries, like China and Vietnam, operating within a variety of state controls. Our visits to sites such as an anti-dam movement at Nagara river, Teshina island anti-dumping movement also raised difficult questions regarding the roles of intellectuals in new social movements, as contrasted with their engagement with more universal questions like democracy, rights and so on.

In relation to such debates, it may be worthwhile to note that sociologist Zygmunt Bauman (author of the engaging book ‘Liquid Modernity’) contrasts intellectuals as legislators who wish to legislate universal values, usually in the service of state institutions, with intellectuals as interpreters, who merely interpret texts, public events, and other artifacts, deploying their specialized knowledge to explain or interpret things for publics. He thus claims that there is a shift from modern intellectuals as legislators of universal values who legitimated the new modern social order to postmodern intellectuals as interpreters of social meanings, and thus theorizes a depoliticalization of the role of intellectuals in social life.

David Kellner has persuasively argued that ‘there can however, be another distinction between functional intellectuals who serve to reproduce and legitimate the values of existing societies contrasted to critical-oppositional intellectuals who oppose the existing order. Sometimes oppositional intellectuals voice their criticisms in the name of existing values which they claim are being violated (i.e. truth, rights, rule by law, justice, etc.) and sometimes in the name of values or ideas which are said to be higher potentialities of the existing order (i.e. participatory democracy, socialism, genuine equality for women and blacks, ecological restoration, etc.). Functional intellectuals were earlier the classical ideologues, whereas today they tend to be functionaries of parties or interest groups, or mere technicians who devise more efficient means to obtain certain ends, or who apply their skills to increase technical knowledge in various specialized domains (medicine, physics, history, environmental impact analysis etc.) without questioning the ends, goals, or values that they are serving, or the social utility or disutility of their activities’.

Functional intellectuals are thus servants of existing societies who are specialists in legitimation and technical knowledge, while oppositional intellectuals are critics who struggle to create a better society. Critical intellectuals were traditionally those who utilized their skills of speaking and writing to denounce injustices and abuses of power, and to fight for truth, justice, progress, and other universal values. In the words of Jean-Paul Sartre, "the duty of the intellectual is to denounce injustice wherever it occurs." For Sartre, the domain of the critical intellectual is to write and speak within the public sphere, denouncing oppression and fighting for human freedom and emancipation. On this model, a critical intellectual's task is to bear witness, to analyze, to expose, and to criticize a wide range of social evils. The sphere and arena of the critical/oppositional intellectual is the word, and his or her function is to describe and denounce injustice wherever it may occur.

The modern critical intellectual's field of action was what Habermas called the public sphere of democratic debate, political dialogue, and the writing and discussion of newspapers, journals, pamphlets, and books. Of course, not all intellectuals were critical or by any means progressive. With the rise of modern societies, there was a division between physical and mental labor, and intellectuals became those who specialized in mental labor, producing and distributing ideas and culture, with some opposing and some legitimating the established forms of society.

Thus, intellectuals were split into those critical and oppositional individuals who opposed injustice and oppression, as contrasted to functional intellectuals who produced technical knowledge that served the existing society and those producers of ideology who legitimated the forms of class, race, and gender domination and inequality in modern societies.

We therefore need to locate the Intellectual within the domain of Public Sphere. Democracy involves a separation of powers and popular participation in governmental affairs. During the era of the Enlightenment and 18th century democratic revolutions, public spheres emerged where individuals could discuss and debate issues of common concern. The public was also a site where criticism of the state and existing society could circulate. The institutions and spaces of the 18th century democratic public sphere included newspapers, journals, and a press independent from state ownership and control, coffee houses where individuals read newspapers and engaged in political discussion, literary salons where ideas and criticism were produced, and public assemblies which were the sites of public oratory and debate.

Bourgeois societies split, of course, across class lines and different class factions produced different political parties, organizations, and ideologies with each party attracting specialists in words and writing known as intellectuals. Oppressed groups also developed their own insurgent intellectuals, ranging from representatives of working class organizations, to women like Mary

Wollstonecraft fighting for women's rights, to leaders of oppressed groups of color, ethnicity, sexual preference, and so on. Insurgent intellectuals attacked oppression and promoted action that would address the causes of oppression, linking thought to action, theory to practice. Thus, during the 19th century, the working class developed its own oppositional public spheres in union halls, party cells and meeting places, saloons, and institutions of working class culture. With the rise of Social Democracy and other working class movements in Europe and the United States, an alternative press, radical cultural organizations, and the spaces of the strike, sit-in, and political insurrection emerged as sites of an oppositional public sphere.

Intellectuals in modern societies were thus conflicted beings with contradictory social functions. The classical critical intellectual -- represented by figures like the French Enlightenment ideologues, Thomas Paine, Mary Wollstonecraft, and later figures like Heine, Marx, Hugo, Dreyfus, Du Bois, Sartre, and Marcuse -- was to speak out against injustice and oppression and to fight for justice, equality, and the other values of the Enlightenment. Indeed, the Enlightenment itself represents one of the most successful discourses of the critical individual, a discourse and movement that assigns intellectuals key social functions. And yet conservative intellectuals attacked the Enlightenment and its prodigy the French Revolution and produced discourses that legitimated every conceivable form of oppression from class to race, gender, and ethnic domination.

Against the Enlightenment and Sartre's model of the committed intellectual who is engaged for freedom, Michel Foucault complained that Sartre represented an ideal of the universal intellectual who fought for universal values such as truth and freedom, and assumed the task of speaking for humanity. Against such an exalted and in his view, exaggerated conception, Foucault militated for a conception of the specific intellectual who intervened on the side of the oppressed in specific issues, not claiming to speak for the oppressed, but to intervene as an intellectual in specific issues and debates, say on the question of a dam, a local environmental problem, abuse of human rights in a specific location etc.

Foucault's conception of the specific intellectual has been accompanied within a new postmodern politics with a turn toward new social movements as the domain of contemporary politics, replacing the state and the national realm of party politics. For a postmodern politics, power is diffuse and local and not merely to be found in macroinstitutions like the workplace, the state, or patriarchy. Macropolitics that goes after big institutions like the state or capital is to be replaced by micropolitics, with specific intellectuals intervening in spheres like the university, the prison, the hospital, or for the rights of specific oppressed groups like sexual or ethnic minorities. Global and national politics and theories are rejected in favor of more local micro politics, and the discourse and function of the intellectuals is seen as more specific, provisional, and modest than in modern theory and politics, subordinate to local struggles rather than

more ambitious projects of emancipation and social transformation.

Such a binary distinction between macro and micro theory and politics is of course problematical, as are absolutist commitments to either modern or postmodern theory. Using the example of the events of 1989 that saw the collapse of communism, for instance, it is clear that the popular offensives against communist power combined micro and macropolitics, moving from local and specific struggles rooted in union halls, universities, churches, and small groups to mass demonstrations forcing democratic reforms and even classical mass insurrection aiming at an overthrow of the existing order, as in Romania. In these struggles, intellectuals played a variety of roles and deployed a diversity of discourses, ranging from the local and specific to the national and general.

Thus, whereas one may argue that postmodern theory contains important criticism of some of the illusions and ideologies of the traditional modern intellectual, it goes too far in rejecting the classical role of the critical intellectual. Moreover, it may be suggested that some of the modern conception of the critical and oppositional intellectual remains useful. One may fight for rights, freedom, and democracy à la Sartre's committed intellectual. But a democratic public intellectual does not speak for others, does not abrogate or monopolize the function of speaking the truth, but simply participates in discussion and debate, defending specific ideas, values, or norms or principle that may be particular or universal. But if universal, like human rights, they are contextual, provisional, normative and general and not valid for all time. Indeed, rights are products of social struggles and are thus social constructs and not innate or natural entities -- as the classical natural rights theorists would have it. But rights can be generalized, extended, and can take universal forms -- as with, for instance, a UN charter of human rights that holds that certain rights, in fact, reject the particular/universal intellectual dichotomy in favor of developing a normative concept of the *critical public intellectual*. The public intellectual -- on this conception -- intervenes in the public sphere, fights against lies, oppression, and injustice and are valid for all individuals -- at least in this world at this point in time.

Consequently, one does not need all of the baggage of the universal intellectual to maintain a conception of a public or democratic intellectual in the present era. Intellectuals may well seek to occupy a higher ground than particularistic interests, a common ground seeking public interests and goods. But intellectuals need not abrogate the right to speak for all and should be aware that they are speaking from a determinate position with its own biases and limitations. Moreover, intellectuals need to learn to get out of their particular frame of reference for more general ones, as well as to be able to take the position of the other, to empathize with more marginal and oppressed groups, to learn from them, and to support their struggles. To perpetually criticize oneself, to develop the capacity for self-reflection and critique -- as well as self-expression -- is thus part of the duty of the democratic intellectual.

## Intellectuals in Contemporary China

Because of the presence of Hu Tao from China and Nguyen Thien from Vietnam in the ALFP2002 group, there were many formal and informal sessions, debates and arguments regarding the location, function and impact of intellectuals in socialist states. The moot point was - apart from functional intellectuals, is there a significant presence of critical intellectuals in these countries, and if so, how do they function. However, to my mind the discussions couldn't go forward significantly because of lack of authentic information about the existing situation in these countries regarding the issue, as also an understandable reluctance of persons from these countries to be publicly forthright on such sensitive matters. Any discussion about Public Intellectuals in Asia would however be very limited if it totally ignored the situation in the billion plus country of China, particularly as it is on the threshold of a great economic leap based, curiously for many persons, on its vigorous attempts to integrate with the neo-liberal economic processes, without opening itself to multi-party democracy. Since the issue is important, a hunt for secondary sources has thrown up a long and detailed article on the intellectuals of China written by Wenfang Tang. The article is based on data collected through eight surveys conducted by the Economic System Institute of China, including the 1992 China Urban Survey, and the seven semiannual surveys on Social Reaction to Reform from 1987 to 1991. Spread over twenty-three provinces, about forty cities are covered in most of these surveys. The 1992 Urban Survey includes 2,395 respondents, and the seven Social Reaction to Reform Surveys have a total number of 16,450 respondents. The 1992 survey asks many detailed questions about the respondent's social and political values. The seven semiannual surveys include questions on satisfaction with and support for urban reforms and are useful to compare reform satisfaction among different intellectual groups. The purpose of these state-sponsored surveys was to provide the government with information needed to shape policy. Summaries of these surveys were circulated within the government but never published. In 1992, Teng not only gained access to the survey data but also was able to check them against the original questionnaires. Teng says, "so far as I know, this was the first time such data were made available to researchers outside China."

He also goes on to add that the "hope often expressed by Western leaders is that China will democratize and so come to fit more smoothly into the world order. Seeing how few and disunited are the Chinese dissidents today calling for democratization, observers are at a loss to specify any coherent Chinese political force pressing for democratization. In fact, however, there is significant evidence that there is a politically vigorous Chinese stratum with an increasingly strong interest in reform if not democratization--broadly speaking, party intellectuals." The effort of his research is to establish such a reformist agenda as the main occupation of the Chinese intellectuals at present. He explains that the modern term *intellectual* (*zhishi fenzi*) has been used to denote those who

in imperial times passed the official examination. *Xiucai* were those who passed the examination at the prefectural level, *juren*, at the provincial level, and *jinsi*, at the national level. Other labels have also been used, such as *xuezhe* (scholars). Under socialism, intellectuals were similar to the intelligentsia in the Soviet Union: people with higher educational degrees holding non-manual jobs. These included not only professionals and government officials with higher education but also enterprise managers and directors. Intellectuals are obviously an extremely important part of Chinese society, but they are also an extremely tiny part. In the 1990 population census, there were only 12 million persons with higher-education degrees, about 2 percent of the total employed population.

That 2 percent in turn was made up of two groups of rather different status: regular four-year college degree holders, who now get into universities through national competition, and two-year junior college graduates with degrees from technical colleges, local night schools, or continuing education programs. Most intellectuals belong to the latter, less-educated group. About 35 percent of the 12 million had regular college degrees, and about 65 percent had junior college degrees.

Our focus here however is on the differences between establishment intellectuals and nonestablishment intellectuals, or within system and outside of system intellectuals. True, given the nature of the communist state, this boundary is partly blurred. Virtually all intellectuals are involved in the system to some degree. Nevertheless, some intellectuals are more involved than others. Thus one can distinguish government and party officials (*guojia jiguan, dangqun zuzhi fuze ren*) with higher education from other professionals not directly working for the state and the party, a group that includes teachers at primary, middle school, and university levels; health care staff; engineers and technicians; accountants, statisticians, and economic planning staff; cultural professionals (reporters, editors, writers, actors, athletes); legal workers; priests and monks; science management professionals; researchers; and enterprise directors and managers. Most establishment intellectuals are party members (*party intellectuals*), whereas other intellectuals are not. *Party intellectuals* and *establishment intellectuals* are however synonymous, as are *nonparty intellectuals* and *nonestablishment intellectuals*.

This bifurcation is a highly institutionalized one that begins early in the education system. Even in elementary school, those who will follow the path into the establishment are recruited into the organization of Young Pioneers (*shaoxiandui*) and appointed as class leaders. In high school, they are recruited into the Communist Youth League (*gongqingtuan*) and given various political and administrative responsibilities. In a study of Tianjin elites, it was found that recruitment into administrative positions was based on both political and educational credentials. Party membership contributed much more than education to gaining administrative positions. In contrast, political credentials were not important for obtaining professional positions; only education

mattered.

Before 1978, Mao limited the quantity of party intellectuals and their role in the decision-making processes of the state. After 1978, however, intellectuals came to play an important though not dominant role in middle- and high-level administration. According to the 1992 Urban Social Survey, intellectuals filled 32 percent of the positions in the government administrative apparatus and 21 percent in the administrative apparatus of factories. These intellectuals in the political center, however, are only a small percentage of the intellectual stratum as a whole, are mostly party intellectuals, and are mostly junior college graduates. In other words, the vast majority of the intellectuals are nonparty intellectuals outside the political center. Moreover, the better-educated intellectuals are mostly part of this stratum outside the center.

Various statistics can be used to describe this situation. According to the 1992 Urban Social Survey, for example, although 32 percent of the middle- and high-level positions in the government administrative apparatus were filled by intellectuals, 87 percent of those were party intellectuals. As for the 21 percent of the factory administrative positions filled by intellectuals, 86 percent were party intellectuals. Similarly, according to the 1990 population census, only 7 percent of the intellectuals were government and party administrators, and these were mostly party intellectuals. Of intellectuals as a whole, 11 percent were managers, 62 percent were other kinds of professionals (mostly teachers and technical personnel), and 20 percent were in still other occupations.

The 1992 Urban Social Survey further revealed social and economic differences between party intellectuals and nonparty intellectuals. For example, nonparty intellectuals fill 35 percent of the positions in clerical work and 36 percent of those in teaching, medical, and other kinds of professional work, as compared with 25 percent and 22 percent, respectively, for party intellectuals. In addition, party intellectuals are also slightly better paid (518 yuan per capita), significantly older (forty-four years), and more male dominated (70 percent) than the nonparty intellectuals (512 yuan, thirty-six years, and 58 percent). Thus, in general, party intellectuals were in a better bargaining position and enjoyed more privileges than nonparty ones.

All in all, nonparty intellectuals were more numerous and often better educated than party intellectuals, while being largely excluded from the political center and suffering from a slightly lower rate of compensation. These facts by themselves would indicate a *xiao ren dang dao* (the road to leadership is blocked by mediocrities) syndrome, that is, resentment directed by a large stratum of nonparty intellectuals toward a privileged minority of party intellectuals and so a great demand for reform on the part of the nonparty stratum. In fact, however, the extent of any such syndrome is in doubt, and the demand for reform seems to come as much from this minority of party intellectuals as it does from the bulk of the intellectual stratum.

Finally, one should distinguish between the handful of influential intellectuals and the much larger number lacking fame. Studying a few of the most prominent intellectual leaders is a powerful tool for understanding the intellectual climate in China because they have considerable influence on other members of their group and on Chinese society. Just how much influence, however, is a different question. Particularly worth studying would be the extent to which the Western ideology of liberalism has now become part of the political culture shared by party and nonparty intellectuals.

## History of Intellectuals and the Party-State

To assess the extent to which intellectuals tend to demand reform, it is necessary to remember the traditional normative role of Confucian scholars, each of whom was "resolutely to take responsibility for the well-being of the world" (*yi tian xia wei ji ren*). This traditional concept became intertwined with the implicit Marxist belief that society's true physical, psychological, and social needs can be "discovered" by those who are wise and informed, who then should guide society. This originally foreign Marxist approach further convinced many Chinese intellectuals that they had a mission to rule.

This Marxist role for intellectuals is diametrically opposed to the way "good" decisions are made in liberal democratic societies, which emphasize that society is complex and humans, fallible. No elite can discover universal truths by mastering this complexity and overcoming this fallibility. The preferences of the mass of individuals are the best indicators of society's true needs and wants. This alternative model, which downplays the role of intellectuals, has had little appeal in China. Chinese intellectuals in the twentieth century have typically believed that they are capable of understanding the "laws of history" and that they have the "moral mission" to lead China's modernization.

This elitist attitude in turn led to an uneasy relationship between intellectuals and the party. After all, intellectuals had traditionally oscillated between co-optation and protest. On the one hand, the "vanguard" party needed intellectuals both to articulate its claim to leadership in Chinese society and to provide technical expertise in economic construction. On the other hand, the Communist Party was always worried that intellectuals would challenge its authority. Given this ambivalence, the relation between the state and intellectuals has gone through two stages since 1949.

The first stage subordinated intellectuals to the state more than the second. Officially, intellectuals were considered *petite bourgeoisie*. Many had been educated in the old system that the Communists sought to overthrow. Mao suspected that they were "fellow travelers," not fully committed to the revolution. Unlike peasants, workers, and soldiers, intellectuals were never elevated in status by being designated as a main force of the revolution. True,

Mao Zedong stressed the importance of intellectuals in winning the Chinese revolution and the need to recruit large numbers of them into the party, military, and government organs. Yet he felt secure enough to do so only when the party's organization and leadership were sufficiently consolidated and immune to potential intellectual erosion. As he saw it, the party should use bourgeois intellectuals to produce its own revolutionary intellectuals, while reeducating the former to serve the revolution.

Under Mao, one of the most frequently attacked characteristics of Chinese intellectuals was not their political outlook but their anti-empirical and elitist academic style. Mao criticized many intellectuals for being "antique collectors" (only accumulating knowledge and not knowing how to use it), and of "shooting the wrong target with their arrows" (trying to apply their knowledge to China without any understanding of Chinese society). He ordered intellectuals to associate themselves with manual workers. He argued that, without doing so, intellectuals would accomplish nothing.

These policies established a social contract between the party and intellectuals after 1949. The party-state would provide opportunities for intellectuals to use their talent and would reward their efforts with social prestige and material benefits if they obeyed the leadership of the Communist Party; accepted Marxism-Leninism and Maoism as the guiding ideology; derived their knowledge from and applied it to concrete conditions in China; performed adequately; and gave up their political autonomy as a social group and their elitist values. Repeatedly, however, Mao felt the intellectuals were failing to honor this contract.

The first major test of this relationship was in 1956, after the Communists took power, when the party invited intellectuals to give their advice on how to improve its leadership. The intellectuals responded by not only giving their advice on how to improve it but also challenging the very basis of the regime: socialist economic planning, the idea of "the people's democratic dictatorship," and the monopoly of political power by the Communist Party. The party felt that the contract had been broken and instigated the antirightist movement in 1957, during which intellectuals suffered terribly.

Whereas the antirightist movement was a *political* campaign against intellectuals, the Cultural Revolution (1966-1976) was a social and academic campaign punctuated with violence, aimed at forcing intellectuals to change their elitist attitudes, lower their social status, and make their lives more closely related to those of peasants and workers. Educated urban youths (both high school and college graduates) were sent to the countryside. Professionals and administrators were sent to reeducation schools, where they had to learn to be self-sufficient by doing manual work to meet their own material needs. Education was to serve production directly. For example, physics was about the mechanics of tractors; chemistry, the nature of chemical fertilizers. Theoretical

research was suspended. For many intellectuals, the Cultural Revolution was the darkest decade of their lives.

In the post-Mao era, the party developed a basically new contract with the intellectuals, seeking to elicit their support by allowing them a kind of qualified autonomy. In the third plenum of its eleventh congress in 1978, the party decided to abandon the longtime policy of keeping China on the socialist road of class struggle and political correctness. Instead, its most important task became economic modernization. Deng Xiaoping realized that the party could not modernize China by means of political campaigns and that it had to rely on intellectuals to achieve this goal. Thus he was less concerned with ideological resistance and the arrogance of intellectuals. Reeducating them was not his main concern. His pragmatism was epitomized by his well-known saying: "No matter black or white, it's a good cat if it catches mice." The party should concentrate on how to keep power, the intellectuals, on contributing to economic modernization. Thus a new, major differentiation between intellectual and political life was institutionalized.

The new relationship with the intellectuals had a variety of aspects:

1. Publicly praising intellectuals. Almost overnight, the officially recognized status of intellectuals was transformed. Instead of forming the bottom of society ("the stinky ninth category," *choulaojiu*), they were defined as the most important force in China's drive to achieve economic modernization, surpassing workers and peasants. They were described in glowing terms: creative, driven to excel, filled with a strong sense of responsibility, upholding the truth, animated by the spirit of exploration, and so on.
2. Redefining political loyalty. The prereform contract had required the intellectuals actively and explicitly to accept the official ideology of Marxism-Leninism and support the Communist Party. This requirement was loosened. Political loyalty was defined in much less demanding terms. Intellectuals could demonstrate political loyalty by just being patriotic, working hard, contributing their specialized knowledge, and avoiding public acts embarrassing the party.
3. Reducing time for political study. The prereform policy required intellectuals to devote significant amounts of time to political study and to understanding the party's policies. Deng Xiaoping wanted them to devote as much time to their work as possible. When China had a work week of six days, he required intellectuals to spend at least five days at work and only one day on policy study and meetings. "It is fine if they want to spend seven days a week at work [and no time on political study]," Deng said in 1983.
4. Rehabilitating intellectuals victimized in political campaigns. Those who were labeled *rightists* in the antirightist campaign in 1957 and as the "bourgeois counterrevolutionary academic authority" during the Cultural Revolution were delabeled. Many intellectuals who had been sent to the

countryside were called back and allowed to return to their old positions. Re-education schools were closed.

5. Deemphasizing the unity between intellectuals and the working class. College graduates no longer had to work with workers and peasants. They were assigned jobs directly related to their training immediately after their graduation. Conversely, the promotion of workers and peasants to professional and administrative positions was discontinued. Those already promoted were either sent back or retrained on the job.

6. Recruiting nonparty intellectuals to fill high positions. Before reform, almost all of the high-level positions in the government (vice minister and above) were filled by party members. Under reform, nonparty intellectuals and even former rightists were given high positions. One example was Wang Meng, an intellectual who was labeled a rightist during the antirightist campaign in 1957 and promoted to the post of minister of culture in the post-Mao era.

7. Professionalizing the party. Before 1978, among the more than 40 million party members, only 4 percent had a college education. The new policy is to recruit intellectuals into the party.

8. Dividing labor between the party and the expert. Along with the separation of power between the party and the state under reform, intellectuals were encouraged to take charge of technical matters in a work unit. The party secretary should not be the same person as the director of the enterprise, and the party secretary should not interfere with the work of the director.

9. Improving material benefits. Along with raising their political and social status, intellectuals were to be rewarded with more material benefits. These included higher wages, more subsidies, bonuses, better medical benefits, more job mobility, improved housing, better vacation benefits, and more retirement protection. This policy to some extent raised the intellectuals' income during reform.

10. Granting more intellectual freedom. Reform has seen a relaxation of media and communication control. Intellectuals have been invited to express their opinions in many talk shows on TV and radio. There has been a proliferation of printed materials under reform (newspapers, books, and magazines). Academic freedom has been enhanced as many academic disciplines banned before 1978, such as political science, sociology, and anthropology, were revived. Most basically, intellectuals, no longer required explicitly to adopt Marxism-Leninism, became much freer to develop their own political and intellectual views. In late 1998, for instance, without creating any significant stir, a Beijing University professor published a survey study of Western liberalism eruditely putting the liberalism of J. S. Mill and F.A. Hayek in an entirely favorable light.

11. Intellectuals acting as advisers. Intellectuals were also promised the opportunity to contribute to "scientific decision making". Intellectuals and scholars with specialized knowledge were to be consulted before an important decision was made. One example of this was the Economic

System Reform Institute of China, a think tank chaired by the then prime minister Zhao Ziyang and staffed by the best and the brightest young scholars. Although such a paternalistic and patron-client relationship between scholars and the state was common during imperial China, it was less visible under Mao. What is new under reform is the Western and scientific flavor of the return to this traditional practice.

Yet although the conditions in the old social contract have been adjusted and professional performance is much more important than during the Cultural Revolution, the bottom-line political requirement remains important. The state seeks a qualified intellectual autonomy, balancing intellectuals' desire for freedom with the state's demand for loyalty. It is true that intellectuals do not have to be actively involved in party politics, but neither are they supposed to challenge its power. The message seems to be that they should mind their own business. There have been a few times since 1978 when intellectuals crossed the line and challenged the political monopoly of the party, as they did in 1957. The party responded with the 1987 antibourgeois spiritual pollution campaign and the purges of many intellectuals after the 1989 crackdown on antigovernment protests.

### **Controversies about the Role of Intellectuals in Communist Societies**

With the emergence of this new contract between the state and the intellectuals, the distinction between establishment and nonestablishment intellectuals became important. After all, under Mao's contract, if the idea of an establishment intellectual was not an oxymoron, at the very least party members with higher education (i.e., establishment intellectuals) were rare. The new contract thus created new questions: How do establishment and nonestablishment intellectuals differ in their political attitudes? More specifically, how do they differ in terms of general satisfaction with the status quo, with promarket values, and with activism. The literature offers very different perspectives on this question.

One can reason that intellectuals outside the establishment enjoy fewer centrally allocated benefits, see themselves as educationally superior to party intellectuals, and so exhibit the bitterness syndrome (*xiao ren dang dao*) adduced above. Thus they would be more likely to support a fast transition away from central planning and the party's monopoly of power. Such a transition would provide them with those increases in authority and material benefits that they feel they deserve. Conversely, establishment intellectuals should be more satisfied with their life conditions and with the party-state. They should also be likely to support the status quo since any rapid change would weaken their privileged position. In Russia, for example, state subsidies for literary journals, writers, artists, filmmakers, and researchers were dramatically reduced during reform, which led to increasing frustration among Russian intelligentsia. This theory should be correct; after all, those with vested interests in the status

quo and thus resisting reform should be those in the political center. It is striking, therefore, that, in China today, this logic runs into difficulties, especially because the advantages enjoyed in post-Mao China by establishment intellectuals are small in comparison with those of most of nonestablishment intellectuals, and this small gap is likely to disappear altogether. Economic reform has provided more opportunities for improving one's livelihood outside the planning system and has reduced the ability of the center to maintain its relative advantage and keep up with the pace of income growth in society. If this is true, party intellectuals should be more dissatisfied with the status quo than nonparty intellectuals.

If, then, there is doubt about which group of intellectuals exhibits less general satisfaction with the status quo, it is also not clear which group is more in favor of the rise of the market. Establishment intellectuals may favor it as much, or almost as much, as nonestablishment intellectuals. Direct and indirect evidence suggests both kinds of intellectuals favor it more than nonintellectual members of the establishment. For instance, according to a 1991 survey carried out in the postsocialist societies of Bulgaria, East Germany, Hungary, Poland, Russia, Slovenia, Czechoslovakia, and Estonia, education reduced support for such socialist principles as egalitarianism, distribution of wealth based on need, and belief in the state as the prime vehicle of welfare benefits for everyone. This finding was stronger in postsocialist societies than in advanced capitalist states.

If intellectuals in postsocialist societies in general favor the market more than nonintellectuals, many factors affect differences in this regard between establishment and nonestablishment intellectuals. The latter are more likely to be the beneficiaries of free market reform because they are more competitive in the labor market, more likely to earn higher incomes, and have more job mobility under free competition. Therefore, they are expected to favor equality of opportunity and market competition. Whether establishment intellectuals favor promarket reform is less clear. On the one hand, they may share an understanding of the problems of central planning and have a competitive edge once put under the control of the "invisible hand." On the other hand, if they depend on the old system both politically and economically, any change will hurt their vested interests. In this case, party intellectuals, many of them party bureaucrats, are likely to hold a critical view of the market, similar to that held by bureaucrats.

At the same time, however, the promarket values of both kinds of intellectuals may be attenuated by a shift to postmaterialism. In the long run, with more education and (in most cases) better jobs and incomes, intellectuals may develop new, postmaterialist concerns with individual development and freedom of expression, thus becoming less interested in material advantages than nonintellectuals.

Apart from the questions of general satisfaction with the status quo and

attitudes toward the market, there is the issue of political activism. According to the modernization school, intellectuals in general throughout the developing world are expected to be politically more active than others in the society. Education leads to a stronger sense of political efficacy and a stronger desire to participate politically. Intellectuals also have more contact with the West and thus more understanding of the basic elements of a democratic system, such as free elections and checks and balances. They are also more likely to challenge the monopoly of power by the Communist Party.

Others, however, describe Chinese intellectuals as generally elitist and antidemocratic, as indicated by students' feeling of superiority and their refusal to associate themselves with workers and peasants in political movements. Another aspect of elitism is the desire of many Chinese intellectuals to be advisers or consultants for the establishment. Whether in imperial times or during the 1989 urban protests, they eagerly sought patrons among top leaders. Moreover, the remaining virtuocratic standards in bureaucratic recruitment should promote political loyalty and obedience among party intellectuals. This tendency ensures the continuity of the "incestuous relationship" between the state and intellectuals.

A third view is that Chinese intellectuals in general are unenthusiastic about democratization but that a small minority of Chinese party intellectuals are prodemocratic. Ding Xueliang, for instance, argues that the majority of Chinese intellectuals are not the driving force for democracy because most of them were trained by the old socialist system, which led to the current spread of neoauthoritarianism in intellectual circles and perhaps especially among intellectuals wanting to be advisers working for the establishment. The real hope for democracy, Ding holds, lies with "independent-minded official intellectuals" who have the institutional resources and quasi-autonomy needed to exert their influence and challenge the authority of the state. According to this view, then, one should expect establishment intellectuals to be more likely than nonestablishment intellectuals to challenge the power and authority of the state and the party. Ding implies that even a tiny minority can be extremely influential. Three hypotheses can be derived from the above discussion. Hypothesis 1 is that during the current stage of relations between the state and intellectuals, establishment intellectuals have become increasingly similar to nonestablishment intellectuals. With increasing educational credentials, technocratic orientations, and rising expectations similar to those of nonestablishment intellectuals, establishment intellectuals are now likely to be more dissatisfied with the status quo, to be more supportive of rapid reform, and to have more promarket and prodemocratic values. This hypothesis emphasizes the convergence of different intellectual groups under modernization, regardless of the institutional impact.

The remaining two hypotheses focus on the institutional impact on intellectual attitude. Hypothesis 2 is that establishment intellectuals, having been "bought

off" or co-opted by more benefits, feel threatened by the prospect of decreasing status under reform and thus will remain more satisfied with the old system and the status quo, less supportive of rapid reform, and less supportive of pro-market and pro-democratic values than non-establishment intellectuals. Conversely, non-establishment intellectuals will be more critical of the status quo and more committed to reform, especially because their superior education and inferior compensation provoke in them a traditional complaint that "mediocrities are blocking the road," keeping the higher positions out of the hands of the most talented and qualified. Hypothesis 3 is about the unintended positive impact of socialist institutions on establishment intellectuals. With an elitist outlook, control of resources, and experience in decision making, establishment intellectuals are expected to show more political activism than non-establishment intellectuals.

We conclude this informative section with the observation that quite clearly, the complexity involved in defining and exploring the role of public intellectuals in a socialist state is staggering compared to the rather simplistic analysis that Posner uses while making his questionable 100 list sitting in a country like the US. There is similar complexity, for different reasons though, for other countries in Asia like, India, Japan, Philippines and Thailand, where the prominence of public intellectuals needs to be contrasted from the number of TV appearances to their degree of involvement with grassroots activism.

## **The Power Intellectuals**

If state control acts as a barrier for critical public intellectuals to flourish in socialist states, is it obvious that access to public is readily available to intellectuals in liberal democracies? In different ways, this question was a source of constant informal debate between Hu Tao and myself at the ALFP2002. For example, how many intellectuals opposed to the imminent Iraq war have access to public in the United States today? In a Znet commentary of May 2001, Edward Herman and David Peterson are candid about this issue when they state "we can agree that the term public intellectual has become problematic, but not because intellectuals have disappeared as a result of being locked in the university. Rather, those we would call public intellectuals are simply not being given the chance to appear on the public stage. We believe that the source of the confusion lies in the failure to distinguish between intellectuals who have ACCESS to the public and those who SERVE the public. There is a strong inverse correlation between the two, which rests on the biased choices of the commercialized and concentrated mainstream media. This in turn reflects the preferences of the corporate community and political establishment."

An intellectual who has generous media access is often funded by the American Enterprise or Manhattan Institutes, Heritage Foundation, or the Hoover Institution, as in cases of neo-liberal and market propagators Dinesh D'Souza, the Thernstroms, Christina Hoff Sommers, Shelby Steele and Heather Mac

Donald. More generally, those who enjoy access can be relied on to say what the establishment wants said on the topics of the day--"civility," "political correctness," race, free trade, and "humanitarian intervention" and the civilizing mission of the United States and West. This characterizes the work of intellectuals such as Alan Wolfe, Charles Murray, Paul Krugman, Robert Kaplan, David Rieff and Michael Ignatieff, who have been relatively ubiquitous figures over the past decade, enjoying bylines, radio and television appearances, and favourable book reviews. Given their service to the powerful we categorize these preferred intellectuals as "power" rather than "public" intellectuals. It is a distinction that captures a crucial feature of the U.S. system of selective promotion or marginalization of intellectuals and their ideas throughout the public sphere. As Noam Chomsky once noted, "It is a system of no small degree of elegance, and effectiveness."

The term "public intellectuals" should therefore be reserved for those strong thinkers who lack access to the public precisely because they are independent and would speak effectively to that public's concerns. Their access is blocked, and their work and ideas are rendered invisible, by vested interests who control the flow of information to the public and are able to exclude from the print media and airwaves those who challenge their interests and preferred policies. That is, effective freedom of expression-- freedom of expression combined with outreach to large numbers--is limited to the "power intellectuals."

Public intellectuals are recognizable not only by their marginalization, they are also frequently subjected to harsh denigration and attack by the establishment's power intellectuals. As Voltaire noted back in the 18th century, with odes to the monarch "you will be well received. Enlighten men, and you will be crushed." Thus, when Rachel Carson published her *Silent Spring* in an extremely propitious environment for criticism of the chemical industry back in 1962--the ecological consequences of DDT were becoming hard to hide, and the thalidomide disaster had recently struck--and succeeded in reaching not only the *New Yorker* but a CBS News program that featured her message, she was furiously assailed by the industry and its academic appendages for "emotionalism" and alleged inaccuracy. Noam Chomsky affords the finest illustration of the public intellectual subjected to incessant and long-term derogation in an attempt to discredit and justify a refusal to allow him to participate in public debates. Power intellectuals can make the most egregious errors of fact and interpretation, their forecasts may be wildly off the mark, and they may be first class war criminals claiming status as intellectuals (and rank number one on Posner's list, as Henry Kissinger does), but this does not impair their ability to reach the public, as establishment good taste prevents mention of their failings. But in Chomsky's case, criticisms based on literal fabrications and misrepresentations about his work are repeated as a matter of course--and usually without any chance of rebuttal--when it is felt necessary to explain why such an "extremist" is denied access.

It is possible to move between the categories of public and power intellectual by a shift in viewpoint and funding source. David Horowitz, master of the "political correctness" and "left fascists" scares, moved from invisibility as a leftist to relative prominence as a Reagan-Gingrich Republican by such a shift. The role of power intellectuals fits nicely into the propaganda model, where the threat of independent experts as sources conflicting with official and corporate perspectives is shown to be alleviated by pushing forward dependent and friendly experts--i.e., power intellectuals--who preempt space that otherwise might be taken by genuinely independent analysts, i.e., public intellectuals. Nurturing and giving credentials to these power intellectuals, who will serve as front-line fighters against the public interest, is a main function of corporate interest. And one of the beauties of the system is the willingness of the corporate media to accept the experts from the corporate thinktanks as genuinely independent and presumably serving the public interest. This has been dramatically illustrated during the past several decades in the provision of experts on "terrorism" by the Center for Strategic and International Studies, Heritage Foundation, Rand Corporation, and other hugely biased, government linked institutions. The result has been a flow of experts into the media that provide an almost uniform echo of the official view on terrorism, with two thirds of the leading experts having been in government service and virtually all focusing on leftwing and insurgent terrorism (see Herman and O'Sullivan, The "Terrorism" Industry). The prominence of the New World Order power intellectuals in the last several decades fits the same pattern, and they have played an important role in putting contemporary imperialism in a friendly light while focusing on the crimes of its opponents and victims. Thus we have the optimists like Francis Fukuyama, featuring the triumph and spread of "liberal democracy" under the leadership of the United States. We have the pessimists like Robert Kaplan, focusing on a "coming anarchy" that is traced to a number of sources, but not corporate globalization, IMF-World Bank policy, or the effects of a colonial heritage and wars traceable in large measure to that heritage.

With newspapers, TV and other media agencies increasingly falling under the control of neo-liberal conservatives not only in the US but in other parts of the World too, including Asia, freedom to speech and expression are highly contested areas in the link between the public and the intellectual.

### **The Organic Grassroots Intellectual**

Largely because of this, we must go beyond the Academia and the Metro city to locate the more invisible intellectuals, who are not necessarily looking for media links to reach their public, but are physically going out to meet the public. In Asia particularly, they are an increasing component of resistance movements, alternate developmental practices, and rural professional support services. They are dreamers, practitioners and writers of a new politics, more in the Gandhian mode. They are not necessarily city elites who have opted to work directly with

people; an increasing number of them are the Gramscian Organic Intellectuals, coming from local areas but preferring to work in their own communities after receiving good education from best institutions. This is a strong component of public intellectuals, particularly in Asia.

It may not be a mere coincidence that institutions like the Nippon Foundation with its Asian Public Intellectual Program, the Japan Foundation and I-House with their Asia Leadership Program or a network like the Asian Regional Exchange for New Alternatives (ARENA) are active today in providing links and platforms for a resurgent Asian Public Intellectual fraternity. The strength of the grassroots movements in Asia is perhaps propelling such initiatives, just as the World Social Forum platform is getting the World's public and their intellectuals on a common platform. That Noam Chomsky is heard by a wildly cheering 20,000 crowd in the small city of Porto Alegre in Brazil, whereas he is shunned in his home country is an indication that people are there for the intellectuals to link up with, provided they are ready to adopt different methods of reaching out, beyond the book, the article and the TV appearance.

Just when everyone thought that the era of street level resistance ended with the anti-Vietnam war rallies, the anti-globalisation rallies, most dramatically visible at Seattle, Genoa, Nice and other places, where millions of people have demonstrated against the ill-effects of imperialist globalisation have instilled a new hope about the politics of dissent and resistance. The massive anti-war rallies that were held just before and during the morally and legally unjustified Iraq war has shown that the resistance movement is unlikely to be a flash in the pan.

But it is easy to resist, what are the alternatives people ask. The World Social Forum, a non-organisational platform of diversity and plurality with the slogan – 'Another World is Possible', has in recent years emerged as a serious meeting point of World's intellectuals and movements to carve out the alternatives. With three editions in the city of Porto Alegre in Brazil, and the fourth slated for January 2004 in Mumbai in India, and with a participation that crossed the 100,000 mark in WSF2003, the WSF has raised hopes regarding the globalisation of people, rather than of market economy and military. The 'new politics', based on diversity and plurality that is associated with the WSF is bound to change the notion of intellectual and political discourse, and one can feel hopeful today that the grass root and academic intellectual might find a common space to combine their efforts against an increasingly violent and repressive World order.

# TRANSNATIONAL CIVIL SOCIETY IN THE AGE OF GLOBALIZATION

by Sakamoto Yoshikazu

## Post-Cold War globalization

Today we are witnessing the extraordinarily accelerated dynamics of globalization unprecedented in history. Many people demonstrate an ambivalent response to globalization because it has intrinsic contradictions as I shall spell out below.

The main engines of globalization are the global marketization of the economy and the global advancement of science/technology. Unlike in the days of the Cold War when science and technology were put under the control of the states, particularly “the Superpowers”, science/technology in the post-Cold War world has been increasingly relegated to the logic of the globalized competitive market economy coupled with the globally dominant power of the United States, and this has led to a diminution in the power of other individual nation-states to exercise control over the forces of globalization.

Thus we can shed light on contemporary world order in terms of four dimensions— (1) the unipolar state system, (2) the market, (3) civil society, and (4) international organizations, including regional organizations. The traditional sovereign state system that has persisted for the last four centuries as the dominant and primary actor constituting world order (or world disorder) is now confronting these four competing systems, all of which go beyond the framework of individual nation-states.

Of the four, international organizations, such as the UN system or the EU, consist of so-called “sovereign states” and are constrained by the legacy of state sovereignty much more than the other three – that is, the US-centered unipolar system, the market and civil society that are undergoing globalization in their respective ways.

So, let me examine, first, the basic problems of global concern that are confronting us in the process of contemporary global transformation, and then the role assumed by these four categories of actors in relation to these global problems.

You may recall that most of us welcomed the end of the Cold War, because, as a consequence, the danger of global genocide, which was one form of globalization in those days – namely, war and annihilation on a global scale – receded. It was expected by the people of the West, particularly the Americans, that the end of the Cold War would bring about a unitary “New World Order”, which would treat the world as a single unit without fundamental global cleavages – the view illustrated by the “End of History” idea of Francis Fukuyama. But the very dynamics that has worked to build “one world” in that

sense has given birth to divisions and fragmentation globally, cutting across national borders. Further, the issue of global war/peace issue that had appeared to have diminished in importance as a result of the end of the Cold War resurged in a new form after 9/11.

Underlying these divisions and fragmentation are the problems of global concern which include, among others, (1) the problems of the globalized market economy, (2) global environmental degradation, and (3) the global effects of the advancement of science and technology.

Each of these problems involves (a) disparity and inequity that affect the disadvantaged, and (b) dehumanization and alienation that affect not only the disadvantaged people but also the advantaged. But I do not think I need to go into the detail of the problematic of globalization here.

### **The Agents of Democratic Control**

The next question we must address is "Who are the agents who can exercise control over these global problems to make the world more humane and democratic?"

In the age of modernity in the 19th and 20th centuries, it was primarily the individual nation-states that were expected to fulfill the task of overseeing the development of the national economy and science/technology; and for the nation-state to meet the legitimate human needs of the people, democracy on a national scale was called for. But, today, the nation-state, which has been the primary political framework of modernity, is being surpassed by the economic and scientific/technological power which in itself is the driving force and products of modernity.

Furthermore, it is not only the global development of the market economy and science/technology that has surpassed the nation-state system. It is also the state-system itself that is transforming the system of sovereign states into a unipolar global power structure headed by the world empire, the USA. Unlike the modern world history characterized by the plurality of imperialist big powers, we see today the emergence of a literally world empire unprecedented in history. The power of the US is of global reach, which is a form of globalization, especially in terms of military power projection. The military expenditure of the US takes 40% of the total world military expenditure. Its military power can reach anywhere in the world, with an unparalleled degree of destructive power and high tech precision, though far from perfect, as illustrated by "collateral damage", which is nothing but *dolus eventualis*, i.e. advertent negligence.

This military power of global reach is a product of the combination of its global superiority in the market economy and its global superiority in military science and technology. These two strands of superior power have given rise to the superior politico-military power of the US; and the dominance of this single global empire has transformed the traditional pluralist state-system based

on the principle of legally equal sovereignty.

On the other hand, the global *political legitimacy* of the American world empire is questioned in varying degrees by most nations in the world (except Tony Blair's Britain), because, contrary to the professed principle of this empire based on the *universal* validity of democracy, the people of non-American states have no democratic right to participate in the decision-making of the world empire. If the US is to be a democratic power of global reach, it must be inclusive in terms of the democratic rights of the people of the world. But it is precisely due to its imperial character that the US takes an exclusionary policy toward other nations and peoples of the world.

This is the problem of "unilateralism", which tends to disregard the crucial importance of multilateral consultation and participation. The crux of the matter is that the global power of the US is not exercised for the global interest of humankind, but for the "national" interest of the American empire, giving priority to "homeland security". Thus, the global unipolarity is not consolidating the unity of the world; on the contrary, its exclusionary unilateralism is deepening the division between the US and the rest of the world and the fragmentation of the non-US world.

The unilateralist global dominance of the US, therefore, has not provided a political framework that is adequate to cope with the global economic disparity and inequity, global environmental degradation, and the global dehumanizing effects of science and technology. In fact, it tends to aggravate these problems.

The question is, "where can we find the source of power that will counter the overwhelming negative impact of the market, science/technology, and the American dominance?"

Here we can direct our attention to another agent in modern history which has been struggling for the creation of a democratic, humane society of equality, dignity and freedom— namely, civil society.

## **Historical Background**

The modern idea of civil society was formulated in the latter half of the 18<sup>th</sup> century by the Scottish Enlightenment school (Adam Ferguson, Adam Smith, et al.) and was taken over by Hegel in his *Philosophy of Right*. By Hegel, civil society was systematically coupled with the market economy, and was virtually equated with what Marxists later called the "bourgeois society."

It was an age when the market and civil society were seeking to establish their autonomy from the mercantilist state; and the underlying idea was that, while the state embodied a closed system of violence and domination, civil society and the market represented an open system of free speech, free competition and free trade. The contradiction between the state, on the one hand, and civil society and the market, on the other, was emphasized. This was a reflection of

the emergence of “bourgeois civil society” as a new bearer of the liberation of “man and citizen” of the time, as illustrated in most rational terms by the original spirit of the French Revolution (though characterized by male dominance, as aptly pointed out by Mary Wollstonecraft). But that was as far as the commonalities between the principles of market and civil society went.

The fundamental contradiction between the market and civil society became unmistakably clear in the latter half of the 19<sup>th</sup> century, when a twofold division of society came to the fore; that is, (1) the division of capitalist society in terms of class conflict and (2) the division of the world in terms of imperialist powers vs. colonized peoples. This *uncivil*, often violent, conflict at home and abroad contributed to the demise of the concept of “civil society” in the mainstream of Western social and political thoughts.

Thus it was made abundantly clear by that time that the idea of civil society (which had been equated with “bourgeois civil society”) contains within itself a sharp contradiction, and having lost the inspiring power as a liberating vision of society, the idea went into oblivion.

In the course of the ending of the Cold War, however, the idea of civil society was unexpectedly revived by the dissident citizens in Eastern Europe in the redefined sense of the term, i.e. the agent of *political* democratization with practically no intrinsic association with the capitalist market economy.

But in the West, the collapse of state socialism through citizens’ struggle for political democracy was congratulated as the triumph of liberal democracy and market economy combined. (“market democracy”) Hence the well-known self-congratulatory conceptualization of the end of the Cold War as the “End of History”. As a critique of this thesis, I wrote in 1993 that this was not the End of History but the beginning of the history of open contradiction between the two ideological forces that had survived the Cold War -- that is, capitalist market economy, on the one hand, and democracy based on civil society, on the other.

To spell out what I mean, let me make further clarification of the two concepts and their relationship. I would summarize the commonalities and contradictions as follows:

### **Common features**

The capitalist market economy seeks autonomy from the state, limiting the role of the state to the maintenance of order necessary for keeping the market autonomous. Hence the liberalization and deregulation of the economy.

Civil society also seeks autonomy from the state, limiting the role of the state to the maintenance of order necessary for keeping civil society autonomous. Hence the democratization of the state and society.

To the extent both the market and civil society seek to create and consolidate

the space autonomous from the state, they are oriented to de(trans-)nationalization and demilitarization. To the extent free trade, reciprocal investment, horizontal division of labor, and economic interdependence (not dependency) are enhanced, and to the extent civil society and political democracy are strengthened as the basis of diplomatic interactions, the incidence of inter-state armed conflict will decrease. This much is the commonality of the two, beyond which the two part company.

## Contradictions

The fundamental contradiction between the two lies in the fact that, while the market refers to the *commodification* of social relations, civil society is oriented to the *humanization* of social relations.

Incidentally, we can say in a similar vein that the state is based on the *nationalization* (including militarization) of social relations.

The market determines the value of human beings in functional terms (e.g. skill, merits, achievement, etc.) and treats human beings as instruments and commodities, that is, labor and consumers whose values are measurable or even quantifiable in terms of productivity and efficiency which, in turn, are measurable in monetary terms. What counts is what you *have* and you *can do*, not who you *are*. In the market, although not all saleable goods are good, goods that are not saleable are no good.

In other words, productivity, efficiency, and money, all refer to *instrumental values* based on the system of the exchange of private interests, which Hegel called "the system of wants." The power of the capitalist market, however compelling it may be, is rooted in the egotistic motive for profit-making, treating human beings and nature essentially as means.

The market, being the system of instrumental values, it is small wonder that, despite the presentation in today's world, especially in the United States, of the free competitive market as if it were a good in itself, very few people will be willing to die for the defense of the market economy!

Put conversely, it is natural that the market of overriding power of commodification should aggravate the problem of dehumanization, alienation and the identity crisis of human beings in every society and also the degradation of the environment which is an aspect of dehumanization. The market as a systemic force that undermines human identity cannot be the focus of ultimate human self-fulfillment or self-realization.

In contrast, civil society refers to democratic social relations based on the mutual recognition of the dignity and equal rights of human beings as ends in themselves. It is grounded in the commitment to humanized end values such as dignity, equality, equity, freedom, and social justice.

Further, two points may be noted. (1) civil society refers to public space, not the system of private interests; and (2) while the market is conceived as an ahistorical “natural order” guided by the “invisible hand” which is also an ahistorical entity, civil society constitutes the historical process through which the meaning of civil society is constantly redefined by civil society itself in accordance with the changing context of human conditions – i.e. historical reflexivity.

This definition is not a product of an *a priori*, ahistorical, or arm-chair exercise. It corresponds to the historic re-emergence and re-definition of the idea of civil society achieved in the course of the citizens’ struggle for democratization in the former “Eastern Europe” such as Poland (and also in some Latin American and Asian countries) in the 1980s.

It was essentially a rejection by leading intellectuals and active citizens of the legitimacy of the oppressive authoritarian political system.

It is a “civil (citizens’) revolution” aimed at the creation and reinforcement of a political civil society, -- a democratic revolution that has three characteristics:

(1) A crystallization of people’s power resulting from the *autonomous* decisions and actions of an innumerable number of seemingly powerless citizens.

(2) An *unpredictability* in the sense that no one, not even the citizens themselves who become the agents of change, can predict when and in what way the apparently inconsequential dissenting opinion and actions of citizens will reach a critical mass to generate an enormous power for change.

(3) Once the *avalanche* of change begins, a new civil leadership secures a “transformational hegemony” through non-violence, “hegemony” meaning political leadership that stems from the moral credibility of the agent of change. This non-violent change takes place where dissidents have already formed under the old regime the *nucleus of a nascent civil society*.

This is the form a democratic revolution through the democratization movement from below took in the late 20th century and will take in the 21st century. This is in sharp contrast to the Marxist-Leninist revolution that provided the model of global social change since the Bolshevik Revolution in 1917 – a revolution without civil society as its foundation or nucleus.

Present Czech President, Vaclav Havel, wrote in an underground article in 1979 when the Communists were still in power that the source of “the power of the powerless” lies in “living within the truth” by rejecting the official lies and hypocrisy of the State. Havel’s remark brings to mind Mahatma Gandhi’s word, “the power of truth (satyagraha).” These are the manifestation of the fact that, in the final analysis, civil society centers on end values, not instrumental values as is the case of the market.

So far I have argued that there are, in principle, fundamental contradictions (1) between the state and civil society, and (2) between the market and civil society.

This is true of the conflict within a state. But these contradictions have become all the more conspicuous and profound when the dominance of the US and that of the capitalist market economy are globalized, exercising enormous power over individual states, particularly the developing countries, as well as civil society in today's world.

If the present structural trend toward widening disparity and deepening marginalization continues, in terms of both political and economic power, it would not be surprising if the marginalized people, feeling indignation at the increasing inequity and inequality and driven by a deep despair toward the future, were to one day erupt into violent action which would spread across national boundaries.

This kind of revolt would not be limited to democratic popular resistance; violent exclusionist actions directed to other races, ethnic and religious groups, together with fascist direct action or fundamentalist terrorism, are also there. I wrote in 1998 that these violent revolts would lead to a "new form of World War" in the 21st century, cutting across national boundaries. The terrorist attacks on 9/11 turned out to be a case in point.

### **Structural roots of terrorism**

Many have singled out poverty as the main cause of terrorism. In my view, however, terrorism is the product of a combination of oppressive political and social structures, of which poverty is a component, and the corresponding political and social consciousness of being oppressed. These oppressive structures in today's world have three dimensions.

Firstly, the global political and military dominance of the United States and its allies and the dominance of global capital have given rise to global disparity and oppression. Secondly, and related to this, there are national/internal structures of disparity and oppression, most notably in many developing countries. Thirdly, there is the transnational structure of inequity and discrimination faced by an enormous number of people (legal and illegal immigrants, migrant workers, refugees) who move to relatively more "advanced" countries in an effort to escape from the dual pressures of global and internal domination.

The world we live in today constitutes a huge pyramid characterized by inhumane disparity and oppression. As information dissemination is globalized and the disadvantaged people become increasingly aware of the global inequities and inequalities, it is natural that a growing number of the marginalized should harbor anger and resentment.

Although I envisaged a new form of World War of the 21<sup>st</sup> century, the inhumanity of the 9/11 terrorist attacks went beyond anything I had ever imagined. At the same time, I felt quite uncomfortable when I heard someone characterize the terror as a "challenge against civilization" or a "war against

civilized society." Of course, it is antithetical to civilization.

But we must ask simultaneously: What do we mean by "civilization"? Does our "civilization" not rest upon the global structure of inequity and oppression which we ignore so long as it does not harm our vested interests?

Of the many observers and media people in Japan, and particularly in the US, who have commented on terrorism, few people (that I know of) have tackled it as part of our own problem, i.e. as intrinsic to our way of life called "civilization". Rather, they have treated terrorism as the subject of analysis and policy making, or as the object of military campaign. I have yet to see an account of the causes of terrorism that refers to *our own* mindset and the modality of our "civilization". This is what has made me deeply uncomfortable.

President Bush said in his Congressional address, "Americans are asking, why do they hate us? ... They hate our freedoms – our freedom of religion, our freedom of speech, our freedom to vote and assemble and disagree with each other."

I was astounded by this remark, and wondered if he truly believed that his statement would prove convincing to the other peoples of the world.

There are a number of people, particularly in the developing countries, who do not accept the means used by terrorists but find their objective and intent understandable. These people are critical of America because, while the US may firmly protect freedom, human rights, and democracy for itself, America has collaborated in the murder and the silencing of those in the developing countries who fought against their oppressive, corrupt regimes in pursuit of freedom, human rights, and democracy. Further, America's "global standard" is seen as having widened the gap between rich and poor and eroded the "freedom to disagree" with America in defense of one's own cultural values.

I must admit that, as far as its continued emulation of American "civilization" is concerned, the Japanese mindset is equally problematic.

## **The backlash from South to North**

It is often said that the terrorists have taken advantage of the democratic freedom of the North for their anti-democratic purposes. Although that is not wrong, terrorism should be considered a manifestation of the much deeper structural backlash underway on four dimensions.

Firstly, there has been the counter-flow of large numbers of immigrants and refugees from South to North, reversing the historical trend of ruling officials and labor force moving from the metropolises to the colonies. By settling in the countries in the North these people, while confronting discriminatory, repressive practices, are altering the character of the national identity and *national* culture of the recipient countries.

Secondly, a backlash can be seen in the development of nuclear weapons by the nations in the South. Twenty years ago, I invited an African friend, for whom I have great respect, to a conference held in Japan. He argued, "It is only when we

have developed nuclear weapons that we can get the First World to take seriously the poverty in the Third World and the enormous North-South disparity." When I criticized him for making this kind of inhumane remark at a conference where A-bomb survivors were present, he refused to retract his statement. I also pointed out, "It is unrealistic to assume that the nuclear weapons of the South will be targeted only on the North, and it will amount to the self-denial of the justice of the South if these weapons are directed against other nations in the South." Yet, the point he made has continued to stick in my mind.

Thirdly, the backlash can take the form of terrorism using biological, chemical or nuclear weapons, which would involve a large number of civilian casualties in the North – undeniably the worst and most dreaded type of protest. Naturally, I loathe the idea of such inhumane, demonic slaughter of innocents. At the same time, I cannot help but also remember the words of despair my African friend uttered.

Finally, the world information and communication order dominated by the mass media of the North, such as CNN, BBC, AP, and Reuters, has been challenged by the recent moves in the South intended to disseminate internationally information compiled from the perspective of global peripheries, mostly using internet networks. The most dramatic example of this kind of backlash was a series of interviews with Osama bin Laden disseminated by the Qatari satellite television, Al Jazeera. The fact that the Bush administration attempted in vain to suppress the telecast, in violation of the very principle of the "freedom of speech and press" it professedly espouses, illustrates the backlash of the free information flow, now from South to North.

The backlash on these four dimensions all speak of actions meant to render visible to the society and civilization of the North the very existence of the peoples of the South who have tended to be forgotten by the North. In this sense, the world is entering a phase of South-North backlash. Do the societies in the North respond to this challenge by closing themselves off or by making themselves open to it? This is one of the fundamental questions raised by the "roots of terrorism".

## **Agents of Democratic Global Transformation**

Given the legitimacy of action to redress the inequality and injustice inherent in the present world political and economic pyramid, and given the illegitimacy of terrorism as a means to achieve this end, we must address the following two questions: (1) What should be done to mitigate global disparity and maximize equality and equity on a global scale? (2) Who should be the agents of this change by non-violent means?

(1) Measures to be taken globally to regulate global capital will include: an

appropriate global capital tax to check the inordinate growth in global economic disparity and inequity – a tax on massive foreign exchange currency speculation (the so-called “Tobin tax”); taxation and legal restrictions to halt and reverse environmental degradation; and international restrictions for abolishing child labor and other forms of excessively low waged labor exploitation. It must be noted that the right to taxation has been the integral part of the sovereignty of the state.

Given the fact that present day capital acts globally, regional (Asian) regulatory response will have certain limits. Yet, a number of measures are feasible. They will include: the establishment of a regional Asian monetary fund for responding without delay to a currency crisis and preventing a currency speculation spillover from one country to other countries in East Asia; the adoption of a currency basket system in line with the conditions of respective countries that will include not only the US dollar, but also the Euro and the yen and other currencies in the region to reduce the adverse effects of foreign exchange fluctuations linked solely to the US dollar; the monitoring and regulation of short-term speculative foreign capital (the “Chile formula”); and mutual humanitarian aid, particularly aid from Japan, for the protection of the socio-economically marginalized people who suffer from the shortage of food and medical supplies, economic hardship due to structural unemployment, and so forth.

In this connection, I should like to make one point clear. In my view, one of the reasons why the global market and global capital are able to exert such a strong influence on our lives concerns the fact that they possess the means to create wealth with a high degree of efficiency through the rationalization of the exploration and utilization of the world’s resources.

It would, therefore, be a mistake to reject this entirely and fall back into “state capitalism” or “state socialism”. The issue here is not the outright rejection of the globalization of the market, but how to regulate it to minimize its negative effects from the perspective of civil society-based public values. And since such regulation solely at the national level is not effective, the issue of how to establish international public regulation needs to be considered.

Similarly, to counter American unilateralist political/military dominance, it is necessary to strengthen regional organizations in various parts of the world, particularly in Asia, to make the world more pluralist. Regionalization has been underway in Europe, in North America, and a large part of South America. Except for ASEAN, East Asia and South Asia remain virtually unorganized in terms of multilateral regional frameworks.

At the same time, it must be noted that inter-state cooperation as such is not the most essential issue because regional organizations may be another way of preserving and protecting the common interests of the privileged elite groups in the region. More generally, the privileged people in a country have the resources and know-how to act beyond national boundaries under the banner

of “internationalism” much ahead of the disadvantaged and marginalized people who often tend to stick to nationalist protectionism.

We must, therefore, bear in mind whose cooperation for whose interest is referred to when we talk about the promotion of “international cooperation,” whether regional or global.

The task of the citizens in (East) Asia in terms of regional cooperation, therefore, is to promote such interstate cooperation that is based on democratic accountability to civil society – namely, cooperative relations that are based on the recognition of the following six conditions of the contemporary world.

(1) Restraint of the American empire and the regulation of global capital cannot be achieved by any single “sovereign state”. Interstate cooperation is indispensable.

(2) Interstate cooperation will not ensure the protection and promotion of the rights and interests of the people, particularly the disadvantaged, unless the states are under the effective democratic control of civil society which is sufficiently powerful to counteract the impact of the privileged global and national power structure.

(3) For civil society to counter the global power structure, civil society has to, and in fact does, transnationalize itself, providing the state with a transnational foundation for a democratic inter-state cooperation.

(4) Civil society, including transnational civil society has no formal institutional mechanism of its own to exert effective and authoritative influence over the global political and economic power structure. Therefore, it must exercise democratic popular control mainly through the instrumentality of the state machinery.

(5) It is on the basis of an association or a union of democratic states that public values such as equity, justice, social welfare and human rights can be put into effect to counter the global power structure.

(6) At the same time, it must be emphasized that transnational civil society is gaining power at a remarkable pace in the rapidly interconnected contemporary world, as illustrated by the innumerable networks of NGOs. They represent in various ways “the power of the powerless”, raising a voice to make the world more democratic and humane. In fact, they reflect the significant post-modern reality of the 21st century that, while the mobilizing power of modern organizations such as political parties and labor unions is declining, the number of NGOs and the active citizen participation in their activities is dramatically increasing worldwide, dealing with global issues, such as poverty, ecological decay, peace, and human rights, from the perspective of “anti-globalization”.

### **Toward a “Regional Union”**

Of course, in advocating the building of a regional community in Asia, I am aware that the experience of the more advanced case, i.e. the European Union, cannot

be mechanically replicated in East Asia. But no one can deny that we live in a world where the myth of “national self-determination” based on the principle of “one nation, one state” is no longer tenable and every state is bound to be multi-ethnic and multi-cultural. The failure to recognize this reality leads to the horror of ethnic cleansing and genocide.

Against this background, two points may be noted. First, it is likely that one of the major actors in the world politics of the 21st century will be what I would call a “regional union.”

Although some of the existing states will continue to disintegrate into smaller “ethno-national states,” these smaller “ethno-national states” will be bound either to join or form a larger “regional union” once they have attained a degree of formal “independence”.

Second, in terms of the internal structure, it is civil society which is transnationalizing itself that lays the solid foundation of the regional union – transnationalizing itself internally, across the boundaries of ethnic groups within the nation-state, and transnationalizing itself externally, across the boundaries of nation-states – as in the case of the EU.

By saying so, I am not romanticizing Western Europe. But it must be noted that the West European democracies, although they are obviously far from ideal, recognize the legitimacy of the principle of civil society and provide institutional guarantees to the self-transformative activities of concerned citizens.

### **The Future of (East) Asia**

The question for us concerns what regional union, or its embryonic framework “regional association,” we can envisage in (East) Asia based on transnational civil society.

In reality, Asia is a region of enormous diversity or even heterogeneity, in terms of civilizational backgrounds, the colonial experience and the legacies and wounds it left on the state and society of Asia, which include even the modern imperialist rule of an Asian state, Japan – a fact which does not apply to Africa or Latin America. The structure of developmental disparities is also diverse.

This heterogeneity can give rise to two opposite scenarios. On the one hand, Asia in the 21<sup>st</sup> century may be in the state of Balkanization. What happened in Sri Lanka, Indonesia, Afghanistan, etc. may be an indication of this danger. Further, the emerging belt of actual and potential military nuclearization, extending from the Korean peninsula, China, India, Pakistan, Iran, Iraq, to Israel, coupled with the scramble of the major powers and multinationals for the oil deposit in the Caspian region in Central Asia, testifies to the danger of the Balkanization of Asia.

On the other hand, if Asian people succeed in achieving the coexistence and cooperation of the states and nations characterized by diversity and heterogeneity, Asia may serve as a promoter of the dialogue among the diverse

civilizations of the world. As far as East Asia is concerned, the civilizational cleavage may not be unmanageable and the economic interdependence based on horizontal division of labor and intra-regional trade has been growing.

But, again, we must ask, "Whose community, for whom?"

In the light of what I have emphasized above, it should be clear that an East Asian regional framework will be democratically accountable to the people only when it is an association of democratic states founded on a civil society which is transnationalizing itself across the boundaries of nations and ethnic groups, at home and abroad.

Obviously, this is not an easy task. But to counteract the two major dangers, i.e. the dominance of global marketization and the Balkanized political fragmentation of the region, it is essential to create an association of democratic states based on the empowerment of transnational civil society.

### **Multi-layer and Hybrid Identity**

We live at the historic moment when, in order to tackle pressing global problems, it is imperative to go beyond the system of national loyalty and national identity. This by no means will dismiss the importance of national and subnational ethnic and local communities and cultures. In fact, we are entering the world of "overlapping communities of fate", namely, a system of multi-layer identities.

But to cope with the problems of global concern, we must be willing to give priority to the identification with an international and supra-national community of fate, whether global or regional.

This would imply that there are two channels for transcending national sovereignty to tackle global problems from a supra-national point of view.

One is to build an inter-state consensus through governmental coordination of national interests with a view to creating a supra-national world or regional organization based on multilateral consultation and coordination.

The other is to activate civil society in support of transnational cooperation and solidarity. This is to foster a new human identity which dictates, for instance, as NGOs such as M\_decins sans Fronti\_re espouse, that citizens have not only the right but also the duty to go across national borders for extending humanitarian assistance, interfering in a non-military, non-violent manner with the domestic affairs of a state that commits massive violation of the human rights of its own people. This would also apply to the poverty and hunger that are localized but call for the universal, principled concern of those whose interests and lives are not directly affected by these problems.

In short, one way is to transcend the national loyalty and identity at the top of sovereign states, and the other is to transcend the national identity at the bottom of sovereign states through the transnationalization of civil society. To

resolve global problems through the reinforcement of *democratic* governance, it is imperative to transform the system of identity from below.

It is no wonder that, in the last decade, the United Nations, which used to be jealous of its character as an “*intergovernmental* organization”, has been increasingly emphasizing and relying on the role played by civil society and NGOs.

Finally, to promote this process of a regional or transnational community building, it is necessary to make an inward re-examination and make ourselves aware of the fact that there is no pure national identity (no pure Chinese, Indian, Vietnamese, Japanese). What we all have is “hybrid identity”.

I think you have heard of Japan's history textbook issue. The Japanese right-wing nationalists have been compiling history textbooks with a view to whitewashing all wrongdoings committed by the Japanese in terms of colonial domination and wars of aggression, and to making school kids deceptively proud of the sanctity of Japanese traditional values. The fundamental intellectual deficiency of this rightist interpretation of history stems from their assertion as if there were pure Japanese and things purely Japanese.

In reality, what is called “the Japaneseness and the Japanese national tradition and values” are a hybrid of Korean culture, Chinese culture, Indian culture, Persian culture, and even Hellenistic cultures which came to Japan via the silk-road across the Eurasian continent, in addition to some pre-existing local cultures that were also hybrid.

To acknowledge the hybrid character of Japanese national-cultural identity is an important step for the Japanese toward treating Koreans, Chinese, Indians, and so forth, not as the “other” but as a cultural component which is also present inside Japan and inside the Japanese mind as an integral part of “Japanese identity”.

This point, in my view, has a crucial bearing on the role of “public intellectuals”. Intellectuals are those people who are characterized by intellectual hybrid identity. You have absorbed Western scholarship, values of other Asian cultures, as well as what you consider your indigenous traditions. This refers to the formative process through which an intellectual acquires and deepens self-reflexivity to be intrinsic to oneself and to transcend oneself at the same time. This gives birth to an intellectual perspective antithetical to exclusionary fundamentalism and ethnocentrism.

It is on these grounds that I trust that public intellectuals like you do foster the capacity and assume the responsibility to play a leading role in creating and strengthening a civil society transnationally, both at the regional and global levels.

## ENDPIECE

### Violence, Terror and Public Intellectuals

by Reiko Kinoshita

In November of 2002, my two-month intensive experience of great interest, as a Japan fellow for the "Asia Leadership Fellowship Program", chosen by the International House of Japan and the Japan Foundation Asia Center came to an end, sadly. I and four other fellows from the Asian region were given lectures especially prepared for us by intellectuals of Japan on a wide variety of issues. We went on stimulating and exciting field trips to meet activists and thinkers working on a variety of issues, and were provided opportunities to freely exchange our thoughts on anything under the earth, on a twenty-four hours basis. What more could one ask for?

Of course, it was an opportune occasion for me to think about Japan. By listening to the other fellows' remarks intently and delving into the meaning of these remarks, my mind was trying to fathom the kind of role many expect Japan to play in a diverse Asia. Without the constraints of professional duties, it was a refreshing experience to ponder over such enormous issues so freely, and state my opinions in the midst of so many counter opinions. I have never spent my time amidst such a luxury of free opinions. Every day I would remind myself how grateful I was for all this.

To be true, I was initially skeptical about this program, since what it was seeking was not very clear. No, actually more than that! It might be that I had not foreseen such a benevolent opportunity, promoted by a set of Japanese institutions, of providing a person with space to grow intellectually. As days went by, I became engrossed in the program. It was so much fun that I couldn't wait for the next day.

However, not everything went smoothly.

It was when the first discussion amongst the fellows began. From the start, there was a premonition, akin to a sense of wonder among the five of us that the discussion might end up on a rocky surface. The theme for ALFP2002 was "The Role of public Intellectuals". To begin with, the definition of "Public Intellectuals" led to some discordant notes. Each of us had to acknowledge "differences" in our respective understandings. Our discussion on the definition kept going around in circles and was unable to move forward - it went on and on.

In the session's few remaining moments, we finally reached a "compromise". By accepting all the differing definitions, each of us would make our own arguments. It was a simple conclusion. However, we learned a lesson that even seasoned and confident people from various countries need mutual

understanding and earnest cooperation from one another in order to move a discussion on, and to reach a satisfactory conclusion, based on a respect for plurality for views.

That is to say, we were reminded of the importance of "a way with words".

### **The World after September 11, 2001**

How could a group of intellectuals meeting in September 2002 remain immune from the earth shattering events of September 2001?

Has the world changed since September 11th?

Such a hypothesis sprang up in our debates repeatedly. I think it "did change". To be sure, a definitive statement like that may contain some exaggeration. It is impossible for everything in the world to change in one day. But such a shocking event sometimes possesses a potential to change the context of everything, in a flash.

The multiple terrorist' attacks of September 11, 2001, were certainly events of such magnitude. For better or worse, the biggest concern for nations since 9/11 has been to position themselves in 'war against terror'.

And in 2003, we as active members of the international community have been mostly coerced into cooperating for the "Operation Iraqi Freedom (the Iraq War)", led by the United States government, without understanding its real intentions.

What needed clarity, I think, was whether we should have defined the devastating events on September 11, 2001, as acts of "war" or something else? In the world of international politics, the threshold of "war" is defined as "a military personnel death toll exceeding 1,000". In the case of the multiple terrorist attacks on America, the victims were civilians and not combatants. Nevertheless, the death toll exceeded 3,000.

And, the perpetrators seemed to have thought out the strategies meticulously. It could be argued that they were like military strategies. Thus, if to administer force as a means to compel someone to do what we exactly desire is a definition of 'war' as some political scientists call it, then the incidents of September 11 were undoubtedly acts of 'war'.

By defining those incidents as acts of 'war', more than a few countries expressed their willingness to cooperate in the 'international community's war against terror'. Britain, Spain, the Philippines and Japan were among them. To view America with its overwhelming military might as an 'imperialist state' has been gaining ground. Indeed, it is unrealistic to discuss today's world politics without

reference to where America is going. However, it would be extreme to say that the world is controlled by America or America rules the world. That would not be very different from the views of American 'neo-conservatives', whose arguments are similarly simplistic and extreme.

The 'neo-conservatives' believe that all the problems of the world can be solved with America's overwhelmingly strong military might. They say one should not hesitate to use military force in fighting against terrorism. They think that the rest of the world will have to follow, as long as America takes the lead. The intensity of 'criticism of America', which has greatly surfaced after September 11 may stem from a reaction to such views.

The critics have argued, "The September 11 terror sprang from America's world strategy. Terrorists were born because the U.S. has become a powerful and arrogant nation. It has attempted to impose the American way on the rest of the world as the right way, and acted unilaterally. Besides, America itself had long supported terrorist-like activities. Don't make a great fuss just because terror has now started coming your way".

I think that the international community's will is definitely the most important aspect in this discussion. In the November of 2002, the United Nations Security Council voted on 'Resolution 1441', and resumed the inspections in order to disarm Iraq of weapons of mass destruction. However, when the United States said that it was dissatisfied with the inspections and would move towards use of military force, France, Germany and Russia objected. In other words, both the US and the World were reminded of the reality that the otherwise traditional supporters of the US differed with it, and they were not simply North Korea or Iran!

Thus the post 9/11 community of nations has become more complex.

### **The Role of Public Intellectuals**

One Japanese man said during the 2003 Iraq War:

'Bush and Saddam Hussein should have a one-to-one match, as leaders of the O.K. Corral. No one else should be involved. The one that falls first shall retreat upon defeat'. Certainly, it would have been easier if today's international community's rules were like the Old West's 'rules of justice'. But, the real global community's rules are diverse, complicated and confusing.

Can the Public Intellectuals play a role that can clarify the fuzz? Because, I think, such a role is imperative.

In the case of Japan, the concept of 'Public Intellectual' has not progressed sufficiently so far. Even the conception and definition of the 'elite' has been used

in a limited sense, especially after World War II.

What kind of "Public Intellectual" would be expected of Japan in the post 9/11 world?

1. A public intellectual as an individual who can exist in all kinds of communities, understands the meaning of democracy properly, can act independently in accordance with information and knowledge about domestic and international issues, and is generous and enthusiastic about efforts to speak and act to the limits of his/her capacities.
2. A public intellectual as an individual who makes a living out of what s/he loves to do, engages without comparing oneself to others, and is willing to contribute positively to communities based on his/her level of confidence.
3. A public intellectual as an individual who has the intellectual curiosity to understand the Japanese history accurately, is able to discuss a variety of political, economic and social issues in a composed manner with people inside and outside Japan, by means of the person's mother tongue or a common language (foreign languages including English), and possesses the "a way with words" in its true meaning.

For example, in terms of making a career out of what one loves to do, let's remember the Japanese professional baseball players active in the U.S. Major League and those who went to participate in the European soccer clubs to test their abilities. As role models who realized their dreams, they are likely to appeal to the future generations in Japan more than anything else. Just by choosing something we love most, or are best at, as our career, our devotion, we can give back a lot to the society. Utilizing the "a way with words", we can reciprocate our society by sharing our experiences, answering questions and expressing how one may act as a member of that society.

## **Democracy and Us**

In an attempt to foster public intellectuals, we must build a structure to deepen the understanding of democracy in Japan once again.

Such efforts have been made in the past. In particular, the two volumes of textbook material titled "Democracy" were produced in 1948. It was something the Ministry of Education asked Japanese intellectuals to write, following discussions with American officials at the GHQ. While the writers and the contents were creations of Japanese thoughts by residents in Japan, the material had global points of views.

But why 'Democracy' now, one might wonder. This is because the 'idea of democracy to stabilize the society by valuing individuals' is necessary today, more than ever.

Let us take a look at countries around the world.

Roughly, they can be put in to three groups:

\*Nations where democracy and the market economy has matured (Most of the U.S. allies belong here)

\*Nations in which the democratization and modernization are developing, and the market economy is still evolving (China, Russia, India, Pakistan, Indonesia and so on belong here).

\*Nations in which democratization and modernization has failed for the time being, and the social order is less than stable (The likes of Afghanistan belong here).

A condition in which countries from these three groups can go beyond their boundaries and form "alliances" has emerged. The fact that Pakistan and the U.S. cooperated in the "war against terror" is a case in point. At that time, did either of them put democratic ideas to work? Did they think of such ideas by asking, 'Would taking this action value individuals?', or 'For what purpose should we take this action?'

The basis of democracy is the respect for a human being as an individual. An individual is a unit for all social activities, abilities are better used by valuing individuals. Even when the market economy functions well, people might fall victim to self-indulgence, whereby they feel that nothing matters as long as they're all right. We learned this sufficiently from the attitudes of various countries in suppressing the number of people infected with SARS, which swept the Asian region in 2003 like a dashing tiger.

I do not mean to say that anyone can be a public intellectual. However, possibilities will grow infinitely in that direction if an active model of democracy becomes pervasive. Japan seems stagnant.

But, it is not a bad idea to remember that the Japanese public intellectuals over half a century ago did try to leave "democracy" in a written form to the future generations, like us.

If we improve on the 'way with words', we may not have such a long way to go. Yes, I did understand a bit about 'way of words' at the ALFP2002.

## Profiles of the ALFP 2002 Fellows

### **Hu, Tao** (China)

Director of Environmental Economics Program, Policy Research Center for Environment & Economy, State Environmental Protection Administration (SEPA) of China

*Proposed Research Topic: Trade and Environment: Toward Sustainable Development*



Dr. Hu is one of the pioneers in China in environmental economics as a methodology of environmental policy. As a senior research fellow of the Policy Research Center for Environment & Economy of China's State Environmental Protection Administration, he often works as policy advisor or project consultant for international organizations and bilateral cooperation organizations, as well as national ministries. He is an expert in analyzing trade and environmental issues and rural environmental policy, and is experienced in Europe and America as well as in ASEAN countries. He has also been active in writing environmental reports and essays and expressing his views on hot environmental topics through appearances on TV and radio programs.

### **Vinod Raina** (India)

Vice President, All India People's Science Network;  
National Secretary, Bharat Gyan Vigyan Samiti (BGVS)

*Proposed Research Topic: Environmental Security & Debt in a Globalised World*



Dr. Raina received a PhD in Physics from Delhi University. He has been one of the key leaders of the NGO literacy movement in India and co-founded one of the most extensive networks of school education, non-formal education, and literacy, Eklavya / BGVS. Although he retains his interest in science, he has also made in-depth studies of the environment, education and development, being the chief editor of a book based on a study of ten Asian countries, *The Dispossessed: Victims of Development in Asia*, published by ARENA, Hong Kong. He is highly esteemed not only among NGOs but also among government leaders.

### **Maznah Binti Mohamad** (Malaysia)

Associate Professor in Development Studies, School of Social Sciences, Universiti Sains Malaysia

*Proposed Research Topic: The Human Rights Question: Nation-States and Cultural Communities*



Dr. Maznah specializes in Development Studies, with a focus on social development policies and political change. Her recent studies have been on Islam, human rights and democracy. She writes regularly for a public-interest newsletter, *The Aliran Monthly*, and tries to provide an unencumbered, if not alternative analysis of the current Malaysian political situation. She has also been active in women's organizations that promote the causes of gender equality, feminism and women's rights against physical and structural violence. She once held the 2001 Visiting Chair in ASEAN Studies at the Munk Centre for International Studies, University of Toronto, Canada.

**Nguyen, Thi Hieu Thien** (Vietnam)

Vice-Dean, English Department, Ho Chi Minh City University of Education

*Proposed Research Topic: Education in Viet Nam: New Strategies*

After receiving her BA in electronics engineering from the Odessa University of Technology in the former USSR, Ms. Nguyen was involved in Russian language education in the 1980s. She later earned an MA in TESOL at the University of Canberra and has become a noted expert in American literature in Vietnam, with her broad knowledge of American culture and extensive reading of American literary works as well as research on U.S. multicultural literature. As vice-dean of the English Department and Head of the American Studies Program of the Ho Chi Minh City University of Education, one of the three major universities of education in Vietnam, she has contributed to the introduction of a number of important reforms in administration, in curriculum development, and in cooperation with other educational institutions both at home and abroad.



**Kinoshita, Reiko** (Japan)

Journalist; Member of Board of Directors, International Women's Media Foundation (IWWMF)

*Proposed Research Topic: Responsibility and Challenges of the Japanese Electronic Media, Promoting Theater Democracy*

Since the 1990s, Ms. Kinoshita has been conducting research and reporting under the theme of "Power Missing in Japan," resulting in the publication of 4 books: *Influential*, *The Prize*, *The Club*, and *American Bubble*. As Visiting Fellow of the Edwin O. Reischauer Center for East Asian Studies at the Paul H. Nitze School of Advanced International Studies (SAIS), Johns Hopkins University, in Washington, D.C., she focused her research on the reconstruction of U.S.-Japan relations and contributed to analysis and discourse among American university students on the subject. At IWWMF in Washington, D.C., she plays a unique role as the sole Board member representing the Asia/Pacific region, working on the development of a network of women journalists active in that region, Africa, the Americas, and Europe.

